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This dissertation traces the emergence of transnational political institutions among 
Arabophone Ottoman emigrants living in New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires, and 
analyzes the development of a long-distance nationalist politics among emigrant activists during 
and after World War I. Using socially-produced primary materials written and circulated by 
Syrian and Lebanese emigrants themselves, this research argues that emigrants living abroad 
played fundamental roles in the nascence of competing Arab, Syrian, and Lebanese nationalist 
movements. From the Americas, these activists were the first to envision a post-Ottoman 
political future for the homeland which placed Syria (or Lebanon, established in 1920) within the 
international community of nation states. The pursuit of nation-building led many of these 
activists to pursue partnership with the Entente Powers, particularly France and the United States 
of America. The partnerships formed between Syrian emigrants and the Great Powers influenced 
the politics of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and helped to usher in the French Mandate 
declared over Syria and Lebanon in 1920. But as the French instituted an increasingly 
imperialistic state over the Levant, sizable emigrant communities in the Americas presented a 
constant source of dissent, agitation against French rule, and support for an increasingly radical 
nationalist movement. By tracing nationalist politics and activism across transnational space, this 
study labors towards a needed reframing of modern Syrian and Lebanese history within the 
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION  
 
This dissertation is in conformity with the Translation/Transliteration Standards laid out by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).1 Diacritics have been added to technical 
terms in Arabic (and translations provided in parentheses where appropriate) but are omitted 
from proper names, places, and words included on IJMES’s common word list (although both 
ʿayn and hamza are preserved in this case).2 
All translations from Arabic, French, Spanish, and Portuguese are my own, and I take full 




                                                          
1 The journal’s transliteration table for rendering Arabic and Persian words into the Latin script is available at 
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/ijmes/docs/TransChart.pdf. (accessed 26 March 2014). 
2 This list is available at http://web.gc.cuny.edu/ijmes/docs/WordList.pdf (accessed 26 March 2014).  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Archives   
LERC   Lebanese Emigration Research Center 
AUB   American University of Beirut 
IHRC   Immigration History Research Center 
NARA   National Archives and Records Administration 
AANM  Arab American National Museum 
 
Frequently Used Arabic Terms 
mahjar literally “place of emigration;” refers to the Syrian and Lebanese 
diaspora, particularly the communities in the Americas. 
Mashriq refers to the eastern Mediterranean lands now comprising Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and parts of Jordan (historical bilad al-
sham) 
muhājirīn  emigrants 
jāliyya/jālliyāt “colony,” “community.” Term used by Syrian and Lebanese 
emigrants to refer to a specific settlement in the diaspora. Used by 
emigrants as a cognate to colonia in Spanish, colonia in 
Portuguese, and colony in English. 
nahḍa literally “renewal” or “renaissance;” refers simultaneously to the 
flowering of liberal political ideas in the late nineteenth century 
eastern Mediterranean and the continuing influence of 
constitutionalist, progressive, and reformist ideas from the late 
Ottoman period into the early twentieth century. 
simsār broker, agent. Refers to individuals who assisted emigrants in 






INTRODUCTION: MAKING NATIONS, IN THE MAHJAR: SYRIAN AND LEBANESE 
LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISMS BETWEEN NEW YORK, SÃO PAULO, AND 
BUENOS AIRES 
 
 Between 1880 and 1914, one third of a million Ottoman subjects left greater Syria and 
boarded steamships headed for the New World. Originating from Mount Lebanon, small towns in 
western Syria, and the suburbs of cities like Homs, Aleppo, and Damascus, these Ottoman 
Syrians represented between 18 and 25 percent of the Mashriq’s entire population.3 Many of the 
emigrants [al-muhajirin in Arabic] began by moving to the city, swelling the populations of 
Damascus and especially Beirut in the late nineteenth century.4 By the 1880s, masses of people 
stopped not at the coast but headed for Beirut’s expanding seaport, congregating on steam ships 
bound for the Atlantic and into the mahjar [literally lands of emigration, sometimes translated as 
diaspora]. Then, after a trying month-long journey across choppy Atlantic waters, often in a 
third-class compartment, these Ottoman subjects arrived in New York City, Buenos Aires, or São 
Paulo, hoping to join other their compatriots in ethnic communities already developing in all 
three cities.  But first, the muhajirin would face the immigration officials charged with 
determining their national origins, and as it turned out, these officials were often at a loss for how 
to categorize Ottoman immigrants. In New York City, they were usually (but not exclusively) 
                                                          
3 The Mashriq refers to historical bilad al-sham, or the greater Syrian territory comprising modern Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Israel, and parts of Jordan. The emigration figures are Charles Issawi’s, and refer to the rates of emigration 
from greater Syria (18%) and from Mount Lebanon (25%) respectively. Although tracking statistical rates of 
emigration between 1880-1914 is a tricky matter (owing not only to the preponderance of clandestine migration as 
well as significant rates of return migration but also to the politicization of population accounting immediately 
following World War I), Issawi’s figures are generally accepted by historians working on the Syrian and Lebanese 
diaspora. Charles Issawi, “The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration, 1800-1914,” in Albert Hourani and 
Nadim Shehadi, eds., Lebanese in the World: a Century of Emigration (London: I.B. Taurus and Centre for 
Lebanese Studies, 1992), 31. 
4 Leila Tarazi Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth-Century Beirut (Cambridge: Harvard  University Press, 
1983), 58-60; Jens Hanssen, Fin de Siècle Beirut: the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).  
11 
 
called “turks,” originating from “Turkey in Asia.”5 In Brazil and Argentina, they were called 
“turcos,” a catch-all pejorative term used by nativists to refer to Arab, Armenian, Persian, 
Egyptian, and Kurdish immigrants.6 Rarely were Ottoman immigrants from Syria called 
“Syrians” as such, and the reason for this was simple: they had left their homes as subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire. They would not “become Syrian” until later, and they did so in America.7 
Before World War I, Ottoman immigrants from Syria were rarely distinguished from 
other Ottoman groups when they arrived in the Americas: Armenians, Sephardic Jews, and 
Turkish speaking Muslims. When Arabophone Ottoman immigrants were classified as “Syrians” 
in the Americas, furthermore, the term denoted a geographical place of origin, and not a 
nationality or political identifier. This all changed during World War I. As the Ottoman Empire 
entered the conflict on the German side, the ugliest facets of war came to Syria: disease, 
conscription, military rule, and a devastating famine which claimed the lives of another 18 
percent of Mount Lebanon’s population.8 In the Americas, Ottoman Syrian emigrants watched 
the horrifying turn of events back home and responded with relief drives, diplomatic appeals to 
the Entents Powers to “Save the Near East,”9 and political activism with an increasingly 
nationalist bent aimed at ending Ottoman control over the Mashriq and the creation of 
independent nation states there instead. Nationalists operating in the mahjar disagreed with one 
another on questions of means as well as on what the new nations in the Mashriq should look 
                                                          
5 Sarah Gualtieri, Between Arab and White: Race and Ethnicity in the Syrian American Diaspora (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009), 77. 
6 John Tofik Karam, Another Arabesque: Syrian-Lebanese Ethnicity in Newliberal Brazil (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2007), 26; Jeffrey Lesser, Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle 
for Ethnicity in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 58. 
7 Akram Fouad Khater, “Becoming 'Syrian' in America: a Global Geography of Ethnicity and Nation,” in Diaspora: 
A Journal of Transnational Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 299. 
8 Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and 
Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 23. 
9 Abraham Rihbany, America Save the Near East (Boston: Beacon Press, 1918). 
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like, but they all reached out “behind the seas” (wara’ al-bihar) to political partners in Ottoman 
Syria as well as to foreign powers to achieve their goals. New political and social expectations 
were placed on the shoulders of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants, framed specifically within the 
pathos of citizenship and national duty. Activists and intellectuals disseminated and refined these 
ideas during the World War, coming to distinctive, at times competing, visions of what 
comprised the Syrian and Lebanese nations, who belonged to them, on what basis, and what role 
emigrants would play in sponsoring national development in the homeland. This represented a 
significant break with the past: emigrants who had left the Ottoman Empire and identified as 
Ottoman subjects before the War began to describe themselves as “Syrian,” “Lebanese,” or 
“Arab” during the War, bearing important consequences for their relationship to their homeland. 
This dissertation queries the emergence of long-distance nationalist politics and culture in 
the American mahjar, with particular attention to the development of Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalists among Ottoman emigrants living in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina during 
and after World War I. Taken together, the chapters within make four principle arguments. First, I 
argue that before the War, Syrian Ottoman emigrants constructed a series of transnational social 
institutions that contributed to the emergence of a mahjari public sphere.10 Through the press, 
philanthropic organizations, political committees, ethnic clubs, and mutual aid societies, the 
emigrant communities in New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires made not only maintained 
enduring contacts with Syrians in the homeland but also with other communities in the mahjar. 
Second, I argue that during World War I, transnational linkages between the Syrian communities 
in the Americas became significant sites for competing nationalist political parties, and that as a 
result, long-distance variants of Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalisms emerged in the mahjar. 
                                                          
10 Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010), 36-48. 
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One of the most important legacies of emigrant participation in the nationalist movements during 
the War was a growing reliance of Syrianists and Lebanists on the French Foreign Ministry as 
the guarantor of the homeland’s independence; after the War, France would claim its Mandate 
over both Syria and Lebanon, with the support of key activists working abroad.  
Third, I argue that as French Mandatory states emerged in the Mashriq during the 1920s, 
they hastened to extend their administrative authority over Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living 
abroad through a combination of population policies, documentary regimes, and the extension of 
its consular infrastructure into Syrian and Lebanese communities abroad. In the mahjar, both 
supporters and opponents of the Mandate made claims on the homeland as a transnational 
citizenry. Finally, I examine the culture of Syrian long-distance nationalism during the 1920s, 
arguing that the virtues of transnational good citizenship and patriotism assigned very different 
(if complementary) roles for emigrant men and women. A familial pattern of nationalism 
emerged that focused on reforming Syrian emigrant men and women for the benefit for 
producing a Syrian national culture in the mahjar. The pursuit of a nationalist cultural “ideal” led 
young emigrant men into political fraternities, homosocial spaces where a rigorous schedule of 
philanthropic, intellectual, and physical self-improvement promised to make them Syrian men. 
But women activists experienced this new trend very differently, particularly woman textile 
workers who after participating in relief efforts and other campaigns led by the Syrian and 
Lebanese nationalist parties of the mahjar during the War, became the subject of discussion 
among these same nationalists soon after. A new disjuncture emerged between the patriotic 
femininity of WWI-era Syrian “national mothers” and the more overtly feminist aims of Syrian 
“new women” in the 1920s. 
Ottoman, Syrian, Lebanese, or Arab: Issues of Definition 
In the mahjar, national self-identifications remained situational and unstable, referring to 
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a messy mixture of an individual’s class background, confessional orientation, political 
sensibilities as well as identification with a national entity that had yet to formally exist.11 The 
emigrants that arrived in the Americas before 1918 did so as subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
Before the War, some identified as “Syrian” to distinguish their largely Christian identity from 
the Muslim associations of the word “Turk.”12 In Between Arab and White, Sarah Gualtieri 
argues that the development of a Syrian ethnic identity in the United States in the early twentieth 
century was a transnational process depending simultaneously on the intellectual wellspring of 
the Lebanese nahda and the desire to parlay an Arab Christian identity into a racial “whiteness” 
intelligible to the American legal system. She argues that what constitutes the “ethnic” or the 
“national” in diasporic spaces is really a question of analytical orientation and referents: if these 
discourses are in reference to the immigrant community’s “place” in relation to the U.S. state 
historians refer to Syrian “ethnicity,” but when the same ideas refer to a homeland they become 
patriotic, or in Gualtieri's usage, “protonationalist.”13 Akram Khater argues in “Becoming 
‘Syrian’ in America” that the experience of emigration influenced the emergence of “Syrian” 
political identity; after an arduous trans-Atlantic journey, these migrants identified as “Syrian” 
for the first time at the ports of the Americas, part of an inclusion strategy in a situation where 
being a “Turk” posed problems. The marker “Syrian” referred to a fluid political identity made 
                                                          
11 The Arab nationalist kingdom under Faysal’s Hashimite monarchy formally proclaimed itself in March 1920; it 
was later extinguished by the French in July 1920. France formally established the state of Greater Lebanon (Grand 
Liban) on 1 September 1920, and administered Syria as five separate statelets: Damascus, Aleppo, and the alawite 
State (established in 1920), and Jabal Druze and Alexandretta (established in 1921). The statelets were integrated 
into a “Syrian federation” under French Mandate in 1922. Although the French administered them separately (with 
varying degrees of success), Syrians participated in local revolts and insurgencies thatg often crossed the borders 
between them, borders which Syrian and Arab nationalists charged were entirely artificial.   
12 Gualtieri, Between Arab and White, 60-1. This strategy is clearly seen in Rev. Bishara’s 1914 book, The Origin of 
the Modern Syrian, a text addressed to the American public with the aim of demonstrating Syria’s “Christian 
Semitic” and “Aryan” roots as a means of promoting the immigrant community’s access to U.S. citizenship. Kalil A 
Bishara, The Origin of the Modern Syrian (New York: al-Hoda Printing Press, 1914).  
13 Gualtieri, Between Arab and White, 82. For more on the connection between ethnicity and national identity, see 
Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta and Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The 
Invention of Ethnicity: a Perspective from the U.S.A.,” Journal of American Ethnic History 12, no. 1 (1992), 3-41. 
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simultaneously in the American and Middle Eastern contexts. As Akram Khater argues, Ottoman 
emigrants “became Syrian” in the Americas, and what being a Syrian meant remained highly 
situational before during, and even after World War I.14 There were also significant non-political 
motivations for an emigrant’s preference for one term over another. In Brazil in the 1920s, to be 
Syrian or Lebanese was a marker of an immigrants degree of economic success; a common joke 
had it that “Turks are poor, Syrians middling, and Lebanese rich” [turco pobre, sírio remediado, 
libanês rico].15 
Although individual Ottoman emigrants identified themselves variously depending on a 
complex amalgam of political, confessional, or economic motivations, to identify as “Syrian,” 
“Lebanese,” “Arab,” or “Ottoman” during World War I was to identify with one of the mahjar’s 
competing nationalist movements. And these floating signifiers also changed over time, 
reflecting the changing sympathies and objectives of their respective movements. Although even 
the Ottoman states referred to residents of Mount Lebanon as “Lebanese” before 1914, after the 
War’s beginning an emigrant’s self-identification as “Lebanese” abroad increasingly connoted 
not only support for the creation of a new “greater Lebanese” state distinct from its Syrian 
hinterland but also support for France as the guarantor of this would-be territory. To further 
complicate things, an emigrant activist’s professed nationality often did not coincide with the 
national territories which emerged in the Mashriq after 1920. To illustrate this point: emigrant 
journalists Naʿum Mukarzil, Sallum Mukarzil, and Amin al-Rihani all came from the same 
village in Mount Lebanon (Freike); they were colleagues who travelled together and even 
collaborated politically during the War. Naʿum Mukarzil identified as Lebanese as early as 1914 
                                                          
14Khater, “Becoming 'Syrian' in America,” 304-5. 
15 Mintaha Alcuri Campos, Turco Pobre, Sírio Remediado, Libanês Rico: Trajetória do Imigrante Libanês no 
Espirito Santo (Vitória: Instituto Jones dos Santos Neves, 1987), 21. 
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and became a significant voice for Francophile Maronite nationalism in New York. His brother 
Sallum, however, never identified as Lebanese, preferring “Syrian” or “Syrian American.”16 
Complicating matters further, Amin al-Rihani called himself “Syrian Lebanese”  a transnational 
terminology used frequently by emigrants after 1920 as a catchall term for the immigrants in the 
mahjar but which was also used pointedly as a means of critiquing the divisive role nationalists 
politics had played in these same communities.17  
National identity is always complicated, situational, and historically contingent, but what 
made it particularly so in the mahjar was the homeland’s experience of World War I, the waning 
of Ottoman sovereignty, and the pressing questions about what sort of political order would 
follow: who would rule the Mashriq? Within what borders? On what terms? The League of 
Nation’s imposition of a French Mandate over the territory (excluding Palestine, which was 
awarded to the British), and France’s establishment of greater Lebanon and the federated states 
of Syria created new lines on the map, but these lines did not accurately reflect the wishes of 
many emigrant activists, nor those of the people living in Syria and Lebanon. For the historian, 
the disjuncture between the emigrant’s territorial origins and their professed national identity 
presents an immediate issue of categorization. What does one call these emigrants, and how to 
distinguish between them?  
This dissertation attempts to stay faithful to the multiplicity of ways that long-distance 
nationalists self-identified. I refer to the activists in this thesis as “Syrian,” “Lebanese,” or 
                                                          
16 This choice is particularly clear when Sallum Mukarzil wrote his brother’s biography. In a text called al-Kitab al-
Lubnani, Sallum Mukarzil writes the history of Naʿum’s political committee, the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-
Lubnaniyya, but refers to himself as Syrian. Sallum Mukarzil, al-Kitab al-Lubnani, xi. 
17 Rihani used the term not only a critic of religious and nationalist particularisms among competing groups of 
nationalists; his ideas arose out of a distinct humanism that self-consciously sought to blend “Eastern” civilizations 
with “Western” ones; see Ameen Rihani, Extremism and Reform, 56-7. The term “Syrian Lebanese” was a common 
one in Brazil and Argentina as well. See John Karam, Another Arabesque: Syrian-Lebanese Ethnicity in Neoliberal 
Brazil (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 99; Also, Gildas Brégain, "Discours et Pratiques Politiques 
des Intellectuels,” in Syriens et Libanais d'Amérique du Sud, 1918-1945 (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2008), 183. 
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“Arab” in conformity with their own preferred identities, with the caveat that my usages of this 
terminology signifies an individual’s position within a nationalist political movement rather than 
in relation to a national territory, a national territory which emerged after their departure and 
which (in several cases) they never returned to. Where possible, I have also included 
biographical information for each activist, including geographical origins. I do so in recognition 
of the manner in which most of the activists, intellectuals, and journalists included herein arrived 
in the Americas as Ottoman subjects and identified as such; they “became Syrian” (or Lebanese, 
or Arab) while abroad,18 developing new nationalist politics that cast them in a new political 
relationship with their homeland as well in into new patterns of conflict or cooperation with one 
another in the mahjar. 
Whatever its variant, diasporic nationalism was a significant part of the intellectual life of 
Syrian communities in the Americas from World War I through the 1920s. In the Syrian 
“colonies” abroad (as emigrants called them, al-jaliyyat in Arabic, colonia in Spanish and 
Portuguese), men’s political discussions in cafes, reading rooms, and over political newspapers 
revolved around the tensions between competing nationalist movements. In textile mills, 
philanthropic circles, and in private homes, emigrant women engaged the same nationalist 
debates, from a distinct (and as shall be seen, a more skeptical, critical) perspective. For Syrian 
emigrant working women, especially the younger generation raised in the America, long-distance 
nationalism offered paternalism in place of political progress. The paternalistic imagery of the 
nationalists alienated many Syrian women activists, generating tensions within the Syrian 
American community. But whatever the tension between emigrant nationalist movements, they 
rested on a common set of assumptions: that as citizens abroad, emigrants in the mahjar bore 
                                                          




responsibility for the homeland’s political, economic, and social progress after the War. This 
sense of patriotic responsibility drove emigrant activists into a distinctively long-distance 
nationalist mode of political action which bore consequences for Syria and Lebanon as they 
emerged in the 1920s. But what is “long-distance nationalism”? How did emigrant activists use it 
to reclaim and redefine their Ottoman homeland? How did it influence emigrant interactions with 
the state? And what could nationalism offer its transnational citizens, as men and women?  
Long-distance Nationalism: Nationalism across Transnational Spaces 
  
 This dissertation places Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab activists living in New York City, 
São Paulo, and Buenos Aires within a single transnational field as a means of tracing the 
development of long-distance nationalism between them. As major ports of entry for Ottoman 
immigrants to the Americas, the “Syrian colonies” in New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos 
Aires were the largest Syrian communities outside the Middle East in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, and the proliferation of newspapers, mutual aid societies, and major 
Syrian and Lebanese employers in all three cities facilitated the continuous circulation of goods, 
people, and ideas between these communities and the Mashriq. Although scholars have used the 
term transnationalism to describe an expansive array of historical processes, my usage of the 
term is intentionally limited to “the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link 
together their country of origin and their country of settlement” as laid out by Schiller et al. 
Within transnational social fields, she argues, 
“transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, 
economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span 
borders. (They) take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, 
and develop identities within social networks that connect them to 
two or more societies simultaneously.”19 
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The term emerged to describe the sociopolitical position of “transmigrants” between two or more 
nation-states, and it invokes the hybrid consciousness of migrant populations as well as the 
political and economic complications (and opportunities) they face when dealing with the 
conflicting governmental agendas of the territorial states they travel across.20 As a mode of 
inquiry, transnationalism provides a valuable counterpoint to the Area Studies “container model” 
popularized by the Chicago School in the 1960s, which framed social histories within the history 
of nations. The Area Studies model began with a territorially defined space and pursued 
questions about its people as categorized in larger regional “zones” which Nina Schiller and 
Andrea Wimmer famously argued contributed to the naturalization of the nation-state and its 
borders. “Methodological nationalism” was particularly problematic in studies of the Third 
World, where the Area Studies model became most hegemonic during the Cold War but where 
national borders were often a particularly recent phenomenon.21  
Transnational analysis offers a means of framing historical narratives according to 
indigenous social categories. Rather than imposing a top-down territorial model which relegates 
migrant populations to the margins, a transnational framework places them at the center of a 
space defined by their organic lived experience, however far afield. Transnationalism prompts 
historians to upend older assumptions about human migration – that societies are generally 
                                                          
20 Schiller et al. prefer the term transmigrants because it refers specifically to the positionality of migrating 
populations between societies and avoids “placing” them in relation to either the homeland or host society. For this 
thesis, however, I will use either migrants (to refer to the mobility of the populations under discussion), or emigrants 
(when referencing the connections that migrants have with the homeland). I avoid the term immigrants where 
possible because it places migrants in sole relationship with the land of adoption. More than simple semantics, the 
Arabic terms for Syrian and Lebanese migrants, al-muhajirin or sometimes al-mughtaribin, invoke connections to 
the Mashriq and cannot be translated as “immigrants.” It also bears noting that the migration experience also 
changed how Syrian emigrants spoke about al-mutakhalifin, or “those left behind” (in the homeland). 
21 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Socials Sciences,” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301-3. 
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sedentary, that nations are territorially bound, that migration is a linear process brought on by 
extraordinary events of crises, and that new immigrants naturally assimilate into their new host 
societies. The Syrian and Lebanese mahjar comprised such a transnational geography, held 
together by peripatetic patterns of migration and flows of money, philanthropic assistance, and 
political activism. At the same time, it bears noting that the transnationalism of the Syrian and 
Lebanese mahjar was neither about “transcending” the political logic of the nation-state system 
nor a conscious attempt to do so. Rather, living a transnational life was about operating within 
several distinct national contexts at once, often times with all of the ambiguities, ambivalence, 
and alienations that come with that.22 In the Syrian and Lebanese mahjar, however, living a 
transnational life at a moment when new nation-states were literally being constructed in the 
homeland afforded emigrants certain political opportunities (as well as pitfalls); they participated 
in the construction, invention, and “imagination” of new national societies through a politics that 
Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron termed “long-distance nationalism.” 
 Long-distance nationalism refers to a “claim to membership in a political community that 
stretches beyond the territorial borders of the homeland” which “generates an emotional 
attachment that is strong enough to compel people to political action that ranges from displaying 
a home country flag to deciding to return to fight and die in a land they may never have seen.”23 
It is simultaneously a claim of belonging across transnational space and a claim made within the 
                                                          
22 One of the central critiques of Schiller et al.’s thesis about migrant transnationalism has been that if historians 
pursue migrant agency through informal migration networks they might lose sight of the state and its power over 
such networks. For a discussion of how “transmigrants” work between states (and cannot “transcend” them), see 
Donna Gabaccia, “Introduction: Review Symposium, Cultures in Contact,” in International Review of Social 
History 49 (2004): 479. 
23 Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Eugene Fouron, Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and 
the Search for Home (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 4. See also Nina Glick Schiller and Georges E. 
Fouron, “The Generation of Identity: Redefining the Second Generation within a Transnational Social Field,” in 
Peggy Levitt and Mary C. Waters, eds, The Changing Face of Home: the Transnational Lives of the Second 
Generation (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 193. 
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framework of the nation-state system; emigrants are, in other words, expressing themselves and 
acting as citizens of a state regardless of whether they live within a designated national territory. 
Their agenda was never one of “transcendence” over the nation-state order nor 
“deterritorialization” of the state itself. Rather, in Syrian and Lebanese long-distance 
nationalism, the discourse that emigrants “belonged” to the homeland was invoked strategically 
(and simultaneously) by emigrant activists, lay notables in Syria and Lebanon, clergymen, and 
even by the French mandatory state. Long-distance nationalist politics entwined Syria and its 
mahjar into a shared politics of transnational connection. 
For nationalists abroad, connection with and reclamation of the homeland became the 
dominant political motif, whether the act of reclamation referred to liberation from the Ottoman 
Empire (during World War I), Lebanon’s separation from the greater Syrian hinterland (for 
Lebanese nationalists), or the reconquest and emancipation of Syria from French imperialism 
(for Syrian and Arab nationalists). At odds as these competing nationalist tendencies were, they 
shared a common telos of national reclamation and reconnection between homeland and mahjar 
in a participatory politics that demanded political action, activism, petitioning, and provisioning 
from Syrian and Lebanese emigrants. Reattaching mahjar to Mashriq cast the emigrants within a 
web of social responsibilities and political obligations. Social discourses of obligation, duty, and 
honor drove the development of political parties, philanthropic groups, and transnational social 
institutions designed specifically to nurture connections between the Mashriq and the mahjar. 
For long distance nationalists, this transnational social field – Syria and its “colonies” abroad – 
comprised an organic (if not territorially contiguous) political geography capable of achieving 
Syrian and Lebanese independence. 
 As a mode of politics that reconnects Syria and Lebanon with their emigrants, long-
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distance nationalism is best thought of as a strategy (one among many) in service to the project 
of nation-building. It, like transnationalism, does not imply a transcendence over the importance 
of the nation-state or a decline in its importance. Rather, long-distance nationalism is a politics in 
service to the larger project of the nation-state: to identify a national territory and national 
community, regardless of domicile. What long-distance nationalism accomplishes that classical 
treatments of nationalism do not is to deterritorialize a national society. The state remains a 
territorial entity that serves, embraces, legislates, and disciplines a national body that extends 
beyond its borders; it is a “trans-border state” that reaches out and selectively claims its 
emigrants living abroad, calling them settlers, sojourners, or colonists but always invoking their 
continued loyalties to and duties towards the homeland.24 
 Long-distance nationalism was not unique to the Syrian mahjar; it was a common mode 
of politics shared by sending states associated with the mass migrations of the late nineteenth 
century. In the mass migrations that peaked between 1860 and 1914, Syrian migrants bound for 
the Americans moved amongst larger flows of Italians, Irish, German, and Jewish workers; upon 
arrival, they encountered large settlements of Chinese immigrants as well. The literatures of each 
of these diasporas illustrates the politics of long-distance nationalism at work: the prominent 
personalities of both the Italian Risorgimento and the irredentist movement that followed it, for 
example, depended on networks of contact, political and fiscal support from the Italian 
diaspora.25 Similarly, German national identity changed over time with the influence of “the 
Heimat abroad” and the lived experiences of German Americans,26 Irish “St. Patricks Day” 
                                                          
24Schiller and Fouron, Georges Woke Up Laughing, 10-2. 
25Donna Gabaccia, Italy's Many Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Samuel L. Bayly, 
Immigrants in the Land of Promise: Italians in Buenos Aires and New York City, 1870-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
26 Tobias Brinkman, “Jew, Germans or Americans? German-Jewish Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century America,” in 
The Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness, ed. Krista O’Donnel et al. (Ann Arbor: University of 
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traditions were born in Irish neighborhoods in Boston and New York,27 and historians widely 
credit the Chinese Revolution of 1912 to the transnational participation and leadership of the 
Chinese diaspora under Sun Yat Sen, himself living in Hawaiʿi.28 
 Merging a transnational unit of analysis with a focus on long-distance nationalism 
captures the degree to which the Syrian and Lebanese mahjar continued to participate in the 
intellectual life, philanthropic efforts, activism and political culture of the homeland. Indeed, the 
ongoing patterns of circular migration, engagement in political discourse, and the persistence of 
transnational networks of finance, employment, commerce, and personal contact demonstrates 
that the mahjar was less a permanent “place of emigration” and resettlement than a suburb to the 
Mashriq. Emigrants were not exiles; they remained a significant part of Syrian and Lebanese 
political society, making claims on the French Mandate state, and framing themselves as a 
transnational citizenry abroad (a phenomenon Rainer Baubock terms “substantive citizenship,” 
see below). 
Mahjar studies, a quickly growing subfield in Syrian and Lebanese social history, is 
making inquiries into precisely this degree of social coherence. The first major wave of studies 
on the mahjar began with Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi’s Lebanese in the World and 
sought to compare the experiences of Syrians and Lebanese living in the Americas with those in 
Europe, Africa, and Australia. The degree to which histories of “Syrians everywhere”29 
                                                          
27Conzen, Kathleen N, David Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George Pozetta, and Rudolph Vecoli, “The Invention of 
Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A,” Journal of American Ethnic History 12 (1992): 3-41. 
28Adam McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaiʿi, 1900-1936 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 89-92; Clarence Glick, Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants 
in Hawaiʿi (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980). One complicating factor in this comparison is that in 
the Irish, Chinese, and German cases, some iteration of the nation-state existed in the homeland already, where in 
the Syrian-Lebanese case, the nation-state formula was emerging. The Italian case can serve an ample 
comparison in this regard; on Italian emigrant participation in the Italian Resorgimento, see Donna Gabaccia, 
“Making Italians at Home and Abroad,” in Italy’s Many Diasporas, 35-57. 
29 My reference to “Syrians everywhere” is an adaptation of a decade long project headed by Donna Gabaccia to 
document the lives of “Italians Everywhere,” formally called Italian Workers of the World. Seeking to “query the 
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resembled one another has since pushed social historians towards more rigorous attempts at 
connection.30 What networks of influence held the mahjar together? Can these networks explain 
political change in the mahjar or its homeland? The goal of this line of inquiry is to end the 
emigrants’ marginalization from Syrian and Lebanese social history and create an historical 
narrative that places human geographies (rather than territorial borders) at the forefront. The 
subfield’s adoption of a transnational framework has yielded a recent wealth of histories where 
emigrants are anything but marginal.  
 Springing from Akram Khater’s observation of the “experience of simultaneity between 
(histories of Syrians) near and far,” this dissertation labors toward establishing connections. 31  It 
goes about this goal in three dimensions. Like other work in mahjar studies, this thesis places the 
Mashriq and its diaspora into a single analytic field, demonstrating how emigrants influenced the 
homeland (the first dimension), and how the homeland influenced the diaspora (the second 
dimension). Additionally, however, I build the claim that peripatetic movements of people, 
goods, and ideas between the Syrian communities in New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos 
Aires constituted a significant third dimension of transnational connection. Links between 
Syrians abroad were every bit as politically and culturally productive as the mahjar’s contact 
                                                          
tyranny of the national in the discipline of history” through a collaborative project documenting Italian lives lived in 
the diaspora, the project ultimately yielded findings on the Italian diaspora’s significance in supporting, participating 
in, and even contesting the nineteenth century Italian Risorgimento. On “Italians Everywhere,” see Donna Gabaccia, 
“Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, and the Immigrant Paradigm of United States History,” in Journal of 
American History 86, no. 3 (1999), 1116-7. 
30 Foremost among comparative studies is Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi, eds. Lebanese in the World: a 
Century of Emigration (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I.B. Taurus, 1992). The move from comparative 
histories of diaspora towards connective ones conforms to broader trends in migration studies. See, for example, the 
International Review of Social History Review Symposium issue on Dirk Hoerder's text Cultures in Contact: World 
Migrations in the Second Millenium (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), particularly Leo Lucassen, “Where do 
We Go From Here? New Perspectives on Global Migration History,” in International Review of Social History 49 
(2004): 519. On the merits of comparative versus connective frameworks for analyzing global migrations, see also 
Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, eds. Migration, Migration History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives 
(NewYork: Peter Lang, 1997). 
31Khater, “Becoming 'Syrian' in America,” 300. 
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with home, and what is more, such inter-peripheral linkages remain an under-acknowledged web 
of influence in the largely bilateral fields of diaspora and immigration studies. By telling the 
history of the interwar mahjar through its transnational social institutions (the press, 
philanthropic organizations, political associations and clubs, and schools), I can illustrate 
political change across a multi-sited, transnational space, rather than dialectically between the 
poles of “homeland” and “diaspora.” 
 This dissertation is about the Syrian mahjar, but it is also about nationalism. Among its 
most principle findings is that early Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalisms not only had 
mahjari cognates, but that each movement depended upon (or interacted with) important activist 
groups operating in the Americas. The modern states of the Mashriq which emerged after World 
War I were not only creations of the victorious Entente Powers and select partners within Syria 
and Lebanon; activists in the mahjar also played significant roles in constructing (and later, in 
protesting) the French Mandate. The following chapters empirically demonstrate that political 
trends in the mahjar impacted the contests between nationalists and colonial administrators in 
Beirut and Damascus, whether through emigrant petitions to the 1919 Conférence de la Paix, 
cash remittances to Syrian revolutionaries in 1925, or the construction of schools and orphanages 
on plans drawn up in Brazil. Such practical examples of mahjari influence on the homeland are 
multitude, in this thesis and in the subfield generally. But what does a transnational perspective 
joining mahjar to Mashriq accomplish in theoretical terms? In the historiography on interwar 
Middle Eastern nationalisms, what can the mahjar add to the conversation?   
 Long-distance nationalism, as it emerged among Syrians and Lebanese in the United 
States, Brazil, and Argentina, was a malleable, diverse form of politics rooted less in ideas and 
sentiments than in action. Like the more well-known Syrian communities in Cairo and Paris, the 
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American mahjar had its intellectuals, who promoted their ideas concerning the history, scope, 
and destiny of the nation in the mahjar through a widening print culture.32 But as Carol Hakim 
argues of nationalisms in this World War I moment, “the appearance of fledgling national 
representations and agendas did not, however, presage their subsequent development in an 
orderly, linear, and predictable fashion.”33 Rather, the Arab, Syrian (“Syrianist”), and Lebanese 
(“Lebanist”) nationalist movements as described in the literature on Middle Eastern 
nationalisms—that is, as movements with distinctive and competing visions of the territorial 
borders, historical identity, and political destiny of their national homeland—were the result of a 
fraught and complex series of negotiations between activists living in the Mashriq and abroad as 
well as between these activists and the Great Powers of the Entente. During the War, these 
movements each “displayed some elements of modern nationalism but had not developed into 
articulate and coherent nationalist ideologies of movements” until after 1918.34 That said, 
historians who write about nationalisms in the Mashriq tend to break down the post-World War I 
tensions, ties, and competitions between the Hashimite Arab nationalist movement under Emir 
Faysal, who established a short-lived Arab monarchy in Syria between 1918 and 1920, and two 
nationalist projects in partnership with the Entente, subsumed under the headings of Syrianism 
and Lebanism.35  
                                                          
32 The Syrian communities in Cairo and Paris were considered the two greatest intellectual outposts beyond the 
Mashriq during this period. Activists in the Americas typically allied with movements in Paris and Cairo, and it was 
widely thought that they depended on them for leadership. A 1918 report from U.S. Consul to Cairo Yale concluded, 
for example, that “As to the Lebanese, who are in the two Americas, they depend to a certain degree for their 
opinions upon their leaders in Egypt and Europe.” Thompson linked this to “a certain amount of propaganda (from 
those cities) in favor of the French (that was) carried on by Lebanese in the Americas; this is particularly true… in 
South American countries.” NARA M367, Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and its 
Termination, 1914-1929, Group 59, Roll 0381, Yale, Consul to Cairo to Leland Harrison, Dept. of State, 28 January 
1918 Report “The Syrian Question Report #12,” document 763.72119/1717, Pages 13-4.. 
33 Carol Hakim, The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Pres, 
2013), 6. 
34 Hakim, The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 7. 
35 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Second Constitutional Period 
of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Raghid al-Solh, Lebanon and 
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 Countering older histories of Arab nationalism that dated its emergence in the late 
nineteenth century, Hasan Kayali connects the development of a politicized Arabism to Syrian 
intellectuals’ disenchantment with the Ottomen Empire’s conduct in the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913. Even these intellectuals’ rhetoric railing against the Ottoman government’s “Turkification” 
policies in the Syrian provinces, he argues roundly, are most fruitfully read in the context of a 
Syrian politics of administrative autonomy, rather than in the vein of an ethnic nationalism that 
did not yet exist.36 Indeed, until 1916 expressions of Arabism tended towards conversation 
within an Ottomanist framework, working towards reform within the Empire rather than towards 
a separatist ethnic nationalism. C. Ernest Dawn similarly finds that the Arab nationalist 
sentiments took root in Syria after the arrival of Emir Faysal’s Arab troops, and that during most 
of the War, even the Hashimite Emir himself deployed nationalism selectively, incompletely, and 
always in reference to a larger project of Islamic revival.37 “Arab nationalism” as it emerged in 
1919—that is, as a demand for Syria’s immediate independence (including Mount Lebanon and 
Palestine), the rejection of foreign Mandates and Zionist colonization, economic and political 
unity under an Arab constitutional system under Emir Faysal, recognized by the world’s 
powers—was the product of compromise between the Hashimite Emir and his elite supporters in 
Syria, a unifying ideal he deployed as he prepared his appeals for the League Nations. According 
to Philip Khoury, the urban political elites of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama adopted 
Hashimite Arab nationalism only after 1918. This recently “unified and coherent local upper 
class,” comprised of urban merchants, former Ottoman administrators, and religious leaders 
                                                          
Arabism: National Identity and State Formation, 1936-1945 (London: I.B. Taurus, 2004); Asher Kaufmann, 
“Between Paris and Beirut,” Reviving Phoenicia: the Search for National Identity in Lebanon (New York: I.B. 
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36 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, 12-5. 
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proved the lynchpin for Faysal’s movement and bid for a Syrian-Arab state, but Khoury reminds 
the reader that this class joined forces with the Hashimite Emir because his project proved “a 
viable and useful substitute for ‘Ottomanism,’ an ideology which after 1918 no longer served 
(this class’s) interests.”38 
 Lebanism, a term used by Hakim to distinguish it from later forms of Lebanese 
nationalism, similarly emerged during the War and in contest with both the Arabist and Syrianist 
movements. The particularistic notion that Mount Lebanon was culturally, historically, and 
religiously distinct from the rest of the Mashriq had deep roots: Carol Hakim and Kamal Salibi 
trace them back to debates amongst Maronite clergy and French-educated intellectuals in the 
nineteenth century.39 But the convergence of Lebanism with patriotic politics (and later with 
nationalism) came much later, and historians of modern Lebanon caution against conflating 
nineteenth century preoccupations with Phoenicianism with the modern, post-Ottoman Lebanese 
nationalism.40 The political Lebanism that actually produced a project for a distinct Lebanese 
nation state had its origins in the Decentralization Movement (Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya and the 
Beirut Reform Society), a push by Lebanese elites linked to Mount Lebanon’s Administrative 
Council under the Ottoman mutasarriffiyya. Decentralist parties like the Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani (Alliance Libanaise in French, established in 1909) sought the preservation of Mount 
Lebanon and Beirut’s local administrative autonomy against the perceived threat of direct 
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Ottoman rule from Istanbul.41 But although these parties were the first to delineate a “greater 
Lebanese” political entity (the Grand Liban) that joined historical Mount Lebanon to the coastal 
cities of Saida, Akkar, and Tripoli and the fertile Biqaaʾ valley, they would do in fits in starts 
during World War I, only after the continuation of Ottoman rule in Lebanon looked increasingly 
untenable, and only in contest with countervailing Arabist and Syrianist politics.42 
Of these three national tendencies, Syrianism was at one point the most popular among 
Syrian and Lebanese emigrants, but by 1919 it had become a casualty of strategic negotiations 
between Syrian elites, Emir Faysal, and the victorious powers of the Entente. Syrianism emerged 
as an inchoate but powerful movement against continued Ottoman rule in Syria, with an 
attendant desire to preserve greater Syria’s territorial integrity (commonly described as spanning 
from the Taurus Mountains to the Suez isthmus, and from the Euphrates River to the 
Mediterranean Sea). Like Lebanism, Syrianism was a politics that was particularly connected to 
activists in the mahjar; both movements had connections to wartime relief committees led by 
emigrant activists during the War, and in both cases emigrant committees working in the 
Americas linked themselves with nationalist political parties already operating in Egypt and 
Europe after 1917. These parties depended on transnationl philanthropic, intellectual, and press 
networks branching across the Americas, which they used to compete with one another over 
constituents as well as for the attentions of the Great Powers (particularly the French).43 The 
idealism and expansiveness of the greater Syrian project unified the efforts of Syrian activists 
during the War, but shortly afterward the many obstacles that confronted it prompted most of 
these activists to embrace the Arabist or Lebanist movements. Among these obstacles: the 
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question of Palestine (claimed by the Syrianists but also by the British and their partners in the 
Zionist movement), mounting demands for Lebanese separation, concerns about ethnic and 
confessional divisions within the proposed Syrian territory, and France’s endorsement of the 
greater Lebanese idea.44 While it emerged from the same wellspring of transnational wartime 
activism and its leaders experimented with a blend of late Ottoman reform ideas and modern 
nationalism, the project for greater Syria was drowned out of a nationalist discourse dominated 
by Francophile Lebanese nationalists, on one hand, and the anticolonial Arab nationalists on the 
other. Put simply, the Syrianist blend of territorial unionism and French-managed 
developmentalism became an anachronism during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, because 
France declined to support Syrian unity, and Faysal’s Arab nationalists rejected foreign tutelage. 
After the War, greater Syrianists took new sides in an increasingly bifurcated political 
atmosphere; most of them opted for Hashemite Arab nationalism. 
Taken cumulatively, these studies demonstrate that the interrelationships between 
Syrianist, Lebanist, and Hashemite-Arab parties were intensely uneasy, fluid, and complex 
during World War I, and they each cohered into more completely “nationalist” political 
movements in the months between the War’s end in 1918 and when the League of Nations 
granted France mandate over Syria at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. During that 
period, each movement laid out conflicting territorial ambitions and vied with one another for the 
attentions of the international forum, but they all claimed to represent the political assertions of 
urban elites, constitutionalists, the professional bourgeoisie, and diasporic activists.45 Despite 
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significant divisions between them, the mode of politics they practiced shows remarkable 
convergence around the issues of constitutionalism, rights of representation, self-determination, 
economic and social developmentalism, and alliance-building with the Allied Powers through 
informal diplomacy. 46 Of course, even though nationalism became the dominant mode of politics 
in Syria and Lebanon shortly after World War I, historians have also demonstrated the enduring 
vitality of Ottomanist ideas during the War,47 and of internationalist, socialist, and fascist politics 
in interwar Syria and Lebanon.48 It bear noting that although this dissertation concerns itself with 
the development of nationalist politics in the mahjar, non-nationalist (or anti-nationalist) 
alternatives were never far away, influencing and informing patriotic cultures in Lebanon, Syria, 
and their respective diasporas. 
This study pulls in transnational, long-distance iterations of Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalisms though the 1920s to further diversify the historical narrative on nationalism in the 
interwar Middle East, while simultaneously looking into the political partnerships and strategic 
alliances which made certain types of nationalism an attractive ideological option (even though it 
was not the inevitable, or only, choice). I argue that political partnerships–negotiations between 
individual activists operating across the mahjar, political committees and their supporters, and 
between these and the powers of Entente—had a greater impact on aims the WWI-era nationalist 
movements than did ideology. This is not to say that ideology or patriotic affect did not matter, 
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but rather that national identity remained malleable in the context of the war and the changing 
nature of the political partnerships that underpinned it. National identity was a significant and 
divisive issue in the mahjar, to be sure; but this thesis views “the nation” as a polysemous 
“floating signifier,” inscribed variously by activist and encapsulating a multiplicity of historical, 
confessional, patriotic allegiances, and personal loyalties.49 During the War, the nationalist 
organizations in the mahjar contained within them serious ambiguities and disputes over the 
identity of the nations they purported to represent. Individual activists from opposite sides of the 
ideological spectrum collaborated and depended on one another. Put simply, the mahjar’s 
experience with Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalisms was a messy affair, and the pattern of 
long-distance nationalism they produced was eminently malleable, ready to be bent, shaped, and 
hammered into place as emigrant loyalties to (or protests against) foreign powers, nationalist 
personalities at home, or between one another shifted and changed.  
The transnational body of sources in this dissertation reveal the extent to which emigrant 
political action and activism outside the Middle East conditioned the course of national politics 
at home. During the War, Syrian nationalists recruited young men to fight for the Entente. In 
1919, Lebanese nationalists in the mahjar pursued an alliance with France, and helped to 
engineer two Lebanese Delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. In the 1920s, Arab 
nationalists funded an array of social institutions in the homeland: schools, hospitals, and 
orphanages, in the interest of demonstrating Syria’s capacity for self-determination and national 
independence.  Each endeavor (and many more like them) created opportunities for nationalists 
in Syria and Lebanon: the emigrant soldiers recruited by Syrian nationalist Shukri Ghanim and 
his partners abroad not only fought in Palestine, they also became an important symbol linking 
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Syria’s political future to the Entente. Similarly, in addition to including notable emigrant 
personalities, both Lebanese Delegations of 1919 delivered plans for a greater Lebanese state 
written by nationalists living abroad, that was endorsed by written petitions of thousands of 
Lebanese emigrants in the mahjar.  
 Recognizing these transnational connections, historians of Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalisms are beginning to write the mahjar back into histories of the modern Mashriq. 
Recent studies show a desire to include emigrants, but they still hold fast to a predominantly 
territorial framework. In Lebanese studies, for instance, emigrants are present but cursorily 
placed in a separate section that fits imperfectly within a more conventional narrative focused on 
high politics and Franco-Lebanese power relationships.50 In Syrian studies, it is rarer for 
emigrants to appear in the narrative at all,51 a tendency that reflects the reification of the state and 
its interests in historical writings on nationalism (since Independence, Lebanon has been more 
adept at “claiming” its emigrants as a potent source of remittance revenues, as well as more 
invested in commemorating emigration as part of its national heritage). Among historians of the 
mahjar, Akram Khater, Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, and Sarah Gualtieri have argued for a more 
thorough analysis of Syrian and Lebanese politics between the diaspora and the homeland, and 
have pointed to transnational modes of analysis as the means to accomplish it.52 Using French 
                                                          
50 See, for instance, Asher Kaufman, “Syro-Lebanese in America,” Reviving Phoenicia: the Search for Identity in 
Lebanon (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2004), 70-9. Carol Hakim does a more thorough-going discussion of emigrant 
activists within debates on the Grand Liban project prior World War I but is concerned more with elite politics than 
with transnational activism. Still, Hakim represents the most recent trend towards reading the emigrants’ intellectual 
history within a Lebanese context, “The Emigrants’ Views: Greater Syria or Greater Lebanon?” in The Origins of the 
Lebannese National Idea, 214-223. 
51 There are exceptions. Isa As’ad’s Tarikh Homs lays out the political history of Syria’s diaspora within the narrative 
of the anti-colonial Syrian Nationalist Movement. In this case, however, As’ad has chronicled his own involvement 
in the Movement, and his role in connecting Syrian activists “at home” with those working abroad. His book 
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52 See Akram Fouad Khater, “Becoming 'Syrian' in America: a Global Geography of Ethnicity and Nation,” in 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 299-33; Sarah Gualtieri, “Nation and Migration: 
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34 
 
diplomatic documents, Gildas Brégain has written the most comprehensive transnational history 
available on Syrian and Lebanese nationalists operating in South America. Her study shows ably 
that a transnational frame delivers an entirely new view of how the French Mandate operated 
beyond the territorial spaces of the Mashriq, particularly in Argentina.53 But by drawing 
exclusively on Francophone archival records, the Syrian and Lebanese networks beyond the 
Mandate’s reach remain unexplored and underexposed. This project’s emphasis on non-official 
materials written by emigrants themselves labors towards accomplishing that goal.   
By focusing on emigrant action and activism and drawing from sources written and 
circulated by emigrants themselves, this dissertation builds the argument that long-distance 
nationalists participated in the politics of nation-making during World War I and into the French 
Mandatory period. But these activists did not only see themselves as nationalists. Ultimately, 
they saw themselves as transnational citizens of a modern Syria and Lebanon, an affirmation that 
conditioned how they related to the new Mandatory states that emerged in the homeland after 
1920. But in a brand new territorial nation-state under foreign management, what did it mean to 
simultaneously be a citizen and non-resident? What happened if emigrant claims to the rights of 
citizens did not exactly square with the goals of the French authorities in Beirut and Damascus? 
In addressing these questions, this dissertation argues that the wartime role emigrant activists 
played in facilitating the French Mandate opened the door for a transnational form of substantive 
citizenship in the mahjar. As French officials sought to extend the “colonial civic order” into the 
pockets of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living in the Americas, both supporters and opponents 
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of the Mandate framed themselves as transnational citizens, regardless of the ambiguous nature 
of their actual legal status. 
Transnational Activism and Substantive Citizenship: Making Claims on the Homeland 
 This study begins with the assertion that the Syrian and Lebanese mahjar was a lively 
social field, with its own patterns of circular migration, employment, and commerce, its own 
intellectual cultures and political centers of gravity, and with its own patterns of political praxis 
and activism, and that very often the creative capacity of this field came from linkages between 
the Syrian communities abroad. This choice of a starting point, however, also illustrates the 
manner in which the mahjar does not conform to established historical models of “diaspora,” 
where mobility is driven by a single cataclysmic event, emigrant writers seek principally to 
engage the homeland after dispersal, and sentimentality, nostalgia, and alienation define their 
genre.54 The emigrants in this dissertation are not “exiles” but rather “Syrians abroad,” and their 
experience of the mahjar is one of agency, action, participation. What distinguishes long-distance 
nationalism from the experience of exile is action: long-distance nationalism is a participatory 
politics that commands action, driving patterns of migration, sociability, philanthropy, and 
intellectual discourse across transnational space.55 In Nina Glick Schiller’s words, long-distance 
nationalism “does not exist only in the domains of the imagination and sentiment. It leads to 
specific actions… long-distance nationalists may (seek to) vote, demonstrate, contribute money, 
create works of art, give birth, and fight, kill, and die all for a “homeland” in which they may 
                                                          
54 Traditional models of Diaspora point to a quite specific model driven by a forced dispersal of a people through a 
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never have lived.”56 
But appended to declarations of national belonging, shared traditions, and political 
activism is a notion of transnational citizenship defined not by recognition by a state but by 
relationships of responsibility and obligation. Substantive citizenship refers to the citizenship’s 
participatory sense and emanates not from the state but from people who make claims on it. 
Developed by Rainer Baubock, the theory works through the contradictions between “the legal 
status of citizen and the actuality of state practices” by focusing on the ways that societies 
(whether at home or abroad) invoke a state’s obligations to its citizenry or take over aspects of 
provisioning for that citizenry.57 The collective mobilization of a society “to protect themselves 
against discrimination, gain rights, or make contributions to the development of that state and the 
life of the people within it” comprises a central aspect of national citizenship.58 But when a 
citizen body who is either absent from its national territory or not formally recognized as 
belonging by its government, this citizen body practices substantive citizenship. By acting “as if” 
they are formal, legal citizens (regardless of whether they held documents reflecting that status), 
transnational emigrants and activists still claim agency, authority, and power in relationship to 
that state. Substantive citizenship emerges in contexts where an emerging nation-state seeks 
support from its diaspora as a means to perform its functions. The Syrian mahjar became a 
transnational “site for political engagements… a public space in which political action 
extend(ed) across state borders.”59 This political action, these contests, were not only between 
emigrant activists, but also with the Syrian and Lebanese states. In this dissertation, substantive 
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citizenship is an extension of interwar political culture, the performative aspect of long-distance 
nationalism. 
 Private philanthropy was one of the most significant means by which Syrian and 
Lebanese emigrants laid claim upon the homeland as a transnational citizenry abroad. Sending 
relief payments, building schools and orphanages, and providing scholarships to Syrians and 
Lebanese to study abroad were as much expressions of mahjari citizenship as petitions to the 
League of Nations, emigrant support for the Mandate (or on the other hand, for the Great Syrian 
Revolt), emigrant participation in the census of 1921 of application for citizenship under the 
Mandate. Historians who write about philanthropy and charity in the modern Middle East 
illustrate how philanthropic practices blended into the politics of citizenship. In Egypt, for 
example, Mine Ener argues that the waning of state authority at the local level after 1900 
produced a boom in private philanthropic organization, empowering local merchantile elites. By 
World War I, many of these philanthropic societies transformed into quasi-nationalist 
organizations, run by political parties and undertaking charity work in the name of the nation.60  
Ener’s argument that the “politics of benevolence” converged the politics of citizenship 
and national development post-WWI also holds in French Syria and Lebanon, where middle 
class activists, nationalists, and female reformers each entered into a pattern of appeal and 
provisioning with French authorities that Elizabeth Thompson calls the “colonial civic order.” 61 
Thompson argues that as the French set about setting up their Mandates in Syria and Lebanon in 
the early 1920s, assuming state control over the many philanthropic initiatives then working for 
local medical, educational, and social relief presented one of the High Commissioner’s principle 
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goals (as well as one of its most hard-won). Private organizations (like Zahrat al-Ihsan in Beirut) 
as well as international groups like the Red Cross had worked in the area for a number of years, 
establishing a social services network that, Thompson argues, was largely female-run.62 During 
the early 1920s, the Mandatory government imposed state oversight over local charities, leading 
to (Thompson argues) the devaluation of women’s labor in this sector but also channeling 
philanthropic endeavors back towards the interests of the state.63 Interactions like this generated 
a new state-society dialectic that defines Thompson’s “colonial civic order,” and struggles over 
who would provide for Beirut’s poor (and under whose terms) constituted one facet of colonial 
citizenship under the French Mandate, matched by activists’ claims for educational 
improvements, public works projects, and extension of women’s legal rights through petitioning. 
But from the mahjar, transnational philanthropy and committee-based activism constituted an 
outsized portion of how emigrants practiced substantive citizenship, not merely because distance 
made other forms of local political activist difficult but because emigrant nationalists continued 
to argue that private philanthropy (not French managed relief) was the most immediate means of 
preserving and advancing the cause of national sovereignty and eventual independence. 
For their part, the French authorities in Syria and Lebanon pursued an uneven series of 
policies regarding the nationality and citizenship status of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants in the 
Americas. On one hand, tax-paying emigrants retained full citizenship rights, they were 
enumerated on the Mandate’s census and given power of appeal through the Mandate’s consular 
offices. On the other hand, emigrants were not formally given suffrage, nor was the Mandatory 
government entirely forthcoming in matters of travel documents or national identification. The 
French Mandate state envisioned the Syria and Lebanese mahjar as a convenient political 
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constituency, to be counted when necessary but not closely consulted in political matters. But the 
pattern of citizenship as a participatory (if managed) affair identified by Thompson also held true 
in the mahjar. Syrian and Lebanese emigrants acted as citizens across transnational space 
influenced not only their activism towards the homeland, but also underpinned the development 
of a transnational political culture in their communities abroad. By acknowledging the ways that 
emigrants interacted with the emerging states of French Syria and Lebanon, historians can place 
them at the foreground of the analysis, rather than granting the Mandatory state the unquestioned 
privilege of classifying who is Syrian, who is Lebanese, and who remained at the margins of 
these national societies. 
Long-distance Nationalist Culture? Transnational Activism, Nationalism, and Gender 
 To live within the Syrian and Lebanese communities abroad was to be folded into 
transnational networks of obligation, patronage, activism, and social responsibility. The same 
geography established by long-distance nationalist activism influenced the political culture of the 
interwar mahjar. This dissertation conceptualizes political culture as the interaction between 
agency and structure, a dialectic identified by Pierre Bourdieu as the habitus. The habitus 
comprises the “principles which generate and organize practices and representations… without 
presupposing (an individual’s) conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them.” 64 Individuals connect with one another through practices, 
representations, and systems of meaning conditioned not only by the simple sum of their own 
aims and desires but also by what larger social structures have deemed possible. For the 
individual cultural agent interacting with larger social structures (social fields, in Bourdieu’s 
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terminology), these structures are partially (or totally) obscured, despite the ways they condition, 
structure, or channel individuals towards a specific praxis.65 At the same time, the cultural and 
political perspectives of individual agents are very often themselves shaped by the patterns of the 
habitus.66 For Bourdieu, the value in exploring the habitus is to get at the subjectivity of the 
people living within a given social field: how do individuals “make” society? How do social 
systems inspire, pattern, regulate, or even constrain certain types of social action? How and why 
do some acts, even seemingly insignificant ones, change the habitus? How did the experience of 
global labor migration, French colonialism, and the formation of a transnational social field 
influence the formation of long-distance nationalist cultures in the Syrian mahjar? Can 
Bourdieu’s “culture engine” help illustrate the link between this mahjar’s transnational social 
institutions and the political culture nurtured by them? The concept of habitus guides the 
principle aim of this thesis: I argue that the development of transnational social institutions, print 
culture, and transnational social activism created a mahjari social field which developed its own 
ways of being political. 
 If the habitus of long-distance nationalism filtered through the institutions that held 
Syria’s colonies together, and if individual agency was both channeled and checked through 
these structures, then the inequities and complementarities of class, ethnicity, and gender were 
reflected and inscribed in these structures as well. Because this dissertation relies principally on 
periodicals, club records, and publications produced by the bourgeoisie, this study focuses on the 
transnational middle class. The reader should also bear in mind, however, that the mahjar also 
has its working classes, urban poor, and the rural peasants in the Syrian communities abroad, and 
that each group had limited access to the societies and spaces this thesis focuses on. The sharply 
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defined bourgeois notion of respectable patriotic activism that dominated the mahjar’s 
newspapers and political committees demonstrates that although these activists mobilized more 
widely across the lines of gender, class, and confession, during the 1920s, their principal 
audience remained the emigrant middle class specifically. Within this class, a “polite” form of 
familial nationalism identified Syrian men and women as its objects for reform. As a result, 
nationalist organizations emphasized self-improvement and social uplift within circumscribed, 
homosocial spaces. For women (especially working women), this new turn was particularly 
limiting: nationalist organizations and activists who had embraced women’s work and activism 
during the War began to protest against this “intrusion” into male spaces during the 1920s. For 
such women living in the Americas, the ideological options afforded by nationalism looked 
bleaker, especially during a time when the international women’s movement provided potential 
for a political future more in tune with working women’s lived experience. The final part of this 
dissertation thus explores how the new, familial nationalism influenced patterns of sociability 
and discourses about women’s places in the 1920s mahjar.  
 Gender has been a highly relevant and well-explored theme for historians looking at 
nationalism and social activism in the modern Middle East. Historians of Egypt have been most 
successful in combining analyses of gender and nationalism, owing in significant part to 
interconnections between the Hizb al-Wafd and the Egyptian women’s movement under Huda 
Sha’arawi. Beth Baron’s investigation of the “Ladies’ Demonstrations” during the 1919 Egyptian 
Revolution opened up a new mode of inquiry: to what degree did Egyptian women’s nationalist 
objectives resonate with their goals as feminists? If these women pressed their claims as 
“mothers of the nation,” how did familialist rhetoric help (or hinder) their cause as women?67 
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During the 1920s, the predicament of women nationalists became clear in variety of contexts in 
the Arab world: by framing their goals for women’s education and advancement within the 
paternalistic language of the duties of patriotic motherhood, female activists in Egypt,68 
Palestine,69 Syria, and Lebanon encountered difficulty in countering the patriarchal inequities 
within the nationalist movements they participated in.70 
 As a critical mode for the discussion of nationalist political culture, this dissertation 
incorporates gender as a significant category of analysis. Building on existing studies on the 
Syrian and Lebanese women in the mahjar,71 it seeks to explain how (and why) men and women 
participated in long-distance nationalist activism in distinct ways. Many of the institutions that 
linked the mahjar to the Mashriq were masculine spaces: the press, patriotic clubs, reading 
rooms, and even the café were places where new definitions of a masculine culture of the citizen 
were worked out,72 but these spaces were simultaneously policed to limit women’s access to 
certain types of public politics. Syrian and Lebanese women, in turn, found more “polite” 
pathways into nationalist activism, working in private philanthropy, cultural education, and in 
their own women’s organizations to promote a patriotic Syrian womanhood. During World War I, 
women activists promoted a patriotic feminism that envisioned the nationalist movement as the 
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means for female emancipation: as mothers, wives, and sisters to the beleaguered homeland they 
raised monies, sewed clothing, blankets, preserved foods, and even took up wage work to 
support the nationalist movement. In the 1920s, however, nationalists sought to limit women’s 
access to formal politics, driving a wedge between two generations of mahjari feminists: those 
who saw service to the nation (as mothers and wives) as paramount, and a younger generation 
born in the mahjar that pushed for a more internationalist feminism that questioned the 
nationalism of poetry, propaganda, and petitions still loved by their male compatriots. The 
tensions that emerged within the nationalist “family,” between men and women activists, and the 
way that these tensions influenced gender patterns in the mahjar are discussed in this 
dissertation’s final two chapters. 
“Moveable Texts:” Methodological Considerations 
 In order to successfully map out and investigate the transnational social networks and 
institutions built by Syrian and Lebanese living in the mahjar, this project depends upon a 
transnational body of source materials. Thankfully, the conduits of migration, personal contact, 
philanthropic and political assistance that linked Syrians living in New York, São Paulo, and 
Buenos Aires were archivally fecund, producing immense collections of non-official, socially 
produced texts: periodicals and newspapers printed in the mahjar, the records and ephemera of 
ethnic clubs and philanthropic societies, Church records, petitions, and personal correspondence. 
Each of these documents also migrated, typically along the same conduits as their authors, and 
they helped to create the very connectivities this dissertation seeks to illustrate. Collectively I 
call them “moveable texts.” Their production provided a discursive forum for emigrants to 
discuss politics, organize, or agitate across the mahjar, and their circulation nurtured new 
national “imagined communities,” making them ideal artifacts for the historian pursuing long-
distance mahjari nationalisms.  
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 Moveable texts usually themselves have remarkable itineraries: most of the materials 
used in this thesis had originally been printed in New York City, São Paulo, or Buenos Aires at 
one of the mahjar’s many Syrian printing presses. Publishing houses sprang up in all three cities 
amidst the commercial hubs of the Syrian communities by the turn of the twentieth century. 
More than just an office, printing houses commonly had their own reading rooms, cafes, and 
very often their own social clubs; they presented the Syrian colony with space for the public 
presentation and debate of ideas, and the mahjar’s intelligentsia organized within and around 
these printing concerns (many were printers themselves). In time, reading rooms expanded into 
full libraries, where periodicals, poetry, plays, and propaganda were dutifully preserved during 
the interwar years. By World War II, however, most of the mahjar’s private libraries closed, and 
their collections were subsequently scattered into individual collections or delivered to research 
libraries across four continents. By recovering these archival fragments and fitting them together, 
this research reconstructs the social and political culture from the perspective of its reading 
rooms; it captures the ideological persuasions, moral outlooks, and agendas of the newspapermen 
and activists who ran them.  
 Using materials from libraries in Beirut, Boston, Minneapolis, Detroit, Chicago, and 
Washington DC, I have partially reconstructed the collections of some of the mahjar’s major 
publishers,73 social clubs,74 and prominent individuals,75 tracing the trajectory of these moveable 
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texts in the meantime. Two practices common among the interwar Syrian reading public has 
made the pursuit of moveable texts possible: commercial imprinting and personal annotation. 
The social clubs and political parties of the interwar mahjar had their own periodicals, their own 
publishing houses, and even their own libraries, and materials entered into these libraries were 
imprinted, stamped, or embossed with the repository’s logo. When these institutions closed 
(many of them did so during World War II, through a combination of changing interests, loss of 
political relevance, or the community’s shift from Arabic to host society vernaculars), these 
materials found their way into the personal collections of prominent Syrian emigrants. 
Oftentimes this transfer came with an annotation: a message from the political party to the 
recipient, or simply the recipient’s name and a date of receipt. The annotation served as a record 
of transfer but also a declaration of ownership. When these texts found their way into research 
libraries, it was usually as part of a prominent émigré’s estate, but a clear chain of transfer can be 
pursued through the series of imprints and annotations the material bears. In this way, the print 
culture of the interwar mahjar provides rich insight into the intellectual life and social 
connections of its participants, not only as a series of texts, but also as mobile physical artifacts. 
Where possible, this dissertation maintains that duality. 
 Newspapers, periodicals, and other materials produced in the printing houses of the 
mahjar together constituted the most ubiquitous manifestation of Syria’s print culture abroad, so 
much so that these media helped create a (trans)national community. But while newspapers 
provided both grist and glue for “making a nation” in Syrian communities abroad, sitting alone 
the infrastructure of the press is merely that: structure. Without flattening the complex series of 
interactions, patterns of cooperation and competition that went into the production and 
syndication of the mahjar’s newspaper industry (processes discussed at length in Chapter 2), 
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newspapers were made to be read, discussed, and debated by a widespread reading public. 
Without accounting for public reception, resonance (or perhaps repudiation) of these texts, a 
study of newspapers loses its social meaning, and the “public” loses its agency. If structure 
interacts with agency (or indeed, depends on it!), it is in pursuit of agency that I use three 
additional types of movable texts: club records, letters and correspondence, and published 
individual speeches, autobiographies, and interviews. 
 The Syrian press and ethnic associations of all stripes – mutual aid societies, social 
welfare groups, literary clubs, and political parties – were the two lungs of every Syrian colony 
around the world; they breathed life into the community, invigorating a public sense of duty and 
inspiring social activism and political work. In rare circumstances the internal records of these 
clubs have been preserved,76 but in most cases these institutions must be pursued through their 
ephemera as it circulated the Syrian colonies. As one of the clearest manifestations of a Syrian or 
Lebanese “public” in the mahjar, this dissertation uses the records and ephemera of ethnic clubs 
as a second body of movable texts. The official records of these societies provide insight into 
their aims, activism, and internal workings of the mahjar’s philanthropic and political 
organizations. Additional materials like jubilee books and press releases relay the ways that these 
institutions influenced patterns of sociability while channeling patterns of activism towards 
certain types of practice.  
 Letters, correspondence, and individual memoirs comprise the third kind of movable text 
in this work. Letters between emigrants, among family members and friends, public “letters to 
the editor,” letters from home, pleas for help and assistance, and official correspondence between 
                                                          
76 This has been the case with the Syrian Lebanese Ladies Aid Society of Boston, a group whose entire records were 
donated to Harvard University’s Schlesinger Library by historian Evelyn Shakir (see Chapter 6). 
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consular officers, clergymen, and political figures all appear in this thesis. Where possible I have 
situated these letters as documenting the lives of individuals and the institutions they represent. 
Published travel memoirs furthermore illustrate the movement of individuals between the Syrian 
communities abroad, demonstrating the continuing relevance of migration networks between the 
mahjar and the Mashriq. Although I draw distinctions between three types of movable text: 
periodicals, club ephemera, and individual letters or memoirs, each type mutually bled into the 
others, revealing the extent to which individual or social agency merged into the structures that 
emerged across the mahjar. An individual like one Hanna Khabbaz simultaneously published 
newspapers in Homs and New York City,77 travelled to Syria’s colonies in Europe, South 
America, and the Caribbean,78 visiting social clubs in each city to deliver speeches and raise 
relief for Syria.79 His itinerary was exceptional, touching more places in the Syrian mahjar than 
many of Syria’s less prominent political activists, but the everyday circulation of individuals 
remained a constant and permanent feature of the Syrian and Lebanese mahjar, owing to the 
enduring quality of its social institutions. 
Chapter Outline and Significant Findings 
 Using a polyglot and transnational bodies of “movable text,” this dissertation argues that 
Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living in the American mahjar influenced the politics of their 
homeland during and after World War I, creating new patterns of long-distance nationalism that 
continued into the early French Mandate period. This thesis falls into three broad parts, each 
guided by its own themes and questions. Part 1 (chapters 1 and 2) introduce the three largest 
                                                          
77 He was editor in chief of Jadat al-Rishad (Homs), and official correspondent to al-Saʾih (New York) in the early 
1920s. 
78 This is merely one part of his extensive itinerary. He published the entire story in Hawl al-Kura al-ʾArdiyya (New 
York: Matbaʿat al-Huda al-Yawmiyya, 1920).  
79 A program of Khabbaz’s visit to al-Nadi al-Homsi appeared shortly after his visit there. Over 1,000 Syrians from 
around South America attended the speech (see Chapter 3). Hanna Khabbaz, Manatiq al-Nufuz wa-Mamlakat al-ʿIlm 
al-Khalida (São Paulo: Matbaʿat al-Raʾid, 1922). 
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Syrian colonies in the mahjar, contextualizing the development of transnational institutions 
between them, and tracing the progression of mahjari political activism from the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908 through the emergence of Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalisms after 
1916. It builds the case for thinking about the mahjar as a single unit of analysis, as a structure 
wherein emigrant activists collaborated, competed, and represented the emigrant public as 
members of a national community.  
Part 2 (chapters 3 and 4) queries the relationship between the French Mandate, its 
partners and its opponents in the mahjar through the 1920s. It argues that as the French 
established new states in Lebanon and Syria, they sought to embrace, administer, and control the 
movements of Syrians and Lebanese living abroad through the census, documentary and travel 
regimes, and through the formalization of a Mandatory consular network. Emigrant activists 
abroad responded to such overtures in many ways: some collaborated with the Mandate’s goals 
and made new claims on the state as a transnational citizen body, while others evaded the 
Mandate’s attempts to domesticate the diaspora and continued to protest French colonial rule in 
the Mashriq.  
Part 3 (chapters 5 and 6) shifts gears from nationalist activism to political culture in the 
interwar mahjar through a gendered lens. It argues that a bourgeois vision of the “nation as 
family” predominated over Syrian diasporic nationalisms in the 1920s, and that by extention, the 
anticolonial nationalist movement demanded a division of activist labor that worked toward the 
collective goal of nurturing and advancing Syrian patriotic culture abroad for en eventual return 
to the homeland. Men were expected to develop their bodies and mind through rigourous training 
and self-improvement as well as to provide philanthropic services for their community. Women, 
by contrast, were expected to commit their labors to within the domestic space of the homestead, 
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an expectation that neither matched up with the realities of women textile workers in the mahjar 
nor the emerging values of the international women’s movement.  
 Emerging as a result of a global economic convergence drawing the Mediterranean labor 
economy to the expanding economies of the Americas, the Syrian “colonies” in New York City, 
São Paulo, and Buenos Aires became the largest settlements of Syrians outside the Middle East 
by the turn of the twentieth century. Owing to the emergence of transnational commercial, 
banking, social, and philanthropic institutions, each of these communities transformed into 
transnational Ottoman suburbs. Chapter 1 provides a brief history of Syrian emigration to the 
Americas in global perspective as well as a discussion of the three settler societies that Syrian 
emigrants encountered in the New World. It then compares the Syrian communities on 
Washington Street, Rua 25 de Marzo, and Avenida Corrientes to reveal how all three 
communities developed similar economies, social institutions, and a common public sphere 
through a shared print culture. Then, moving from comparison to connection, the chapter closes 
by investigating early manifestations of a shared transnational patriotic culture during the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908, an important episode which revealed the extent to which political 
events “back home” reverberated into and across transnational Syrian space. 
 If a shared print culture facilitated Syrian emigration to the Americas and transformed the 
emigrant communities in New York, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires into Syrian intellectual 
“capitals” by the nineteenth century’s close, it also supported the rise of competing Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Arab nationalist movements during World War I. Chapter 2 argues that the Syrian 
press in the mahjar oversaw the critical shift from Ottoman constitutionalism to separatist 
nationalism during the War, transforming the colonies into epicenters for nationalist activism and 
creating discursive space where emigrants claimed, created, and represented their respective 
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national communities as alternatives to Ottoman hegemony. Emigrant journalists set out to 
manage the homeland’s transition from empire to nation, using the transnational Syrian press to 
organize across the mahjar. I argue that the ubiquity of the newspaper industry guided the Syrian 
nationalist habitus in two importance ways. First, it led activists into a distinctive politics of 
petition that depended on the ability to represent and “speak for” the mahjar through 
transnational party activism. Second, the search for partners in this project drove the diaspora’s 
activists (Arab, Syrian, and Lebanese) into to complex political alliances (and just as often, 
antagonisms) with France as the self-interested guarantor of a post-Ottoman Syrian state. The 
twists and turns of diasporic nationalist activism culminated at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. 
Through the mahjar’s intervention and France’s domination of the Conférence, Syria (and 
Lebanon, created in 1920) did not transition from empire to nation-state. Instead, it was 
transacted from Empire to Mandate.  
With the San Remo Conference in April 1920, the Syrian and Lebanese territories were 
awarded to France. After displacing Mount Lebanon’s Ottoman-era Administrative Council and 
defeating Emir Faysal’s short-lived Arab nationalist Kingdom, French General Henri Gouraud 
set about establishing his authority over two new entities: “Greater Lebanon” [Grand Liban in 
French] and a federated state of Syria, which emerged after 1920. But in newly-created Lebanon, 
the new territory’s political viability and France’s presence there remained hotly contested 
among both residents and emigrants. Serious disputes over who represented the “Lebanese” as a 
national community (and on what basis they did so) boiled on as France set to building new 
legislative structures. As Chapter 3 argues, France’s Mandatory authority depended on Gouraud’s 
partnerships with religious leaders in general, and with the Maronite Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik in 
particular. In the confessional Lebanese Republic France set out to build, the Mandate needed to 
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create an overall Christian majority and preserve the political supremacy of its Maronite 
constituencies within Lebanese politics. Both objectives, seen as favorable for the continuation 
of French rule, lead the French High Commissioner to to reach out to the mahjar as a source of 
political authority and demographic support. Chapter 3 reveals the Maronite Church’s role in 
conducting the first Lebanese census of 1921. It argues that the French Mandatory State and the 
Maronite Church labored to integrate Lebanese Maronite emigrants into the Greater Lebanon’s 
national population. By “claiming” Lebanon’s Maronite emigrants, both Church and State 
extended their authority well beyond Lebanon’s territorial borders. The emigrants’ inclusion in 
the 1921 census, in turn, paved the way for new patterns of transnational, participatory 
citizenship to emerge among Lebanese Maronites living abroad. Demands for services and rights 
fused into a complex pattern of Lebanese substantive citizenship. A new transnational political 
contract, born of expedience and the successful precedents of the War, emerged between French 
Lebanon and the Lebanese Maronite diaspora. 
If France’s authority over Lebanon began with General Gouraud’s proclamation of the 
Grand Liban and the census of 1921, Syria’s experience with the early French Mandate began 
with a destructive war against the fledgling state of Hashimite King Faysal in Damascus. Chapter 
4 and 5 each deal with Arab nationalist activism and political culture in South America (in 
Argentina and Brazil, respectively). Chapter 4 follows the political lives of a group of Arab 
nationalists in Buenos Aires from World War I through the 1920s, situating them in relation the 
transnational consular networks that linked the city’s Syrian Ottoman community to the 
homeland (first to the post-1908 Ottoman government under the Committee of Union and 
Progress, and to the French Mandatory government after 1920). It argues that over the course of 
the 1920s, the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement articulated a progressively more radical 
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and anticolonial form of pan-Arab nationalism which, rather than appealing to the League of 
Nations and seeking dialogue over Syria’s political future, increasingly saw the international 
forum as the handmaiden of foreign colonialism and armed revolt the ony means of Syria’s 
liberation. In the bilingual Syrian press (Spanish and Arabic), activists like Amin Arslan, Jurj 
Sawaya, and Jurj ʿAssaf drew analogies between Syria’s independence movement and the history 
of Argentinian liberation from Spanish rule. As French authorities in the Mandate’s Buenos Aires 
consulate tried to curb continuing Syrian immigration into Argentina and to counter Arab 
nationalist propaganda, these men criticized the French Mandate, and after 1928, the moderate 
nationalists of the Syrian National Bloc [al-Kutla al-Wataniyya] as illegitimate representatives of 
the Syrian people.  
After defeating Faysal and conquering Syria by force in 1920, France sought to cut ties 
between the anticolonial Syrian nationalist movement and its emigrant supporters. But instead of 
fading into obscurity, Syrian emigrant activists pursued their own long-distance nationalist 
culture in opposition to the French Mandate. Chapter 5 introduces Al-Nadi al-Homsi, one of the 
mahjar’s most prominent political clubs at the center of a diasporic Syrian nationalism during the 
early 1920s. It argues that in the wake of the movement’s defeat at the Battle of Maysalun, 
Syrian emigrant nationalists in São Paulo developed a vision for Syrian cultural development 
that drew analogies between patriotic masculinity, liberation, and future national sovereignty. Al-
Nadi al-Homsi was an organization focused on transforming Syrian boys from São Paulo into 
men and ideal citizens in preparation for an eventual “return” to Syria to liberate it from French 
occupation. The club undertook philanthropic work, building Syrian orphanages in São Paulo 
and Homs, funding educational institutions, and it housed a fraternity devoted to cultivating 
young Syrian men’s mind and bodies. The poetry readings, speeches, and charitable events given 
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at Al-Nadi al-Homsi operated around the logic that through collective intellectual pursuit and 
corporeal discipline, the Syrian nationalist movement could remake a Syrian masculinity rooted 
in strength and respectability as the first step towards Syria’s national liberation. 
Meanwhile, in New York new tensions emerged between a men’s culture of paternalistic 
nationalism and a developing Syrian feminism that nurtured ties to the international women’s 
movement. Chapter 6 lays out the development of Syrian and Lebanese feminism in New York 
City during the 1920s, arguing that as the decade wore on Syrian emigrant women increasingly 
called to question the patriarchal structures of the nationalist movement and sought out (and 
found) internationalist alternatives. Springing from a “polite” form of social activism that 
focused on the advancement of Syrian women through education and private philanthropy 
(mirroring the trends analyzed in chapter 5), Syrian and Lebanese female activists soon pushed 
the boundaries of their assigned places within a nationalist respectability in favor of a feminist 
ideal informed by the American women’s movement. Syrian feminism took on new forms in the 
1920s: debates over women’s place in public politics, publishing, and wage labor; discussions 
about marriage, motherhood, and divorce; and a generational struggle between an older feminism 
that made the home a site of activism, and a new feminism conversant with internationalist 
politics and concerned with women’s place in the public sphere. I argue that cooperation between 
Syrian-Lebanese women’s groups and the American institutions for wartime relief (from the Red 
Cross and Near East Relief to the New York Settlements Project and the Denison House) 
influenced the emergence of a new Syrian feminism, critical of the paternalistic nature of the 
Syrian nationalist movement and in favor of internationalist activist goals based on middle-class 
notions of civilization, modernity, and gender equality. 
 This dissertation begins with the question “what makes a national community?” and that 
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is also where it ends. I argue in turns that the national community that emerged between the Wars 
in the Syrian and Lebanese mahjar depended on a transnational political infrastructure that cast 
all of the colonies into shared webs of social responsibility, activism, and political imagination. 
Journalists, community organizers, clergymen, and even the emerging Syrian and Lebanese 
states depended on these networks that linked New York, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires to the 
Mashriq, and in turn, these networks helped generate new ideas about who participated in 
building a nation, how they did so, and who belonged as a citizen. Using moveable texts and 
transnational theories of community, my findings demonstrate the construction of a transnational 
political community spanning across the interwar American mahjar.  
But at the same time, an ethnographer visiting the mahjar might come to a very different 
set of conclusions: if this was a national community in formation, it was simultaneously a 
community deeply divided over questions of national identity. Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalists in the mahjar may have proclaimed their unending support for national movements 
“at home,” but they also quarreled with their emigrant neighbors over confessional loyalties, 
Church politics, or identification with competing political narratives. If the mahjar developed 
structures that channeled emigrant politics into a shared discursive space and political praxis, the 
ideological content and loyalties of its activists remained very much at odds. That is to say, 
“shared discursive formations” can refer as much to a jovial, spirited debate as to an antagonistic 
screaming match; “shared praxis” often meant that nationalists vied ruthlessly with one another 
for signatures on petitions that, while ideologically opposed, looked very similar in form. In the 
spirit of recognizing unities and divisions, this dissertation concludes with a discussion of the 





CHAPTER 1: MASHRIQ IN THE MAHJAR: READING SYRIA’S ‘COLONIZATION’ OF 
THE AMERICAS IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, 1880-1912 
 
 The third quarter of the nineteenth century was a moment of global economic 
convergence, advancing technologies of travel and communication, and intense mass labor 
migration. The integration of a colonial world economy centered on the movement of raw 
materials and proletarian labor from economic “peripheries” into the manufacturing core centers 
of Western Europe and the Americas began as early as the seventeenth century, but the brief four-
decade period between 1880 and 1914 saw new patterns of temporary labor migration on a truly 
massive scale.80 Owing in part to advancements in steam technology and improvements in 
passenger transport, and in part to the disintegration of local peasant economies before the 
demands of a hungry and expanding Western European capitalist economy, the emigration 
“industry” and each of its aspects – steamship shipping, money-lending, employment agencies, 
immigrant social welfare and boarding houses, etc. – swiftly became profitable business 
enterprises in various parts fo the world simultaneously, including Ottoman Syria, Italy, Ireland, 
Eastern Europe, and China (among others). The first Syrians who emigrated to the Americas 
often found work in assisting their compatriots into their new land of adoption; after Najib 
Arbeely arrived in New York City with his father, Yusuf, at fourteen years old in 1878, he learned 
English and took a job as an interpreter at Ellis Island, even sponsoring new arrivals where he 
saw fit. In 1894, he founded the first Arabic newspaper in the United States, Kawkab Amrika, 
                                                          
80 Adam McKeown calls this period of increased international labor migration a “first-wave globalization” preceding 
its late twentieth century counterpart. Adam McKeown “Global Migration, 1846-1940,” Journal of World History 
15, no. 2 (2004), 155-189; although modern transportation technologies allowed for a grander scale than ever before 
in the nineteenth century, other historians hav pointed out similar world economic convergences, for instance in 
sixteenth century Europe or the thirteenth century Indian Ocean. See Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: 
Migration in Western Europe since 1750 (Bloomington; University of Indian Press, 1992) and Janet Abu Lughod, 
Before European Hegemony: The World System, 1250-1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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which published alongside the day’s events information about employment, American customs, 
and other information relevant to new arrivals.81  
Early arrivals such as Arbeely family, historians of migration note, help explain how 
Syrian “colonies” emerged within the urban spaces of the Atlantic ports of entry: Syrians joined 
Italians, Eastern Europeans, and other Mediterranean communities in a pastiche of urban 
enclaves which emerged in New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires between 1880 and 
1914.82 By the starting point for this dissertation (1913), the Syrian colonies were already large 
enough to be noticed, marveled at, and sometimes resented by mainstream American observers. 
But although seemingly insular to the outside observer, these communities operated in a 
transnational space that joined the Syrian and Lebanese homeland to each host society and its 
Syrian inhabitants; networks of commerce, philanthropy, print culture, and political activism 
served as the ties which bound them together. This dissertation is concerned with the emergence 
not of the Syrian colonies themselves, but with their transformation into important epicenters for 
Syrian and Lebanese nationalist activism and political culture after 1914. However, important 
questions must be addressed before coming to the sea-changes of World War I: why did Syrians 
emigrate, and why did they arrive in the Americas? How did the immigrant entrepôts in three 
Atlantic port cities – New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires – become de facto Syrian 
colonies, what made them “colonial”? And perhaps most significantly, when did the mahjar's 
three largest communities become significant places for homeland activism? How and why did 
                                                          
81 Henry Melki, al-Sihafa al-ʿArabiyya fi al-Mahjar:wa-ʿAlaqatuha bi-l-Adab al-Mahjari (Beirut:Dar al-Sharq al-
Awsat li-l-Tibaʿ wa-l-Nashr, 1998), 30. 
82 On Italians, see Donna Gabaccia and Franco Iacovetta, eds. Women, Gender, and Transnational lives: Italian 
Workers of the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); on Mediterranean Jews in New York, see Devin 
Naar, “From the ‘Jerusalem of the Balkans’ to the ‘Goldene Medina:’ Jewish Immigration from Salonika to the 
United States,” in American Jewish History 93, no. 4 (2007): 435-473. At the same time, Chinese emigrant colonies 
emerged in Pacific port zones, most notably San Francisco, California, and Lima, Peru; see Adam McKeown, 
Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change, Perus, Chicago, and Hawai’i, 1900-1936 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 136-40.  
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this happen on the eve of World War I? 
 This chapter accomplishes three preliminary goals. First, it frames Syria’s mass 
emigration within the broader historical experience of late nineteenth century economic 
globalization and the mass labor migration that accompanied it. Global processes linked the 
Mediterranean world economy to the economic powerhouses emerging in the post-Abolition 
Atlantic: the proletarianization of skilled labor, the introduction of steamship passenger traffic, 
and the development of transnational circuits of credit, commerce, and capital drew Syrians, 
Greeks, Italians, and Sephardic Jews across oceans to participate in a “colonization” of port cities 
in the new World. Second, this chapter lays out a brief history of the three largest Syrian 
“colonies” in the Americas before World War I: Washington Street’s “Little Syria” in New York 
City, Rua 25 de Marzo in São Paulo, Brazil, and Avenida Corrientes in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
I build the case for comparing these three colonies through an examination of their social, 
intellectual, and political institutions, and I argue that through these institutions a shared, 
transnational political culture emerged on the eve of World War I. Finally, the chapter closes with 
an exploration of how the Ottoman Empire’s 1908 Young Turk Revolution played out between 
the three Syrian colonies, demonstrating that the political connectivities I pursue in this thesis 
had significant Ottoman precursors, and also foreshadowing the development of a political praxis 
that was “transnational” before it became “long-distance nationalist” during World War I. 
Syrian Emigration in Global Context 
 Syrians and Lebanese began to leave the coastal Levant as early as the mid-eighteenth 
century. Between the 1750s and the 1880s, the first, rather small emigration wave from Ottoman 
Syrian comprised mostly of Syrian urban elites, headed for the Egyptian cities of Cairo and 
Alexandria for work in commerce and the professions. These émigré elites, numbering about 
4,000 according to Thomas Philipp, came from the wealthiest Greek Catholic households in 
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Aleppo and Damascus; once in Egypt their patterns of settlement set them apart from native 
Egyptians, as elites merchants connected to French commerce and as foreign émigrés.83 
Although this elite wave of emigration was not a mass migration nor did later emigrants leaving 
Syria resemble its elite character, the Syrian community that emerged in Cairo by the mid-
eighteenth century established important precedents for the emigrant settlements that appeared 
later in the Americas. The Syrians in Egypt developed the earliest Arabic language periodicals, 
for instance, and within them this community nurtured a vibrant literary culture that borrowed 
late nineteenth century notions about civilizations East and West, social progress through public 
education, and political reform through tactful borrowing and Western political theory. And as 
Syrians settled in larger numbers in the Americas, their own periodicals entered into conversation 
with their counterparts in Cairo, for instance, in Naʿum Labaki’s al-Afkar in Brazil.84 These 
ideas, and an array of related notions about Islamic legal reform, literary renewal, and the 
emergence of an authentic Arab liberalism are known as al-nahda [renaissance].85 In many ways, 
Syrian emigrants leaving for the Americas emulated Syrian Cairo as the model for an illustrious 
and civilized diasporic lifestyle. Indeed, many of the first Syrians to arrive in America had spent 
months or years in Cairo along the way, and at the same time, Syrian emigrants continued to 
arrive in Egypt even as the colonies of New York, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires grew to numbers 
over and above their Cairene compatriots. Although this thesis focuses on Syrian and Lebanese 
communities across the Americas post-1900, it must be remembered that Egypt was (and 
remained) the beating heart of the early Syrian mahjar. That Syrian American communities had 
                                                          
83Thomas Philipp, The Syrians of Egypt, 1725-1975 (Stutgartt: Berliner Islamstudien Bd, 1985), 11-2. 
84 Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), 35-9. 
85 On the nahda, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Marwan Buheiry, ed. Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890-1919 (Beirut: American 
University of Beirut, 1981). 
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historical ties to older networks of Syrian émigrés in Egypt was a given, but more than that, the 
Egyptian “mother colony” continually conditioned successive waves of emigration, conditioning 
the intellectual and political cultures which emerged farther abroad.86 
 The Syrian emigration that produced the colonies in New York, São Paulo, and Buenos 
Aires constituted a “second wave,” running from around 1880 to the beginning of World War I in 
1914.87 The migrants and their children born in the mahjar (the “second-generation”) are the 
subjects in this study; these migrants were youthful, the first of them being unmarried or 
recently-married men and male relatives, they were typically of the middling peasant classes 
from Syria’s smaller towns or from rugged Mount Lebanon.88 Many of these migrants were 
recent additions to a budding educated bourgeoisie, frequently educated in the French, American, 
or Russian missionary schools which dotted the Syrian landscape over the courses of the 
nineteenth century’s second half. Those young men most likely to emigrate were part of a 
generation of rising expectations and a discordant contraction of economic opportunity: a rising 
population, booming urbanization, increasing literacy, and improved access to higher education, 
on one hand, and mounting land hunger and debt, a global crash in the silk market (the premier 
cash crop of coastal Syria) in the 1870s, and a dismal employment outlook in the urban 
professions at home, on the other.89 Economic decisions in both Mount Lebanon and the rest of 
                                                          
86 Alixa Naff refers to New York City as the Syrian “mother colony” as the hub for Syrian American thought and 
society in the United States. The New York colony fed other, smaller colonies of Syrians via employment networks 
and social work: Utica and Buffalo, New York, and Boston, Fall River, Worcester, and Lowell, Massachusetts. In the 
grander scheme of the entire Syrian diaspora, however, the Syrian settlement in Cairo is the clearest waypoint for 
early Syrian emigrants to the Americas. I borrow her term to express a common experience of migration to and 
through the core colony; Alixa Naff, "New York: The Mother Colony," in A Community of Many Worlds: Arab 
Americans in New York City, Philip Kayal and Kathleen Benson, eds (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 
7-10. 
87 Thomas Phillipp notes that Cairo and Alexandria both experienced a second wave of Syrian immigration during 
the same period, The Syrians in Egypt, 58-62. 
88 Akram Khater concludes that “most emigrants from the Mountain were poor, but not destitute” peasants, driven by 
land hunger as well as mounting expectations for economic and social advancement; Khater, Inventing Home, 56. 
89 Roger Owen, “The Provinces of Greater Syria, 1850-1880,” The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 
(New York: I.B. Taurus, 1981), 158-161. 
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coastal Syria were made at the household level; families sought upwards mobility through the 
selective out-migration of young men, a pattern Leslie Page Moch has identified as the 
transnationalization of the cottage economic model. As flexible economic units, families could 
deploy male and female labor in a complementary manner, but the system depended on both.90 
Akram Khater notes that in Syria, young women entered into wage work in the spinning and 
reeling of silk as a means of bolstering men’s labor (and honor) in a peasant agricultural system 
or through mercantile emigration.91 By joining male labor emigration with female industrial 
work, for a time this transnational family papered over some of the dislocations attendant to the 
region’s entrance into the global world economy. Once in the Americas, Syrian men depended on 
a budding system of credit-making and employment agents to find quick work in petty retail, 
particularly in the peddling of textiles (both silk and cotton) and dry goods (coffee, sewing 
notions, groceries, etc).92 The family economy of late nineteenth century Syria retained aspects 
of both peasant and proletarian economies, through a gendered division of labor, peasants 
became workers engaged already in a complex transnational economic system. 
 Selective emigration as part of a nineteenth century family economy was not only a 
Syrian, or even Mediterranean, phenomenon, and similar patterns of migration emerged 
simultaneously in Italy, China, Japan, and within Europe, in response to the same global 
economic pressures. And the scale of these global migrations was truly immense: between the 
mid- and late-nineteenth century, for instance, an estimated 50 to 55 million Europeans – 20 
                                                          
90 Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1750 (Bloomington; University of 
Indian Press, 1992), 69; see also Leslie Page Moch, “Connecting Migration and World History, Demographic 
Patterns, Family Systems and Gender,” in International Review of Social History 52 (2007), 102-4. On Syrian 
female emigration, see Sara Gualtieiri,“Gendering the Chain Migration Thesis: Women and Syrian Transatlantic 
Migration, 1878-1924,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, no. 1 (2004) 71-4. 
91 Akram Fouad Khater, “’House’ to ‘Goddess of the House:’ Gender, Class, and Silk in 19th Century Mount 
Lebanon,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 3 (1996), 329-31. 
92 Alixa Naff, Becoming American: the Early Arab Immigrant Experience (Carbondale, IL: University of Illinois 
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percent of Europe's entire population – participated in the Atlantic migration circuit. 93 Between 
1870 and 1914, some 14 million Italians emigrated, constituting around 39 percent of the 
peninsula’s total pre-World War I population.94 In this light, the concurrent departure of between 
18 and 25 percent of bilad al-sham's total population looks typical of broader trends on the trans-
Atlantic circuit.95 Like European migrants, Syrians typically (but not exclusively) headed for 
developing countries in the Atlantic.96 Like other Mediterranean migrants (especially the 
Italians), Syrians were more likely to settle in port cities and to engage in either small-scale 
commerce or industrial textile work.97  
By the beginning of World War I, cash remittances and investments made by Syrian 
emigrants came to constitute the central pillar of Syria’s homeland economy. The rudimentary 
character of the mahjar’s early banking industry and the common practice of clandestine cash 
remittances makes tracing their impact on Syria a difficult undertaking, but Charles Issawi 
clearly demonstrates the accelerating tilt of the economy towards emigrant remittances even 
through an incomplete body of data. He finds that by 1900, Mount Lebanon received around 
200,000 British Pounds in remittances from the Americas; by 1910, this number appreciated to 
                                                          
93Dirk Hoerder, Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the Second Millennium (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 331-2. 
94 Donna Gabaccia and Fraser Ottanelli, eds, Italian Workers of the World: Labor Migration and the Formation of 
Multiethnic States (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 6.  
95Moch, Moving Europeans, 147; Charles Issawi, “The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration, 1800-1914,” 
in Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi, eds., Lebanese in the World: a Century of Emigration (London: I.B. 
Taurus and Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), 31 
96 Smaller flows of Syrian emigrants continued to head to Egypt, and to West Africa after 1900. Communities of 
Syrians also emerged in western Europe, particularly in London, Paris, and Marseilles. See Xerxes Malki, 
“Productive Aliens: Economic Planning and the Lebanese in Ghana, 1930-1972,” Mashriq & Mahjar 1 (2013), 85-
114; Andrew Arsan, Interlopers of Empire: the Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Fred Halliday, “The Millet of Manchester: Arab Merchants and the Cotton Trade,” British 
Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 2 (1992), 159-170.  
97 Samuel Baily concludes that before 1914, one third of all Italian immigrants in Argentina lived in Buenos Aires 
(totaling 312,000), and one quarter of all Italians in the United States concentrated in New York City (toalling 
370,000), Immigrants in the Land of Promise: Italians of Buenos Aires and New York City, 9-10. Angelo Trento finds 
the tendency intensified in Brazil, where 71 percent of Italian immigrants settled in São Paulo prior 1905, 
“’Wherever We Work, That Land is Ours:’ The Italian Anarchist Press and Working-Class Solidarity in São Paulo,” 
in Italian Workers of the World, 103. 
62 
 
800,000, reflecting both the growing numbers of emigrants and their commercial success 
abroad.98 By 1917, emigrant remittances constituted Mount Lebanon’s single largest economic 
resource, comprising 220 million Ottoman piastres per annum compared to the silk trade's 60 
million, agriculture's 30 million, and industry's 10 million piastres.99 World War I, of course, 
accounts for a sharp decline in agricultural returns, and much of the 220 million that Issawi 
reports comes in the form of wartime relief. But nevertheless, these numbers throw into stark 
relief the level of economic influence the mahjar came to posess; remittances presented a 
significant portion of Syria’s economy during times of stability, and in periods of wont and 
catastrophe, they provided an essential economic lifeline. 
The remittance economy influenced patterns of consumption within the Syrian and 
Lebanese family, bearing dramatic consequences for the shape of the family especially in terms 
of socioeconomic class and internal gender norms. As Akram Khater demonstrates, those 
families that had several sons in the mahjar came to form a new upwardly mobile middle class; 
as they expanded their homes into red-tiled villas across coastal Lebanon, the families of 
emigrants set themselves apart by their affluent spending patterns, preference for the nuclear 
family unit, and their focus on developing Lebanese schools, charities, businesses, and public 
infrastructure.100 The growing affluence of the homeland as a result of emigrant remittances (and 
of returning emigrants themselves-- some 45 percent of Mountain Lebanese who left before 1920 
later returned to the Mountain during the interwar period)101 altered the landscape and the culture 
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of the homeland. 
Although economic factors presented the most important causes of Syrian emigration 
during the period, political and social factors also played a role. First, Syrian and Lebanese 
Christians, particularly Maronites, Melkites (Greek Catholics), Syrian and Greek Orthodox, and 
Syrian Protestants emigrated in larger numbers than Sunnis, Shiʿis, Druze, Alawis, or Armenian 
Christians (although all of these groups did engage in selective sojourning).102 Many historians 
conclude that the arrival of foreign missionaries in Syria and their role in advancing Syria's 
educational system opened the gates of emigration for young pupils enrolled in these schools.103 
As the Orthodox and Maronite Churches competed with Russian, American, and French 
missionary groups, new schools cropped up across the Levant and competed with one another for 
enrollments.104 Many of the earliest Syrian emigrants were educated in missionary secondary 
schools and colleges, especially the French Jesuit Université Saint Joseph (USJ) and the 
American Presbyterian Syrian Protestant College (SPC, later renamed the American University 
of Beirut, AUB). Alumni from these institutions often formed informal networks of assistance for 
their colleagues seeking to move abroad, providing employment and occassionally influencing 
where new emigrants decided to settle. After graduating from USJ, for instance, Lebanese 
                                                          
102 Unfortunately, the true ratios between these groups can be estimated only at great hazard, due in no smaller part 
to the problems and pitfalls of the 1921 Lebanese Mandate’s census, which remains the most commonly cited 
statistical source for reporting population data in the Lebanese diaspora. For a thorough summary of the data 
reported in this census, see Kohei Hashimoto, “Lebanese Population Movement 1920-1939,” Lebanese in the World, 
66. The caveat remains, though, that Hashimoto’s data (the census itself) was likely inaccurate on its reporting on 
non-Christian Lebanese emigrants. As it is, only anecdotal evidence (and not hard statistics) points to the 
demographic weight of non-Christian Syrian and Lebanese groups. It remains that Christians (particularly Maronites 
and Greek Orthodox) numerically dominated the American mahjar. What is less clear is by what ratio they did so. 
See Chapter 3 for details the 1921 census and related issues. 
103 Philip M. Kayal and Joseph Kayal, The Syrian-Lebanese in America: a Study in Religion and Assimilation 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 197), 107-8; Michael Suleiman, “Impressions of New York City by Early Arab 
Immigrants,” in A Community of Many Worlds: Arab Americans in New York City, ed. Kathleen Benson and Philip 
Kayal (New York: Museum of the City of New York, 2002), 43, 46; Alixa Naff, Becoming American, 36-7;  
104 Isa As’ad, Tarikh Homs, vol. 2 (Homs: Mutraniyyat Homs al-Urthudoxiyya, 1983), 386; Ussama Makdisi, Faith 
Misplaced: the Broken Promise of U.S –Arab Relations, 1820-2001 (New York: Perseus Books, 2010), 51-3.  
64 
 
publisher Na’um Mukarzil (a man whose story laces throughout the following chapters) arrived 
in Cairo in 1897 to work at a Jesuit school, and then in New York to attend a Jesuit medical 
school,105 while Dr. Khalil Sa’adeh would travel through Cairo, Buenos Aires, and São Paulo 
between 1892 and 1925 working entirely through SPC alumni networks.106 
 Second, within the Syrian and Lebanese emigrant communities abroad, narratives of 
political repression or religious persecution developed after World War I, drawing the interest of 
historians who have in turns called the “persecution theory” a pervasive diasporic myth or an 
observable reality. It is clear that Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s strict checks on the press, on free 
expression, and his regime’s surveillance of intellectuals and constitutionalist reformers proved 
too stifling for Syrian elites and professionals, many of whom could afford to leave the Empire 
for political reasons. Indeed, the development and vitality of the first Syrian newspapers in Cairo 
was due in part to the Sultan’s repressive censorship policies; under British occupation after 
1882, Cairo was not a pleasant place to be Egyptian but the lot of the Syrian émigrés improved 
notably, and many worked for British administrators.107 That said, there developed at some point 
long after the fact a narrative about Syrian flight from the Mashriq centered on endemic political 
and especially religious persecution.108 More recent analyses of the persecution narrative have 
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revealed such narratives to be partly a construction of a diasporic self-image.109 Older histories 
that frame emigration from Mount Lebanon as a consequence of the violence of 1860, for 
instance, do not closely consider that mass emigration began in the late 1870s and continued 
through the 1910s, a time the local political and religious climate became comparatively 
comfortable. The “long peace” of the Lebanese mutasarrifiyya period (1861 to 1915) does not 
resemble the descriptions of out-and-out religious persecution of religious minorities as a cause 
of emigration.110 Instead, it appears that discussions about persecution arose out of an early 
twentieth century debate over changes to Ottoman conscription laws which required military 
service of all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of millet (non-Muslims had until then been excluded 
from military service).111 Dodging military conscription presented one motivation for young 
Syrian and Lebanese men emigrating abroad, certainly,112 but the conflation of this story with a 
larger theme of “religious persecution” should be looked at as a relic of late Ottoman political 
discourse, not as an explanatory force promoting the mass emigration of Syrians.113 
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 By 1914, an estimated 1 in 4 Lebanese and 1 in 6 Syrians had left for the mahjar, whether 
on the temporary or permanent basis. In some villages, as many as half of the able-bodied 
workforce had gone abroad, leading to the feminization of many of Mount Lebanon's smaller 
agricultural settlements.114 The move out followed two broad patterns which determined the 
mahjar 's shape and its patterns of settlement: step migration and chain migration. Step migration 
described the process by which migrants moved through multifaceted circuits of migration, 
checking in at several waypoints along the way. The primary nodes in this circuit were port cities 
linked by French and Syrian shipping companies: Beirut, Alexandria, Marseilles, New York, São 
Paulo, Buenos Aires, etc. But would-be emigrants did not simply move from one point to another 
in this system; rather, the more typical sojourn began with an extended stay in Beirut, followed 
by a stop in one or more port cities abroad that could last weeks, months, or even years.115 
Before Nami Jafet arrived in São Paulo, Brazil to become one of the mahjar’s most important 
textile moguls (see section below, “A Colonia”) he accompanied his brother, Antonius, and a 
small group of his co-villagers in a passage from Beirut to Alexandria and then to Naples, Italy. 
Three weeks later, his group boarded a steamship headed for Spain, stopping in Barcelona, and 
on to Rio de Janiero (a trip, Antonius Jafet recalled in his memoirs, took some three weeks on the 
open ocean). He arrived in Brazil in September 1903, and made haste for São Paulo to build an 
empire in cotton.116 Sometimes these stops lasted not days or weeks, but years: Dr. Khalil 
Saʿadih , for instance, spent 21 years in Cairo (1892-1913), followed by 6 in Buenos Aires 
                                                          
University of California Press, 1997), 83. 
114Charles Issawi, “The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration, 1800-1914,” in Lebanese in the World, 31. 
115 Indeed, Leila Fawaz illustrates that between 1860 and the 1890s, Damascenes migrated to Beirut in numbers 
large enough to alter the city’s confessional demographics. Older migration “steps,” even generational ones, were 
significant because they joined internal migration systems to international ones, influencing patterns of commerce in 
the meantime; Leila Tarazi Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 
1983), 58-60. 
116 Antonius Jafet, Dhikrayyat: Nisf Qarn 1903-1953 (São Paulo: Dar al-Tib’a wa-l-Nashr al-‘Arabiyya, 1957), 10-1. 
67 
 
(1914-1920), and then 14 more in São Paulo (1920-1934).117 
Similarly, Syrians who arrived in the major port cities of the Americas-- in São Paulo, 
Buenos Aires, or New York City-- would find themselves among thriving Syrian colonies already 
established there. But these “mother colonies” were not typically a migrant’s final destination or 
endpoints unto themselves; many Syrians tarried there for a time, another waypoint along the 
way, meeting with employment agents who descended upon New York from the textile firms of 
Massachusetts, from the pack-peddling businesses that drew Syrians progressively towards Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, or the Midwest, or to Michigan’s auto plants.118 Some of these firms were run by 
Syrians and Lebanese businessmen themselves: in São Paulo, Nami Jafet contracted Syrian and 
Lebanese workers arriving in Brazil to work in his Ypiranga factory.119 Networks of employment 
nearly always began at the ports of entry but often drew itinerant Syrian and Lebanese workers 
towards the interior, especially in the peddling trade, celebrated in the history of this diaspora.120 
At the same time, however, as the three largest colonies in the Americas, New York City, São 
Paulo, and Buenos Aires remained critical nodes in this emerging system as commercial and 
intellectual “capitals” in the Syrian mahjar. Step-by-step, nearly all Syrian and Lebanese 
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migrants to the Americas laid their feet in one of these three communities.121  
The second pattern that determined the shape of Syrian communities in the Americas was 
chain migration. Chain migration describes the tendency for migrants to move along migration 
circuits guided by the advice or itineraries of friends, family, or fellow villagers and governed by 
networks of social capital and trust.122 Trustworthy leads on employment or the ability to seek 
sponsorship from an older male relative helped determine where a would-be Syrian migrant 
would land in the Americas; such contacts also determined the route he took, what kind of work 
her undertook, and very often the level of success he could expect while abroad. Promises of 
ready employment, credit, or simply information about opportunities abroad enticed new 
emigration, but also created a system whereby towns and villages with the densest connections to 
the mahjar saw higher levels of emigration as well as denser patterns or resettlement. 
 Annual emigration of Syrians and Lebanese waxed and waned between the 1880s and 
1920s, with the clearest peak being the years immediately preceding World War I. Elie Safa 
estimates that in the last four decades of the nineteenth century, 120,000 Lebanese left the 
Mountain prior 1900.123 Kemal Karpat shows that between 1900 and 1914, another estimated 
225,000 left bilad al-sham.124 The problems that undermine such rough estimates aside, the trend 
towards increasing emigration after the year 1900 is clear, despite that the Ottoman government 
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sought to check the continuing outflow of Syrian and Lebanese Arabs after the 1890s.125 By the 
years immediately preceding the War, around 15,000 to 20,000 Syrians were emigrating 
annually, a flow stemmed immediately by the wartime blockade of the eastern Mediterranean, 
but which resumed after 1920.126 
 By the 1920s, Syrian and Lebanese communities in the Americas assumed the diaspora's 
new center of gravity. A look at the numbers demonstrates the shifting quantitative weight of the 
communities in Brazil, Argentina, and the United States. By the mid-1920s, the Syrian 
communities in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina constituted 50.7 percent of the entire 
Syrian diaspora. Of the 688,917 Lebanese emigrants recorded before 1926, the United States had 
received 29 percent, or around 200,000. The U.S. was the largest receiving country prior World 
War I. For its part Brazil counted a total of around 177,000, or 25.7 percent, and Argentina 
boasted 110,000, or 16 percent of the Syrian diaspora. Mass immigration of Syrians had not been 
recorded in the U.S., Argentina, or Brazil before 1880. But after 1880, Syrians arrived in all three 
countries in such large numbers that they each outpaced the older Syrian community in Egypt, 
which never grew larger than 120,000 (or 17.4 percent).127 These numbers demonstrate several 
things. First, although Syrian emigration to Egypt continued through the entire nineteenth 
century, these numbers reveal a slowing of that migration and the preference for American 
destinations, especially the United States. They also demonstrate the strength of the colonies in 
Brazil, Argentina, and the United States in particular, especially when the demographic strength 
of other destinations is compared. Mexico, for example, had roughly 20,000 Syrian immigrants, 
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or 2.9 percent; Cuba, another well-known colony, was only 16,000 strong, or 2.3 percent.128 
Comparing and Connecting the Syrian Colonies of the Americas 
 Where the Mediterranean experience of the nineteenth century’s economic convergence 
was one of mass labor migration, the Atlantic economies in North and South America 
experienced these shifts as rapid, exponential expansions in agricultural output, industrial 
development, and a booming export-driven economy. Nowhere did these economic boons hold 
truer than in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, and none were more changed over the 
course of the nineteenth century. In the early to mid-nineteenth century, all three countries were 
large, underpopulated, with only tenuous territorial claims to the lands purportedly under their 
domains. All three saw civil wars and conflicts due to competing claims to economic expansion, 
and all three countries had themselves emerged from colonial pasts. In the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century, all three countries used foreign immigration as a means of domesticating new 
lands, increasing cultivation, building industrial infrastructure (especially railroads), and 
critically, developing its labor force after the global abolition of slavery. And by any of measure, 
the economic growth experienced simultaneously by the United States, Brazil, and Argentina 
was exponential. Between 1870 and 1914, the United States doubled its population and acres 
under cultivation, tripled its imports, quadrupled its exports, built a coast-to-coast rail, and 
increased its foreign investments by a factor of five.129 Although tempered slightly by an 1889 
military coup and the birth of a Republic, Brazil's railroad industry grew thirty-fold, and its 
agricultural exports (particularly coffee) grew steadily enough to support a doubling in 
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population.130 Argentina's growth was most astounding: influenced by the hemisphere's most 
permissive immigration regime, Argentina's population and level of foreign investments 
quadrupled between 1870 and 1914, its exports increased 17 times, and its imports multiplied 72 
fold.131 
 Such economic growth offered opportunity to new immigrants, and indeed, all three 
countries depended heavily on foreign labor to create these figures. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, all three governments equated the immigration and settlement of workers 
with national prosperity and progress, leading each to develop liberal immigration policies, often 
while competing with one another. The earliest laws governing immigration typically served the 
interest of producing foreign immigration, through incentive programs to attract the “right” kind 
of immigrant. In the United States, for instance, the first federal laws governing the conduct of 
immigration appear in the Immigration Act of 1864. Called “an Act to Encourage Immigration,” 
the 1864 Immigration Act endorsed government sponsorship of migrant laborers. It established a 
federal Immigration Commissioner whose job consisted of verifying the employment contracts 
of would-be immigrants prior their arrival, offering loans to contract laborers, and facilitating 
transportation to American shores. It channeled all new immigration through New York City, 
where the Immigration Commissioner's office was, and gave the Commissioner powers to create 
incentives to encourage mass migration (both temporary and permanent) to the United States. 
The 1864 Act provided the basis for all U.S. immigration policy until 1882, when a new logic of 
immigration restriction took hold, disqualifying the infirm, the insane, the unskilled, and most 
infamously, new immigrants from China from entry into the United States.132  
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Like the United States, Brazil encouraged and subsidized new immigrants through much 
of the nineteenth century, and like the United States and Argentina, Brazil targeted “desirable” 
European immigrants in particular. Brazil emerged under Don Pedro I after declaring its 
independence from Portugal in 1822, and very quickly after declaring its territorial sovereignty. 
Pedro I envisioned himself as a modernizer, and his new regime pushed for well-managed, state-
sponsored mass immigration as the path to economic development and self-sufficiency.133 In the 
mid-1820s, the imperial government subsidized the immigration and resettlement of Germans in 
the provincial towns surrounding Rio de Janiero and São Paulo with the goal of creating 
agricultural colonies there. The project continued through the 1850s and was successful in 
expanding Brazil’s lands under cultivation and establishing Brazil's coffee industry.134 The 
imperial government saw the selective colonization of agrarian peasant groups as the best model 
for domesticating new lands, expanding cultivation, and shoring up Brazil’s claims upon its 
hinterland. Such settlement strategies were commonplace in the nineteenth century, not merely in 
the Americas but globally; in the same moment, for instance, the Ottoman Empire resettled 
Circassian, Arab, and Kurdish nomads in its southern provinces within carefully provisioned 
agricultural settlements, and in Egypt, Muhammad Ali constructed a massive, state-owned cotton 
industry that depended on the forced resettlement and corvee of local labor.135 This was an 
historical moment, in other words, where free and forced labor migration was widely seen as a 
tool of the state, necessitated by the demand for economic development and the advancement of 
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the world capitalist economy. But in Brazil, Dom Pedro I’s incentive programs drew not only the 
Germans, Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese immigrants his government actively solicited, but 
also unintended Mediterranean groups: Sephardic Jews, Syrians, and Lebanese, who made their 
first appearance in the twilight of the Empire in the early 1880s.136  
In Argentina, the Constitution of 1853 codified an open philosophy linking the free 
immigration of foreign workers to national prosperity. In articles 20 through 25, for instance, the 
Constitution endorsed the immigration of any national group that contributed demonstrably to 
Argentine society. The document especially emphasized the promotion of European immigration, 
and awarded foreign residents the same legal and civil rights (including property rights,) as 
native Argentine citizens. Any foreign arrival could apply for nationalization after only two years 
of residence in the Republic.137 
 Beginning around the mid-nineteenth century and speeding significantly during the 
1860s, the governments of the United States, Brazil, and Argentina enacted policies and 
incentive programs designed to foster new labor immigration into their territories in the interest 
of economic expansion. Not only did the permissive immigration regimes of all three countries 
resemble one another (and they were likely written in reference to one another), it also appears 
that through them the governments of the United States, Brazil, and Argentina competed with for 
the most “desirable” immigrants, creating labor hierarchies while also influencing the flow of 
migrant labor between them. 138 For instance, when in the 1880s the United States placed new 
restrictions on ships coming from Mediterranean ports (citing health considerations, quarantining 
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ships or even sending them south of the equator),139 greater numbers of Syrians, Italians, and 
other Mediterranean migrants arrived in Buenos Aires, where the customs laws remained 
comparative laxer. When Argentine nativists got wind of these changes, however, they renewed 
their efforts to restrict the free immigration of those potentially rejected by their northern 
neighbors.140 
 It was into this Atlantic world of countervailing tensions, disputations, and contradictions 
that Syrian and Lebanese found themselves in upon their arrival to “America.”141 In these settler 
societies of the Atlantice, was immigration a path towards economic betterment, or an economic, 
medical, or moral threat? Were these Mediterranean “Turks” (an ethnic misnomer used by 
immigration authorities in all three receiving states until after 1900, referring to their status as 
Ottoman subjects)142 to contribute to the commercial wealth of the cities they inhabited, or were 
they a venal and insular lot, as American nativists complained? In the nineteenth century 
American imaginary, new immigration was read in terms of “colonization” and “settlement.” The 
question that vexed American, Brazilian, and Argentinian public officials in the late nineteenth 
century was: to what extent were these new “colonists” like our own? Were these settlers or 
sojourners? Immigration was a critical issue not merely because it influenced economic 
development in these three American societies: it was an issue because immigration, and the 
incorporation of new immigrants, became a critical part of the Brazilian, Argentine, and 
                                                          
139Ignacio Klich, “Criollos and Arabic Speakers in Argentina: an uneasy Pas de Deux, 1988-1914,” in Lebanese in 
the World, 242-3. 
140Bayly, Immigrants in the Lands of Promise, 79. 
141 Indeed, many among the early Syrian arrivals were less aware of precisely where in “America” they had been 
brought: the United States, Brazil, and Argentina were all subsumed under this self-reported category, reflecting both 
the vague sense of the new immigrant’s heading (new migrants, Khater argues, often acting on tips, rumors, and 
success stories from “Amerka”) as well as the not-unheard of practice for passenger shipping agents to tell their 
passengers they were in the United States whether it that was accurate or not. Khater, Inventing Home, 62. 
142 The term also carried the implication of “Muslim” with it, a conflation that was often incorrect as many of these 
Syrian and Lebanese migrants in the Americas were Christian. Sarah M. A. Gualtieri, Between Arab and White: 
Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian American Diaspora (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 52-3. 
75 
 
American national narratives as well.143 As “settler societies,” there was purportedly space for all 
newcomers, as long as they fit the narrative of the settler. It is unsurprising that like other 
Mediterranean immigrants, the Syrians sought to fit themselves into the mold of “colonist,” 
quickly folding themselves into the expanding Atlantic economies they encountered. As will be 
seen in the following sections, the development of certain types of migrant social institutions in 
the Syrian colonies of New York, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires was aided both by a desire to 
protect and integrate new immigrant into the colonies and by a need to present the colony’s self-
sufficiency, productivity, and contribution to the larger settler societies they inhabited.  
The New York Colony: “Little Syria” on Washington Street 
 Between the 1870s and 1926, some 200,000 Syrians immigrated to or through the United 
States of America, representing around 29 percent of the global Syrian diaspora.144 The oldest 
and largest Syrian settlement in the U.S. was in Lower Manhattan, in the “Little Syria” 
neighborhood on Washington 
Street. Situated between 
Battery Park and Rector 
Street, Washington Street 
became a hub for Syrian 
American commerce and 
religious life for some 8,000 
Syrian immigrants, who 
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blended with adjacent communities of Italian, Irish, Sephardic, Greek, and Eastern European 
immigrants entering through the ports at Ellis and Castle Islands.145 Some went on to work for 
the railroads, others headed north for the textile mills of Lawrence, Boston, Fall River, and 
Lowell, Massachusetts, but the bulk of the early immigrants worked as peddlers and small-time 
entrepreneurs and an increasingly sophisticated Syrian carrying trade.146 An entire Syrian 
economy developed in New York that joined the migration “industry” to itinerant peddling: 
shipping companies, customs agents, lenders, and employers within a dense network of personal 
contact. The Damascene U.S. Customs agent mentioned above, Najib Arbeely, also presided over 
his own employment agency devoted to extending credit to newcomers and getting them started 
in the sale of cheap cloth goods arriving at his port daily from Mediterranean Europe.147 Soon 
enough, a banker from Mount Lebanon named Daniel Faour opened the colony’s first bank, 
which directed most of the immigrants’ commerce in small goods between port and peddlers. 
After arriving on Ellis Island, Syrian migrants depended on contacts like Arbeely and institutions 
like Faour Brothers bank to help arrange employment for them within or beyond Washington 
Street. Once they got there, these Syrians also found a sophisticated set of service institutions 
also ready to meet the social, cultural, and economic demands of a Syrian colony: boarding 
houses, hostels, restaurants, parlors and cafes provided the comforts of home and spaces of 
sociability to the emerging ethnic neighborhood.148  
Although the earliest migrants to New York were predominantly male, Syrian women 
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also made the journey. This was particularly true of young, unmarried women, who conducted a 
carrying trade in domestic items for the home, operated entirely within female circles.149 Indeed, 
the immigration of Syrian women to the United States was conditioned in part by women's 
experience in silk production on Mount Lebanon. The eclipse of Syria's silk industry, the result 
of crashing prices and the rise of Japanese silk,150 correlated to the outmigration of Syrian 
women and serves to explain two distinct streams of female migration: young, unmarried women 
workers (working in both textiles and peddling),151 and married women rejoining male relatives 
or participating in the bride trade (itself the object of much contention in the colonies).152  
 What transformed Washington Street from a simple ethnic neighborhood into a Syrian 
“colony” was the development of transnational institutions that linked this Syrian settlement to 
others in the mahjar as well as to geographic Syria. Transnational commercial institutions, 
mutual aid societies, and the periodical press lent Little Syria its own social coherence by 
providing new arrivals with credit, lodging, and information about jobs or local culture, but these 
groups also operated between Syria’s communities abroad, altering the intellectual gravity of the 
entire diaspora. Washington Street became a significant site of Syrian publishing, in a flowering 
of print culture that peaked between 1900 and 1914. Syrian newspapers from New York were 
widely circulated, read by Syrians locally but also exported to other Syrian communities in the 
Americas. The more successful newspaper firms expanded into full-scale publishing houses: al-
Huda and Mirat al-Gharb each produced significant numbers of serials, novellas, plays, and 
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didactic materials which they sold through subscription.153 The Syrian presses of New York 
were, at the outset, closely linked with those in Cairo: not only did these newspapers regularly 
reprint editorials from al-Muqtataf, al-Muqattam, and al-Hilal, these papers also having been 
founded by Syrian and Lebanese emigrants.154 The fruition of this new print culture, furthermore, 
fostered new patterns of migration, as Washington Street drew some of Syria’s most well-known 
writers and public intellectuals after 1900, for instance, Farah Antun, who spent nine years 
developing an American branch for his Cairene paper al-Jamiʿa, or Najib Diab, who founded 
Mirat al-Gharb after following the Arbeelys from Cairo.155 If Cairo was the place to cut one’s 
teeth in the newspaper industry in the 1880s and 1890s, after 1900, that place was 
unambiguously New York City. Where Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s censorship policies lent 
the Syrian presses of Egypt their vitality after 1878, the growing commercial and political 
significance of Washington Street brought the newspapermen further abroad.156  
 The vibrancy of New York City’s Syrian press was helped along by a tendency towards 
political and religious particularism, as well as the widely-held belief that the newspaper role 
was to “represent” the Syrian mahjar as a whole (a sentiment that produced an enormous amount 
of competition between Syrian newspapers with opposing political views). Henry Malki 
demonstrates, for example, that each political or confessional group in New York had its own 
publishing house by the eve of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution: among the largest papers, there 
was the “Maronite” paper (al-Huda), the “Orthodox” paper (Mirat al-Gharb), the pro-Hamidian 
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paper (al-Bayan, also called the “Druze” paper by Malki), and an anti-clerical paper (al-
Muhajir), among others.157 Several historians of the émigré press have built towards a 
“typology” of these newspapers on the basis of their respective political affiliations.158 But the 
orientations of these newspapers were constantly in flux, rapidly changing with the political 
landscape as well as with the demands of their readership. al-Huda, for instance, typically 
described as a Francophile, pro-Lebanese Independence paper with pro-clerical leanings, went 
through periods where its editors made profound criticisms of French ambitions in the Levant 
and critiques of the Maronite clergy who held close relations with the French. Amin al-Rihani, a 
writer from Mount Lebanon whose work has been described as secular humanist, anti-clerical, 
and even socialist by historians,159 wrote weekly editorials for al-Huda during it first years in 
New York.160 In 1905, al-Rihani’s criticisms of the Maronite Church became so strident that 
Mukarzil dismissed him from the newspaper, but a wave of letters of protest by al-Rihani’s 
readers soon convinced Mukarzil to reinstate his regular column. The interruption lasted mere 
weeks.161 Although Syrian newspapers in New York had clear editorial bents and political 
perspectives, this incident demonstrates that a simple classification of papers on such bases 
papers over very real contests and debates occurring within their very pages. These papers were 
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about contest and conflict as much as consensus. 
Recognizing how in flux the political leanings of these newspapers were and how 
significantly editorial politics bore down on them is important because doing so changes the 
nature of their political conflicts. When al-Huda and Mirat al-Gharb clashed acrimoniously over 
the place of the clergy in Syrian and Lebanese politics, for instance, the explosive debates 
recorded in the press were less often about interconfessional politics they were about the 
emergence and development of a Syrian public sphere through print culture (see Chapter 2). 
Where typologists of the press have read the colorful rhetoric, accusations of treason, and 
internecine struggles of Syrian American newspaper editorials as evidence of the colony’s 
fractiousness, I argue that the development of this discourse, however colorful, shows a 
community in formation. The explosion in Syrian print culture in New York City, and the in-
fighting between the editors of Washington Street (whether vying for ideological positions of 
subscriber numbers), gave the Syrians of the New York colony a set of shared scripts and 
something to talk about as a community. 
 The question of citizenship in the United States was one of the New York colony’s first 
public issues, debated at length in the press. Although the “open door” immigration policies laid 
out in the 1864 Immigration Act remained technically in force, the rising tide of xenophobia in 
the 1880s led to new restrictions on Asian immigration and created new obstacles for Syrian 
immigrants seeking legal naturalization. The first federal restrictions on new immigration came 
with the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which barred new migration from East Asia and created a 
new logic for assessing the “desireability” of immigrants along the hierarchies of racial and 
national origins as well as issues of “assimilability.” Although the Syrians were not the target of 
the Exclusion Act, the introduction of new principles for assessing the race and national origins 
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of Asian immigrants between 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1917 (which placed strict quotas 
on the basis of national origins) created an environment that conflated whiteness with access to 
U.S. citizenship.162 Sarah Gualtieri demonstrates that in this setting, Syrian American groups in 
New York City to fight for the redefinition of their community as legally “white,” distinguishing 
themselves from other “Asiatic” immigrants by their historical roots in the Christian Holy Land 
and their racial connection to the Semites.163 Publishers Naʿum and Sallum Mukarzil as well as 
the Syrian American Association of New York (hereafter SAA) contested court decisions that 
denied Syrian immigrants access to citizenship. Beginning in the federal Appellate Court in 
1909, the SAA sued for unrestricted Syrian immigration and a “white” legal status, culminating 
in a federal decision in George Dow v United States in 1914, which ruled that as a Semitic 
people with Judeo-Christian roots, the Syrian people were legally Caucasian and thus eligible for 
U.S. naturalization. 
 Gualtieri notes in her discussion of the Dow case that the theatrics of Syrian American 
whiteness reverberated around the entire mahjar, enervating discussions about race, ethnicity, 
and national identity in the transnational Arabic press.164 The specter of Ottoman subjects living 
abroad obtaining American citizenship (and discarding their allegiances to the Empire) prompted 
the imperial government to rethink its own policies governing travel and emigration, placing new 
restrictions on passenger ships leaving the port of Beirut.165 At the same time, the Ottoman 
Consulate in New York City placed diplomatic pressure on the U.S. government to limit the 
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naturalization of Ottoman subjects living there.166 The Consulate also engaged in public relations 
overtures aimed at Syrian, Armenian, and Anatolian emigrants living in the city; In 1909, for 
instance, Ottoman consul Mundji Bey strongly encouraged Ottoman subjects living abroad to 
return to the Empire, and he invoked the progressive aims of the new constitutionalist 
government in doing so.  
Despite the Ottoman Consulate’s efforts to stem the flow of Syrians abroad, the arrival of 
Syrians to the New York colony continued apace between 1900 and 1914, largely unchecked by 
the Federal laws that sought to limit new immigration from Asia. During the dislocations of 
World War I, Syrian emigration halted for a time owing to an Allied blockade of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, but it quickly resumed in 1918 and reached pre-War numbers by 1924. However, 
that year, the enactment of a new federal legislation, the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, instituted a 
punitive national-origins quota for immigration from Syria at 100 new arrivals annually.167 With 
that, the bulk of new Syrian and Lebanese emigration flowed not into the United States but 
towards South America, particularly Brazil and Argentina. The Syrian colony on Washington 
Street, the largest single community of Syrians in the Americas before 1914, was soon eclipsed 
by the burgeoning settlement in São Paulo, Brazil. 
A Colonia: the Syrians of São Paulo on Rua 25 de Março 
 After World War I, the Syrian and Lebanese community in Brazil became the second 
largest in the American mahjar, and historians estimate that by 1926, around 177,000 Syrians 
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lived there, or 25.7 percent of the diaspora.168 Although slightly smaller than the numbers of 
Syrians living in the entire United States, Syrians settlement in Brazil was more tightly 
concentrated in the cities on the coast, making São Paulo the single largest urban Syrian colony 
by the mid-1920s.169  
The first Syrian immigrant to São Paulo is believed to have arrived in 1881, but mass 
migration did not commence for ten years after that. After 1891, however, Syrian migration into 
Brazil simply exploded: between 1881 and 1891, only 158 Middle Eastern immigrants came to 
Brazil (an ambiguous figure that includes Syrians), but between 1891 and 1916, the Brazilian 
government would document the arrival of 106,184 Ottoman Syrians in Brazil.170 The mass 
immigration of other groups into Brazil mirrors this trend: between 1890 and 1919, over 2.6 
million new immigrants arrived in Brazil: Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Germans, and 
Mediterranean Jews alongside the Syrians and Lebanese.171 Why mass immigration, and why 
this moment? Like other American settler states, Brazil’s economy was centered on plantation-
style agriculture fueled by African slave labor. Over the course of the 1880s, large landowners in 
Brazil found the continuation of African slavery an untenable political position. In 1888 (twenty-
five years after the Emancipation Proclamation in the United States, and some fifty years after 
the British Empire sought to extinguished the trans-Atlantic slave trade), Brazil formally 
abolished slavery. In nearly the same breath, the Empire of Dom Pedro II came to an end in 1889 
in a bloodless coup that gave way to a Brazilian Republic. The new Republic’s first order of 
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business was the encouragement of mass immigration to revive Brazil’s agricultural economy 
through free labor to replace the slavery institution.172 
From 1891 into World War I, Syrian and Lebanese immigration into Brazil continued at a 
pace between 1,000-4,000 arrivals annually, and peaked after the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908.173 During that period, between 4,000 and 8,000 Syrians entered annually, and in 1913 a 
record 11,101 Syrians came to Brazil, a large portion of them headed to São Paulo.174 The 
disruptions of World War I stymied the flow for a time, but it quickly rebounded in 1919 and 
continued through the 1920s. Like their compatriots in New York, the majority of São Paulo’s 
Syrians arriving in Brazil were unmarried (63.5 percent), male (70 percent), and a slight majority 
travelling without family (56 percent), a trend they shared with other immigrants entering 
between 1890 and 1939.175 But as in New York, young single men arriving alone participated in 
a transnational proletarian family economy, and many of them return to Syria at least once to call 
on male relatives or to marry.176  
 The permissiveness of Brazil's immigration regime in the 1890s made it a particularly 
attractive option for arriving Syrians, particularly because this very moment coincided with a 
trend towards restrictionism in the United States. Although federal laws in the U.S. did not 
prohibit the free migration of Syrians or other Mediterraneans, clauses in the 1882 Exclusion Act 
allowed the Immigration Commissioner in New York to restrict new immigration on medical 
grounds, quarantining steamships coming from the Mediterranean or turning them around 
                                                          
172 Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 60-1. 
173Shukri al-Khuri, "Sijil al-Asbaqiyya: Awaʾil Tarikhiyya li-l-Hijra al-Lubnaniyya fi al-Barazil," Abu al-Hawl 
(unknown 1924 issue), 3-5; Clark Knowlton, The Social and Spatial Mobility of the Syrian and Lebanese 
Community of São Paulo, Brazil,” in Lebanese in the World, 291. 
174 Knowlton, Spatial and Social Mobility of the Syrians and Lebanese in the City of São Paulo, 60. 
175 Secretário da Agricultura do Estado de São Paulo, Boletin do Serviço de Imigração e Colonização, no. 2, out. 
1940; via Truzzi, Patrícios: Sírios e Libaneses em São Paulo, 30. 
176 Truzzi, Patrícios: Sírios e Libaneses em São Paulo, 30. 
85 
 
(whereupon steamship operators would make a new heading for South America). Concerns about 
trachoma, tuberculosis, and even cholera prompted the authorities at Ellis Island to turn away 
scores of Syrians and Lebanese who subsequently arrived in São Paulo. Similarly, Syrians and 
Lebanese who failed to meet an ever-restrictive list of criteria for eligibility – local sponsorship, 
financial security, or literacy, for instance – might then find themselves in Brazil.177 Many of 
those who arrived in São Paulo in this manner worked there for a period of weeks, months, or 
years while planning a second trip north.178 Others would settle into the growing community on 
Rua 25 de Marco more permanently. Once in Brazil, Syrian and Lebanese immigrants swiftly 
found work in urban commerce, and particularly itinerant peddling. Peddling was a savvy choice 
for a variety of reasons: credit was readily available, the initial investment very small, and the 
trade very profitable; it was the ideal type of work for the unattached and entrepreneurial young 
Syrian man.  
 However, the development of a Syrian carrying trade centered on São Paulo flew in the 
face of official expectations. Since the days of Don Pedro I, Brazil’s lenient immigration regime 
was aimed squarely at producing a particular kind of immigrant: the agricultural laborer, whose 
toil in the field previously worked by slaves would not only enhance Brazil’s export-driven 
economy in cash crops like coffee, but would domesticate new lands, displace the old imperial 
class of large landholders from the days of the latifundia, and “whiten” Brazil’s labor force.179  
The image of the Syrian peddler (called the mascate) became a pervasive negative motif in 
Brazilian anti-immigration discourse. Peddlers were depicted as vagrant and parasitic, foiled 
against the virtues of intensive, sedentary labor in the agricultural settlements. But despite 
                                                          
177Clark Knowlton, “The Social and Spatial Mobility of the Syrian and Lebanese Community of São Paulo, Brazil,” 
in Lebanese in the World, 290-1. 
178 Naff, Becoming American, 109. 
179 Lesser, Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 52-3. 
86 
 
accusations of venality, the Syrian peddlers fulfilled a necessary part of the pastoral economy. By 
delivering small household items, textiles, sewing notions, salt, hats, and the like from urban São 
Paulo to the plantations (fazendas) of the hinterland, the Syrian peddling economy assisted and 
promoted Brazil’s pastoral economy and operated in stasis with it.180 And by capitalizing on the 
lack of commercial infrastructure in the rural countryside, the Syrians profited immensely, as 
reflected by the affluence of the São Paulo colony around the turn of the twentieth century. 
As in Syrian New York, textiles, sewing notions and ready-wear clothing constituted a 
significant chunk of the Syrian carrying trade.181 Many of these items even originated at the 
ports, even brought to the Americas by Syrian agents and migrants themselves. Everywhere in 
the mahjar the Syrians dealt extensively in cloth, and not merely in the Americas: as weaving 
and piecework boomed in turn of the century Homs, Hama, and Aleppo,182 Syrian-owned textile 
factories opened in England (the famous “millet of Manchester” that exported its textiles to 
Syrian communities in West Africa and the Americas).183 In New York City and the mills of New 
England, Syrian and Lebanese migrants engaged in weaving and garment-making. But Brazil’s 
Syrian cloth economy presented a major point of distinction between the São Paulo colony and 
its other counterparts in the Americas: in Brazil, Syrians did not join into the existing textile 
economy. They took it over, and relied on transnational connections linking the whole Syrian 
“colonial” world as markets for its cotton cloth.184 
In 1903, two Syrian traders, Nami and Antonius Jafet, arrived in São Paulo. Both 
graduates of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, the pair had already made a sizeable fortune 
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in transnational Syrian commerce, wholesaling from ports in Beirut and Mediterranean Europe to 
provide goods for the peddling trade of the Americas since the 1890s. By the time the brothers 
themselves emigrated abroad, they had already participated in the mahjar’s commercial economy 
for nearly a decade. What led them abroad was a new acquisition in São Paulo; the family had 
reinvested the proceeds derived from their wholesale business into a piece of land in Ypiranga, 
just outside São Paulo.185 On it, they planned the construction of a cotton processing plant, where 
the Jafets would refine, dye, and weave raw American cotton into bulk textiles bound for the 
wholesaler markets of the Syrian mahjar. By processing and refining the cloth themselves (as 
opposed to shipping it from various ports in the Mediterranean), the Jafets quickly became one of 
the mahjar’s most successful entrepreneurial families. Relying almost exclusively on Syrian 
labor contracted in São Paulo or from Syria, Nami Jafet helped foster a transnational Syrian 
commercial economy in the production, finishing, and piecework of cotton cloth. His factory 
opened in 1907, and with over 1,000 mechanized looms, it was the largest of its kind in Brazil. 
 
Figure 2: Jafet Factory in Ypiranga, Brazil; completed in 1907. Source: Antunius Jafet, Naʿimi Jafet: Hayatuhu, 
Amaluhu, wa-Atharuhu (São Paulo: Antunius Jafet s.p., 1934), 51. 
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Nami Jafet situated himself neatly into the economic aims and interests of both the Syrian 
mahjar and those of Brazilian society at large. On the one hand, Jafet’s use of Syrian immigrant 
labor fit within Brazilian economic ideas linking labor migration to economic expansion and 
national progress.186 On the other hand, Jafet’s factory produced cotton cloth that was exported to 
the rest of the Syrian world, sold on New York’s Washington Street, on Avenida Corrientes in 
Buenos Aires, in Syrian neighborhoods across the Americas and the Eastern Mediterranean. In 
1906, Jafet drafted a public proposal for developing a cooperative Syrian economy within urban 
Brazil: “Commerce is like war in that both pursuits require union and audacity,” he wrote in the 
local Syrian newspaper al-Afkar, “we will succeed in becoming well-established and winning 
over our competitors, but only through solidarity and synergy.”187 Jafet called for the creation of 
a collective economy for the Syrian colony that worked in the interest of Syrians abroad and at 
home, and called for the shunning of political and confessional enmities (al-ta’assub) in service 
to this goal. In the spirit of cooperative endeavor, he pledged lower margins for Syrian traders 
who purchased his cloth and devoted a significant portion of the profits to educational, 
philanthropic, and humanistic organizations both in Brazil and in Syria. 
Cotton made the Jafet family fantastically wealthy but also boosted the commercial 
profile of the Brazil’s Syrian community. In 1913, Nami Jafet organized Syrian labor and 
business owners by founding al-Ghurfa al-Tijariyya al-Suriyya, a diasporic Chamber of 
Commerce. Syrian and Lebanese merchants, industrialists, bankers, and professionals joined the 
endeavor, which sought to manage the immigrant colony’s commercial interests, reduce 
competition within the community, and to represent Syrian business to Brazil’s Republican 
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government.188 The organization’s central hall provided space for local Syrian merchants to 
gather and discuss matters of mutual interest; during World War I, it doubled as a space for 
fundraising for the homeland. By the 1920s, the Ghurfa Tijariyya had grown into a lobby 
powerful enough to pursue grievances with the Brazilian government, for instance in 1925 when 
it submitted a petition demanding that the government protect the price of Brazilian cotton, then 
undergoing an international price crash.189   
 One of the principle impacts that the establishment of the Jafet cotton plant had on Syrian 
migrants in Brazil was the “capitalization” of São Paulo. Before 1907, small Syrian communities 
appears across several Brazilian cities at once: Rio de Janeiro (another major immigrant port), 
Santos, Minas Gerais, and Campinas hosted smaller Syrian communities, each with their ethnic 
institutions and periodical presses. But as cotton boomed in São Paulo and a growing Syrian elite 
emerged on Rua 25 de Marzo, several Arabic periodicals relocated there, and ethnic clubs, credit 
agencies, and social welfare groups followed suit, forming the nucleus of a sophisticated social 
infrastructure and immigrant ethnic leadership. By 1914, more than fourteen distinct Arabic 
newspapers were read in São Paulo alone, each with its distinctive editorial and political 
persuasion, mirroring the industry in New York, and engaging with it in print.190 
 Brazil’s Syrian textile industry drove both a substantial remittance economy and Syrian 
investment in Brazilian public spaces. Local Syrian and Lebanese exporters and retailers in 
cotton cloth did quite well for themselves, sending home an average of 2,000 and 4,000 French 
francs annually by the early 1920s, “a staggering amount,” reports Jeffrey Lesser, “considering 
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that a one-way ticket from Syria to South America cost only 250 francs” at the time.191 Many of 
these retailers later opened their own factories: by 1934, for instance, there were 225 registered 
Syrian factories in the state of São Paulo alone, the majority engaging in textile production.192 
Beyond remittances, Syrian and Lebanese elites in São Paulo invested in Syrian schools, 
hospitals, charities, and even public monuments on Rua 25 de Marzo. In 1922, Basil Jafet 
commissioned a statue of Brazilian national hero Ximenes in celebration of Brazil’s Centennial, 
revealing the extent to which the community situated itself between two settler societies, the 
Syrian and the American.193 
Avenida Corrientes in Buenos Aires: Piastres en la Plata 
 Argentina’s experience of the late nineteenth century mirrored those of the United States 
and Brazil in many ways. Argentina abolished slavery with the new Constitution of 1853, and 
although its more modest agricultural economy had never reached the proportions of either the 
plantations in Brazil or the United States, the 1853 document drew clear links between desires 
for a white working class and the encouragement of new European immigration. Like Brazil, the 
Argentine government undertook settlement programs and created monetary incentives for 
agricultural migrant laborers from Germany, Italy, and Spain as a means of whitening the 
Argentine population. Like the United States, Argentina weathered an attempted secession (in 
1880), and the ruling National Autonomist Party responded by increasing federal control over the 
provinces and announcing a wide-reaching agricultural development project to remake the 
countryside as a feeder for Argentinian industry. And mirroring both the U.S. and Brazil, 
Argentina depended increasingly on foreign labor as a means of expanding its economic 
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productivity in a global economy centered on export. 
 But among the three settler societies, Argentina was the most successful in enticing new 
immigration: between 1889 and 1914, Argentina’s population doubled (to 7.8 million), and 
foreign-born immigrants accounted for 30 percent of it 1914 population.194 In a seismic 
migration wave of 2.5 million, an estimated 104,000 (around 4 percent) came from the Middle 
East, arriving primarily from Syria. 195 Syrian immigration into Buenos Aires was, it seems, the 
unintended consequence of enticement programs built by the Argentinian government to bring 
white European migrants from the ports of Barcelona and Marseilles.196 Like in Brazil, Syrian 
immigration to Argentina began suddenly: in 1889, 2,020 new Syrians arrived, up from just 31 
the previous year.197 Why? Ignacio Klich argues that the Argentinian government’s incentive 
programs produced this sudden wave; in 1887, President Miguel Juárez Celman introduced an 
immigration program that offered cash subsidies, reimbursement for travel expenses, and access 
to public hostels opening at the port in Buenos Aires to any immigrant deemed productive and 
“desirable” by his state. The passenger steamship companies operating in Buenos Aires took note 
of these new funds, and brought record numbers of Germans, Italians, European Jews, and 
Syrians to Argentine shores. President Celman’s earmark, aimed at stimulating European 
immigration, helped produce an Asiatic, “Turkish” migration flow, prompting Argentine nativists 
to call shrilly for greater specificity and oversight into which immigrants were eligible for these 
incentives. In 1890, Celman’s government limited Syrian access to state subsidies by earmaking 
them for European immigrants destined for agricultural labor and agrarian development only.198 
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 But even if Syrian and Lebanese immigrants in Argentina quickly found themselves 
ineligible for state subsidies, they also discovered that Argentina had the most liberal 
constitutional provisions regarding immigrants’ right in the Western Hemisphere. The 
conservative National Autonomist government of Miguel Celman, in power since 1880, included 
some of the country’s most outspoken Argentinian nativists, but the Constitution had been 
written by the Liberals: it stipulated that all “foreigners (irrespective of race or national origins) 
enjoy... all of the civil rights accorded [Argentine] citizens,” a hospitable approach to 
immigration that allowed uninhibited Syrian entry into the country without pressure to obtain 
documentation or seek citizenship.199  
 After 1889, a Syrian colonia grew up in Buenos Aires, centered on its commercial hub 
Avenida Corrientes. As in the rest of the Americas, pack-peddling and other forms of itinerant 
commerce provided the seeds for the growth of related industries, particularly dry-goods retail 
and banking. During the 1890s, around 85 percent of Syrian migrants in Buenos Aires 
participated in some form of local commerce, drawing the ire of Argentinian nativists who saw 
the “turco” peddler as a mendicant and criminal. Stephen Hyland argues that the Syrian peddler 
defied official expectations that foreign labor would people the Pampas, delivering Argentina 
into an agricultural renaissance. Despite the fact that Syrians essentially ran a secondary 
economy in service to Argentinian agriculture (in Hyland’s case, the expanding sugar industry of 
nearby Tucuman), popular resentment graced the pages of the Argentinian press, for instance in 
1902 when Caras y Caretas announced the arrival of the peddlers thus: “A plague of Turkish 
pedlars has appeared, worse than if they were locusts. The police must prevent them from 
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continuing to commit such abuse.”200 By the first years of the twentieth century, though, the 
various facets of the textile industry had consumed the colony: arriving immigrants engaged in 
weaving, piece-work, wholesaling and the sale of ready-wear clothing, oftentimes selling these 
wares to other recent immigrants in Buenos Aires.  
The Buenos Aires colony developed a series of very successful textile companies, family 
enterprises that depended on transnational circuits of labor, finance, and markets that spanned the 
mahjar. That dozens of Syrians living in Buenos Aires often made the progression from petty 
retail into unbridled success as textile moguls illustrates the degree to which transnational Syrian 
industries met the demands of Argentina’s rapidly expanding market. An adolescent named Isaac 
Ilyas ‘Annan, for example, arrived in Buenos Aires in 1901 with two acquaintances from his 
village. After receiving 500 pesos from the local mutual aid society, ‘Annan became a peddler 
selling trinkets and bolts of cloth outside the city, sending a portions of his profits home to Syria. 
In 1910, he had saved enough money to establish his own storefront on Avenida Corrientes; he 
opened “El Siglo” and sold ready-wear clothing, dry goods, and an assortment of Syrian books 
and newspapers. He sent for his two brothers, Miguel and Tanus, who arrived from Syria on the 
eve of World War I; by War’s end, both brothers returned home but Isaac stayed on, opening his 
first textile factory in Pergamino, a growing city outside of Buenos Aires.201 After 1920, Isaac 
ʿAnnan founded the Sociedad Siria de Socorros Mutuos de Pergamino, an organization that 
subsidized new Syrian immigrants to Argentina and fed his factory with skilled Syria textile 
workers. The shirtwaists sewn at the ‘Annan factory were sold across Argentina but also made 
their way to New York City, where they were sold by the Manhattan Shirt Company.202   
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 Syrian newspapers emerged in Buenos Aires concurrently with their New York and São 
Paulo counterparts: the most prominent was Assalam, established by Wadiʿ Schamun in 1902 
and later edited by his son, Alejandro. Assalam was one of many Arabic titles in the colony 
(Buenos Aires had five Arabic language newspapers by 1907),203 but it was particularly 
important because it was linked to the Ottoman diplomatic corps and partially subsidized by the 
Ottoman government.204 Its editor, Alejandro Schamun, also worked as a dragoman at the 
Ottoman Consulate established in 1910.205 Schamun was particularly interested in encouraging 
the Syrians in Argentina to adopt agricultural work, arguing that the Syria's propensity towards 
urban and itinerant commerce fueled Argentinian nativism. Pushing to restyle Syrian immigrants 
as peasant-settlers was perhaps a lost cause, but the ten years before WWI saw impressive Syrian 
economic advancements among in the country: in 1907, Schamun enumerated some 6,500 
businesses nationwide, collectively worth 65,750,000 Argentine pesos. At the same time, 30,000 
new immigrants from Syria arrived in Argentina annually.206 
Shared Structures, Common Culture: Why the Syrian Colonies Should be Considered Together 
 This dissertation connects the Syrian colonies of New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos 
Aires within a single transnational unit of analysis, justified by the presence of networks of 
migration, philanthropy, and activism as well as a shared (albeit contentious) political culture. 
The forgoing sections have demonstrated the many ways that Syria’s largest American colonies 
developed comparably, yielding similar commercial activities, social infrastructure, and 
intellectual institutions. All three developed in relationship with the permissive immigration 
regimes of the United States, Argentina, and Brazil, and each colony fit itself within the 
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economies and social narratives of the nineteenth century “settler society.” In each place, the 
Syrians formed ethnic neighborhoods which appeared alongside other groups of Mediterranean 
peoples—Italians, Greeks, Mediterranean Jews, Armenians, and Anatolian Turks—who all came 
to Atlantic port cities in response to global economic pressures and shared labor opportunities.207 
In all three cities, the influx of Syrians raised new questions about ethnic culture and the 
desirability of Arab immigrants within their host societies. In each colony, in turn, Syrian 
organizations and the press engaged in spirited debates about assimilation, citizenship, and 
settlement, creating a transnational Arabophone public sphere. 
 Such patterns of similarity between the Syrian colonies across the Americas leads this 
historian into pursuit of transnational connections: with so many networks of migration, 
commerce, print culture, and remittance set down between these three Syrian colonies, what 
impact did they have on mahjari political culture? Was there a “mahjari” political culture, and if 
so, how, when, and why did it emerge? What were its implications on the changing politics of the 
Mashriq? The emigrants’ growing affluence, the development of a remittance economy, and 
return migration (Akram Khater and Kohei Hasmimoto both demonstrate that up to one-half of 
Syrian emigrants ultimately returned to the Mashriq),208 each contributed to the construction of a 
bourgeois cultural politics that “came home” in the form of red tile roofs, consumer fetishism, 
Western clothing, and diaspora-born debates about “tradition” versus “modernity.” As Akram 
Khater puts it, “not only did the experiences of Lebanese emigrants greatly amplify the intensity 
and reach of debates within Lebanon about ‘modernity,’ but they also helped contour and define 
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its constituent manners and customs.”209 The class anxieties and civilizations discourses of 
diasporic Syrians and Lebanese transmuted into Lebanese issues, as cultural baggage and a 
significant part of an authentic Lebanese modernity at the close of the Ottoman period.  
But if (as Khater argues) the diaspora had everything to do with the construction of a 
Lebanese modernity, what did this mean for social action, political activism, and the 
development of Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms? How did bourgeois notions about 
“modernity,” patriotism, and the virtues of responsible citizenship play out in the mahjar? To 
what extent did the transnational, diasporic setting of these activists and intellectuals condition 
their political culture and activism? If the carrying and textile trades, employment networks, 
mutual aid societies, and the periodical press all bridged the distance between Syria’s colonies 
abroad and fused them into a single social field, what did this mean for Syrian politics, 
particularly during the period of incredible change accompanying the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire? The following chapters of this dissertation will investigate Syrian and Lebanese long-
distance nationalisms as they emerged during and after World War I, but if nationalism was 
something new that emerged during the conflict, long-distance Syrian politics and activism was 
clearly cut from an Ottoman cloth, particularly during the second Constitutional period following 
the Revolution of 1908. 
 “Long-Distance Ottomanism:” Transnational Ottoman Patriotism after 1908 
 During World War I, collisions between emigrant nationalists, imperial powers, and the 
waning Ottoman government set up the patterns and possibilities that governed mahjari political 
culture through the interwar period. During the conflict, emigrant nationalists would depend on 
the diaspora’s social infrastructure to send aid home to Syria, contract alliances with foreign 
                                                          
209 Khater, Inventing Home, 109. 
97 
 
powers, and to combat the Ottoman administration of Cemal Pasha (see Chapter 2). The late 
Ottoman Empire had by then developed a complicated relationship with Syrian and Lebanese 
subjects living in the Americas: for Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 1890s, emigration pose a 
serious threat, draining the lifeblood of Syria’s economy and its military assets. But for a new, 
“Young Turk” movement with its own exilic roots, Ottoman emigrants in the Americas presented 
a political constituency worth pursuing during the 1908 Revolution. 
 By the first decade of the twentieth century, the Syrian communities in New York City, 
São Paulo, and Buenos Aires became upwardly mobile “capitals” of Ottoman Arab political 
culture. And a culture of Ottoman patriotism emerged in all three cities in the summer of 1908, 
when the Young Turk Revolution upset the regime of Abdul Hamid II and reestablished the 
Ottoman Constitution of 1876. Historians attribute the rise of constitutionalism in the greater 
Middle East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a series of sociological 
changes: the development of a private newspaper industry and an Ottoman Arab “public sphere,” 
the emergence of a coherence middle class capable of voicing its political interests and 
expectations (expectations themselves piqued by the promises of reform emanating from the 
imperial government), and the success of constitutional movements in Japan, Iran, and Russia.210 
Paramount among these changes, though, was a new political culture that identified the state 
itself as a site of political contestation. In James Gelvin's words, “ideology- not dynasty- 
(became) the foundation of political legitimacy.”211 This was the beginning of mass politics in 
the greater Middle East and in its diasporas. 
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 In the mahjar as in Syria, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 represented a major victory 
for the forces of political progress, and the news was met with street festivals in Cairo,212 well-
attended banquets in New York City and São Paulo,213 and a Syrian parade in Buenos Aires.214 
The events in Istanbul that summer – the reestablishment of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, the 
reorganization of the imperial government, the return of exiled members of the Committee of 
Union and Progress Party (CUP), fresh promises of individual rights, free expression, and 
freedom of the press – all provided a dramatic backdrop to a frenetic period of upheaval and 
activism in the diaspora. In the United States, the Sultan's diplomatic corps was upended: Mundji 
Bey, the new Ottoman General Consul in New York quickly moved to support the Young Turk 
revolutionaries, while the Ottoman Ambassador in Washington, Muhammad ʿAli bey ʿAbed, 
vehemently opposed the CUP’s government in favor of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. An 
assortment of prominent Syrians in the New York colony formed the Syrian American 
Association (called Jamʿiyyat al-Ittihad al-Suri al-ʿUthmani in Arabic, and the same organization 
cited in the Dow v. United States case above) and campaigned for Ambassador ʿAbed's 
censure.215 The Hamidian ambassador was recalled to Istanbul for reassignment, but before he 
left, he delivered searing indictments against the Revolution and against “that insurrectionist 
Mundji Bey” to the U.S. Department of State and the American press.216 The battle of the 
consuls lasted only three weeks, but it conditioned a new pattern of activism among Syrians in 
New York, a pattern that would ultimately outlive the Empire. Eager to press its diplomatic 
advantages, the Syrian American Association raised funds for the legal betterment of the colony; 
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the funding that paid for the Association to press for Syrian access to U.S. citizenship had been 
raised during this 1908 consular battle.217 
 The Ottoman Consul in New York, Mundji Bey, had only come to New York with the 
Revolution, and with orders from Istanbul to organize the Empire’s expatriate communities there 
(not only the Syrians but also Armenians and Anatolian Turks) and to strive to correct US 
misconceptions about Istanbul's new constitutional government. In this second endeavor, the 
Consul understood that skilled diplomacy with the emigrants in New York would improve the 
Empire’s international reputation. Mundji Bey’s first order of business, announced just days after 
the Revolution, was a general amnesty to all Turkish, Armenian, and Syrian exiles accused of 
“political crimes” against the regime of Abdul Hamid II.218 Speaking to the New York Times, 
Mundji Bey explained that “the Constitution granted in my country is not like that granted in 
Russia; it is like that of England and France” in that “it grants amnesty to all her political 
refugees. Let those who work for the good of their country return. The Government needs 
them.”219 The Consul identified some 400,000 emigrants in the United States who would benefit 
from the amnesty and who (he hoped) would consider returning to the Ottoman fold. His 
overtures raised the Syrian expectations that as transnational Ottoman citizens abroad, their 
political rights would be protected under the new Constitutional system.220 
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When the Sultan Abdul Hamid II himself saluted the Ottoman Constitution in an Istanbul 
ceremony in April 1909, Syrians living in New York celebrated “a victory for the Constitutional 
government,” in the words of Na’um Mukarzil.221 Reinvigorated by the promise of democratic 
reform after constitutionalism’s “long slumber” under Abdul Hamid II, the Syrian community in 
Buenos Aires petitioned the Argentine government to establish formal diplomatic relations with 
the Ottoman Empire under the CUP government.222 In 1910, an Ottoman Consular Office opened 
in Buenos Aires, and Lebanese Druze notable Emir Emin Arslan became the first Consul General 
there, working alongside Assalam editor Alejandro Schamun. 223The establishment of a regular 
diplomatic relations not only increased the Empire’s standing in the world of nations; it also 
augmented the political significance and authority of the Buenos Aires colony vis a vis Istanbul.  
 In the Syrian communities abroad, 23 July became “Constitution Day” and was 
vigorously celebrated with parades, festivals, and public speeches on the virtues and duties of 
Ottoman citizenship. In São Paulo, the cotton factories, cafes, and Syrian shops closed for the 
day, and Syrian food vendors set up stalls along the Rua 25 de Marzo to feed the society folk, 
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intellectuals, peddlers, misbehaving children, and Brazilian onlookers who attended the event in 
the thousands. At the 1912 festival, the Ypiranga Cotton Factory mogul Nami Jafet delivered the 
keynote address, mounting the stage to give a brief history of the Ottoman Constitution: its 
creation by enlightened administrators in 1876, its occultation by Sultan Abdul Hamid II two 
years later, the flight of its principles into the diaspora (specifically to Paris, where 
constitutionalist exiles agitated beyond the Red sultan’s reach), and its return to Istanbul after 
three decades of struggle. For Jafet, the three-decade struggle between a constitutionalist 
Ottoman patriotism (Otomanidade, or Osmanlilik in Turkish) and the imperial absolutism of 
Abdul Hamid yielded a worthy Revolution in 1908. What was less clear to Jafet was whether the 
Young Turks had succeeded in creating a new basis for ordering and administering the polyglot, 
multi-confessional Empire. Sympathetic to the Young Ottoman founding fathers of 1876, Jafet 
argued that a secular Ottoman political culture, inclusive to all of the Empire’s subjects, still 
needed to nurtured: 
“Now, these nations [defined as Ottoman millets], diverse in religion, separated by 
language and yet lacking in patriotic sentiment; can these nations in four years, or 
any infinite number of years, reach harmony and create a union like those of the 
British, French, or the world’s other advanced peoples? Is it possible for any 
nation or people to reconcile, to live in concordance with peoples complete 
distinct and divergent in language, religions, race, and traditions? Everything is 
possible under the Sun, because these divisions were caused by governments past 
[Abdul Hamid II]. With the elimination of those causes for social disintegration 
comes the cessation of disunity. But now I ask you all: has this Constitution 
actually set down conditions that will make the divisions of the past 
disappear?”224 
Jafet identified common Syrian grievances that by 1912 fed a public discourse critical of the 
ruling Committee of Union and Progress Party: the underrepresentation of Syrians and Arabic-
speakers in imperial administration, checks against Mount Lebanon’s administrative autonomy, 
                                                          
224 Nami Jafet, “A Constituição Otomana: Discurso Proferido em 23 de Julho de 1912,” in Ensaios e Discursos, 
trans. Taufik Daúd Kurban (Arabic to Portuguese), (São Paulo: SP Editura, 1947), 238. 
102 
 
ongoing concerns about conscription of Syrians into the Ottoman military as it campaigned in the 
Balkans, each of these complaints flying in the face of constitutionally guaranteed protections 
codified only four years prior. Jafet argued that constitutional rule was an imminently fragile 
thing, demanding vigilance from Ottoman citizens as well as the nurturance of a shared 
patriotism to undermine pervasive ethnic, religious, and political divisions: 
“The Constitution guarantees the unity and life of the nation. We struggle, then, 
for its conservation, in order to ensure a straight and true path for ourselves; a life 
of ease; a life of hope. The thick clouds we see forming in the Ottoman sky are 
made up of ignorance, remnants of the ancient regime of subsistence and 
submission. Let us disarticulate these clouds with breaths of knowledge and 
harmony.”225 
But even as Jafet critiqued the ruling Committee of Union and Progress Party, and even as he 
addressed demands for Syrian autonomy, his 1912 Constitution Day speech addressed the 
Syrians of São Paulo as an Ottoman community, with Ottoman origins and political obligations 
to the Empire in Istanbul. Just two years later, with the Empire’s entry into World War I, a few of 
the Syrian intellectuals present that day would begin to address “the nation” as an entity distinct 
from the Empire; by mid-1916, many more would define their nation in direct opposition to the 
Ottoman government under the CUP, Nami Jafet among them. During the War, the Syrian colony 
on Rua 25 de Marzo would become a major site for nationalist political activism. But in 1912, 
none in the mahjar envisioned a Syrian future beyond an Ottoman imperial framework. Jafet’s 
Constitution Day speech closed not with a vision of an Empire on the brink of War but rather on 
the cusp of a cultural renaissance: “Ottomans! Know that our love of country should be the 
pavilion under which we will gather and unite. Join me here, join me in patriotism, in 
Ottomanism (otomanidade); let us shout together: love live the Constitution! Long live the 
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Ottoman nation (viva a pátria otomana)!”226 The annual gatherings of 23 July persisted in Syria 
São Paulo, even after the demise of the Empire and Syria’s occupation by the French. In the 
years to follow, Constitution Day metamorphosed into a day of nostalgia, a day or national 
mourning, and by the late 1920s, a day of nationalist demands for Independence.  
 This chapter has situated the emergence of three Syrian “colonies” in the Atlantic port 
cities of New York City, São Paulo and Buenos Aires, placing them within three layered sets of 
context: the global experience of late nineteenth century economic integration and mass labor 
migration; the development of transnational networks of migration, commerce, and print culture 
that joined all three colonies and their homeland within a shared discursive system; and the local 
experiences of Syrian immigrants in each colony seeking to fit themselves into the economic 
rhythms of their adopted countries. Although attitudes towards immigration varied considerably 
between Brazil, Argentina, and the United States, in the late nineteenth century a remarkable 
convergence of ideas linking the selective settlement of immigrant labor to national progress 
offered both economic and symbolic opportunities to Syrian migrants. In terms of economics, the 
Syrians maintained a secondary commercial economy that, while not in line with the stated 
objectives of America’s settler states (all three saw the ideal immigrant as an agricultural settler 
or barring that, an industrial wage worker), provided needed services to an expanding export-
driven Atlantic economy. In terms of symbols, the Syrians fit themselves into the social 
narratives of the settler state by conforming to the language of the colonial: the Syrian ethnic 
neighborhoods became “colonies,” and Syrian sojourners became “settlers.”  
At the same time, imagining the Syrian diaspora as a collection of colonies bore 
significant implications for their ongoing relationship with the homeland, in particular, the 
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expectation that Syrians abroad were to remain active participants in the political life of the 
Ottoman Empire as “long-distance Ottomans.” Mundji Bey’s efforts to engage the Syrian 
diaspora after 1908 demonstrate that the constitutionalists of the Young Turk party saw emigrants 
as an important population with continuing ties of obligation to the Ottoman state. Mundji Bey’s 
strategy of enticing return migration was perhaps never as successful as he hoped it would be, 
but it belies a shifting attitude towards Ottomans abroad, casting them not merely as subjects to 
be moved by the imperium at will (as in the days of the sürgün),227 but as transnational citizens 
who (for the moment)228 interacted with the Ottoman state at will. With the eruption of World 
War I in 1914, a series of competing nationalist movements would emerge in the diaspora, each 
similarly invoking the language of a shared political culture and calling on the obligations of 
Syria’s “colonies” abroad to combat the Ottoman state, not because of an “awakened” ethnic 
consciousness as Arabs, but because of the perceived failure of the Committee of Union and 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSNATIONAL MODES AND MEDIA: THE SYRIAN PRESS IN THE 
MAHJAR AND EMIGRANT POLITICAL ACTIVISM DURING WORLD WAR I 
 
“The sentiments of honor and loyalty... are 
incompatible with these individuals who sold their 
profession... to the highest bidder. Hirelings of the 
foreigners, they tried to inculcate the 
inexperienced youth with the same subversive 
ideas that they had entertained.”  
- Jamal Pasha on Syria's Journalists, 1916.229 
 
 On 6 May 1916, the military government of Jamal Pasha, “the bloodletter,” convicted 
some forty Syrian journalists and intellectuals of treason. Using documents seized from the 
abandoned French Consular Office in Beirut, the Ottoman government demonstrated that 
prominent members of Syria's Decentralization movement had colluded with France to end 
Turkish rule in Syria and Lebanon. The condemned shared several attributes: they were 
reformers who had called for greater Arab participation in imperial administration; they were 
journalists and newspaper editors who participated in the nahda; and lastly, they each had 
connections to the Syrian diaspora. Such links to Syrian communities in Cairo, Paris, and the 
Americas spared some of the condemned their lives. Many fled during the first months of World 
War I, and could only be convicted in absentia.230  
 Jamal Pasha hanged twenty one “traitors” in Beirut and Damascus, in a public 
demonstration of the high costs of talking reform.231 Their editors executed, the presses at 
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Ahmed Tabbara's al-Ittihad al-ʿUthmani, ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi's al-Hadara, and the 
Khazin brothers' al-Arz closed quietly. Only Muhammad Kurd Ali's pro-Ottoman al-Muqtabas 
remained.232 The following month, a disastrous famine visited the Mountain, depleting entire 
villages of their populations. Death warrants remained on the books for many of Syria's 
intellectuals, who continued to combat the Ottoman state from New York City, São Paulo, 
Buenos Aires, Paris, and Cairo.  
 The greatest irony of this moment is that although Jamal Pasha had correctly identified 
the Syrian press as a political force connected to the diaspora, he failed to consider the Reform 
movement's largely Ottomanist outlook. The 1913 Syrian Congress in Paris brought together 
reformers from Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya, the Beirut Reform Society, al-Fatat, and other parties 
comprised chiefly of journalists from Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, and New York City. 
Having used the diaspora's press to reach consensus, the Congress laid out its platform: 
immediate administrative reform, greater Arab participation in local affairs, and the protection of 
political rights (including those in the diaspora) within the Ottoman Empire.233 Istanbul sent its 
own delegate, who reported that these resolutions would assist in negotiations between the 
Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter C.U.P.) and Arab reformers. 
 Instead of reform, the following months brought war. The empire entered World War I, 
and Jamal Pasha arrived in Syria, placing it under military occupation by 1915. He immediately 
stepped up censorship over Syria's press, instituting bans on diasporic periodicals, closing 
printing houses, harassing and even executing journalists.234 The clampdown alienated the 
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C.U.P's former partners in the mahjar. By 1916, activists abroad once associated with the Syrian 
Reform movement mourned their dying homeland, and called for its emancipation from the 
“Turkish yoke” (nīr al-atrāk) for the first time. In the struggle for Independence, the mahjar 
became a critical front where activists waged battles in the press.  
This chapter outlines the story of transnational political activism in the Syrian mahjar, 
paying special attention to the myriad ways that the Arabic language press in Brazil, Argentina, 
and the United States served the Independence project. It documents the emergence of a Syrian 
and Lebanese reform movement in the mahjar after 1909, and links the proliferation of reformist 
political parties to networks of journalists and periodicals across transnational space. It argues 
that as the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, policies adopted by the Ottoman 
government—conscription, press censorship, surveillance of Syrian journalists and intellectuals, 
and the repression of Syria’s reform parties—drew criticism from Syrian activists living abroad. 
By 1916, Jemal Pasha’s mass hanging of “treasonist” activists and the mounting famine in 
Mount Lebanon had alienated Syrian and Lebanese activists abroad, who began calling for 
independence from (and not reform within) the Ottoman Empire.  
During the War, the mahjari press presented diasporic Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalist political parties with a focal point for addressing, defining, and particularly 
representing the nation. Although each party had distinct, competing visions for a post-Ottoman 
Syria (or Lebanon), they mirrored one another in significant ways, the most consequential of 
which was that they each sought the assistance of one or more Entente Powers as the guaranteurs 
of the nation. This chapter argues that ultimately, this strategy led both the Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalist movements into collaboration with the Great Powers, and most notably the French. In 
the diasposa, the periodical press became fertile ground for the politics of nationalist public 
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opinion; in the pages of competing political newspapers, new fissures emerged between activists 
who fundamentally disagreed over Syria's future and the place of Lebanon within (or apart from) 
it. By 1919 the French Foreign Ministry, eager to delegitimize the Arab nationalist government 
emerging under the Hashimite Emir Faysal, used its connections to activist communities in the 
mahjar to push for a French Mandate over all of Syria and Lebanon. 
Transnational Media: Syrian Publishing Houses and the Varieties of the Press 
 As the diaspora's major print capitals, Syrian publishing houses in São Paulo, Buenos 
Aires, and New York City comprised critical sites for public opinion and nationalist activism 
during the War. Beyond newspapers, publishers produced nationalist propaganda for the Syrian 
reading public.235 Political parties used such media to disseminate open letters, pamphlets, and 
books. These texts were printed in Arabic, French, English, Portuguese, and Spanish for both 
Arab and foreign audiences. Their content evolved during the conflict, and the mahjar’s political 
culture resembled an ongoing discussion between the activists around the world. 
 Publishing houses also provided new social spaces oriented towards patriotic politics and 
middle-class activism. They had their own subscription-based libraries, printing dime novels, 
translations of European literature, biographies, political poetry, and language primers.236 They 
often featured reading rooms for the oration and performance of texts; this mirrored similar 
institutions in Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo.237 Some engaged in everyday printing, 
producing stationary and letterhead for local Syrian businesses. Such measures offset the cost of 
producing a newspaper.238 Most importantly, the mahjar's publishing houses founded their own 
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literary societies and book clubs. Meeting weekly to discuss poetry, history, and politics, these 
fraternities offered young men a social outlet as well as a worldview that carried patriotic and 
even nationalist content. Many such groups discussed in this chapter-- the Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani, the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya, and the Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Watani-- began 
as fraternities attached to publishing houses. 
 During World War I, political, intellectual, and activist networks cohered around their 
respective newspaper presses. In such a setting, the journalism industry itself became a space 
where an emerging Syrian and Lebanese middle class abroad asserted its primacy in political 
debates. Newspapers were simultaneously sites of contest and patronage: in New York City, 
Naʿum Mukarzil subsidized Lebanese writers in his Arabic daily al-Huda, a paper officially 
linked to his own political committee Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya. For aspiring young 
writers, membership in a club like the Nahda Lubnaniyya and access to the press came hand in 
hand; participating in the politics of patriotism hinged on both aspects. In the end, newspapers 
were greater than the output of their individual presses; they created their own intellectual 
gravity and governed both political discourse and nationalist activism. 
 The mahjar's press was an important political institution which fostered transnational 
networks across the diaspora. As such, it facilitated the continuous circulation of intellectuals, 
activists, and professionals. Readers across continents could order issues of al-Huda, al-Saʾih, or 
Abu al-Hawl remotely through mail-order subscription, and party activists brought copies with 
them as they moved across the mahjar. Their peripatetic movements established a circuit that 
enabled activism across the mahjar. The transnational nature of this press also reflected in the 
mahjar's economy: newspapers like Sallum Mukarzil's al-Majalla al-Suriyya al-Amirkiyya in 
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New York combined political commentary with descriptions of employment markets, economic 
conditions, and prices for items like cotton, coffee, cloth, tobacco, and ʿaraq.239 
 As transient activists and journalists imagined Syrian and Lebanese communities into 
existence, the diaspora's newspapers transformed them into epicenters for nationalist politics. 
But, unlike Anderson's imagined communities, the process by which the periodical press enabled 
patriotic nationalism was anything but consensual. Rather, in the mahjar the press was a place of 
semiotic contest, a place where the diaspora's activists variously became “Syrian” or “Lebanese” 
by engaging in discursive warfare for the right to define and represent the community abroad. 
National symbols, historical narratives, and language became rhetorical munitions within a 
“political and cultural minefield” where Syrians in Brazil, Argentina, and the United States 
competed for access to the diaspora's collective voice.240  
 If the press created new political spaces, it also constrained emigrant agency, channeling 
it towards specific a political praxis.241 Newspapers empowered a transnational Syrian middle 
class which then pressed its claims to representative legitimacy in international fora. At the same 
time, the press provided structures which governed Syrian activism in important ways. First, as 
continued out-migration dispersed the Syrian reading public, periodicals and political parties 
needed to maintain active networks of support and information across a widening transnational 
space. Second, this reading public's middle-class identity influenced how politics functioned: 
committee-based activism, complete with a faith in “public opinion” and the power of petition 
took center stage over ideological or mass party activism. Emigrant activists relied on 
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newspapers to popularize political viewpoints and enervate the diasporic public into supporting 
new visions of the homeland as a matter of patriotic duty. If the periodical press helped create 
new notions of community among the transnational reading public, the production of newspapers 
and the journalist’s trade also governed what types of political action emigrant nationalisrs 
engaged in. For nationalist personalities (who were also newspaper editors), political authority 
and relevance was attained by grabbing the attention of the mahjar’s readership and channeling 
Syrian public opinion (itself a new political force) towards nationalist visions of the homeland.  
The Press in the Mahjar as Transnational Archive 
 As a body of sources, the mahjari press gets short shrift in historiographies of interwar 
Syria and Lebanon in favor of colonial documents. A practical reason for this stems from how 
historians frame Middle Eastern history. Within the Area Studies framework popularized by the 
postwar American academy, studies of the region have focused on the relationship between 
territorially defined nation-states and the societies they produce. Mobile peoples: nomads, 
migrant laborers, or emigrants, fit only problematically within such a perspective, not least 
because as migrants, they undermine the “methodological nationalism” which presumes the 
immutability and inviolability of the homogenous nation-state.242 The states of Syria and 
Lebanon emerged only after World War I, on maps drawn by European powers seeking an 
amiable colonial solution for the post-Ottoman Levant. The mahjar and its activists played a 
complicated role in the construction of this geography, but “landlocked” methodological lenses 
typical of Area Studies presume salt water to be more boundary than conduit for political 
change.243 This chapter takes the opposite tack, arguing that there is no place better suited to 
                                                          
242 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, 
Migration and the Socials Sciences,” Global Networks 2, no. 4 (2002): 301-3. 
243 Akram Fouad Khater, “Becoming 'Syrian' in America: a Global Geography of Ethnicity and Nation,” Diaspora: A 
Journal of Transnational Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 299-301. 
112 
 
explore the utility of transnational modes of inquiry than in the history of nationalism. Emigrants 
participated in drawing the borders, building the states, and defining the nations of Syria and 
Lebanon. Like other nations with sizable diasporas, patriotic politics and nationalist ideas from 
the mahjar figured among the most consequential of remittances during the War. 
 Because political parties, charitable organizations, and intellectual clubs printed their 
minutiae in the press, these periodicals provide an inside look into the values, culture, and 
politics of the mahjar. The meeting minutes, election results, propaganda, and local news printed 
in the press provide a story of Syrian life abroad that is simply not accounted for in either 
Ottoman and French records. Activist groups are particularly obscured because they operated 
clandestinely and escaped government detection.244 The press delivers empirically by recording 
political goings-on, transnational communications, and intellectual discourses. At the same time, 
the press presents its own blind spots that need accounting for. The mahjar's newspapers were 
widely distributed and poorly preserved, creating an issue of survivability that requires a creative 
methodology. Although New York papers al-Huda, Mirat al-Gharb, al-Bayan, and al-Saʾih 
maintained complete archives, other titles—al-Faraʾid (Buenos Aires), al-Zaman (Buenos 
Aires), and Abu al-Hawl (São Paulo)—have left only a few issues scattered around the world. 
However, the emergence of transnational Syrian press syndicates during the War allowed for the 
reproduction of important news stories, making it possible to read editorials by Syrians in Egypt, 
Argentina, or Brazil by reading the New York papers. Similarly, even where newspapers have 
not survived, supplemental materials produced by these publishing houses have. Propaganda, 
poetry, and personal narratives remain and are more successfully preserved in research libraries. 
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 In this spirit, the following pages explore the press's imbrication with Syrian and 
Lebanese nationalist activism during World War I. Following on the heels of a familiar story: the 
emergence of the Syrian Reform movement, its transformation into distinct and competing Arab, 
Syrian, and Lebanese nationalisms, and subsequent splintering of activist groups in 1919, a fresh 
look at this history from the diaspora's perspective reveals how the collaborations and 
competitions of Syrian and Lebanese activists abroad influenced politics at home.  
The Syrian Press Abroad: From Reform to Nationalism 
 From its inception in 1909, the Syrian Reform movement had close ties to the diaspora, 
and nearly all of its early leaders were newspapermen. The printing profession reflected the 
values of a new middle class in Syria. Raised on the principles of the nineteenth century nahda, 
these men were educated, urban, and liberal in their attitudes concerning political participation. 
They were well read in the Arabic classics as well as in European sociology, political 
philosophy, and history. In the Syrian press in Egypt, for example, the editors of al-Hilal, al-
Ahram, al-Muqtataf, and al-Muqattam enthusiastically translated pieces by Leo Tolstoy, Maxim 
Gorky, and T. S. Carlyle into Arabic, and encouraged their readers to purchase full length copies 
from their respective publishing houses.245 Reading such materials provided more than 
recreation; it became a marker of class identity, and a prerequisite to participating in Syrian and 
Lebanese social discourse in the late Ottoman context. In Cairo, young Syrian and Lebanese 
members of reading rooms and publishing houses supported Ottoman constitutionalism under the 
banner of the Young Turks. In July 1908, Syrians in Cairo held a street festival in honor of the 
C.U.P, and touting the revolution as the beginning of an awaited Ottoman constitutional 
flowering and a realization of the ethos of al-nahda.246 The heady feeling would not last, and in 
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1909 a second coup within the C.U.P. brought a centralist faction to power under Enver, Talat, 
and Jamal Pasha and changed the ruling regime's focus. This alienated Syrian intellectuals, and 
in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, new questions about whether the new Ottoman government 
would protect Arab local interests and autonomy emerged. 
 The diaspora's first reform party, Cairo's Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani [the Lebanese Union 
Party, also known as l’Alliance Libanaise] emerged from a falling out between the Syrians of 
Cairo and Lebanese mutasarrif Yusuf Franco Pasha. In 1909, Syrian emigrant publishers Yusuf 
Sawda and Antun al-Jumayyil (who wrote for Beirut's al-Bashir, and Cairo's al-Ahram and al-
Zuhur)247 arrived in Mount Lebanon to investigate recent rumblings that the C.U.P. planned to 
alter Lebanon's administrative status. Rumors that 1864’s Règlement Organique would be 
discarded in favor of direct imperial control caused controversy among Syrians living in Cairo 
and Alexandria, who advocated for the extension of administrative autonomy for their homeland, 
which they defined as Mount Lebanon and the wilaya of Beirut. Arriving at Franco Pasha's 
office, al-Jumayyil and Sawda presented their case for autonomy. They were told, “you must 
understand that we are an Ottoman wilaya, and that the Lebanese must also assume this 
status.”248 Yusuf Sawda recalled storming out of the mutasarrif's office, leaving al-Jumayyil to 
awkwardly take his leave with grace. The pair returned to Cairo, and in December 1909 
convened with the colony's most prominent intellectuals, newspaper editors, and professionals. 
The Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani emerged with two headquarters: in Cairo under Iskandar 
ʿAmmun, Daud Barakat (al-Ahram), and Antun al-Jumayyil, and in Alexandria under Yusuf 
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Sawda.249 This was not an ideological political party, but instead a pragmatic political committee 
that represented a Syrian and Lebanese urban professional class abroad. Because the Ittihad 
Lubnani was essentially a syndicate representing fluid, sometimes inchoate political interests, the 
organization never became a mass political party. The Egyptian branch's membership peaked at 
2,000 by 1919; more common for the mahjar were smaller pockets of several dozen 
professionals, writers, and functionaries representing Ittihad Lubnani locally.250 The 
organization’s agenda was to protect Mount Lebanon's administrative privileges [imtiyazat 
idariyya] as outlined by the Règlement Organique of 1864, to support the extension of local 
rights and home-rule, and to establish Arabic as the administrative language.251 As such, the 
Ittihad Lubnani was the first emigrant party to articulate a reformist, decentralization platform; it 
later formed the nucleus of the Hizb al-Lamarkaziya [Decentralization Party] in 1912.252 
 Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani set the tone for organizing across the mahjar, and parties 
which came after mirrored its organizational structure. First, the Ittihad Lubnani's leadership 
valued and nurtured links with the press, which it saw as the pathway for developing and 
domesticating Syrian public opinion. The party's executive committee was itself made up of 
journalists: Antun al-Jumayyil (al-Ahram), Daud Barakat (al-Ahram), Khayrallah Khayrallah 
(al-Hurriya), Iskandar and Daud ʿAmmun (al-Mahrusa), Yusuf Sawda, and Auguste Adib 
Pasha. These men commanded editorial opinion in the mahjar, and they used this hold over the 
press to publicize the Decentralization question from 1909 until the First Syrian Congress of 
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1913. Additionally, the Ittihad Lubnani's leadership was itself transnational: Syrian writer 
Khayrallah Khayrallah founded a chapter in Paris in 1909, while Naʿum Mukarzil (al-Huda) was 
a close affiliate in New York.253 By 1912, the Ittihad Lubnani also had client branches operating 
in Rio de Janiero, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mendoza (Argentina), New York City, and Boston. 
 Because the Ittihad Lubnani commanded the mahjar's intellectual space, the group easily 
publicized its agenda without taking on additional financial burdens. It maintained no regular 
treasury, and rather than fundraising, the executive committee simply reached out to partners in 
the Americas and their publishing houses. Professional and political partnerships emerged 
simultaneously in this context, and in more remote places in the mahjar, publishers and 
journalists had everything to gain from joining Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani: fodder from Cairo's 
most respected newspaper and access to party structures and activist networks. In effect, the Hizb 
al-Ittihad al-Lubnani created the mahjar's first informal media syndicate, a network that crossed 
continents but was exclusive to Ittihad members.254  
 In New York City, al-Huda owner Naʿum Mukarzil served as Ittihad Lubnani's closest 
American partner. Freike-born and Jesuit-educated, Mukarzil had himself lived in Cairo before 
emigrating to the United States with his brother Sallum in 1890.255 In New York City, the 
Mukarzil brothers founded several publications which drew heavily on material written in Cairo: 
al-ʿAsr, al-ʿAlam al-Jadid, and al-Huda, which became one of New York's most successful 
Arabic-language dailies by 1905.256 In 1910, Sallum Mukarzil developed the first Arabic wax 
linotype machine which made small-scale printing inexpensive and widely available in the 
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mahjar.257 al-Huda adopted the technology and expanded its operations beyond newspapers, 
printing books, translations, stationary, and propaganda, which were featured in its Brooklyn 
library.258 In 1911, Mukarzil established his own political party. Called Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-
Lubnaniyya [called the Lebanon League of Progress in its English writings], the organization 
began as a reform party linked to the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani. And like the Ittihad Lubnani, it 
later championed Lebanese independence from the Ottoman Empire.259  
 
Figure 3: Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya's Executive Committee in 1913. This photo taken to commemorate 
Mukarzil's attendance at the First Syrian Congress in Paris that June. Naʿum Mukarzil seated, second from right. 
Ibrahim Najjar seated at Mukarzil’s left. Source: Mukarzil, al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 12. 
 The Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya espoused a political outlook Mukarzil had 
already popularized in the press. Inspired by the nineteenth-century nahda and closely affiliated 
with the Decentralization movement,260 the Nahda Lubnaniyya's original purpose was the 
retention of Lebanon's administrative privileges within an Ottoman context.261 Mukarzil's 
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approach mirrored that of the Ittihad Lubnani, save one major exception: the Nahda Lubnaniyya 
lobbied Ottoman authorities but also sought Western partners to leverage claims against Istanbul. 
Mukarzil cultivated alliances with French policymakers in particular, and he saw France as the 
Lebanon's natural guarantor for autonomy and independence.262 This distinguished Mukarzil 
from his compatriots in the Ittihad Lubnani, who avoided direct collusion with the French, 
British, or other foreign powers. Mukarzil had no such scruples; he was amused when the 
Ottoman government denounced his group as “French spies, who have penetrated everywhere 
and have mingled with all (political) currents as informers to the Government in Paris.”263 
 Despite important differences in perspective, Mukarzil's Nahda Lubnaniyya remained an 
important partner to the Ittihad Lubnani, and this closeness is reflected in the party's 
organizational structure. Like the Ittihad, the Nahda Lubnaniyya's leadership was transnational 
and made up largely of journalists. As a political organization, the Nahda Lubnaniyya operated 
in several places at once, bringing together Syrians and Lebanese across a transnational, 
diasporic space. Mukarzil depended on his own professional contacts in establishing satellite 
chapters across the Americas. He leaned especially on al-Huda's Istanbul correspondent, Ibrahim 
al-Najjar, who spent most of his time on steamships shuttling between Istanbul, Paris, Cairo, and 
New York between 1908 and 1913. al-Najjar's work as al-Huda's correspondent brought him in 
touch with prominent Ottoman figures like Yusuf Franco Pasha and prominent Syrian emigrés 
like Khayrallah Khayrallah and Shukri Ghanim, who introduced him to French diplomats like 
Raymond Poincaré and Jean Gout.264 In 1912, al-Najjar and Shukri Ghanim founded Nahda 
Lubnaniyya's Paris chapter. He simultaneously corresponded with journalists in São Paulo, most 
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notably Shukri al-Khuri, the controversial editor of the Francophile daily, Abu al-Hawl. In 1912, 
al-Khuri opened Brazil’s first chapter of the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubaniyya with a group of 
other Syrian immigrant journalists.265 By 1914, the Nahda Lubnaniyya had twenty-nine active 
satellites operating across the United States, Canada, Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, and Costa Rica, 
as well as in Paris and Istanbul.266 Ibrahim al-Najjar's movements traced the lines of the Syrian 
newspaper circuit; his status as a journalist gained him access to the mahjar's most important 
personalities and supplied him with a ready route along the diaspora intellectual geography. 
 The Nahda Lubnaniyya also mirrored the Ittihad Lubnani in the way it collected and 
distributed funding. The membership's modest annual dues were maintained in the Faour Bank in 
Brooklyn, where Doumit and Daniel Faour (both Nahda members) maintained the books. But the 
party only collected larger sources of revenue when a project was identified, a strategy that lent 
the organization the flexibility to raise money across international borders informally, making 
them less vulnerable to foreign interference.267 Such flexibility brought the Nahda Lubnaniyya 
vitality, but it also brought conflict. Sometimes satellite chapters opposed Naʿum Mukarzil's 
political designs, and Mukarzil himself was not known for compromise. Disagreements over 
Mount Lebanon's future bubbled over during the War, most dramatically in Paris where a serious 
disagreement between Mukarzil and Shukri Ghanim led the latter to break ties with the Nahda 
Lubnaniyya completely. However, the Nahda Lubnaniyya's early efforts were directed against 
C.U.P. centralism and towards French assistance, positions flexible enough to bring disparate 
personalities like Mukarzil and Ghanim into close collaboration. 
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 World War I's beginning in 1914 changed everything in the Syrian mahjar, and the 
Ittihad Lubnani's concerns shifted as well. As the Ottoman government abrogated and concluded 
capitulations treaties with Western Powers, Mount Lebanon's 1864 Règlement Organique was 
among those left on the cutting room floor.268 In response, the Ittihad Lubnani altered its official 
stance towards the Ottoman state, changing its Constitution to state that the party would “solicit 
the absolute Independence of Lebanon, within its natural boundaries (ḥudūd ṭabīʿīya), under the 
Protection of the Powers.”269 The Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani transformed from a reform party to 
a nationalist organization. Soon after declarations of independence rang out from Lebanese, 
Syrian, and Arab nationalist groups in the mahjar's newspapers. In Brazil, Nahda Lubnaniyya 
leader Shukri al-Khuri's image appeared on a party circular. Declaring war on the Ottoman state, 
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Figure 4: the Nahda Lubnaniyya of São Paulo declares its support for Lebanese 
independence from the Ottoman Empire, 1914. The party’s president, Abu al-Hawl 
editor Shukri al-Khuri, appears in the window. Co-founder Shukri Bakhash in first row, 
second from right. Source: al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya Pamphlet, 29 September 1914, 3. 
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al-Khuri hoisted a new Lebanese flag: a green Cedar on a white background which quickly 
became the South American mahjar's standard. al-Khuri urged Brazil's Lebanese to join both the 
Nahda Lubnaniyya and the Allied Powers in overthrowing the Turks. al-Khuri concluded that by 
partnering with the Entente, that “with their victory, we will see the betterment of our 
homeland.”270 
Syrian and Lebanese Nationalist Activism in the Mahjar, and Growing French Influence 
 Shortly after arriving in Syria in 1915, Jamal Pasha introduced martial law and placed 
new limits on the press, closing local opposition newspapers and banning many periodicals from 
the mahjar. At times his regime enforced an even harder line, hiring local thugs to ensure 
compliance: neither the fire that burned down al-Nasir's press nor the beating of al-Barq's editor 
in Beirut was formally investigated.271 During the War's early months, Syrian journalists abroad 
equated the loss of press freedom with the loss of their homeland.272 Similarly, Jamal Pasha's 
unpopular conscription policy led many to assist draft dodgers and their families in hiding from 
Turkish soldiers.273 In both cases, the press was presented as a national forum and the place 
where Syrians and Lebanese could act out in political ways; the circumscription of this space 
was therefore seen as an act of war. By 1916, the mahjar's activists turned to another mode of 
national service: deploying its own sons militarily through the French-led Légion d’Orient. 
 The Légion d’Orient was an irregular regiment comprised of Syrian, Lebanese, and 
Armenian volunteers from across the diaspora. Syrian and Lebanese leaders abroad worked with 
French Foreign Consuls in New York, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo to drum up volunteers for 
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this force in summer 1916. The Légion d’Orient was primarily the brainchild of Shukri Ghanim, 
who coordinated the recruitment drive from his home in Paris. The effort brought together 
political parties from across the ideological spectrum: Naʿum Mukarzil's Nahda Lubnaniyya and 
the Ittihad Lubnani participated with enthusiasm, recruiting 52 volunteers in New York City in 
early 1917.274 There were, however, some groups that refused to participate: Salomon Busader, 
the president of Ittihad Lubnani's Buenos Aires chapter, defected from his party because he 
refused to work with pan-Syrianists like Shukri Ghanim or his Ghanim’s local agent, former 
Ottoman consul-general Emir Amin Arslan.275 Busader’s objection stemmed from his party’s 
conviction that the French would not sponsor the construction of a Lebanese entity distinct from 
greater Syria; such a position was fairly common among Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani partisans 
prior 1918 (although France’s sponsorship of the Grand Liban after 1918 later proved Busader’s 
predictions to have been incorrect). 
 The Syrian press reported on the Légion d’Orient's movements from France in 1916 to 
Cyprus, and finally its disembarkation to Palestine in 1917. Newspaper editors played a critical 
role in publicizing the recruitment drive, but also in sponsoring individual volunteers. In March 
1916, a young Homsi named Hafiz Khizam traveled from his adopted home in São Paulo to the 
French Consul in Buenos Aires to enlist in the French military. Najib Trad, editor of al-Jadid and 
officer in Argentina's Ittihad Lubnani paid Khizam's passage, and Ghanim’s Buenos Aires 
partner, Amin Arslan, assisted him through the enlistment process.276 Khizam sent regular letters 
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home as he fought alongside French soldiers, and his letters appeared in a syndicated series in 
Najib Trad’s own newspaper, al-Jadid (Buenos Aires) as well as in ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad’s al-
Saʾih (New York) and Shukri Ghanim’s Correspondance d'Orient (Paris).277 Until 1917, Syrian 
émigré military recruits were funneled through Buenos Aires, typically managed by Amin Arslan 
in partnership with the local French Consulate. 
 But the recruitment drive caused considerable disagreements among Syrians abroad, 
specifically because Légion d’Orient recruits labored in the French military to further French 
ambitions in the Mashriq, something that Arab nationalists, many pan-Syrian nationalists, and 
Ottoman loyalists resented. Such disputes sometimes boiled over into episodes of violence, as 
happened in Rosario, Argentina, in April 1916. Wishing to expand the recruitment campaign into 
Argentina’s interior, Najib Trad arrived in Rosario seeking new enlistments. Trad’s arrival 
sparked an ugly confrontation between pro-Ottoman Syrians and Légion d’Orient supporters. In 
Rosario as elsewhere, support for the project often fell along sectarian lines: Maronites and 
Greek Orthodox Christians largely supported the French-led regiment, Muslims typically 
opposed it. Sunni leaders accused the Legion's boosters (and by extension the French) of 
harboring sectarian motivations; a noon-time confrontation outside a Rosario Church devolved 
into a riot involving hundreds of men.278 One Ottoman loyalist, a Muslim, was killed, another 
sixteen were hospitalized and dozens more arrested by Argentinian authorities.279 The Argentine 
                                                          
277 Hafiz Khizam al-Homsi, “Barid min Mutaṭawʿi al-Homsi al-Suri fi-l-Jaysh al-Fransi,” al-Saʾih, 10 April 1916, 1. 
See also Khizam, “Fi-Sahat al-Qital,” al-Saʾih, 20 July 1916, 1. 
278 Reportage reveals divisions on what the riot was about. Al-Huda draws upon the Argentine Maronite paper al-
ʿAdl described the riot as Muslim violence against Christians. Al-Huda's version does not mention the Légion 
d'Orient recruiters present, “Bayna al-Suriyin: bi-Ism al-Massih wa-l-Muhammad,”  5 April 1916, 6. ʿAbd al-Massih 
Haddad's  al-Saʾih, by contrast , draws upon Buenos Aires paper al-Zaman. It mentions the recruiters, but omits that 
the riot occurred on a Sunday outside of a Church, “Qatil bayna al-Suriyin,” 6 April 1916, 1-2. 
279 ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad, “Qatil bayna al-Suriyin,” al-Saʾih, 6 April 1916, 1-2. 
124 
 
government then accused the French of inciting violence in its territory; a street fight with 
transnational dimensions threatened Argentina's diplomatic equilibrium with France. 
 From his position in Paris, Shukri Ghanim ramped up recruitment efforts in South 
America in 1917. Raising a substantial sum through his new political organization, the Comité 
Central Syrien (al-Lajna al-Suriyya al-Markaziyya in Arabic), Ghanim sent a two man Syrian 
delegation to travel across South America campaigning for the Légion d’Orient and soliciting 
recruits. Jamil Mardam Bey and Dr. Qaysar Lakah arrived in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1917, 
meeting with French consul Paul Claudel, who accompanied them on a tour of every large Syrian 
colony on the continent.280 The effort, jointly sponsored by Ghanim and the French Foreign 
Ministry, was very successful in terms of inspiring Syrian solidarity for the Entente; in addition 
to several dozen new recruits, the Mardam-Lakah delegation amassed 50,000 Francs in relief and 
aid for the soldiers.281 Although the delegation drew opposition from some emigrant leaders who 
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Figure 5: The Mardam-Lakah Delegation in São Paulo, Brazil, June 1917. French Consul Paul 
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resented Ghanim's growing influence (especially from his estranged partner Naʿum Mukarzil),282 
Ghanim's efforts placed him on the French Foreign Ministry's radar and laid the basis for future 
cooperation. Jean Gout and Stephen Pichon, for example, both saw Ghanim as a valuable Syrian 
partner, and as a barometer for Syrian public opinion.283  
 While Syrians abroad coordinated, and sometimes combated, the growing alliance with 
France through the Légion d’Orient, events at home took a sharp turn for the worse. Jamal 
Pasha's 1916 executions of journalists were quickly followed by a food rationing policy that left 
Syria's civilian population facing shortages. By June 1916, the shortage produced a famine that 
ultimately killed between 350,000 and 500,000 in Mount Lebanon and western Syria.284 The 
diaspora's newspapers collected letters from compatriots in Beirut, Homs, Zahle, and Mount 
Lebanon describing mortality rates that often reached fifty or sixty percent.285 Town-based 
mutual aid societies began raising relief; groups like the Homsi Fraternity (al-Ikhaʾ al-Homsi), 
the Tripoli Society [al-Jamʿiyya al-Tarabulsiyya], or Maronite Priest Habib Estefan's group 
Lebanese Youth [Jamʿiyyat al-Shabiba al-Lubnaniyya] collected relief for their home cities.286 
 As more about the disaster's extent became known, it became clear that famine relief 
required broader organization across the mahjar. Both the Nahda Lubnaniyya and the Ittihad 
Lubnani jumped into the breach, relying on their established networks to remit both money and 
aid to the homeland. A case in point is the Lajnat Iʿanat Mankubi Suriyya wa-Lubnan [The 
Committee for Syrian and Lebanese Relief, hereafter called Lajnat al-Mankubin], headquartered 
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in New York City. This committee was linked to a political party called al-Ittihad al-Suri [the 
Syrian Union], which was itself linked to Shukri Ghanim’s societies in Paris. In 1916 and 1917, 
the Lajnat al-Mankubin collected monetary relief from committees in Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico and printed its progress in al-Saʾih, a political daily edited by ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad.287 
Haddad was skeptical of the village-based approach to charity, owing to the unequal distribution 
in aid,288 and the corruption of local distributors.289 His group, the Lajnat Mankubin, worked 
with the Red Cross and U.S. Department of State transfer money to Syria.290 In Buenos Aires, 
Khalil Saʿadih  arranged for his group, al-Jamʿiyya al-Suriyya, to fund-raise for the Lajnat 
Mankubin; his own newspaper, al-Majalla, reported the Committee's progress.291 In the summer 
of 1916, the committee raised over $13,000 across the Americas.292  
 The press served the relief effort with an organizational space to appeal directly to the 
public, a public that in many ways had only come to consciousness just years before. The Lajnat 
Mankubin drafted weekly letters to the Syrian mahjar as a whole: appeals for aid, volunteers, or 
for information from Syria obtained through the paper’s readership. Letters from home were 
rare, but when they arrived in Brazil, Argentina, or New York, they were often published.293 Of 
course, these letters were subject to a tightening Ottoman censorship policy.294 That the news of 
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Jamal Pasha's executions did not make headlines for weeks, but the famine did so immediately, 
reminds the historian that Ottoman censors were acutely aware of the power of public opinion.295 
 If the relief drive brought together activists across the mahjar, emigrant leaders also made 
choices that sowed the seeds for future discord. 1916 proved a major turning point between the 
parties and the public: the tone of reportage on the calamity became decidedly political. This 
happened in two stages. First, the recruitment campaign for the French-led Légion d’Orient and 
the famine relief drive prompted many Syrian leaders abroad to partner with the French Foreign 
Ministry in unprecedented, and controversial, ways. Second, alliances emerging between the 
mahjar's political parties and the Great Powers shook loose unresolved questions about Syria's 
post-Ottoman future, and the place of Lebanon within (or apart from) it. Naʿum Mukarzil's 
Nahda Lubnaniyya described a pressing need for Lebanese independence and autonomy from 
Syria; Ghanim's Comité Central Syrien instead referred to Lebanon as “Syria's heart.” 
 Long-standing transnational connections between emigrant leaders and the press broke 
apart, and over the course of 1916 and 1917 reconstituted themselves along ideological, 
nationalist lines. To illustrate, Naʿum Mukarzil and Shukri Ghanim both supported an alliance 
with France, and the Nahda Lubnaniyya promoted a Francophile perspective. In 1916, however, 
the two men quarreled over the prospect of an independent Lebanon separate from Syria, and 
Ghanim closed the Paris chapter, taking his local partners with him. The following year he 
established the Comité Central Syrien; Mukarzil became his most vocal opponent.296 Around the 
diaspora, Ghanim's supporters followed suit, forming a new coalition: the New York Lajnat 
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Mankubin was reborn as a larger organization called the Lajnat Tahrir Suriya wa-Lubnan [which 
called itself the Syrian-Lebanese League of Liberation in English], under the leadership of 
Ayyub Tabet, Amin Rihani, and Jubran Khalil Jubran.297 Amin Rihani traveled to Mérida, 
Mexico, and founded a local branch of the Lajnat Tahrir in late 1917 to counter Mukarzil's long-
standing influence there.298 In São Paulo, Nami Jafet founded the Comité Patriotico Syro-
Libanenze.299 In Egypt, Haqqi bey al-ʿAzm established the Lajnat al-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya fi-
Misr.300 In 1918, Ghanim collected telegrams from each of these parties proclaiming their 
support for a greater Syrian state, “federated and integral.. from the Taurus Mountains... to the 
Mediterranean Sea,” under French protection. Ghanim remitted the letters to the French Foreign 
Ministry as proof of the mahjar's political voice.301 
 The Ittihad Lubnani saw similar seismic shifts. Disagreements over whether to cultivate 
Western support led President Iskandar ʿAmmun to resign his post in 1917.302 After ʿAmmun's 
defection, the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani narrowed its political vision, calling for a Lebanese 
state independent from Syria under a Lebanese Republican administration, a position which put 
it at loggerheads with Shukri Ghanim, the Comité Central Syrien, and the interests of the French 
government.303 By the time British, French, and Hashimite troops expelled the Ottomans from 
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Syria in October 1918, the mahjar's politics realigned along the, at times contradictory, questions 
of French support and the nature of Lebanon's relationship to Syria. This new state of affairs 
gave the French government its choice of Syrian partners, empowering it to interfere in the 
mahjar's politics more than ever. And although the French Foreign Ministry closely aligned with 
Shukri Ghanim and the larger Syrian Unionist Movement during the War, this all changed in 
January 1919, as the Paris Peace Conference opened its formal proceedings. Over the course of 
1919, the victorious Entente Powers and a brand new League of Nations would hammer out the 
postwar settlement governing former Ottoman territories, including those in the Middle East. 
And in January 1919, the French Foreign Ministry made two major changes in terms of which 
Syrian political parties to support: it abandoned its former collaborators in the Syrian Unionist 
movement led by Shukri Ghanim, and it cultivated a new alliance with the Hizb al-Ittihad al-
Lubnani and the Lebanese independence movement. But to understand why they French Foreign 
Ministry made this significant shift in alliances in January 1919, some geopolitical context must 
be explored. For within the Syrian unionist movement abroad, there emerged in early 1919 some 
new sympathies for the notion of “complete independence” for a federated Syria “without 
protection or tutelage,” ideas popularized by Emir Faysal, the leader of the Arab Revolt. 
Mahjar Against the Mashriq: Syrian-Arab Nationalism and the Question of Representation 
When the Syrian emigrant soldiers of the Légion d’Orient landed in the eastern 
Mediterranean in 1917, they found themselves joining the predominantly British Allied forces 
that had been campaigning there for several months, flanked by Arab troops loyal to the 
Hashimite Emir Faysal, son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca. The alliance between the Hashimites 
and the British Foreign Office had begun with the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence of 1915, a 
series of letters wherein Britain offered its support for the formation of an independent Arab 
Kingdom in return for Arab military support against Ottoman troops in the Mashriq. The Sharif 
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Husayn’s son, Faysal, raised a levy of Arab troops in 1916, and the “Arab Revolt” campaigned 
northward from the Hijaz into southern Syria, reaching Damascus in October 1918. With the 
Armistice of Mudros and the evacuation of Ottoman forces from Syria, Faysal set about fulfilling 
what his British partners had promised him: the creation of an independent Arab Kingdom 
centered on Damascus. 
But if Britain had promised Syria to Faysal in 1915, just months later it had also 
promised it to France. In May 1916, just four months after concluding negotiations with Sharif 
Husayn, the British concluded a secret agreement with France ceding control over Syria to the 
latter. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 demarcated territorial “zones of influence” shared 
between Britain and France; in return for French recognition of British influence in Iraq, the 
Hijaz, and Palestine, Britain would support French influence in Syria and Mount Lebanon. As 
Allied victory in the Middle East looked more certain in 1918, the partnership between British 
General Allenby and Emir Faysal’s Arab forces created mounting concerns among French 
officials about whether the British would honor the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. No 
sooner had the Paris Peace Conference started its proceedings than Emir Faysal headed to Paris, 
eager to make his claim for a federated and independent Syria, without French assistance or 
mandate. And worse, France’s closest allies among the Syrian emigrant parties, Shukri Ghanim’s 
Comité Central Syrien, appeared to be losing credibility to the heady mixture of secular 
constitutionalism and nationalist self-determination that Faysal’s Arab Nationalist movement 
promised. 
During World War I, France’s official opinion of Syrian and Lebanese political parties 
was closely guided by concerns over these parties’ links with (or sympathies to) Emir Faysal, 
and Cairo’s Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani was no exception. In February 1918, the French Consul in 
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Cairo reported a meeting between Ittihad Lubnani leaders and one of Faysal’s partisans, Farid al-
Khazin. The Consul concluded that “it appears that the Committee of the Ittihad Lubnani thinks 
it better to secure the future of its country by linking itself with a Muslim Hijazi prince rather 
than through a secular protector [France]. This presumption works to Faysal’s advantage.”304 The 
Foreign Ministry’s suspicion remained that the Ittihad Lubnani represented British and 
Hashimite political interests. French Minister to Egypt LeFevre-Pontalis, for instance, described 
Ittihad Lubnani leader Yusuf Sawda as a Lebanese emigrant “sans notoriété” in a letter to 
Stephen Pichon, concluding that his claims that “France will grant Lebanon its absolute 
independence” should not be taken seriously.305 France’s preference to work its influence 
through Shukri Ghanim’s Comité Central Syrien and its American clients, moreover, sparked 
occasional confrontations with Ittihad Lubnani activists who resented Ghanim's Syrian unionist 
sympathies. In Buenos Aires, for instance, the local Ittihad Lubnani branch (Union Libanense) 
threatened to end its endorsement of the Légion d’Orient unless France moved to support a 
national Grand Liban “within its historical, geographic, and natural boundaries” and agreed to 
take the Lebanese independence movement more seriously.306 During the War, such protests had 
fallen on deaf ears in Paris. 
The changing circumstances in January 1919 led the French Foreign Ministry to revisit 
its position on the Ittihad Lubnani. Emir Faysal had arrived in Paris, ready to present his case for 
an Arab Kingdom in Syria. Eager to check Faysal’s momentum, Comité Central Syrien president 
Shukri Ghanim issued a public statement authorizing France to speak on Syria's behalf at the 
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Paris Peace Conference, an announcement that was immediately met with a firestorm of 
criticism, even from Ghanim’s most earnest supporters in the Americas.307 Writing in his New 
York City paper, Mirat al-Gharb, Najib Diab wrote a furious article proclaiming that Shukri 
Ghanim held no authority to claim the mahjar's voice and acted in bad faith.308 In return, Mirat 
al-Gharb sustained a barrage of angry letters defenind Ghanim's statement.309 Undeterred, Diab 
then published a mock proclamation thanking the Comité Central Syrien for making partition 
and imperialism Syria's inescapable fate.310 Diab then mocked Ghanim's partners in the Americas 
as traitors (khāʾinīn) who would sell their homeland to the highest bidder.311 It was clear that 
within the Syrian nationalist movement, the hegemony Ghanim’s party had maintained during 
the War was quickly shaking apart in the lure of complete independence.  
In searching for new allies for French influence in Syria, the French Foreign Ministry 
revisited its opinions of the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, and in January 1919 the Cairo Consulate 
conducted a thorough investigation of the party’s origins and agenda. The report concluded that 
the Ittihad Lubnani’s aim for “the complete independence of Lebanon, under protectorate of the 
Powers, within its natural, historical, and geographical boundaries” was more easily conversant 
with French interests in the Levant than was Shukri Ghanim’s vision of a unified great Syrian 
state under French mandate.312 The report advised cultivating the Ittihad Lubnani as a French 
ally to leverage against Emir Faysal’s demands. It cited the party's control over the Syrian press 
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as a particularly valuable asset that would make it “the largest, most influential, and most 
capable of all Lebanese societies.”313  
 As the Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon focused on strengthening a French partnership 
with the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani in Cairo, his Ministry notably distanced itself from Shukri 
Ghanim.314 More than that, Ghanim found his wings clipped; his persistence requests in late 
1918 and 1919 to travel to Syria to help organize Syrian unionist committees there were 
consistently denied. Unable to leave France, Ghanim took to writing letters of protest to his 
former politicl partners; he accused France of harboring sectarian intentions in managing Syria, 
and he warned Pichon that in siding with the cause of Lebanese independence, France would not 
see Syrian independence but instead its pitable “dismemberment by powerful hands” But even 
Ghanim’s most scornful protests contained within them an appeal; “We would like to add,” 
Ghanim concluded in 1919, that the Comité continued to support “a renewal of our fidelity to our 
secular friend” should France abandon the Lebanon Question and “return to its senses.”315 
 But if Ghanim’s greater Syrian project had seemed, for the French, an entrée into the 
post-Ottoman Mashriq during the War, by 1919 the Comité Central Syrien’s insistence on Syrian 
political unity, a federated constitutional Republic, and limited French assistance resembled Emir 
Faysal’s project for immediate independence for a constitutional Arab nationalist monarchy far 
too closely for French comfort. Indeed, even for some of Ghanim’s erstwhile supporters, Syrian 
unionism began to seem an inferior substitute for complete independence. In February 1919, 
France sponsored the First Lebanese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The First 
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Lebanese Delegation was comprised of representative from two bodies: the Administrative 
Council of Baʿabda (a constitutive assembly of notables from Mount Lebanon founded during 
the Ottoman mutasarrifiyya of the late nineteenth century), and executive members of the Hizb 
al-Ittihad al-Lubnani. The delegation’s head, Daud ʿAmmun, presided over both organization, 
and had returned to Beirut from Cairo shortly after the War ended. With France’s sponsorship, 
the First Lebanese Delegation made the case for a separate, “greater Lebanon” that would join 
Mount Lebanon and Beirut to the coastal cities of Tripoli and ʿAkkar in the north, Saida in the 
south, and with the fertile Biqaʾ Valley behind the Lebanon Mountains. ʿAmmun justified these 
borders using a blend of appeals for economic viability and historical determinism, concluding 
that only the “reestablishment” of greater Lebanon’s its “natural, historical, and geographical 
borders” could protect Lebanon from the continuing threat of emigration and privation: 
“The territories that these borders encompass are a condition of our existence; 
without them, we have no commerce, no agriculture, and our people are forced 
into emigration; Just let us close the gate, by simple administrative action, as we 
have, in this war, literally died of hunger.”316 
ʿAmmun’s argument conformed to the stances popularized by the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani in 
the Syrian press abroad; that Spring, the party published a book-length pamphlet laying out the 
historical bases for the creation of a greater Lebanese state and reproducing the points of 
ʿAmmun’s meeting with the Great Powers. The pamphlet, called Lebanon after the War, 
appealed to Lebanese living around the world to support the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani and 
petition the League of Nations on behalf of the First Lebanese Delegation.317 And petitions 
arrived to Paris in droves from Syrian and Lebanese communities across Europe, Africa, and the 
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Americas. Many of these supported Daud ʿAmmun’s First Lebanese Delegation and the project 
for a greater Lebanese state under French mandate. Others reiterated demands for Syrian unity 
and more limited French tutelage; Ghanim collected a series of these for remission to the League 
of Nations, concluding that Syrians would be best served if France would “hasten the fulfillment 
of her Mandate (over all of Syria) so that the damage caused by these regrettable rivalries, 
competitions, and unjustifiable claims (concerning Mount Lebanon) may be swiftly repaired.”318  
But after the First Lebanese Delegation’s February 1919 meeting in Paris, a new voice 
was heard from the Syrians in the mahjar with increasing urgency: those who demanded 
complete independence for Syria, who opposed French involvement in Syrian affairs, and who 
saw in Emir Faysal’s movement the opportunity for the realization of a decentralized 
constitutionalism reminiscent of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Calling itself the 
“Moderates Party” in Cairo, the “New Syria Party” in New York, and the “Democratic 
Nationalist Party” in Buenos Aires, this new political tendency merged complete independence, 
secular nationalism, and a potential alliance with the United States of America into a political 
program conversant with Hashimite Arab nationalism as well as Syrian unionism. 
The “New Syria Parties:” Syrian-Arab Nationalism and the American Mandate 
With the French actively pursuing the creation of a greater Lebanese state and its 
mandate over all of Syria in 1919, many among Shukri Ghanim’s former supporters began 
seeking new alternatives for the preservation of Syrian unity and autonomy. In the Syrian mahjar 
in the Americas, true Hashimite Arab nationalism had been present but had been a minority 
current before spring 1919, organized primarily by two al-Fatat branches in New York City and 
São Paulo.319 Among Syrian nationalists, a general mistrust of Hashimite designs on Syria 
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(Faysal was, after all, a foreigner from the Hijaz) had prevailed over concerns about French 
imperial designs before 1919. But as the news from Paris increasingly sounded as though the 
Grand Liban would be separated from its Syrian hinterland, an anti-French tendency among the 
Syrian nationalists ignited a new organizational campaign between Syrians in Cairo, New York 
City, and Buenos Aires. In Cairo, Faris Nimr and Yaʿqub Sarruf (publishers of the al-Muqattam 
and al-Muqtataf) established a Syrian Moderates Party in February 1919. The party’s manifesto, 
collected by French intelligence officers in Cairo, laid out the principle demands of the party: 
complete independence for a united Syrian federation; absolute opposition to a French mandate; 
the promotion of a partnership with the United States of America in matters of technical 
assistance and national development; and the complete separation of religious matters from 
government and politics (save for personal status matters).320  
Soon after its establishment in Egypt, Nimr’s party sought out connections with Syrian 
and Arab nationalists in the Americas, relying on personal networks and significantly, on links 
between alumni of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut (SPC). Of the men involved in 
organizing political committees in concert with Nimr’s Moderates Party and who pushed for an 
alliance between their movement and the United States of America, nearly all were SPC 
graduates: Georges Khayrallah, Philip K. Hitti, and Abraham Rihbany in New York, and Khalil 
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Saʿadih  in Buenos Aires. 321 One Najib Khalaf, a Moderate Party member in Mansura, Egypt, 
for instance, wrote his brother Nasib in New York, explaining, 
“It (the Moderates Party) has declared most emphatically that Syria is for the 
Syrians, independent and undivided, under American guidance. This party is 
made up of the most progressive Syrian element, and has gained such prominence 
as render it the leading and most influential party in Syria.”322 
In New York, these ideas resonated with Khayrallah, Hitti, and Rihbany, all of whom had 
advocated for Syrian American participation in America’s war effort and who headed a political 
committee called Hizb Suriya al-Jadida [the New Syria Party, also called the Syrian National 
League in English]. The Hizb Suriya al-Jadida, advocated for a “Syrian homeland, federated and 
independent,” with “no tutelage, no protection” from any foreign powers, save for technical 
assistance from the United States.323 In 1918, Abraham Rihbany published a monograph called 
America Save the Near East, which endorsed an alliance between the Syrian nationalist 
movement and the United States of America. The text analysed America’ unique position and 
status as an anticolonial world power. In opposition to the explicit agendas of Britain and 
especially France (as laid out by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916), Rihbany concluded that 
the United States alone could guarantee Syrian independence in keeping with the principles of 
national self-determination.324  In 1919, fellow partisan Ayyub Tabet elaborated on this notion, 
arguing that as a young nation “in its childhood,” the U.S. was best positioned to give Syria what 
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it needed: technical assistance (musāʿada) without imperial tutelage (wiṣāya).325 Tabet styled 
himself as the United States’ Syrian partner, even proposing to conduct a formal treaty of 
friendship between a united Syrian federation and the United States of America. Tabet's public 
statements incensed French diplomats; French Minister LeFevre-Pontalis scoffed at the irony of 
asking an allegedly “anti-colonial” America to take mandate over the East before dismissing the 
Hizb al-Suriyya al-Jadida as British agents.326 
 Meanwhile, in Buenos Aires, Syrian journalist Khalil Saʿadih  founded the al-Hizb al-
Dimuqrati al-Watani (Democratic Nationalist Party). Like Khayrallah and Hitti in New York, 
Khalil Saʿadih  had been a colleague of Faris Nimr's at the SPC in Beirut. Like Nimr, Saʿadih  
had socialist leanings and spent the War developing an anti-colonial reading of events back 
home. In January 1919, Saʿadih  issued a public call for a reassessment of the diaspora's political 
goals, and he announced his intention to host a General Syrian Congress in Buenos Aires.327 The 
Conference reflected Saʿadih 's desire to form a secular patriotic coalition against French 
domination: “we are no longer Muslim, nor Christian, Druze, nor Jew,” Saʿadih  wrote, “for the 
gallows are erected for all of us together; the famine killed all indiscriminately. We must now 
form... a single coalition. We are now Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians, without factions, 
religions, or sects.”328 
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 Saʿadih's Syrian Congress occurred on 25 February 1919, timed symbolically to raise 
protest to the First Lebanese Delegation occurring simultaneously in Paris. Its resolutions—that 
Syria be granted its complete independence [al-istiqlāl al-tām], without French “protection” 
[ḥimāya], and that the new Syrian nation be given a seat at the League of Nations—laid the basis 
for Saʿadih's Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Watani. The Party's slogan, “A bedouin's independence is 
better than civilized bondage” [al-istiqlāl maʿa al-badāwa khayr min-l-ʿubūda maʿa al-ḥaḍāra], 
contested Shukri Ghanim's idea that Syria was not yet ready for independence and required 
guided development first.329 Saʿadih  emphasized “the rights of barbarians” (ḥuqūq al-barābara) 
to national independence. He argued that in the former Ottoman lands, national sovereignty must 
precede civilization (tamaddun); it could not happen the other way around. 
The relationship between the “New Syria” parties and the Hashimite Arab nationalism 
was a complex one, much more complicated than a simple partnership or alliance. Khalil 
Saʿadih’s proclamations regarding “a bedouin’s independence” were less a true declaration of 
Arab nationalist solidarity than an understanding that Emir Faysal’s goals in Syria closely 
resembled those of the Syrian unionists. In April 1919, the New York branch of the Hizb Suriya 
al-Jadida pursued (and obtained) Faysal’s approval of a potential United States mandate over 
Syria, in return for its support of his appeals against the French.330 Such negotiations show that 
the “New Syria” parties were not merely satellites of the Arab nationalist movement; instead, 
they engaged Faysal in a horizontal pattern of collaboration focused on the shared goals of each 
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movement, particularly against the division of Syria and for an American role in Syrian 
reconstruction. With those goals identified in April 1919, Emir Faysal returned to Paris to again 
seek an audience with the League of Nations, and the New Syria parties both in Cairo and in the 
Americas published extensively about their project. Faris Nimr wrote to George Khayrallah in 
New York, directing him to “publish through associated Press that… our party has been 
petitioning the Paris Peace Conference that Syria be kept undivided and that… the United States 
of America be named mandatory power for Syria. We must appeal to the American public and 
press to support our aspirations.”331 Meanwhile, a pamphlet written in New York, called 
“America and Syria” appeared in circulation in Cairo and Alexandria. It endorsed American 
reconstruction in a united Syria, and proposed Faysal as an intermediary between the United 
States and the Syrian people. The pamphlet concluded,  
“All right minded persons will confidently believe that America will not let the 
Syrians’ call (for reconstruction) go unheeded. Indeed she has the lofty idealism 
and imagination to appreciate the privilege of returning on behalf of the West, the 
debt of the East, of helping in the restoration of the old glories of Jerusalem and 
Damascus and the land of immemorial cedars… through that masterpiece, the 
League of Nations convenant.”332 
With this momentum at his back, Emir Faysal returned to Paris in April 1919 to accompany a 
Syrian delegation made up of his partisans and “new Syria” supporters at the Paris Peace 
Conference. The French protested, charging that Faysal’s Syrian delegation was not truly 
representative of the Syrian people’s feelings regarding a French Mandate. After some 
deliberation, the League of Nations dismissed the delegates without hearing their appeal.  
Outraged by claims that their protests against a French Mandate were not 
“representative” enough, Georges Khayrallah drafted a challenge to the League of Nations from 
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New York. In it, he claimed that if the League of Nations wanted to find the true pulse of the 
Syrian people, they would have to venture beyond the confines of Paris. They could not rely on 
printed materials arriving to France from Damascus, because even though “Syrian Muslims quite 
plainly speak that they do not want France… censorship is so rigid and strict that not a shred of 
paper in which a political idea is expressed is allowed to go out of the country.”333 Khayrallah 
challenged that instead of deliberating the Syrian Question from Paris, “the League of Nations 
(ought to) approach the Syrian people direct (sic) and ask them to speak for themselves.” 
Khayrallah’s circular endorsed the idea of an independent commission to Syria to discern the 
wishes of its people, and it argued that as “the best friend of the weak peoples,” the United States 
of America was the obvious candidate to form such a commission. With the announcement that 
an American Commission headed by Charles Crane and Henry Churchill King had been 
scheduled to arrive in Syria in June 1919, the Hizb Suriya al-Jadida rejoiced, stating:  
“America is our best friend. She is the best friend of the weak peoples. America 
made it possible for the weak nations to speak. America made it possible for 
dependent states to have justice and be free. Now is the time; now is our 
opportunity! … Have the Syrians courage enough to ask for what they want? 
Have we, who live in the United States of America, the land of freedom and free 
speech, the courage to speak our minds?”334 
 
The idea for an American-led commission of inquiry into a postwar settlement in greater Syria 
originated in the doubts of American policymakers that the plan for a Grand Liban as laid out by 
the Paris Peace Conference’s First Lebanese Delegation truly represented the wishes of the 
people who would come to live in the new state.335 These doubts were informed by the views of 
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prominent American missionaries in Beirut, especially those affiliated with the Syrian Protestant 
College. SPC president Howard Bliss, for example, requested that the League of Nations sponsor 
an “Inter-Allied or Neutral Commission” to Syria to determine the true wishes of its people as 
early as February 1919.336 Ussama Makdisi argues that in the face of competing European 
territorial claims, this was a “revolutionary proposal” that “defied the imperial nature of both 
[the] Sykes-Picot and the Balfour Declaration” by introducing the principle of national self-
determination in a meaningful way.337 The prominence of SPC alumni among the ranks of the 
“new Syria” parties in the Syrian mahjar as well as their enthusiasm for an American 
commission to Syria convinced some French officials that these parties had been formed through 
the work of American or British intelligence agencies.338 The interactions between the Hizb 
Suriya al-Jadida leaders and the U.S. Department of State, however, demonstrate that the Syrian 
American activists approached them, and not the other way around. 
Arriving in Syria in June 1919, The Inter-Allied Commission led by Charles Crane and 
Henry Churchill King travelled extensively through Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian territory, 
interviewing local elites, clerical leaders, and various political parties with the goal of 
establishing the representative political will of each district’s population.339 Its findings largely 
validated the arguments of Emir Faysal and the “new Syria” parties: most Syrians wanted 
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immediate and complete independence for Syria; that if a foreign Mandate was to be imposed on 
Syria, American or British tutelage was preferable to French; that most Syrians supported a 
single constitutional state including Lebanon and Palestine; that Syrians rejected Zionist claims 
to a state in Palestine out of hand.340 The Commission’s report was sent to the League of Nations 
in August 1919, where it was subsequently ignored. Instead, the French Foreign Ministry began 
laying the groundwork for a Secon Lebanese Delegation, this time led by the chief cleric of 
Mount Lebanon’s Uniate Maronite Church, Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik.  
The Second Lebanese Delegation of 1919: Competing Lebanese Nationalisms and the Church 
 As the American King-Crane Commission toured Syria and Palestine, French Foreign 
Ministers in Paris began to discuss their options in light of early predictions that the 
Commissioners would confirm that most Syrians and a significant portion of Lebanese preferred 
complete independence to the prospect of a French Mandate.341 Foreign Minister Pichon sent Lt. 
Colonel Cousse to Damascus to discuss a repprochment with Emir Faysal in June 1919. Cousse 
suggested that in return to Faysal’s recognition of a greater Lebanese state, France would 
guarantee the “future independence of Syria.”342 The Emir rebuked French overtures, and 
remained firm in his conviction that any “indigenous movement for Lebanese separation” was in 
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fact a parti colonial working in French employ. Lt. Colonel Cousse concluded similarly of 
Faysal’s partisans in Damascus, “the extremists of the Complete Independence Party… certainly 
there are local English agents operating among them.”343  
 Although Faysal swiftly sent the French packing in June 1919, just the presence of a 
French Lt. Colonel sent rumors flying in both Mount Lebanon and into the mahjar that France 
had reached agreement with the Hashimite Emir. Those who supported the tems of the Grand 
Liban as laid out by the First Lebanese Delegation protested in Baʿabda, 344 and many more 
wrote to the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Ilyas Huwayyik, entreating him to speak out on 
behalf of Lebanese national aspirations. In the American mahjar, Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalist propaganda competed for space as speculation over the King-Crane Commission and 
France’s meetings with Faysal continued in July 1919.345 Among supporters of the Hizb al-
Ittihad al-Lubnani and other secular Lebanese nationalists organizations, an increasingly acerbic 
political atmosphere conditioned by rumors and propaganda resulted in the resurgence of 
Maronite Christian nationalism. The Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda Lubnaniyya, Naʿum Mukarzil’s party 
headquartered in New York City, was at the vanguard of this new movement, and in summer 
1919 his party pushed for a second Lebanese delegation comprised primarily of Maronite clergy. 
In June 1919, Mukarzil himself travelled to Paris, where he wrote appeals to the French and the 
Maronite Patriarch for the sponsorship of a second Lebanese Delegation.346  
Meanwhile, French consular officials in Cuba and elsewhere reported an uptick in 
Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya propaganda across the Americas as well as a dramatic boost 
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in the organization’s popularity. In Cuba, for instance, Consul Mr. Brillouin reported that 
Mukarzil and the Nahda Lubnaniyya had become an overnight sensation “that represents some 
ten thousand people locally.” In his report to Paris, Brillouin described a series of mass 
demonstrations by the island’s Lebanese nationalists. The demonstrators brought pamphlets 
printed by Mukarzil’s press in Brooklyn, as well as a new Lebanese flag designed by the Nahda 
Lubaniyya, a French tricolor “bearing a Cedar within the white band.”347 Although in the end, the 
King-Crane Commission's report was not released to the public (nor was it officially entered into 
the proceedings at the Peace Conference),348 fears among Lebanese Maronites living abroad that 
its findings might contradict plans for a greater Lebanese state drove many to support the 
unambiguous Francophilism and Maronite nationalist agenda of the Nahda Lubnaniyya. 
 Huwayyik met with the King-Crane commissioners at his Church’s Patriarchate 
compound in Mount Lebanon, where he confirmed his assent with the terms of Daud ʿAmmun’s 
First Lebanese Delegation. Significantly, the Patriarch framed the Lebanese nation in terms of 
secular self-determination, and not Maronite nationalism: “If Lubnan al-Kabir is granted 
independence, and is allowed its nationhood and internal security, then we will protect our land 
and make it a refuge from oppression for any people, sect, or nation within it (ay shaʿb wa-
madhhab wa-umma kānu). Why shouldn't the Lebanese have their own state, if that is their 
aspiration?”349 When Crane and King pressed Huwayyik on the question of French protection, 
(asking specifically, “protection from who, exactly?”) Huwayyik responded that French 
“protection” over Lebanon was about building a sovereign state that places all groups under a 
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single national system, another hallmark idea of secular Lebanese nationalism, particularly that 
of the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani.350 Patriarch Huwayyik’s meeting with the King-Crane 
Commission was his first intervention into the politics of the Paris Peace Conference, and he was 
then careful to represent himself as a spokeman for a Lebanese nation defined in secular terms. 
In the coming weeks, however, the French Foreign Ministry would propose that the Patriarch 
bring a Second Lebanese Delegation to Paris. As plans for this delegation progressed into Fall 
1919, it became clear that the Church’s role in the politics of the Conférence drove a wedge 
between Lebanese nationalists of two camps: the secularists of the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, 
and the Francophile pro-clerical Maronite nationalists of the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya. 
 The Second Lebanese Delegation was scheduled to meet with the Conférence in October 
1919, and, eager to demonstrate that the Patriarch’s delegation represented Lebanese public 
opinion, the French Foreign Ministry solicited petitions and letters of support from Lebanese 
communities across the mahjar. Many such letters poured into the Maronite Patriarchate in 
Bkerke from Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and the United States, where they were 
bound together for presentation to the Paris Peace Conference as proof of the diaspora's 
endorsement for an independent Lebanon.351 Mukarzil’s Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya 
organized a letter writing campaign in support of Huwayyik’s delegation, and chapters from 
across the Americas authorized the Patriarch to represent the party's interest in creating the 
“absolute independence of Mount Lebanon, the return of its ancient borders, under the fraternal 
protection of France.”352 In October 1919, Mukarzil returned to Paris once again, and he 
accompanied the Second Lebanese Delegation as formal representative for the American mahjar. 
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 But the Church’s involvement in the Paris Peace Conference was far from a settled issue, 
and there were many Lebanese nationalists in the mahjar who were deeply unhappy to have a 
member of the clergy representing their movement. This was particularly the case among 
supporters of the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, which had supported Daud ʿAmmun’s first 
Delegation and saw no need for a second one. Many Ittihad Lubnani leaders saw the Patriarch’s 
presence in Paris as a threat to the authority of the Administrative Council at Baʿabda, a 
constitutive assembly active since late Ottoman times and which the party hoped would form the 
nucleus of a Lebanese parliamentary assembly after the War. A June 1919 letter to Patriarch 
Huwayyik written by a Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani affiliate in Brazil Ibrahim al-Bakhkhash 
reveals his fear that secular Lebanese nationalism was being edged out by two flank movements: 
a Hashimite Arab nationalism whose partisans denied the viability of an independent Lebanese 
entity, and the Francophile Maronite nationalism that envisioned greater Lebanon as a Christian 
state in a Muslim region.353   
 Eager to support Huwayyik's delegation, São Paulo newspaper editor and Nahda 
Lubnaniyya founder Shukri al-Khuri published a series of articles justifying Huwayyik's 
involvement in his political daily, Abu al-Hawl. One such article argued that the Church's 
philanthropic efforts and activism during the War more than justified Huwayyik's attendance in 
the peace proceedings. Al-Khuri argued that the Ittihad Lubnani's objections to Huwayyik had 
less to do with a difference in political opinion (“after all, they also say that Istanbul had 
infringed on Lebanese freedoms and rights”) but with the notion that Huwayyik's role as a 
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religious head would present a conflict of interest for Lebanese secular nationalism. Interestingly, 
al-Khuri resorts not to Christian religious nationalism to counter the Ittihad's claims, but instead 
presents the Patriarch as a secular leader and representative for the Lebanese community.354 
During the war, the Patriarch “raised and distributed 1 million lira,” among both Maronites and 
other groups in Mount Lebanon, and while “he is the religious head of the Maronite sect, the 
Patriarch's role has been both religious and civil since time immemorial.”355 Furthermore, Khuri 
emphasized that the Great Powers (and particularly the French) had sought out the Patriarch as 
the arbiter “for Lebanese near and far (al-qarīb wa-l-gharīb),” in matters “both religious and 
political.”356 For al-Khuri, opposing the Patriarch's delegation on the grounds that he represented 
the Church undermined the secular aspects to Huwayyik's agenda. That al-Khuri foregrounded 
the secular nature of the Delegation’s agenda (despite its clerical composition) demonstrates the 
degree to which his Lebanese nationalist leadership remained divided over the proper role of 
Maronite clergy in politics. That said, Abu al-Hawl endorsed the Second Lebanese delegation as 
well as the French mandate that followed. Meanwhile, the Nahda raised funds to cover 
Huwayyik's personal expenses while in Paris: Boston chapter Secretary Yusuf Habib al-Qamar 
sent a payment of 222 “riyal” and applauded Huwayyik's efforts “to demand the independence of 
Greater Lebanon.”357 
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356 Khuri, “al-Baṭrīrk al-Mārūnī wa-Ṭāʾifihi,” Bkerke Letters, Huwayyik Collection, Folder 087, Document 390. 
357 The currency referred to here is unknown; in the Bkerke letters the word riyāl is used to variously to dollars, 
pounds, francs, pesos, in addition to the Ottoman riyal. This presents a problem when dealing with emigrant 
remittances and relief work in the Levant, and indeed one finds contemporary cases of misunderstanding where the 
mother Church and diasporic donors disagree on amounts of funding actually sent; Letter (s.d. Received 22 April 
1920) from Yusuf Habib al-Qamr of Boston's al-Muntada al-Lubnani to Patriarch Huwayyik, Bkerke Letters, 
Huwayyik Collection, Folder 087, Document 0188. 
149 
 
Resentment against French authorities seeking signatures of support of Huwayyik’s 
delegation was also common. In Santiago, Chile, the French consul found himself completely 
unable to find supporters for the Patriarch’s delegation. Rather than a petition of support for the 
second Lebanese Delegation, Chile’s Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani sent a letter of protest. When 
given the ultimatum to either support the Patriarch or lose their vote, they drafted a telegram to 
the French, saying that left “without a true delegate,” the Lebanese of Chile “unanimously 
resolve to entrust defense of their interests to (Stephen) Pichon.”358 Among Lebanese 
nationalists, the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani was the largest, most organized source of opposition 
to the Church’s delegation, but it was not the only such source. Several break-away political 
parties, local organizations, and individual Maronite activists wrote letters to the Maronite 
Patriarch protesting the Second Lebanese Delegation, the Church’s partnership with France, and 
the notion of a Grand Liban distinct from Syria. The Hizb al-Watani al-Lubnani [Lebanese 
National Party] of “America,” for example, implored Patriarch Huwayyik not to cooperate with 
the French or any foreign power for Lebanese independence; Western partners would bring only 
Western economic interests, resulting in “economic occupation” of the land.359 Before the war, 
the Hizb al-Watani al-Lubnani concluded, the Lebanese nationalist movement had focused on 
“making Lebanese men lords of their own land.” Now, it seemed that Parisian high politics had 
unjustly taken the fore. 
 As the diaspora roiled in claims and counterclaims about clerical involvement, 
Huwayyik's delegation presented its plan on 27 October 1919. Citing letters of support from 
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Lebanese institutions in the Levant and the Nahda's campaign abroad, the Patriarch endorsed the 
territorial claims of the Grand Liban and the principle of French protection.360 A month later 
French Minister Georges Clemenceau presented a letter to Patriarch Huwayyik that included an 
official recognition of Lebanon's independence and the terms of the second Lebanese 
delegation.361 This outcome was a moment of triumph for both the Church and the Lebanese 
independence movement abroad, but it also specifically cemented a bond of patronage and 
representative authority between the Patriarch and his diasporic partners, presenting Huwayyik 
with new responsibilities to provide for a political constituency living abroad.  
Conclusions 
 By tracing the political activism of a transnational network of Syrian and Lebanese 
journalists living in the Americas, this chapter has analyzed the emergence of reformist political 
committtees through the press and their progression into competing Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab 
nationalist political parties during World War I. The close relationship between these political 
organizations and a transnational Syrian press then reaching a degree of syndication made 
newspapers a powerful place to appeal to a mahjari “public,” and eventually to make claims to 
represent that public as a national community. Syrian and Lebanese journalists living abroad 
were simultaneously leaders of diasporic political parties, and their access to the media and to the 
diplomatic networks of the Entente made these men attractive partners for international relief 
efforts and military recruitment campaigns. By War’s end, many of these activists promoted 
partnership with one or more Western powers as a means of safeguarding a post-Ottoman 
political future for Syria or Lebanese, variously defined. 
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 But the same transnational alliances that gave these political organizations strength 
during tha War transformed into a complicated set of political entanglements shortly after 1918, 
especially as France moved to assert a Mandate over Syria and Lebanon and to establish a 
separate greater Lebanese state. New fractures within and between the Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalist movements in the mahjar ultimately gave France the upper hand in sponsoring their 
choice of allies at the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference. The increasing allure of 
Hashimite Arab nationalism among the pan-Syrianists once supportive of Shukri Ghanim, on one 
hand, and that of the overtly Maronite nationalist and Francophile Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-
Lubnaniyya, on the other, fundamentally altered the discussions heard in Paris concerning 
Syria’s political future.  
Uninterested in actively endorsing an independent Hashimite Arab Kingdom centered on 
Damascus and including Mount Lebanon, the League of Nations ultimately ruled in favor of a 
French Mandate at San Remo in April 1920. Within weeks, French troops amassed in Beirut, 
planning an offensive against Emir Faysal as he hastened to create an Arab state in defiance of 
the League’s ruling. Gouraud campaigned into Syria, meeting Faysal’s men at Maysalun in July 
1920, routing them and putting an end to Faysal’s monarchy in Damascus. That September, 
Gouraud declared the establishment of the Grand Liban, abolished the Administrative Council at 
Baʿabda, and in 1921 announced that greater Lebanon would have its first formal census. As the 
following chapter shows, the Lebanese census of 1921 would set important precedents in the 
Lebanese state's project to assert a coherent national identity, and the inclusion of emigrants 





CHAPTER 3: MANDATING THE MAHJAR: THE LEBANESE CENSUS OF 1921 AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF A TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENRY ABROAD 
 
The arrival of Maronite Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik in Paris in October 1919 marked a 
significant turning point in the plan for a greater Lebanese state. As head of the Lebanese 
Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Patriarch Huwayyik appealed for a greater Lebanese 
state incorporating historical Mount Lebanon with the fertile Biqaʾ valley and the former sanjaks 
of Beirut, Saida, and Tripoli, thus reiterating the principle demands of Daud Ammun’s First 
Lebanese Delegation eight months earlier.362 He additionally endorsed French tutelage over 
Mount Lebanon on the basis of France’s “traditional” role as protector of Lebanese Christians in 
an overwhelmingly Muslim part of the world.363 The Patriarch’s appeal to the Conference in late 
1919 cemented what would become a long-term pattern of cooperation between the Maronite 
Church and the French Mandatory government of greater Lebanon. A year after Patriarch 
Huwayyik’s audience in Paris, the French general Henri Gouraud would formally announce the 
establishment of the Grand Liban in Beirut in September 1920. Seated at his right was the aging 
Patriarch of the Maronite Church, who represented Lebanese Maronites both in Lebanese 
territory and beyond at the 1920 ceremony; a Lebanese flag (a cedar superimposed on a French 
tricolor) hanged over the efficient, its design also created abroad.364 The state of Lebanon was 
defined along territorial lines, lines which encompassed a religiously diverse population of 
former Ottoman subjects, many of which contested both its borders as well as France’s right to 
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protect them. As French High Commissioner in his new office in Beirut, General Gouraud faced 
a few pertinent questions: who were the “Lebanese”? Who counted as Lebanese: the people 
living within the Grand Liban (some of who denied the new state’s viability), or Lebanon’s 
diaspora, then numbering some 25 percent of its population?365 Any French attempt to define the 
Lebanese, he concluded, would require a population study, but in the absence of a transnational 
administrative infrastructure linking all of Lebanon’s scattered populations abroad, who would 
do the counting? 
This chapter takes a close look at the 
first Lebanese census of 1921, one of the 
French Mandate’s first points of contact 
with the Lebanese population it sought to 
administer. Among historians, remarkably 
little is known about the 1921 census, save 
that (in the words of Stephen Longrigg) its 
results were considered “highly imperfect, 
for the reasons... of concealment, 
misunderstanding, falsification, conjecture, 
and motives peculiar to communities which 
in such countries always prevent accurate 
personal registration.”366 
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Figure 6: General Gouraud and Maronite Patriarch Ilyas 
Huwayyik at Proclamation of the Grand Liban, 1920. 
Source: Mukarzil, al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 128. 
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From the outset, French authorities were pressed between a set of countervailing 
concerns, the desire to maintain the political supremacy of French partners in the Mandate 
(particularly the Maronite Church) versus the terms of the League of Nations Mandate that 
charged France with building representative administrative infrastructure in Lebanon. Looking at 
the 1921 census, this chapter argues that France pursued Lebanese Maronite emigrants into the 
diaspora, enumerating them alongside residents as a means of preserving (perhaps even creating) 
a Christian demographic majority for the new Lebanese state as well as protecting Maronite 
political preeminence within that emerging political order. It demonstrates that the French High 
Commissioner’s office in Beirut employed the Maronites Church to conduct a portion of the 
1921 census, specifically to enumerate Lebanese Maronites living in the Americas for inclusion 
in the count. The Church’s involvement in the census bore significant consequences for all 
concerned parties: the French Mandatory government created the demographic ratio it saw as 
favorable to the continuation of its rule in Beirut, the Maronite Church used the census as an 
opportunity to further expand its authority over its flock living abroad; and for Lebanese 
emigrants, their registration in the 1921 census created new expectations that as citizens abroad, 
they would be consulted in Lebanese elections and political affairs. In attempting to define who 
was “Lebanese,” the census of 1921 raised new questions about what what kind of obligations 
bound the emigrants to the homeland under French Mandate. 
Chapter 2 showed the means by which Syrian and Lebanese journalists in the mahjar 
participated in nationalist activism and military recruitment during World War I, and in the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference which soon followed. By “claim(ing) membership in a political 
community that stretched beyond the territorial borders of the homeland,”367 activists in the 
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majar created distinctly long-distance Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms. But long-distance 
nationalism, as Nina Glick Schiller conceives it in Georges Woke Up Laughing, was never 
singularly about emigrants and exiles laying claim to the homeland. States, institutions, and 
individuals “at home” also lay claim to the diaspora when it becomes politically meaningful to 
do so.368 Thus, this chapter approaches both the production of the 1921 Lebanese census (its 
methodology, collection of data, its applications) and the results of the census within the grander 
project of the Mandate’s administrative development. By domesticating the diaspora, or 
“mandating the mahjar,” both the French Mandatory government in Beirut and the Maronite 
Church (in different contexts and for varied reasons) could extent their political authority into 
Lebanese communities abroad. In turn, however, the Mandate’s inclusion of emigrants in the 
census encouraged new patterns of transnational substantive citizenship and claims-making by 
Lebanese emigrants upon the French Mandatory state. 
The French Mandate and its Census: Who are the Lebanese? 
 For Patriarch Huwayyik, Gouraud's September 1920 proclamation of the Grand Liban 
within enlarged borders under French mandate was a political victory and a confirmation of the 
Great Powers' support for a Christian state in the Middle East. However, the Lebanese territory's 
demographic realities did not coincide with the image of a Christian fortress in a Muslim region. 
In both the coastal cities and the Biqaʾ Valley annexed to the new state, Muslims comprised the 
majority, and most of them were deeply unhappy about being separated from the Syrian 
hinterland (as were some Christians). Historians of the early Mandate usually point to the 
contradiction within the Lebanese nationalist movement's two stances: the enlargement of 
Lebanon's borders, and the maintenance of a Christian majority. While diasporic opponents to 
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Lebanon's political separation from Syria (most notably George Samné) urged that the new state 
either abandon its claim to a Christian national identity or else accept a reduction of its territory, 
the French mandatory authorities and the Maronite Church proposed alternative measures.369 In 
1921, France sought to limit the continuing emigration of Lebanese Christians, which quickly 
resumed after the War and which threatened the demographic balance the High Commissioner 
sought to preserve.370 At the same time, the High Commissioner announced in early 1921 his 
desire for an administrative census to enumerate the Lebanese, including those living abroad.371 
 The Lebanese Mandate conducted two official censuses, in 1921 and 1932. The 1921 
census established the country's electoral districts and set up the confessional distribution of seats 
in the 1922 Representative Council, the administrative body that replaced the Ottoman-era 
Administrative Council abolished by France in 1920.372 Stuck between the twin objectives of 
building a democratic Republic and sponsoring a state with a Christian-majority leadership, 
French High Commissioner Gouraud opted to include tax-paying Lebanese emigrants in the 
census as part of their districts of origin, boosting Christian numbers in mixed areas, especially 
in the mountainous zones that had seen the most extensive emigration.373 In a February 1921 
letter circulated by the French consulates across the Americas, Gouraud emphasized the census 
as an administrative matter catered to “the interests and intentions to Syrians and Lebanese 
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abroad to maintain a link with their place of origin.” The voluntary registration of “all Lebanese 
(emigrants) who so request it” afforded France with a supportive and “numerically significant” 
national constituency abroad.374 It additionally provided the High Commissioner's Office with 
data to be mined for the solution to Lebanon's continuing emigration problem: by facilitating 
informal networks of diplomacy between the Mandate and its diaspora via the French consulate 
system, the government could inquire into remedies for Lebanese emigration.  
 Carried out between March and December 1921, Gouraud's census of 1921 set important 
precedents for the well-documented census of 1932: it enumerated emigrants alongside residents, 
it over-reported Christian populations and under-reported Lebanon's Muslims, and for Lebanese 
living abroad, it presaged access to formal Lebanese citizenship.375 France's insistence that the 
census was “purely administrative” prompted many Muslims to refrain “from registering as 
Lebanese subjects because registration could be interpreted as a recognition of the Lebanese 
state.”376 The Muslim boycott and France's decision to count Lebanese emigrants led to the 
conclusion that Christians constituted 55 percent of Lebanese population in 1921, compared to 
Muslims at 45 percent.377 In each of Lebanon’s administrative districts, Muslims constituted a 
numerical majority, but the apportionment of elected seats in the Representative Council was 
made on ratio reached by the census: six Christians to five Muslims (6:5).378 Comparable ratios 
would be repeated in the 1932 Census and the 1943 National Pact.379 Given that population data 
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from 1921's census was reused and referenced in 1932, it is important to address the census's 
methodological aspects. 
 The census's registrants were arranged along three planes, classified by sect, village (or 
village of origin), and by heads of household. The French Mandate government borrowed this 
principle from their understanding (or misunderstandings) of Ottoman precedent. For much of 
the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had classified its subjects according to their millet, a 
useful method because tax rates and many other responsibilities exchanged between the Sultan 
and his subjects (conscription, for instance) were in accordance with their belonging to a distinct 
millet.380 Edmund Burke III and more recently, Benjamin Thomas White argue that France 
brought to its Syrian and Lebanese mandates a significant misperception: informed by Marshall 
Lyautey’s colonial principle of “association” (which dictated that colonial peoples are best 
governed according to their own laws and traditions),381 High Commissioner Gouraud 
incorporated sect into the Lebanese census, conflating it with the Ottoman idea of the millet.382 
These two categories—“sect” and “millet”—are distinct in important ways. First, French 
conflations of the organizing principles underwrote more generalized assumptions that the 
religiously diverse groups in Syria and Lebanon had been, since time immemorial, in a state of 
constant religious conflict.383 This assumption was particularly acute between Christians and 
Muslims. Such assumptions mattered immensely as France began to build administrative 
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infrastructure for greater Lebanon; the focus was on balancing sectarian interests through 
accommodation of older legal norms more than on the development of a secular, common 
citizenship. For the same reason, the Mandate delegated personal status laws and other legal 
issues to the respective religious courts (with the exception of the awqaf, over which the High 
Commissioner retained oversight.)384 Second, France’s self-perception as the historical 
“protector” of Lebanese Christians (particularly of their Maronite partners) not only informed the 
Mandate’s classification of Lebanese into confessional groups but also the integration of a 
confessional logic into Lebanon’s early representative structures.385 
Registration with the 1921 census was often an individual's first formal contact with the 
French Mandate. The receipts given in exchange for registering became first proof of 
relationship with the new Lebanese entity, and they were offer to registrants with the expectation 
that the Lebanese living abroad would ultimately return to Lebanon.386 In the Americas, many 
Lebanese Maronite registered enthusiastically, eager to obtain new documentation that could 
replace their now-antiquated Ottoman passports. But conducting a Lebanese census in the 
expansive American mahjar required access to transnational networks of trust and cooperation 
that French Mandatory officials in Beirut did not directly control. The French would have to 
solicit institutional partners for the census project. High Commissioner Gouraud delegated the 
registration of Lebanese emigrants to religious authorities already operating in Lebanese 
communities in the Americas, particularly the Maronite Church and its Patriarch Ilyas 
Huwayyik. The Maronite Church participated in several aspects of the Lebanese census of 1921, 
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collecting data for the Mandatory state but also using the project as a chance to reorganize the 
Maronite Church and project its influence further into the Lebanese communities abroad. 
Gouraud’s decision to rely on the Church to enumerate Lebanese emigrants raises questions 
about the various political, ecclesiastical, and personal agendas this project set at play. Who 
counted the Lebanese abroad in 1921? How was it done? How was the census data used beyond 
the confines of Lebanon's electoral politics? What political partnerships formed as a result? 
The Maronite Church as Census-Taker: Enumerating the Emigrant Faithful 
 The Maronite Patriarchate was intimately involved with the counting of Lebanese 
emigrants, and letters between Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik and High Commissioner Gouraud 
suggest that the Maronite Church began registering Lebanese abroad even before the census 
formally began. Shortly after the French High Commissioners announcement of the census in 
February 1921,387 the Patriarchate in Bkerke sent Maronite Archbishop Shukralla al-Khuri on an 
expedition to the Americas to tour the diaspora's Maronite communities and report on the state of 
the Church; the trip lasted over two years and brought the Archbishop to New York, through the 
United States, to Canada, and finally to Latin and South America. al-Khuri's orders were to meet 
with local Maronite clergy and lay community leaders to enumerate Lebanese Maronites and 
appraise the clergy's progress in each emigrant community.388  
 Although Patriarch Huwayyik was aware of the French High Commissioner's decree for a 
Lebanese census, Archbishop al-Khuri boarded a steamship in Beirut with the resolve that his 
mission was ecclesiastical in nature; only after his arrival in New York did the French 
government seek the Church's assistance in registering Lebanese populations for the Mandate's 
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census of 1921.389 In a 6 April letter, the French consul in New York sent al-Khuri a formal 
register, asking him to categorize emigrants according to sect and village of origin, and to 
enumerate households as well as raw numbers.390 The High Commissioner also sought the names 
of household heads where possible, a prerequisite for the registration papers that were being 
prepared in Beirut. The French consul concluded in their correspondence with al-Khuri that such 
registration was necessary to assist France “in everything it undertakes to protect your 
compatriots in the most effective way possible.”391 
 Across the Americas, Maronite clergy were alerted to send the requested information 
regarding their congregations to al-Khuri's dormitory at Our Lady of Lebanon Cathedral in 
Brooklyn, New York. Along with the census data came commentary on the state of local 
Maronite religious practice. Al-Khuri amalgamated this data and remitted it to two offices: it 
went first to the French Consulates in New York and Washington DC, and also to the Patriarch's 
compound in Bkerke, where Patriarch Huwayyik planned a reformation of the Maronite Church 
in the Americas. The census was a joint effort, a partnership made by French authorities and the 
Maronite Patriarchate in the name of identifying, embracing, and ultimately governing Lebanon's 
non-resident national constituents. It shaped both governmental and clerical policy towards the 
diaspora while further cementing the partnership between the Church and the Mandatory state. 
 In the weeks that followed, discussions between Maronite clergy and the French 
government reveal important mismatches in agendas. The paramount question was who to count:  
the French Consul asked al-Khuri for help in counting “all Syrians and Lebanese in our 
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jurisdiction (the United States),” of all sects and religions, but the Archbishop's orders from 
Bkerke remained to count Lebanese Maronites abroad for the Church's purposes. With limited 
access to the Lebanese diaspora, the French Mandatory government had to work through their 
clerical partners to obtain the data they required; al-Khuri agreed to collect data on Maronites for 
French authorities, but he concluded that “I regret only that I can offer imperfect numbers, 
offering more exact figures for the Maronites, the object of my visit to America.”392 
 Because the Mandatory authorities contracted this part of the census out to religious 
figures like Archbishop al-Khuri, the accuracy of the data they compiled hinged upon their 
ability to locate and access willing census-takers. al-Khuri offered data on Lebanese Maronites 
and offered to help locate Orthodox and Melkite institutions in New York, emphasizing the 
demographic strength of Lebanese Christians in the United States.393 In the same letter, al-Khuri 
concluded that “with respect to other, non-Christian Syrians-- Jews, Druze, Muslims-- I do not 
know for certain, but I think they are very few in number.”394 To the contrary, in 1921 there were 
numerous communities of Lebanese Muslims and Druze in the United States and elsewhere in 
the Americas. These communities had their own societies, newspapers, and social institutions.395 
They were visible participants in Lebanese political culture: the political daily al-Bayan, 
operated by Suleiman Baddur in New York City, had a distribution comparable to Mirat al-
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Gharb, al-Saʿih, and al-Shaʿb newspapers.396 Al-Bayan had a Druze editor, a mixed Druze and 
Sunni set of columnists, and an Arab nationalist outlook very much at odds with French rule in 
Syria and Lebanon as well as with the census project of 1921.397 The publication ran 
continuously from the late Ottoman period through Independence, and would have been a 
highly-visible focal point for the Syrian colony’s non-Christian population as well as those who 
opposed the Mandate. Precise population numbers, however, have not been possible to ascertain. 
Those incluced in the 1921 census are almost certainly incorrect because Lebanese Muslims and 
many Druze abroad boycotted the census effort.398 Other contemporary commentators—Philip 
Hitti, the U.S. census of 1920—did not use sect as an organizing principle in their estimates.  
 By 1 May (a month into the project), Archbishop al-Khuri could personally account for 
16,000 Maronites living in the northeastern United States, the bulk of which resided in New 
York and Massachusetts.399 For reasons not entirely clear, however, he submitted a regional 
estimate of 25,000 Maronites living in the northeastern United States to the French 
government.400 He estimated a grand total of 55,000 Maronites for the entire country.401 These 
numbers were highly speculative, rough estimates on al-Khuri's part to conform to a rushed 1 
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May deadline set by the French High Commissioner’s office. By that date, many of the Church's 
American parishes had yet to reply to al-Khuri’s request for popoluation data. The archbishop’s 
decision to round up based on an incomplete data set likely reflects his concern to build the case 
for his sect’s numerical supremacy in the Americas.  
 Although it is clear that faced with a stiff French deadline, Archbishop al-Khuri 
submitted population data that was incoherent or incomplete at best, what is less clear is whether 
his estimate was incorrect. When al-Khuri’s figures are compared to other sources of population 
data for the Syrian and Lebanese American communities , a mixed picture emerges. For 
instance, the firmest numbers al-Khuri could present to the French Consulate in May 1921 
concerned the Lebanese Maronites living in New York and Massachusetts, perhaps an 
unsurprising revelation given that these two states had the largest Syrian and Lebanese 
communities as well as an extensive network of Maronite churches by 1921. But in both states, 
al-Khuri’s numbers prove unreliable. In 1921, the archbishop reported that 7,500 Lebanese 
Maronites lived in New York and another 5,977 in Massachusetts.402 The U.S. census conducted 
just months earlier in 1920, however, enumerated the Syrian and Lebanese population of New 
York at only 7,760, all religions and sects combined.403 This discrepancy is even more severe in 
Massachusetts: al-Khuri reported registering 5,977 Lebanese Maronites, but the U.S. census only 
found 3,150 total Syrian and Lebanese immigrants state wide a year earlier.404 The discrepancy 
cannot be explained by Lebanese aliens being left out of the U.S. census (in included aliens and 
naturalized immigrants), nor by Lebanese immigrants dodging the census takers. Indeed, Syrian 
and Lebanese immigrant groups encouraged the community to register for the U.S. census; the 
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Syrian American Club (which had branches in both New York and Massachusetts) even saw in 
the American census a means of documenting Syrian aliens in preparation for this naturalization 
in the United States.405 Such inconsistacies between the archbishop’s numbers and those of the 
U.S. census cast doubts over their accuracy. 
 On the other hand, a comparison of al-Khuri’s data with more rigorous attempts by 
historians to assesss the size of the Syrian and Lebanese communities in the United States make 
the archbishop’s numbers appear conservative if anything. From May to August 1921, additional 
data continued to arrive at al-Khuri's Brooklyn dormitory, and it is unlikely that the Archbishop's 
estimate of 55,000 Maronites in the United States was artificially inflated. Just one year before, 
the U.S. General Commissionr of Immigration had issued a report confirming the arrival of  
89,971 Syrians and Lebanese (of all sects) between 1899 and 1919.406 Reporting in 1924, Philip 
Hitti estimated some 200,000 Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinian immigrants, if taking the 
Immigration Commission’s numbers in comparison with Syrians arriving between 1880 and 
1899.407 More recent attempts by historians to enumerate Syrians and Lebanese in the United 
States conclude that around 105,000 (of all religions and sects) Syrians lived there by 1924. 
There is a sizable degree of variation between these figures, but the idea that Lebanese Maronites 
might constitute roughly half of the lowest population estimate (50,000 out of 89,000) is 
certainly too conservative.408 It is also generally noted that the Maronites constituted the largest 
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single religious group in the United States at the time.409 Uncertain of the Maronite community’s 
actual numerical weight and pressed for time by the French Consulate in New York, Archbishop 
al-Khuri’s seems to have erred on the low side, revealing the extent to which his Maronite 
Church had yet to centralize its infrastructure in the American mahjar. 
 Submitting the Maronite census to the French, al-Khuri pressed the High Commissioner 
to recognize that in his opinion, the Maronites abroad made “more contact with Europe... 
establishing a moral rapport in the name of civilization” than any other Lebanese sect. He 
continued that in the Grand Liban, Lebanese Christians “fear the fanaticism of Islam” and that 
“France's supporters (among the Lebanese) come from villages and towns with a Christian 
majority.”410 As shepherd to his flock he wanted to ensure that the diaspora Maronites be 
included in the census, as (he concluded) they had the most to lose by surrendering a 
demographic majority in their own country. The French General Consul later reassured the 
archbishop that “with respect to this question that concerns you, I have just received specific 
reassurances regarding the legitimate apprehensions on the part of the Lebanese.”411 The French 
Mandatory government ultimately concluded that 42,637 Lebanese lived in the United States, 
25,000 of whom were all Maronite and all lived (as Archbishop Shukrallah al-Khuri has written) 
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in the northeast.412 The heads of household al-Khuri counted were offered receipts which served 
as legal registration.413 
Producing the Right Ratio: Results of the 1921 Lebanese Census 
 With population data from each of Lebanon’s six municipal districts as well as the 
Lebanese diaspora, the French High Commissioner’s office in Beirut set to amalgamating the 
data, a task completed in December 1921. That same month, the High Commissioner announced 
general elections for the 1922 Representative Council [conseil représentatif].414 According to 
Arrêté 1307, its representatives would be elected by universal male suffrage, but a registration 
receipt from the 1921 census was required to be eligible to vote.415 Those who had evaded the 
census were not eligible.416 At the same time, representatives for each of Lebanon’s six 
municipal districts as named on the census—Beirut, Tripoli Zgharta, Matn, Saida, and Biqaʾ-- 
would be nominated on the basis of each district’s confessional balance. Each representative 
elected was to serve a constituency of 20,000, also defined in terms of their religion.417 The 
Council’s confessional ratios conformed to the findings of the 1921 census, findings that 
depended on the inclusion of Lebanese emigrants.  
 In determining the electoral ratio for the members of the Representative Council, the 
Mandatory government used the relative numbers of two groups: resident Lebanese, and tax-
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paying emigrants.418 These were grouped into “Christian” (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek 
Catholic, and Protestant numbers) and “Muslim” (Sunni, Shiʿi, and Druze) groupings: 327,267 
and 273,366 respectively, creating the ratio of 6:5. The exclusion of tax-paying emigrants, 
however, would have produced a different result: Christians comprised 51.9 percent of the 
resident population, and Muslims 48.08 percent. Even without taking the (largely Muslim) 
boycott of the 1921 census into account, the gap between “majority” and “minority” visibly 
closes when emigrant numbers are excluded. [see Appendix I for a copy of this census]. 
Although the inclusion of Lebanese emigrants appears not have upset the demographic outcomes 
of any single electoral district, it clearly ensured that Christian representatives safely 
outnumbered Muslim ones. Furthermore, with even representative districts of 20,000, the 
Representative Council’s Muslim constituencies were not only fewer but more broadly drawn.419 
Muslim representatives likely had greater difficulty in asserting an agenda and attracting the 
loyalty of their constituencies in a confessional system that was already difficult to navigate.   
 The same law which governed voting eligibility for resident Lebanese voters, Arrêté 
1307, also included an article allowing tax-paying Lebanese emigrants to vote (article 28).420 But 
despite the effort that the High Commissioner’s office and French Consulates across the 
Americas made to include emigrants in the Lebanese census, there was no subsequent effort to 
get out the emigrant vote. Emigrants who had successfully registered in 1921 could vote in 
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Lebanese elections as long as they returned to their reported villages of origin to cast a ballot.421 
But despite the appeals of Lebanese living abroad for some method of absentee balloting, the 
French Mandate never did make accommodations to this effect. Although it cannot be explained 
with undisputable certainty why the French did not seek Lebanese votes from abroad, the reason 
was certainly not a lack of consular authority. For as shall be seen, the Mandate government 
invested sizable resources into the creation of Syrian and Lebanese consulates in the Americas 
[see below]. The most likely explanation is that the French Mandate government saw the 
Lebanese diaspora as a convenient national constituency, to be counted for demographic 
purposes but not closely consulted in matters of Lebanese politics. 
Patriarchal Intelligence-Gathering: The Maronite Church’s Uses of the 1921 Census 
 As a high-profile census taker, Archbishop al-Khuri was placed at the center of 
Lebanon's most pressing political questions. Back home, Patriarch Huwayyik had entered 
Mandatory politics as France's representative for Lebanese Maronites, a constituency that the 
Church claimed spanned across both Lebanon and its diaspora. Laying claim to the voice and 
pulse of the Lebanese diaspora placed the Patriarch under enormous pressure to shore up the 
diaspora's actual political support, and a large part of archbishop al-Khuri's mission abroad was 
to oversee the Maronite Church's complete reorganization there.422 al-Khuri's position as an 
intermediary between the mother Church and the diapora's divided parishes was at least as 
important as his role as a census taker laboring under French contract. He worked in an 
ambiguous space between secular and clerical powers: between a Church laying claim to 
political preeminence, their French partners building a confessional republic, and a dizzying 
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array of political parties, activists, and rogue clerics each looking to advance their own agendas. 
Each aspect weighs into how the 1921 census was conducted. 
 As archbishop al-Khuri collected population data he also sought intelligence regarding 
Church structures in the diaspora, the activist networks that clerics had developed there, the 
Church's public image in each host society, and the degree to which each parish abroad adhered 
to Maronite doctrinal orthodoxies. This data, al-Khuri explained, would be critical in Patriarch 
Huwayyik's plan to reorganize and centralize the Maronite Church, placing the diaspora under 
direct control from Bkerke. During the War, the Patriarchate had only limited contact with the 
diaspora's parishes, and Maronite clergy living abroad dealt with their parishes in an ad hoc, 
autonomous, and decentralized fashion. In such a setting, accusations of corruption (both 
financial and liturgical) involving local clergy joined with a pervasive fear that Maronite 
believers would leave the Maronite fold for other Latin Catholic denominations convinced 
Patriarch Huwayyik that an audit of Maronite life abroad was due. Political exigencies comprised 
a major part of this audit, but in 1921, al-Khuri's tour was just as much about the Patriarchate 
extending its reach in the Lebanese diaspora as it was about reaching desirable demographic 
conclusions at home. 
 Although the archbishop's questionnaire does not appear in the Bkerke letters, the 
responses of many of the diaspora's highest priests are instructive of both the mother Church's 
aims and the agendas of local clergy. Archbishop al-Khuri’s focus on both numbers of 
parishioners and questions about Maronite spiritual practices (al-riyāḍāt al-rūḥiyya), ritual 
adherence, and doctrinal conformity encouraged priests to demonstrate their own passion for 
Orthodoxy. 423 At one of New York City’s oldest Maronite churches, Saint Jirjis, Father Jirjis 
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Baʿalani drafted a particularly thorough response letter describing the church’s philanthropic 
societies, tight accounting of finances, and even covering questions of ritual: “there has not been 
and there shall be no relics of saints in this church.”424 Baʿalani then outlines a system of 
payments given to needy parishioners, and appeals to the archbishop for an extra priest for his 
growing congregation. Father Baʿalani’s letter also shows evidence that his congregation 
understood al-Khuri’s census to be about expanding the Maronite Church’s authority abroad, and 
perhaps even dissented to it: along with the names of heads-of-household required, Baʿalani 
admits that “the parishioners (raʿīyya) of this diocese are of two minds regarding the census.”425 
In New York, as elsewhere in the mahjar, the Maronite community remained politically divided 
over the issue of the Church’s role in politics; just two years earlier, it had been the secular and 
anti-clerical political parties leading the vanguard of territorial Lebanese nationalism. Father 
Baʿalini's response letter demonstrates both his own desire to demonstrate conformity with the 
mother Church and an attendant image of a congregation more ambivalent about the Church’s 
role as census taker.  
 Meanwhile, a letter from Mexico City reveals that some saw opportunity in the 
archbishop's audit. By 1921, sizable groups of Maronites worked in Mexico, particularly in 
Mexico City and Mérida, but perhaps because these communities were among the youngest in 
the diaspora, Mexico boasted few official Maronite institutions.426 In August 1921 an itinerant 
priest in Mexico City submitted his response letter to archbishop al-Khuri. One of a network of 
clerics who followed Lebanese peddlers into the Latin American interior that comprised the 
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diaspora's frontier, the priest saw the audit as an opportunity to seek a Church for the local 
Lebanese community. Accompanying his plea for a Church and more direct communication with 
Bkerke were signatures of some two dozen of young merchants, nearly all of them involved in 
the textile trade.427 The archbishop remitted this request directly to Patriarch Huwayyik, advising 
him that “although the clergy has been sufficient in ensuring the representation of Lebanese 
Maronites in the United States and Canada,” places south of the border lacked clerical 
infrastructure, complicating the census project but also raising the specter of a flock lost in the 
wilderness.428 
 The archbishop's concerns about the lack of Maronite infrastructure in the southern 
mahjar combined with fears that Maronites in Latin and South American countries might 
actually leave the Maronite fold.429 Here, concerns about the spiritual practices (al-riyāḍāt al-
rūḥiyya) of Maronites in Latin countries combined with the political preeminence of secular and 
anti-clerical political parties operating there (among them, the Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani that 
had opposed the Church's participation in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference).430 Patriarch 
Huwayyik and Maronite clergy around the diaspora alike expressed dismay at the prospect of 
“losing” Maronite believers to rival Churches, especially through the assimilation of Lebanese 
emigrants to their Catholic host societies.431 Given that Lebanese Maronite emigrants comprised 
an important political and religious constituency, this prompted a discussion of how to best retain 
the emigrant faithful. 
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 Back in Bkerke, Patriarch Huwayyik read the details of archbishop al-Khuri's audit and in 
August 1921 issued a proclamation to tackle these problems on three fronts. First, existing 
Church infrastructure would be centralized and placed under Bkerke's direct authority. Second, 
locales with notable Maronite communities would be provided with priests, missions, and 
Churches to ensure the continuation of the faith abroad. Finally, through these new missions, the 
Maronite Church would pursue a public relations project aimed at improving the image of 
Lebanese Maronites in the Americas. Huwayyik believed that through the provision of Maronite 
schools, charities, and social clubs, the faith's public profile could be enhanced, stymieing 
pressures that Maronite emigrants felt to assimilate into rival churches. Huwayyik's declaration 
finally authorized the establishment of new Maronite missions in Rio de Janiero, Mendoza, and 
Tucuman, giving them two projects: “to extend a helping hand to our sons in the mahjar for the 
purpose of returning glory to them, and to raise the name of our dear sect in the eyes of the 
Brazilians (etc) through the works of our honorable Lebanese sons.”432 
Substantive Citizenry Abroad: Lay Maronite Political Infrastructure in the 1920s  
 If the census of 1921 paved the way for both the Maronite Church and the Mandatory 
state to embrace Maronite emigrants as part of the national body, it also created new expectations 
within certain sectors of the Lebanese diaspora for an extension of rights and privileges as 
partners to the national project at home. Lebanese nationalist activists, some of them participants 
in both the establishment of the Grand Liban and the census project of 1921, used the new 
transnational infrastructure being built by the Maronite Church and the French Mandatory state 
to press claims for their own communities: the right to travel and trade in Lebanon, to obtain 
Lebanese nationality and citizenship, and to participate in the Maronite Church's reformation. 
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Invoking the diaspora's cooperation with Mandatory authorities in the census of 1921, lay 
Maronite activists framed themselves as substantive, de facto citizens of the Lebanese entity. 
They defined their citizenship less often in the presence (or absence) of documentation but in 
their partnership with the Lebanese state, and the social contract they shared. 
 Both the Mandatory government and the Maronite Church responded to emigrant 
pressures for participatory political institutions by creating new forums for the discussion of 
emigrant political opinion. Patriarch Huwayyik, for example, facilitated the construction of a 
web of lay Maronite political societies. The largest of these organizations was the Jamʿiyyat al-
Ittihad al-Maruni, established in New York by Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya president 
Naʿum Mukarzil (the same man who accompanied Patriarch Huwayyik in 1919 as the diaspora's 
representative). Established jointly by Archbishop Shukralla al-Khuri (who remained in New 
York after the 1921 census), Archbishop Khayrallah Istafan, Father Francis Wakim, and an 
assortment of Lebanese nationalists organized by Naʿum Mukarzil,433 the Ittihad Maruni became 
a transnational lay organization with offices in New York and Buenos Aires that “aim(ed) to 
gather Maronite opinion in the diaspora in service to progress in matters of morality, patriotism, 
and social values.”434 The organization presented itself as a representative chamber (dīwān) 
linking Maronite emigrants to the mother Church, offering the Patriarch a pathway towards 
centralizing, unifying, and representing the diaspora's interests in Lebanon's politics. Ittihad 
Maruni secretary Alex Habib and president Naʿum Hatem (Hatem was himself a journalist who 
wrote for Mukarzil's newspaper al-Huda) described the group as an opportunity for Maronite 
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Christian emigrants to assert themselves more directly as partners in building Lebanon's 
confessional democracy while also serving as a lay forum for Maronite political action.435 The 
ubiquity of Maronite priests among the organization’s trustees, however, underlines that this 
forum had its own internal hierarchy and was funded primarily by the Church. A lay 
organization, it was nonetheless not the place for criticism of the clergy or of Church politics.  
 The Ittihad Maruni played an important intermediary role as the Maronite Patriarchate 
exerted its authority in the diaspora, and the Church funded the club primary as a means of 
reaching lay Maronites and secular activists and bringing them back into the fold.436 The 
society's mandate “to serve the interests of the Maronite faithful (al-taʾifa) in the mahjar and the 
homeland” empowered it to represent Lebanese Maronites in matters beyond Church business; in 
the early 1920s, for example, the Ittihad Maruni launched a transnational campaign to put 
pressure on the French Consulates of New York and Buenos Aires to liberalize regulations at 
Lebanon's ports, particularly in Jounieh, a growing entrepot closely linked to the Maronite 
emigrant business establishment.437 Although the society had originally been established to allow 
the Church “to nourish any political trend that calls for progress in matters of the nation, its 
politics, and the preservation of its independence,” it soon took on the characteristics of an 
informal diplomatic body or a chamber of commerce.438 By invoking and nourishing its ties to a 
Maronite national constituency abroad, the Church also empowered that community to insert 
itself in the politics of the emerging Lebanese state as transnational citizens. 
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French Mandatory Migration Policy and What it Says about the Mahjar 
 France's decision to apportion the seats of Lebanon's first Representative Council 
according the comparative weight of Lebanon's various sects presented an immediate systemic 
problem: having produced a ratio the High Commissioner's Office saw as favorable, this ratio 
could only be preserved by revising Lebanese population policies. The Mandate's determination 
to maintain a Christian majority flew in the face of decades of Lebanese emigration that, though 
temporarily stalled during World War I, quickly resumed at peak levels in the early 1920s.439 
Especially dense migration networks linked the Lebanese mountains to the United States, Brazil, 
and Argentina, both because these villages maintained older patterns of circular migration and 
because they were most decimated by famine and the resulting economic dislocations, leading to 
the persistence of emigration as an economic strategy. As French authorities took stock of the 
Grand Liban's complicated demographic situation, the High Commissioner's office expressed 
alarm at the continuing out-migration of Christians, and of Maronites in particular. The same 
logic that informed the decision to include the diaspora in the 1921 census also influenced the 
Mandate's early population policy: a desire to retain a transnational Maronite constituency 
abroad through informal diplomacy, and a countervailing desire to limit the mobility of Lebanese 
Maronites at home.  
 In 1924, the French High Commissioner's office in Beirut took a series of measures to 
slow the emigration of Arab Christians from Lebanese territory, including a new system of 
passports, standardized port controls, and consular work in the mahjar's ports of entry in the 
Americas. Shortly after the end of World War I, Lebanese emigration to the Americas quickly 
resumed, and for the first years of the mandate, French officials could do little to stop it. One 
complication lay in the absence of coherent nationality laws and passport controls: despite the 
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census receipts that many Lebanese carried as proof of national belonging after 1921, there was 
no internationally agreed upon basis for Syrian or Lebanese nationality before the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne, which formally invalidated Turkish claims to the Empire’s former Arab provinces. 
The following year, the French drafted Arrêté 2825, the first in a series of laws that would create 
a Lebanese nationality code. Executed in August 1924, Arrêté 2825 naturalized all Lebanese 
living in Lebanese territory and extinguished all claims upon Turkish citizenship. Lebanese 
emigrants were given two years to “opt” for Lebanese nationality (and apply for a Lebanese 
passport) or else seek naturalization in their domiciles abroad.440 Notably, the law did not include 
provisions for dual citizenship; the goal was to encourage repatriation of Lebanese emigrants as 
well as to issue a standard set of Lebanese passports, thus facilitating the closer regulation of 
Lebanese travelers disembarking from Beirut.  
Arrêté 2825 later formed the basis for Lebanon’s Nationality law of 1925, which offered 
Lebanese citizenship to native residents of Lebanese territory, emigrants who had registered with 
the 1921 census, and any patrilineal descendent of a Lebanese citizen. 441 Whether because of the 
new nationality law or another reason, Lebanese emigrants began to repatriate to Lebanon in 
significant numbers in 1925; that year, France reported to the League of Nations that the 
numbers of returning emigrants had outstripped ongoing rates of emigration abroad.442 By 1926, 
the charged atmosphere of the Great Syrian Revolt transformed the issue of the nationality 
“option” into a divisive political issue: anti-Mandate nationalists boycotted the nationality option 
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while the French drafted aggressive new policy to ensure compliance with the Mandate’s new 
nationality laws (even threatening some with statelessness, see Chapter 4). 
 Regularizing nationality laws and issuing new Lebanese passports was one major way 
that French authorities sought to discourage emigration and encourage repatriation, but High 
Commissioner Maxime Weygand also targeted passenger traffic coming through Lebanese ports 
with stiffer regulations and heightened visa controls. French efforts to constrain Lebanese 
emigration through its documentary regime were assisted by changing attitudes about 
immigration in the Americas. In 1924, the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in the United States 
introduced a strict annual quota that halted new legal entry of Syrians and Lebanese into that 
country.443 U.S. immigration restriction did not stop Lebanese from seeking entry, however, and 
a clandestine network of traffickers emerged, smuggling would-be immigrants from Mexico, 
Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil into the United States.444 Accusations of smuggling and extortion of 
would-be Lebanese emigrants moving through Lebanese ports provided the French a sound 
pretext for cracking down on the passenger trade, prosecuting Beiruti shipping companies 
involved with the trade, with mixed success.445 
 In addition to discouraging new emigration, the Mandate state also pursued emigrants 
into the diaspora. In 1924 new consular offices representing French Syria and Lebanon opened in 
Buenos Aires, Rio de Janiero, São Paulo, Santos (Mexico), New York City, and Cairo, and 
staffed with local dragomans (the Ottoman term was used) from among the Mandate's mahjari 
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partners.446 These new consular offices were within the already operating French Consulates in 
the Americas, and typically the dragomans selected had been working informally with the 
French since World War I. The High Commissioner described the new consuls as an attempt at 
due diligence under the Mandate's Article 3, which described the government's responsibility for 
“maintaining and ensuring the rights and contacts (of emigrants) with their place of origin.”447 
The consular network cemented transnational Lebanese ties while delivering government access 
to emigrant enclaves. Where the 1921 census presented the Maronite Church with the 
intelligence needed to expand the Patriarchate's influence abroad, so too did it convince the 
French to cultivate political partners in the Lebanese diaspora.  
 Of course, the Mandate's transnational consular network did more than embrace Lebanese 
abroad: they also supervised and collected intelligence on them. The diaspora's dragomans sent 
regular reports on political goings-on in Lebanese emigrant communities. In New York, for 
example, Rashid Takieddine reported on plans made by Arab Nationalist leader ʿAbd al-Rahman 
Shahbandar to tour to Americas fundraising and seeking signatures for petitions against the 
French Mandate.448 In Buenos Aires, Shukri Abi Saʿab received the at times unpopular task of 
promoting French actions in Syria and Lebanon, a task that made for exhausting work during the 
Great Syrian Revolt in 1925 [see Chapter 4].449 
                                                          
446 It should be noted, however, that diplomatic and consular interchange between the French Consulate of Buenos 
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 Wary of the threat that emigration posed for the administrative system France was 
building in Lebanon, the Mandatory government went to lengths to service the diaspora and 
retain the fealty of Maronite emigrants. At the same time, it encouraged immigration of other 
Christian groups into Lebanon to balance to numbers. The Mandatory government’s sensitivity 
to preserving a Christian majority in Lebanon led the High Commissioner’s office to endorse the 
immigration of foreign Christians. After the Turkish War of Independence ended in 1923, for 
example, High Commissioner Weygand welcomed the arrival of Christian refugees from 
Anatolia. During the War, the Mandate had resettled fleeding Armenians, Assyrians, and 
Nestorians into Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. Of these groups, the Armenians were the largest 
community resettled in Lebanon, assimilating into the existing Armenian communities of Beirut 
and elsewhere. These new immigrants also became eligible for Lebanese citizenship under 
Regulation 15 of the 1925 Lebanese Nationality Law.450 Rania Maktabi notes with some irony 
that they were more easily naturalized than Lebanese Muslims who had evaded census-takers 
just four years before.451 
 For French authorities, the issues of Anatolian immigration and Arab emigration were 
inexorably linked,452 but for the moment, “the question of Anatolian Christian expulsion from 
Turkey has taken an even greater significance than the continued emigration of Syrians and 
especially the Lebanese, who depart in large numbers for the Americas.”453 Of a wave of 
refugees 96,000 strong, 35,000 Armenians entered Lebanon, joining older Armenian committees 
already in Lebanon as the government hastened to provide hospitality and relief.454 In an annual 
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report presented to the League of Nations, the French Foreign Ministry noted demographic 
pressures presented by the Armenians resettling in Lebanon, but concluded that “they will 
contribute a necessary artisan class to Syria and Lebanon, skilled in the trades, and by default 
they will compensate for the rarefaction of labor, itself a consequence of the traditional 
emigration of Lebanese to the Americas.”455 In Being Modern in the Middle East, Keith 
Watenpaugh concludes that French efforts to resettle Armenian refugees in Syrian and Lebanese 
territory were driven by a desire to integrate them into a “respectable lower middle class” with a 
stake in partnership with the Mandate state.456 
Conclusion: The Expectations Gap in the Mandatory Mahjar 
 The first Lebanese census of 1921 depended on a set of partnerships formed between the 
French Mandatory state and the Maronite Patriarchate in Bkerke. Though the French authorities 
and the Church worked together to cultivate and domesticate the diaspora for the purposes of 
state-building, the registration of Lebanese emigrants also encouraged the development of a 
transnational Lebanese substantive citizenry, raising the expectations of Lebanese abroad to be 
counted and consulted in the politics of the homeland. The early Mandate's population policies, 
themselves informed by the outcome of the 1921 census, demonstrate a desire to retain, 
maintain, and (if necessary) constrain Lebanese emigrants for the purposes of state-building in 
Lebanon. The census itself enumerated emigrants (particularly Maronites) as a means of 
retaining a demographic balance favorable for the confessional system of representation that 
France was building there. The emergence of a diasporic system of consulates for the Mandate 
illustrates the ways that France saw Lebanese emigrants as a national constituency, a population 
in partnership with the state. But at the same time, the French Mandate government made only 
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cursory moves to extend full powers of citizenship to its diasporic partners. Lebanese emigrants 
could vote, but only if they returned to Lebanon to do so; they could opt for Lebanese 
nationality, but only within a narrow time window and with French approval. On one hand, 
Lebanese emigrants were embraced and cultivated as a needed national constituency that was 
purported to protect Lebanon's national identity. On the other, the state placed new limits on 
mobility aimed at halting outward migration. On one hand, the census counted Lebanese 
emigrants; on the other, these same Lebanese emigrants were given incomplete access to 
suffrage. Between these two impulses – proclaiming the emigrants as unabashedly Lebanese 
while also questioning it – it is revealed how the Mandatory state saw the mahjar. The diaspora 
was a convenience, a useful national constituency whose transnational situation could be 
harnessed at the appropriate time and for political purposes. 
 The census of 1921 was, in the end, the beginning of a larger project by the French to 
“mandate the mahjar:” that is, to refract the Mandate’s authority beyond Syria and Lebanon and 
into the communities of Syrians and Lebanese abroad. The establishment of Mandatory 
consulates in the Americas was a significant move toward that ends, and through a diplomatic 
corps, the French had hoped to collect intelligence, influence nationalist politics, root out 
troublesome activists, and regulate the mobility, migration, and employment patterns of Syrians 
and Lebanese beyond the homeland. The Mandate’s consuls abroad, unsurprisingly, became by 
the mid-1920s a central focal point for the Arab nationalist movement, pushed out of Damascus 
in July 1920 but alive and well in Argentina. Chapter 4 examines the confrontations of 
Argentinian Arab nationalists, the French Mandate, and the League of Nations; the French 
Syrian-Lebanese consulate established there in the months following the census provided an 
important setting for this battle.  
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Appendix I: Lebanese Census of 1921457 
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CHAPTER 4: COLONIALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE CONSULATE: ARAB 
NATIONALISM IN ARGENTINA 
 
“All of the Syrians are loyal [to the Allied Powers], except 
for a few living in Mexico and Argentina.” 
- Naʿum Mukarzil, writing to the U.S. Bureau of Investigation, New 
York City, 18 April 1918458 
 
  
 On 10 November 1918, Amin Arslan sent a cable to United States President Woodrow 
Wilson  from his office in Buenos Aires. Written four weeks after Ottoman troops evacuated 
greater Syrian territory and published in Syrian newspapers across the Americas (including 
Arslan’s own Spanish language title, La Nota), this appeal might have been like any other:  
 
“Among the Syrian-Lebanese people in the mahjar, all have loudly proclaimed 
they want independence for Syria and Lebanon under the aegis of France [sous 
l'égide de la France] on the principles proclaimed by you: that all peoples, 
whether grand or small, have the right to choose his political fate... Sir, my 
parents are dead, my ancestral home has fallen to ruin. My political career is over. 
But my thoughts fly with no less emotion to the high mountains of Lebanon, and 
in the name of progress and prosperity, I sincerely proclaim that independence 
must come only under the aegis of France.”459  
 
Arslan’s language was typical for the hundreds of public appeals circulating in the mahjar 
between 1918 and 1919, and it repeated (with small variations) appeals written by Shukri 
Ghanim, Naʿum Mukarzil, Nami Jafet, Ayyub Tabet, and other activists discussed thus far. But 
Arslan’s appeal stood apart from the others in one important respect; it is not every day that an 
Ottoman diplomatic official makes a public appeal in favor of a foreign occupying power. But 
these were not ordinary times, and from his residence on Avenida de Corrientes, the Emir Amin 
Arslan would turn coats not once but thrice between the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the 
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French Mandate. In 1908, Arslan was among the first Ottoman diplomats to support the Young 
Turk Revolution and was sent to Argentina to set up a new Consulate there.460 In 1915, he openly 
opposed the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany and was unceremoniously dismissed from 
his post. During the War, he collaborated with the French to overthrow the Ottoman government, 
and he endorsed the concept of a “French protectorate” in Syria upon the armistice of 1918.461 
With French intentions shifting towards the separation of Mount Lebanon from a larger Syrian 
country during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Arslan moved swiftly to support Faysal’s 
Hashimite monarchy emerging in Damascus and a treaty relationship with the United States of 
America to counter French influence in the region.462 And in 1925, sickened by France’s 
treatment of Druze insurrectionists in the Hawran, Amin Arslan would become one of the 
mahjar’s most militant anti-colonial intellectuals, supporting the Great Syrian Revolt and 
rejecting the more moderate nationalist politics of the Syrian National Bloc [al-Kutla al-
Wataniyya] that emerged in 1928. 
 Amin Arslan's story and political trajectory from ardent Ottomanist to French 
collaborator, from collaborator to Hashimite Arab nationalist, Syrian revolutionary, and finally 
towards a world-conscious anticolonial pan-Arabism made him one of the mahjar’s most famous 
barometers of the Syrian anticolonial movement. Between 1915 and 1929, Arslan navigated 
                                                          
460 “The Papers of Mahmud Pasha,” London Times, 28 August 1908, 5. According to the London Times, Arslan had 
been a long-time member of the “Young Turkey” Party (as early as 1895), despite beginning his consular work 
under the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. “Letters and Correspondence,” London Times, 16 December 1895, 5. 
461 NARA M367. Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and its Termination, 1914-1929, 
Group 59. U.S. Consul to Buenos Aires Y. Stimson to U.S. Secretary of State, 4 Novermber 1918, document 
763.72119/3033, 2-3. 
462 As Maronite Patriarch Huwayyik headed to Paris to head the Second Lebanese Delegation to the 1919 
Conférence de la Paix (a French creation, see Chapter 2), Amin Arslan joined a delegation of Lebanese Druze 
leaders to confer with the American Commission Mandates in Turkey (in Paris), reminding them that Syrians had 
overwhelmingly appealed for American, not French, assistance in reconstructing Syria. Arslan proposed 
accomplishing this through a treaty relationship with the Emir Faysal already in Damascus. NARAM367. Records 
of the Department of State Relating to World War I and its Termination, 1914-1929, Group 59. American 
Commissioner Wallace and American Consul in Beirut Knabershue U.S. Secretary of State, 9 October 1919, 
document 763.72119/7232, 1-2. 
186 
 
through seemingly contradictory alliances linking diplomats in the Americas, Europe, and the 
Middle East. But the development and trajectory of Arslan’s Arab nationalism—constitutionalist, 
anti-colonial, and increasingly radical—was far from peculiar. Rather, it was typical for Syrian 
Arab nationalists both at home and in the mahjar during the 1920s.  
 Eager to fill the political vacuum left by the Ottoman exodus from Syria and its diaspora, 
the administrators of the French Mandate declared the creation of Grand Liban and moved 
swiftly to conduct a transnational census of the Syrians and Lebanese living abroad in 1921 [see 
Chapter 3]. Finding an estimated 100,000 Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living in Argentina, the 
French Foreign Ministry announced the creation of a special Consulate dedicated to the Syrian 
and Lebanese Mandates in 1924, staffing it with a half dozen local immigrant personalities, 
including the long-time dragoman Shukri Abi Saʿab. The Buenos Aires consulate was one among 
many established in the American mahjar, created in compliance with the League of Nations 
Mandate’s Article 3, describing the government's responsibility for “maintaining and ensuring 
the rights and contacts (of emigrants) with their place of origin.”463 
 Focusing on the Syrian and Lebanese office within the French Consulate in Buenos Aires, 
this chapter builds upon an argument in Chapter 3: specifically, that the administrators of the 
early French Mandate used consular affairs as a means of pursuing Syrian and Lebanese 
emigrants abroad, whether for purposes of regulating migration, gathering intelligence on emigre 
political activities, or to contain anti-French activism that (as shall be seen) progressively gained 
force in the mahjar during the 1920s. This chapter argues that the Consulate in Buenos Aires 
itself became a major site of political contest by 1925, and that dragomans, migration agents, 
collaborators, and consular officials (both current and former) became the leaders of a pan-Arab, 
                                                          




anti-colonial nationalist movement in the Buenos Aires colony. Men like Amin Arslan, Jurj 
Sawaya, Jurj ʿAssaf, and others used their position in the Latin American mahjar to make an 
incisive set of critiques, not only of the French Mandate itself, but after 1925, of the League of 
Nations which supported it and by 1928, of the moderate nationalists of the Syrian National 
Bloc. All former French collaborators, these men, and their political party, al-Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-
Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya increasingly saw armed insurrection as the only means of liberating Syria, 
and pan-Arab unity as the only means of effectively countering the greater forces of imperialism. 
Before one can sketch the contours of an increasingly radical anticolonial Arab nationalism in 
Argentina, however, it must be asked: what led Ottoman subjects and diplomats like Arslan into 
collaboration with France? How did the consulate become a site of contest between nationalists 
and the state? And how did the consulate’s role in governing the mahjar change (or stay the 
same) during the 1920s French Mandate? 
Firing the Emir: The Closure of the Ottoman Empire’s Argentinian Consulate in 1915 
 
 Founded in 1910 as a Committee of Union and Progress response to local demands for 
representation, the Ottoman Consulate in Buenos Aires represented an estimated quarter million 
Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living across South America (the New York Consul under Mundji 
Bey oversaw North America; see Chapter 1).464 The Consul’s first (and only) Ottoman consul-
general in Buenos Aires was Emir Amin Arslan, recently reassigned after spending a few years as 
Ottoman Consul to Belgium.465 From a prominent Druze aristocratic family from Shwayfat, 
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Amin was cousin to both Shakib Arslan, who became a prominent leader in the Arab Nationalist 
movement following World War I, and Fuʿad Arslan, who would became a parliamentarian in 
Lebanon during the French Mandate.  
Amin Arslan’s appointment in Buenos Aires gave 
the estimated 100,000 Syrian and Lebanese emigrants in 
Argentina a formal diplomatic liaison to the Ottoman 
government, but his selection as General Consul was a 
strategic one.466 In Belgium, Amin Arslan had established a 
reputation as a worldly public intellectual. His emphasis on 
mastering the local language and familiarizing himself with 
local political currents made him the darling of Belgium’s 
progressive and Socialist parties, and once in Argentina, one 
of his duties was to enter into formal diplomatic relations 
with the Argentinian state.467 Arslan focused his efforts on 
trade relations and on regulating Syrian migration; he 
envisioned Syrian labor immigration to Argentina as 
mutually economic benefit that could underwrite a deeper 
political alliance.468 Meanwhile, Arslan held regular visits with officials representing other 
European states, and was particularly close to the city’s French Consulate.469 In 1910, 
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Figure 7: Emir Amin Arslan shortly 
before his 1915 dismissal. Source: 
La Critica, 13 April 1915, 1. 
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maintaining varied official contacts earned Arslan an esteemed diplomatic career. By 1914, 
however, such connections made Arslan and his office the object of mounting official suspicion. 
 The trouble began shortly after news broke that the Ottoman government entered World 
War I on Germany’s side in October 1914. Within weeks, the French Consul in Buenos Aires 
approached Amin Arslan seeking reassurances that his office was opposed to the Ottoman 
Empire’s entry into War, and indeed, a great many Syrians and Lebanese in the city similarly 
petitioned against the effort.470 Arslan was quick to proclaim his opposition to the Empire’s 
alliance with Germany, and in Spring 1915, he went rogue entirely: from his post in Buenos 
Aires, Arslan made speeches in favor of the Entente and insisted that the Ottoman Empire’s entry 
into the War was contrary to “the interests of the [Syrian] community, who are now in the hands 
of foreigners [Germans].”471 Arslan’s support for the Allied Powers prompted the city’s German 
Consul to complain to his employers in Istanbul, and in April 1915, the German Consulate wrote 
Arslan, threatening to have him fired if he did not honor his government’s alliance with the 
Central Powers. The Syrian colony’s response was fierce and immediate: on 12 April 1915, 
several thousand local Syrian and Lebanese immigrants descended upon the Ottoman Consulate 
in Buenos Aires to demonstrate against the War and show support for their embattled Consul.472 
Arslan met them on the Consulate’s steps, and read aloud a letter he had penned to Germans,  
“Señor Consul General [of Germany], I have the pleasure of acknowledging your 
letter… I think it goes without saying how surprising this letter was, as its 
contents conflict with all established diplomatic protocol, and it has not come to 
my earnest attention that my Ottoman Empire forms a mere part of your German 
Imperium. And I keep hope, nevertheless, for the honor and dignity of my poor 
country, dragged unwillingly into the abyss of this war by you, a savage foreign 
power.”473 
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Arslan ended his speech by proclaiming his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, “to my august 
sovereign, the Sultan… and my only superior, the Grand Vizier.” If he was to be terminated, it 
would not be by the Germans; Arslan challenged Istanbul to terminate him if they were not ready 
to repudiate their German alliance.474 
 And terminate him they did. On 19 May 1915, an official letter signed by Grand Vizier 
Talat Pasha arrived, relieving Amin Arslan of his post and proclaiming the immediate closure of 
the Ottoman Consulate in Buenos Aires. The letter instructed Arslan immediately return to 
Istanbul and to deliver the Consul’s records, including any documents relating to Ottoman 
subjects living in Argentina, to the city’s German Consulate.475 Arslan refused to comply and saw 
this course of events as further evidence that the Ottoman government had become a mere 
German puppet. In an interview with La Prensa newspaper, he explained that “many [of these 
documents] provide legal protection and justice [for Syrian immigrants] in this country. No 
foreigner has the right to take and oversee the files of Ottomans [living in Argentina], nor to 
determine the interests of my countrymen, who are no less than 100,000 and have an interest in 
defending what is rightfully theirs.“476 Arslan resolved that he would keep the Consulate 
shuttered, but if the Germans came for Ottoman records, he would appeal to Argentina’s 
Supreme Court for their protection. In return, the Ottoman government comvicted him of treason 
in absentia, and condemned him to death.477 
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Both Argentinian and Brazilian newspapers reporting on the fracas were quick to call the 
German Consulate’s proposed takeover of Ottoman Consular affairs an “act of piracy”478 and 
also to “congratulate the Consul of the Turkish colony [colonia turca] for so energetically 
opposing the pretentions of a foreign monarchic regime.”479 But what they were less likely aware 
of was the extent to which Arslan’s office had collected intelligence on Syrian political activities 
in South America. Arslan likely hesitated to turn over his records not only because doing so 
would amount to submitting his community to foreign administration, but also because the 
documents could lead to criminal prosecution. It bears noting that at this same moment, in mid-
1915, Cemal Pasha’s troops broke into the abandoned French Consulate in Beirut, leading to 
dozens of treason charges for those named in documents found there. The martyrs of May 1916 
[see Chapter 2] were among those named.480  
Similarly, the Ottoman Consulate building housed one of the colony’s most advanced 
Arabic-language printing press, a Merganthaler machine produced in the United States [see 
Chapter 2]. The Ottoman government’s demand that Arslan submit the press to the Germans was 
an attempt at de facto censorship.481 Not happy to have his wings clipped, Arslan responded by 
founding a Spanish language newspaper called La Nota, bringing together Syrian, Argentinian, 
and other Latin American voices together in critique of the Central Powers for the War’s 
duration.482 Arslan was also among the activists who after 1916 recruited young Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Armenian immigrants in South America for the Légion d’Orient, despite the fact 
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that his political leanings were in greater sympathy to Emir Faysal’s Arab Revolt than to the 
Francophile pan-Syrian views of his Parisian partner, Shukri Ghanim.483 Arslan’s support for 
French actions in the Mashriq was both pragmatic and complicated. On one hand, Arslan 
collaborated with Ghanim’s Comité Central Syrien and the French Consulate in Buenos Aires to 
recruit local Syrians for the French military. And as Arab troops closed in on Damascus and 
France declared victory in early October 1918, Arslan had publicly endorsed French intervention 
in Syria, calling it “the beginning of a new period of prosperity, progress, and unity [that] will 
open if Syria enters into French protection [bajo de égida de Francia].”484 On the other hand, 
however, Arslan saw complete independence for Syria as his primary political goal, and his 
support for French actions in his home country was contingent on Arslan’s belief that they would 
be nation builders, not colonizers. As the Paris Peace Conference opened in January 1919, for 
instance, Arslan wrote French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon that French assistance was 
obligatory for reasons of civilization: “unfortunately, Syria does not have the means to become a 
modern nation by itself as [it has] just come out of the darkness of the Ottoman occupation.”485 
Therein lay the root of Arslan’s (and Syrian Argentinian) early support for the French Mandate: 
his belief that the French would help develop a Syrian civil society, eradicate sectarian politics, 
and build modern political institutions in preparation for self-rule. France’s February 1919 
endorsement of the First Lebanese Delegation and subsequent promotion of Lebanon’s 
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separation from Syria appeared, to Arslan, to contradict these aims. The King Crane 
Commission’s summer 1919 findings further suggested that Arslan was not the only one who felt 
this way; according to this report, most Syrians desired complete independence and territorial 
unity.486  
In a dramatic reversal of his previous opinion regarding partnership with France, Arslan 
drafted a public letter of appeal to the League of Nations and the United States government in 
October 1919, arguing that:  
“In conformity with Article 27 of the Convenant of the League of nations, we 
have demanded the complete independence of our Syrian nation with respect to 
the maintanence of its political unity and the granting of the mandate to one of the 
two Anglo-Saxon nations and to no other; begging the allies and friends, 
champions of the oppressed peoples… [we are] fully convinced that only the 
Anglo-Saxon nations are able to uplift and promote the welfare of our country 
without seeking colonial advantages.”487   
 
Despite Arslan’s appeals, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference concluded with the April 1920 San 
Remo Agreement, in which the League of Nations awarded the Mandate over Syria (including 
Lebanon) to France. Within a year, French troops deposed Faysal in Damascus, created a Grand 
Liban distinct from Syria, and initiated a Lebanese census that would ensure French clients the 
lion’s share of political power in the new country. Ussama Makdisi concludes of this period, “a 
new colonial age had dawned.”488  
From Buenos Aires, former French collaborator Amin Arslan came to Hasmimite Arab 
nationalism somewhat belatedly, primarily a function of his opposition to the creation of a “tiny 
Lebanese republic” [republiqueta libanesa], which he argued would be terminally incapable of 
                                                          
486 Ussama Makdisi, Faith Misplaced, 142. 
487 NARAM367. Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and its Termination, 1914-1929, Group 
59. American Consul in Beirut Knabershue to U.S. Secretary of State, 9 October 1919, document 763.72119/7232, 
3-4. 
488 Makdisi, Faith Misplaced, 146. 
194 
 
autonomous self-government.489 Between the establishment of the Mandate in 1920 and the 
Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, politics in the Syrian diaspora would be defined by a struggle for 
political legitimacy between the France (who had the state) and the Syrian-Arab nationalist 
movement led by Dr. ʿAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Shakib Arslan, who argued that Syrians 
wanted the fulfillment of the recommendations made by the King-Crane Commission of 1919: 
complete independence, a unified, federated, and constitutional Syrian state including Lebanon 
and Palestine, and the repudiation of European support for Zionist settlement in Palestine.  
As French officials hastened to secure the machinery of the Mandatory state, investing 
Syrian and Lebanese living at home and abroad in their regime through the census, issuanceof 
passports, and nationality laws, Arab nationalists living in Argentina and beyond targeted their 
political appeals directly at the League of Nations, the emigrant public, as well as at Argentinian 
diplomats and policymakers. Their anticolonial strategy was aptly summed in 1922 by former 
American commissioner Charles Crane himself: “Demand your independence in a modern and 
civilized manner, and you will achieve it with your Arab heads held high.”490 Until 1925, the 
formation of the Syrian Palestinian Congress and the issuance of petitions to the League of 
Nations constituted the movement’s “modern and civilized” means of suing for independence. 
The French Mandate and the Syrians of Buenos Aires before the Revolt, 1920-1925 
 Among the three Syrian and Lebanese “colonies” under consideration here, the Buenos 
Aires community presented the most difficulty for the French as they sought to institutionalize 
their Syrian Mandate. During World War I, the Argentinian chapter of the Lebanese 
independence party Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani broke ranks with its sister chapters to protest 
against the recruitment of Syrian emigrants in the Légion d’Orient. The Légion issue itself 
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caused a riot outside a Rosario Church in 1916, raising the eyebrows of the Argentinian 
government (then neutral in the war) and forcing French consul Paul Claudel to focus his efforts 
on Syrians in Brazil rather than Argentina.491 In 1919, Khalil Saʿadih held his Syrian General 
Congress in Buenos Aires, a meeting of Syrian and Arab nationalists that demanded immediate 
independence and repudiated any French claims to Syria or Lebanon in the postwar settlements 
at the Paris Peace Conference [see Chapter 2]. When France defeated Emir Faysal and instituted 
the Mandate by force of arms in 1920, presenting the Mandate as a liberal exercise in nation-
building proved to be a hard sell to the Syrians living in Argentina, who more than other mahjari 
communities opposed French intervention from the start.492 
 Between 1920 and 1922, French authorities nevertheless took measures to extend the 
Mandate’s administrative reach into the southern mahjar, particularly in Argentina. In 1920, the 
French consulate in Buenos Aires employed local Syrian and Lebanese dragomans, making the 
first formal diplomatic connection with the emigrant community (during the war, France’s 
foreign consuls worked through such Syrian emigrant intermediaries but did so informally). 
After the census of 1921 (which estimated that Argentina’s Syrian and Lebanese community was 
at that point 110,000 strong),493 the French High Commissioner’s Office in Beirut announced the 
establishment of a Mandatory consular network in South America, centered on the Buenos Aires 
consulate.494 The Mandate’s Buenos Aires consulate was empowered with the right to issue 
passports, travel papers, and certificates of Mandatory nationality under articles 34 and 36 of the 
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Treaty of Lausanne, which provided a means for former Ottoman subjects to “opt” for Syrian or 
Lebanese nationality through the French Consulate.495 Because most them had arrived in 
Argentina with Ottoman passports, Syrian and Lebanese emigrants found themselves in an 
uneasy legal predicament: they could either opt for Syrian or Lebanese nationality under the 
French Mandate, seek naturalization in Argentina, or their Ottoman nationality would 
automatically transfer to a Turkish one after the grace period set out by Lausanne lapsed. For the 
Mandatory government, already concerned with retaining Syrian and especially Lebanese 
emigrants for demographic reasons, the preferable choice was clear. For the first years of its 
existence, then, the Mandate’s Buenos Aires consulate was primarily tasked with encouraging 
Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to opt for French Mandatory citizenship,496 a project that ran 
immediately against the Arab nationalist, anticolonial political currents of the Buenos Aires 
Syrian community (and which, as a result, largely failed).  
 Although in 1919, the General Syrian Congress organized by Dr. Khalil Saʿadih was 
ultimately unsuccessful in convincing the League of Nations to back a federated Syrian 
nationalism, this meeting of South America’s most prominent pan-Syrian and Hashimite Arab 
nationalists had one significant and lasting impact: it created new alliances between activists that 
later influenced the Arab nationalist movement. Dr. Saʿadih left Buenos Aires and moved to São 
Paulo in early 1920 after being appointed to the presidency of al-Hizb al-Watani al-Hurr, a 
Syrian nationalist political party that had been operating there under Asʿad Bishara and Najib 
Trad (in various iterations) since 1914.497 But in Buenos Aires, Saʿadih left behind a vibrant Arab 
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nationalist activist scene led predominantly by Dr. Jurj Sawaya and Felipe Homad, who both 
attended Saʿadih’s General Syrian Congress of 1919 and who strove to support an Arab 
nationalist future for Syria, under Emir Faysal until 1920 and through organized transnational 
activism with the Syrian Palestinian Congress soon after.498  
 While Khalil Saʿadih left for Brazil, another prominent Arab nationalist personality, Dr. 
Jurj Sawaya, had recently arrived in Buenos Aires from Boston, where he and his brother Najib 
wrote occasionally for al-Fatat newspaper and its Boston sister title, Fatat Boston.499 Both 
papers supported Emir Faysal’s Arab Revolt and his political party, al-Fatat.500  Shortly after 
coming to Argentina, Jurj Sawaya established another Arab nationalist party, al-Hizb al-Watani 
al-ʿArabi, which boasted a multi-confessional membership (predominantly Sunni Muslim and 
Greek Orthodox, according to Maria Narbona) and which advocated for an alliance between 
Faysal’s Syrian state and the United States of America.501  
Sawaya attended Saʿadih’s Syrian General Congress in February 1919, where he 
attempted to broker a demand from the Congress for a treaty of alliance between Emir Faysal 
and American president Woodrow Wilson.502 In his search for American allies, Sawaya was 
inclusive; in March 1920, for instance, he reportedly visited Argentinian Foreign Minister 
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Honorio Pueyrredón, asking for his government’s formal recognition of Syria’s Hashimite Arab 
nationalist government under Emir Faysal. Pueyrredón welcomed Sawaya in 1920, and although 
the Argentinian Foreign Ministry did not recognize Faysal’s government (which was deposed 
shortly thereafter), this meeting inaugurated several years during which Jurj Sawaya was seen as 
an informal representative for the city’s Syrians and Lebanese. In 1926, Sawaya would even be 
appointed Argentina’s Consul to Beirut, a post which Sawaya had to decline after just a few 
weeks amidst a firestorm of protest from the French Foreign Ministry.503 Sawaya was a man, in 
other words, who operated within several national contexts at once, often through informal 
networks, and with varying degrees of political capital in each. It is little wonder why the French 
Consul in Buenos Aires had him under periodic surveillance.  
 Jurj Sawaya met Taʿau “Felipe” Homad at the Syrian Congress in Buenos Aires in 
1919.504 During the war, Homad worked as a merchant trading through the port at Buenos 
Aires.505 That year the two would found al-Hizb al-Watani al-Suri, distinct from Khalil Saʿadih’s 
own party, al-Hizb al-Dimuqrati al-Watani, in that Sawaya and Homad endorsed an alliance with 
the United States of America. In 1921, Homad travelled to Geneva to attend the Syrian 
Palestinian Congress in Geneva as representative for the Arab nationalists of Argentina. The 
Syrian Palestinian Congress of June 1921 was a meeting of all the exiled leaders of Emir 
Faysal’s former kingdom. Led by Michel Lutfallah, Rashid Rida, Shakib Arslan, and ʿAbd al-
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Rahman Shahbandar, the Syrian Palestinian Congress seeded an organizations by the same name 
with the express goal of using the terms of the League of Nations Mandates to counter French 
occupation of Syria.506 Although the American Charles Crane would not tell Abd al-Rahman 
Shahbandar to “demand your independence in a modern and civilized manner” until 1922, this 
was precisely the Syrian Palestinian Congress’s tack. The organization worked primarily through 
intense petitioning campaigns aimed at the League of Nations, public appeals through the press, 
and committee-style activism, a pattern which mirrored the Syrian Congresses of 1913 (Paris), 
1919 (Buenos Aires), and 1920 (Damascus), among others. This was a pattern of politics, in 
other words, that was nearly a decade old already.507 
The 1921 Geneva Congress drafted a set of demands made to the League of Nations on 
behalf of Syrians, Palestinians, and Arabs under the French and British Mandates: they protested 
against the usurpation of Syrian and Palestinian lands against the express wishes of their 
inhabitants (according to the King-Crane Commission of 1919), against the Balfour Declaration 
of 1917 that declared Britain’s support for a “Jewish national home” in Palestine, and against the 
principle of “class B mandates” laid out by Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter.508 The 
Geneva Congress couched its resolutions in terms of both self-determination and human rights, 
aspects which marked anti-Mandate activism for the following decade. As the delegates in 
Geneva returned to Paris, Cairo, and Beirut, Felipe Homad returned to Buenos Aires and once 
there, rejoined Jurj Sawaya as well as the community’s most influential men: Alajandro Schamún 
(Assalam newspaper), Ilyas ʿAmar and Constantine Melhem,509 Musa and Solomon Busader, 
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Musa ʿAzizi (future director of the Patronato Sirio-Libanése), and Jurj ʿAssaf. The group formed 
al-Jamʿiyya al-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya in 1922, an organization allied with Dr. Shahbandar’s 
People’s Party. The party itself would not last, but in 1925, two of its number, Jurj Sawaya and 
Jurj ʿAssaf, would join former Ottoman consul Amin Arslan in supporting the Great Syrian 
Revolt against the French. 
The Great Syrian Revolt and Arab Nationalism in Buenos Aires, 1925-1927 
 
 In July 1925, a band of irregular fighters organized under Druze emir Sultan al-Atrash 
attacked French troops in Salkhad, a small outpost in Suwayda. What looked for a moment like 
another small skirmish in the Jabal Druze, a part of southern Syria that remained only partially 
pacified by the French in the wake of Syria’s occupation in 1920 soon ignited into a local revolt 
against Mandatory misadministration, rampant inflation, and rising grain costs.510 Guided by a 
colonizer’s perspective that the Druze revolutionaries acted not out of economic grievances but 
out of a feudal (or tribal) obligations, French troops took a hard line against the uprising, creating 
mass dissent not only in the Hawran but even in Syria’s largest cities: Homs, Aleppo, and 
Damascus. Michael Provence argues that what transformed the Great Syrian Revolt from a local 
insurrection into a nation-wide general uprising was the unanticipated participation of urban 
notables and the commercial middle class in Damascus, two classes that up to that point had 
been friendlier to French authority and even suspicious of the Hawran peasants.511 It was the 
combination of ineffective, often violent colonial administration and mounting Syrian frustration 
with internationally sanctioned forms of civil protest that helped produce this new solidarity. 
When petitions to French authorities (and later to the League of Nations) failed to produce 
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Syrian political or economic advances, revolution loomed as the best means towards 
independence.  
 In The Great Syrian Revolt, Provence argues that for the revolutionaries of the Hawran, 
the rural insurrection against French authority was only the latest chapter in an Arab Revolt 
begun in 1916; this was Arab Nationalism’s second wave.512 The revolt’s aims, for example, bore 
striking similarity to those of the WWI-era Arab nationalists: leader Sultan al-Atrash declared in 
July 1925 that his revolutionaries demanded “complete independence for Arab Syria,” “the 
creation of a national government, with the free election of a constitutive assembly,” and 
significantly, the immediate evacuation of occupying French soldiers and “the creation of a 
national army” in their place.513 If al-Atrash drew any simile between his own loose 
confederation of Arab militias and those of Emir Faysal the previous decade, the generals of the 
French Mandate took a similarly hard line against his movement. A series of violent 
counterinsurgency campaigns and collective punishments in the countryside backfired, and by 
late 1925, French authorities in Damascus feared a general uprising in Syria’s major cities. With 
famously little investigation or warning, the newly appointed French High Commissioner, 
General Maurice Sarrail ordered an aerial bombardment of quarters of Damascus believed to be 
sympathetic with the Revolt in October 1925.514 The bombardment killed an estimated 1,200 
unarmed civilians, was internationally condemned, and earned General Sarrail a place alongside 
Cemal Pasha among the most brutal of Syria’s military occupiers. And like Cemal Pasha’s 1916 
mass hanging of Syrian dissenters, the bombardment of Damascus thrust political shockwaves 
into the diaspora, shaking apart perceptions of French legitimacy among Syrians and Lebanese 
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emigrants and reigniting the nationalist political movements headquartered there.  
For Amin Arslan, both a member of the Druze elite and a former French partner, the 
Mandatory government’s utter disregard for the humanity of Syrian civilians and the “ceaselessly 
repeated idea by Poincaré, Briand, and the majority of the French newspapers... that the Syrians 
themselves wanted and solicited the French Mandate” proved that the spirit of France’s mission 
in Syria was not progress and prosperity but rather and ugly “disguised colonialism” [un sistema 
de colonización disfrazada].515 Arslan began agitating on behalf of the Revolution, giving talks 
in support of Sultan al-Atrash and against the Mandate, writing South American newspapers, and 
collecting funds from the mahjar to remit to victims of the bombardment. In 1926, Arslan 
amalgamated all of these critiques into a volume in Spanish entitled, La Revolución Siria Contra 
el Mandato Francés. Directed towards the Argentinian reading public, Arslan sent copies of the 
text to major Argentinian newspapers for review and soon after began a speaking tour, 
contextualizing the Great Syrian Revolt as an indigenous people’s revolution against a brutal and 
dehumanizing imperial regime. In these speaking engagements, Arslan particularly drew 
parallels between the Syrian revolutionaries and the Indian nationalists then contesting British 
authority: “It is natural that the educated Indian people would want autonomy and independence. 
They no doubt want what all people everywhere crave: to own their homes, for better or worse, 
poor or rich, it doesn’t matter. What matters to such people is, in a word, their liberty and 
independence.” Arslan’s book was directed at a Spanish speaking audience, but he 
simultaneously reached the immigrant Syrian community through a political weekly called al-
Istiqlal, also established in 1926. 
In La Revolución Siria Contra el Mandato Francés, Arslan’s arguments about the 
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Mandate’s illegitimacy were two-fold. First, he argued that Syrians were not consulted in the 
division of bilad al-sham: 
 
“And in an instant, they [Britain and France, in 1916] traced over a map, carving a 
zone A and a zone B, this zone Blue and the other Red, and then Great Britain 
said to France, ‘let us part!’ just as they had done with the German colonies in 
Africa. The division was made, without painful haggling. BUT THOSE PEOPLE 
WHO WERE DIVIDED, WERE THEY CONSULTED? NO, IN NO FORM AT 
ALL.“516 
 
Second, Arslan conceded that France’s “traditional” relationship with the Maronite Church dated 
back to 1864, when France “helped Lebanon win an autonomous state within the [Ottoman] 
Empire.” But he argued that not only did the 300,000 Maronites living in the Grand Liban not 
constitute a representative sample of “a larger Syrian population that has no reason or 
predilection to maintain sentimental ties to France,”517 but that Lebanese Maronites were 
themselves divided over support for the French Mandate:  
 
“Even the brother of the distinguished Maronite Patriarch [Ilyas Huwayyik, 
France’s most significant clerical supporter] has been banished to Corsica 
alongside several other Maronite notables accused of anti-French politics.“518 
 
Upending ideas about the Mandate as “protection” or “progress,” Arslan argued instead that it 
was a thinly-veiled colonial project, imperial both in intention and execution. On the eve of the 
1925 Revolution, Arslan began, there were 80,000 French troops inside Syria, in addition to an 
expanding bureaucratic civilian staff. He argued that France’s motives were primarily economic, 
and he pointed specifically to the creation of the tobacco monopoly in Syria, speculation in 
Syrian agriculture, and the pegging of Syria’s currency to the Franc.519 Quoting liberally from 
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French newspapers, Arslan determined that the preoccupation of French educated society with 
Syria’s potential as a consumer market revealed the Mandate as an exploitive imperial project 
comparable with African colonization; he cited a 15 January 1926 Le Temps article in particular, 
“in economic terms, France has everything to gain in the Levant. Syria and Lebanon should 
become priority markets for French products.”520 
 Arslan pointed to a number of ways that French colonial authorities used the diplomatic 
service to gather intelligence, domesticate, prohibit, and even punish political activism from 
abroad. Despite the Mandate’s official rhetoric to the contrary, Arslan argued that “the diplomatic 
and consular representation provided to Syrians and Lebanese [living] abroad are entirely 
controlled by the larger French Consulate and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”521 The Buenos 
Aires office was particularly consumed with press censorship,  
 
“freedoms of speech and press are totally curtailed [in Syria]… As the local press 
was muzzled by preventative censorship, only the free émigré periodicals became 
the venue for venting anger, dissent, and indignation against [France’s] violent 
acts. But at the mere mention of independence, the French prohibit all periodicals 
from abroad.“522 
 
Meanwhile, the French Consul in Buenos Aires charged its dragoman, Shukri Abi Saʿab, with the 
unenviable task of monitoring Arslan’s movements and political activism, countering his many 
public statements, begging Argentinian newspapers and statesmen to ignore Arslan’s entreaties, 
and disrupting Arslan’s travel plans where possible. And with the French Mandate’s Consular 
office at his disposal, Abi Saʿab had a potent means of clipping Arslan’s wings: the denial of 
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travel permissions, especially after 1926, when the French invalidated the Ottoman passports and 
identity papers held by most Syrian immigrants in the county. 
 Writing in Spanish and circulated to Argentinian diplomats, the South American press, 
Amin Arslan’s La Revolución Siria Contra el Mandato Francés was clearly directed at a South 
American audience. Arslan’s argument was similarly framed to fit within the socialist discourse 
of the time, and the book was a continuation of discussions Arslan had been having with leaders 
in the socialist movement for nearly a decade. Arslan’s bilingualism in publishing reflected his 
desire to effectively translate anticolonial Arab nationalism for an intenational leftist audience; 
his early publication, La Nota, had integrated articles on the “Syrian Question” in conversation 
with Argentina’s most well-known socialist voices, and his Arabic title, al-Istiqlal, incorporated 
Spanish-language reporting (as did two other titles in this chapter: al-Islah and Diario 
Siriolibanes). Arslan produced a collection of political writings during the 1920s, all in Spanish 
and focused on the problems of colonialism in the Mashriq.523 Of course, the increasing 
bilingualism of the Syrian press in Buenos Aires reflects changes occurring within the Syrian 
community as well as practical concerns: during the 1920s, progressively larger numbers of 
Syrians raised in Argentina spoke Spanish as their first language, not Arabic.524 Similarly, in 
1928 the city’s Chamber of Commerce levied a tax on materials printed in foreign languages; 
bilingual publications remained exempt.525 The decision to print in Spanish (or in both Arabic 
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and Spanish) was the result of practical considerations and the changing vernacular of the Syrian 
community itself. In Arslan’s case, however, the decision to print in Spanish was a pointed 
attempt to address the Argentinian Left and foster support for Syria’s revolutionaries against the 
French Mandatory state.  
The international Left, however, remained unconvinced by Arslan’s argument that Syria’s 
revolutionaries were liberators or that, by extension, the French Mandate was a colonial project 
in the first place. The Socialist Party (a party which Amin Arslan, like his more well-known 
cousin, Shakib, belonged to) spoke out in protest of France’s 1925 bombardment of Damascus, 
but theirs was a protest against the Mandate’s failure to inform Argentina’s diplomatic staff of the 
strike ahead of time. A Belgian party leader, Emile Vandervelde, drafted a public letter of protest 
to the French government, claiming that the first indicator of the imminent bombardment that 
diplomatic staff received was “when French troops simply quit their posts and these [officers] 
had no hope for protection by them.” In 1925, Vandervelde expressed his outrage that France had 
ignored its “obligation towards, and responsibility for, the lives and well-being of diplomats in 
the city during these extraordinary events,” and also his surprise that “despite French [press] 
releases to the contrary… the general Muslim population of Damascus has protected the [city’s] 
Christians and Jews, including those [of us] who are foreigners, with a grand and spontaneous 
outpouring of benevolent relief.”526 In the aftermath of the bombing, Vandervelde thanked the 
citizens of Damascus for their protection of non-Muslims and foreign diplomats, but he was 
otherwise silent on the massive civilian losses suffered by that very population. And in 
international Socialist circles, Vandervelde held fast to his alliance with France, denying that the 
Syrian Mandate was “colonial” in intention or execution. Vandervelde’s statements were 
                                                          
526 October 1925 telegram as reproduced in George E. Sawaya, “Ha Llegado un Lier: Quien es M. Emile 
Vandervelde,” al-Islah 11 September 1928, 15. 
207 
 
particularly maddening for Amin Arslan’s and co-activist (and fellow bi-lingual publisher) Jurj 
Sawaya, who wrote of the Socialists, “Meanwhile, Mr. Vendervelde, the blood still runs in our 
country, which no one has admitted has become a French colony. But for illustrious French allies 
like yourself, of course, willingness to hide the piracy of the colonial imperialist parties is 
necessary to protect one’s other socialist assertions.”527 
 Painfully aware of Arslan’s continuing efforts to organize support for the Syrian Revolt, 
in early 1926 the French Foreign Ministry went to extreme lengths to curtail possible return 
migration of politicized Syrians. The Consulate’s provision, legitimation, and abrogation of 
travel and identity documents became a means of containing Syrian activism and of punishing 
dissenters. In April 1926, for example, the French Consulate circulated an open letter to the 
Syrians of Argentina, announcing that the entire community (then 170,000 strong according to 
Arslan) had four months to seek naturalization as French Mandatory citizens. Those who refused 
compliance, the letter said, would be considered Turkish subjects by the nation of France. The 
threat of mass denationalization was intended to encourage submission to French authority but 
also gave the Consulate the power to retain politically desirable Syrian and Lebanese emigrants 
while disowning troublemakers. The letter was dressed up in the language of international 
government, and cited the planned expiration of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne as the reason for 
the new policy. What France had done in actuality, however, was push the Syrian community of 
Argentina to the brink of statelessness, a maneuver that would impact whether they could legally 
seek employment, travel, petition for their rights, or even pursue Argentinian citizenship. It is not 
difficult to imagine that such a twist would strike the community like lightening. 
 And lightening did strike. In his public response, Amin Arslan recalled that the 
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announcement “was followed by an explosive indignation and anger.” In his book, Arslan wrote, 
“It was not enough for the French to occupy our country militarily, nor take our 
gold [standard economy] and replace it with paper Francs, nor flood our 
government office with their functionaries. Now, after putting our country to 
blood and fire, they want to persecute us until the world’s end?”528 
 
The four-month deadline lapsed, and in August 1926 over 100,000 Syrians and Lebanese living 
in Argentina became Turkish citizens on paper, a fact that the Turkish government did not 
formally recognize. And a result, the issue of Syrian and Lebanese nationality and citizenship 
comprised the most recurrent single political issues in the ethnic press in the late 1920s. The 
French Mandate government did little to correct the nationality issue for Syrian and Lebanese 
emigrants before 1928, however, when in the middle of a diplomatic conflict with Turkey over 
the Sanjak of Alexandretta, the Turkish government drafted the Turkish Nationality Act no. 
1312, the first to lay claim upon former Ottoman subjects living beyond the territory of 
Turkey.529 The Mandate’s dragoman in Buenos Aires, Shukri Abi Saʿab, wrote to the High 
Commissioner in Beirut that 90 percent of the Syrians and Lebanese in Argentina still had not 
opted for French Mandatory citizenship, making them susceptible to Turkish authority if Turkey 
so wishes to claim them.530 
Revolution in Exile: Emigrant Arab Nationalism and the Syrian National Bloc, 1928-1930 
 The Great Syrian Revolt began with rural armed insurrection, seemingly-spontaneous 
episodes of mass disobedience in the cities, and dramatic rebel victories punctuated by brutal 
French counterinsurgency campaigns, collective punishment, and bombardments. But it ended 
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less assertively, in Michael Provence’s words, “with the slow an inexorable reassertion of 
government control over the devastated countryside, district by district.” By 1927, he concludes, 
“militant popular resistance was dead,” and moderate nationalist figures among Syria’s 
traditional urban elite made new moves “to rule under the auspices of, and in cooperation with, 
the imperial power.”531 French troops pushed revolutionary leaders Sultan al-Atrash and 
Muhammad Izz al-Din al-Halabi south, into Wadi Sirhan (in Transjordanian territory) where they 
continued to launch reprisals and send public demands through 1927, but where their political 
relevance was indubitably checkmated.532 In 1928, French High Commissioner Henry Ponsot 
announced his desire to create a Constitutive Assembly for Syria, a representative body 
comprised of moderate Syrian nationalists to draw up a constitutional charter. Ponsot’s objectives 
were clear: by channeling nationalist feeling into institutions cooperative with the Mandate, the 
French High Commissioner’s office could pick their opponents from among Syria’s urban elite 
(the Constitutive Assembly was largely comprised of Damascenes from notable families) and 
exclude more radical political voices by delegitimizing them. The formation of the Constitutive 
Assembly also satisfied, for a time, growing demands by French liberals back home that France 
par down its direct rule of the Mashriq as well as the League of Nations.  
 Philip Khoury argues that Ponsot’s strategy had the effect of fostering a shift in both the 
tone of Syria’s nationalist movement and in the faces of its leaders: the Damascene educated elite 
framed the goals of national independence within a negotiated power-sharing strategy called 
“honorable cooperation” [al-taʿwun al-maʿqul]. 533 By participating in Ponsot’s Constitutive 
Assembly, these elites maintained political order and stability while also pressing for France’s 
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fulfillment of its Mandatory obligations, enshrined in article 22 of the League of Nations Charter. 
National economic development, progressive steps towards national sovereignty, and the 
construction of a Syrian constitutional system were the goals of the new Syrian nationalist 
movement. In summer 1928, the Constitutive Assembly got to work on drafting a Syrian 
Constitution, the first since the French occupation in 1920. A new chapter in Syrian politics 
opened, one which eschewed militancy in favor of order, progress, and cooperation with the 
Mandate. But among the exiles, emigrants, and Arab nationalists abroad, the trend away from 
revolutionary action was an unwelcome one, and Amin Arslan, Jurj Sawaya, Jurj ʿAssaf, and 
other activists in Buenos Aires became critical not only of the Mandate itself, but with the Syrian 
nationalists of Ponsot’s Constitutive Assembly of 1928 and the Syrian National Bloc [al-kutla al-
wataniyya] which emerged after it. Using language that was increasingly pan-Arab and world-
conscious, these men compared Syria’s colonial present with the colonial history of the 
Americas. If Syrians wanted to live in an independent constitutional Republic, they asked, why 
not follow the examples of the constitutional Republics of the Americas? And how many of these 
exemplary republics, they continued, were granted their liberty by politely asking for it? 
 In August 1928, Syria’s Constitutive Assembly submitted its draft for a Syrian 
Constitution to the French Foreign Ministry in Paris. As a delegation of Syrian representatives 
debated the document’s merits with the French government, copies of the Constitution were 
printed and circulated broadly across both Syria and the mahjar. Its articles included a 
“declaration of an expeditious independence,” as well as articles outlining a unicameral 
parliamentary system, freedoms of speech and political expression, and universal suffrage for 
Syrian men at 25 years old. The document included demands that Syria’s relationship with 
Lebanon be reevaluated (e.g. a “declaration of Syrian unity”) and it pointedly elided the language 
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of confessional representation the French had brought to Lebanon. It also demanded that Arabic 
(and Arabic alone) be the language of government in the would-be Syrian Republic. These three 
issues—the relationship with Lebanon, secular representation, and Arab self-government—
reflected the primary points of moderate nationalist opposition to French rule in Syria.534 In the 
weeks to come, Henry Ponsot reject the document on the grounds that some of its terms—
specifically, its declaration of Syrian unity, its demand for a Syrian national army, and the 
empowerment of a Syrian president in matters previously reserved by the Mandate’s High 
Commissioner (specifically, the right to enact a foreign policy)—violated the terms of France’s 
Mandate in Syria.535 Ponsot tabled the constitutional issue and summarily dissolved the 
Constitutive Assembly, demonstrating the cost of non-compliance to French policy objectives in 
Syria and Lebanon. With that, Syrian politics entered a period of harried stalemate that would 
last two full years.  
 Stunned by the dissolution of the Constitutive Assembly, many of its former members 
subsequently formed the Syrian National Bloc [al-kutla al-wataniyya]. Less a political party than 
a representative umbrella organization with a moderate nationalist compass, the National Bloc 
sought the progressive implementation of steps towards a Syrian constitutional republic through 
negotiations with the French and very often, appeals to the League of Nations.536 The Bloc’s 
emergence in 1928 was significant in that it harnessed the political energies of elite Syrian 
activists across a broad political spectrum, and by the 1930s, its structures began to form the 
nucleus of the Syrian state that would emerge after Independence. However, in its first two years, 
the Bloc’s gains were quite small, and the French persistently refused to entertain its larger 
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demands for national unity, a Syrian army, and greater administrative autonomy. Among the 
Bloc’s most significant concessions wrested in 1928 was a general amnesty for Syrians who 
participated in the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927, with the notable exceptions of the revolt’s 
leaders, ʿAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash, both of whom continued to agitate 
for armed insurrection against the Mandate from outside Syria. 537 
 Arab nationalists in Buenos Aires watched the events of 1928 with a critical eye. On one 
hand, Amin Arslan and his fellow activists saw a constitutional, Republican Syria as the only 
viable way forward for their homeland. On the other hand, they each argued that France’s 
interests in Syria ran contrary this goal and they questioned the validity of the National Bloc’s 
“honorable cooperation” strategy. Jurj ʿAssaf, for example, called the Syrian National Bloc an 
historical “absurdity” and questioned why Syrians “living in Damascus, once the seat of the 
Umayyad Caliphate… would [now] make themselves willingly beholden to French domestic 
politics.”538 ʿAssaf’s problem was not the validity of the project for a Syrian Constitution itself. 
He agreed that a Constitution would “be a necessary foundation for a free Syria.” ʿAssaf’s 
critique centered on the validity of “honorable cooperation” as a means of liberating Syria; he 
argued that the use of armed force (or at least, its legitimacy) presented the only proven means of 
liberating a territory from foreign colonialism.539 Like many Syrian American Arab nationalists, 
ʿAssaf drew parallels between Syria’s colonial predicament and the history of anti-colonial 
independence movements in the Americas: the United States, Brazil, and particularly Argentina. 
According to ʿAssaf, Argentina’s experience with declaring its independence, writing its 
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constitution, and unifying its divided provincial territories could serve as a model for Syria’s 
nationalist movement. Argentinians, he explained, had two major national holidays, marking 
three historical events: 25 March, which marked the 1810 declaration of Independence from 
Spain, and 9 July, which simultaneously commemorated the Tucuman Congress of 1816 (a 
meeting with yielded the first of Argentina’s articles of Confederation), and the ratification of 
Argentina’s Constitution in 1853: 
“These are dates of remembrance for all Argentinians. For the free Syrian-
Argentinians who enjoy watching [the celebrations], they anticipate the same for 
the homeland with hearts ablaze and eyes full of tears. They [Syrian Argentinians] 
wish to ‘remember’ their land, which demanded its independence and a self-
governing constitution.”540 
 
But for ʿAssaf, each chapter of Argentina’s political emancipation depended upon the willingness 
of its leaders to use armed force: the heroes of his history were all generals (and indeed, most of 
those present in 1810, 1816, and 1853 had been). ʿAssaf had been a supporter of the Great Syrian 
Revolt, was a partisan of ʿAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar, and with Jurj Sawaya had since founded 
the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-Arabiyya, a political party that continued to monetarily support 
Sultan al-Atrash and the insurrectionists contained at Wadi Sirhan.541 ʿAssaf firmly argued that 
the appeals of French officials like Henri Ponsot and international organizations like the League 
of Nations were merely a ruse, designed to disarm and contain the nationalist movement. By 
collaborating with the French to draw up a Constitution, ʿAssaf proclaimed that the document 
was not only invalid because it was silent about Syria’s right to military autonomy, but that the 
Syrian Constitutive Assemble (and by extension, the Syrian National Bloc) had allowed the 
Independence question “to become beholden to French domestic politics.” 
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 Only one way out was possible, concluded ʿAssaf: Syrians must follow the example of 
successful anti-colonial American revolutions, tossing aside the demands of colonial powers and 
the League of Nations. Liberation came at the price of armed insurrection:  
“Where is this revolution’s General [José de] San Martín?... Where is our Syrian 
General [José] Urquiza who will turn to those who ask for our ‘Program’ 
[referring to Henry Ponsot’s 1928 language requesting a list of Constitutional 
demands] and say: ‘Our plan is that our soldiers will carry your heads on their 
pikes, to remind all that our Revolutionary aspirations are not merely dreams. Our 
goals have not changed, ever: complete independence.”542 
 
A Syrian Constitution was the goal, ʿAssaf added, but the drafting of civilian charters could not 
create an authentic national independence that did not exist: “Argentina’s Tucuman Congress [of 
1816], after all, only solidified an Independence that was already apparent.” Constitutions had no 
benefit for an unfree people, because as Jurj Sawaya concluded on the matter that same week, 
“there cannot be cooperation or understanding between the prey and his predator.”543 
At the same time, ʿAssaf’s political party, Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-Arabiyya, 
maintained that Argentinian Independence went hand in hand with unification, a theme that 
ʿAssaf connected to both Syria’s relationship to Lebanon as well as to the greater Arab region. 
ʿAssaf saw Lebanese independence as well as the British Mandates in Transjordan, Iraq, and 
Palestine as unnatural forms of colonial divide and rule, and he predicted that with the removal 
of the imperial regimes, a reunification at the force of arms might even be necessary. Argentina’s 
historical unification served him with an apt historical cognate, particularly in the example of 
Greco-Argentinian general [Bartolomé] Mitre, who after 1853 put down  a series of local 
rebellions [thawrat ahliyya] and “who halted the emergence of provincial ‘dictatorships‘” to 
preserve Argentina’s territorial integrity.544 
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ʿAssaf is less clear about which regional rebellions a Syrian general Mitre would target, 
but elsewhere in al-Islah he targeted the issue of the Grand Liban’s separation from Syria as a 
colonial manifestation, a position that concurred with the demands of the Hizb al-Istiqlal’s 
demand for reunification. For ʿAssaf, partition and foreign interference went hand in hand:  
“Among the strangest occurances that the history of the Syrian-Lebanese people 
has recorded during their struggle for Independence, which has brought them 
under foreign control—first by the English, then the French—is the faction within 
them [the Syrian-Lebanese people] that requested this foreign control, supporting 
it and arguing—according to their belief—that a foreign occupier will give them 
[back] their lands!”545 
 
In Lebanon, ʿAssaf continued that the French had politicized confessional identities to the point 
of “promoting religious extremism.” The parliamentary system built in Lebanon, he concluded, 
“cannot undertake any measures to smooth the divisions issued into the hearts of patriots from 
different mathhabs or religions.” The result, he concluded powerfully, was that in Lebanon, 
“each [sect] works according to his own interests.” 546 
In addition to the issue of Lebanon, the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-Arabiyya supported a 
militant response to the entire Mandate system, opposing British and French imperialism across 
the Arab world (including in Egypt, then under the monarchy of Fuʿad) as well as against the 
emerging Zionist state in Palestine. Calling itself a “party of nationalist renaissance [al-nahḍa al-
qawmiyya] in South America,” the Hizb al-Istiqlal saw itself not only as a Syrian organization 
but an Arab one, “within it are Arabs from every locale and every people, from Syria or Lebanon, 
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or Palestine primarily, but also from East Jordan and any other Arab lands that are presently 
under the foreign yoke [al-nīr al-ājnabī] and who want to remove the chains of oppression.”547 
Founded by Jurj ʿAssaf and Jurj Sawaya in summer 1928, the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-
Arabiyya was the earliest pan-Arab political party in the mahjar. It placed the suffering and 
struggle of all of the Arab peoples within a single political field and prescribed ethnic unity and 
anti-imperialist solidarity as a means of liberation. The struggle against colonialism, furthermore, 
was not merely a national one, it was a pan-Arab one:  
“[We seek] not only complete independence for Syria… it is also hoped that these 
advances [in Syria] will themselves be part of a greater set of advancements of all 
of the Arab peoples, who wish to fling the yokes from upon their shoulders and 
instead enjoy self-government with the other advanced peoples.”548 
 
The party was ideologically invested in Shakib Arslan’s and ʿAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar’s 
ongoing critiques of moderate Syrian nationalism, and it regularly issued statements in support of 
armed revolt and raised funds for “our soldiers of the language of ḍād”549 [lughat al-ḍād] in the 
hopes of re-launching the stalled Syrian Revolt.550 
 The Hizb al-Istiqlal’s militancy and insistence upon Syria’s liberation at the force of arms 
was in response to what its leaders saw as the central hypocrisy of the French Mandate: the 
unwillingness of Henri Ponsot and other French officials to allow the Syrians under their tutelage 
autonomy, particularly in military and educational affairs. The Hizb al-Istiqlal’s organizing 
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manifesto declared “that all people should bear the right to enjoy their freedom, independence, 
and autonomous administration of their affairs,” and equate French denial of these rights to the 
Arab people is tantamount to an act of War. Negotiations, “honorable cooperation,” and appeals 
to the international forum had not been fruitful, and the party held that “despite that the Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Palestinian people, as well of other Arab peoples, have been vocal in their 
demands for these rights, they are denied them.”551 The most significant national right, the right 
to military autonomy, the French quite clearly opposed any significant moves towards the 
development of a standing army. Indeed, in August 1928, Henry Ponsot scrapped the first Syrian 
Constitution drafted by his Constitutive Assembly over disagreements about the development of 
a Syrian national army,552 a turn of events that shocked moderate Damascene nationalists but left 
Jurj Sawaya, Jurj ʿAssaf, and the Hizb al-Istiqlal in Argentina chagrined but unsurprised.553  
 Syrian writers in Buenos Aires also called attention to the disconnect between liberal 
French political values and the illiberal method embraced in administering French colonies 
abroad.554 Another member of Hizb al-Istiqlal, Ibrahim Yunis, wrote in 1928 that although 
France was the world’s birthplace for individual freedoms, liberty, and the values of enlightened 
government, the French simultaneously denied these same virtues to lands under their tutelage: 
“The French people want to monopolize freedom and independence for themselves, while 
binding others in chains and limiting those same liberties they proclaim to be a ‘natural’ right.” 
Instead of “civilizing” Syria as the Mandate (Yunis argued) purported was its project, France 
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instead “continues a campaign of imperialism and military occupation… for the purpose of 
extracting our wealth and resources.”555 Despite the fact that France justified its Mandate in 
Syria in liberal terms, they quickly resort to authoritarian measures when faced with Syrian 
resistance.556 Yunis opined that the Syrians could only face force with force. 
 As both emigrants and nationalists, the leaders of the Hizb al-Istiqlal had a complex 
relationship to the issue of Syria’s continuing emigration. On one hand, these men fought battles 
with the French Consulate to maintain a liberal, open migration regime in place between 
Mandatory Syria and the Argentine Republic. On the other hand, however, emigration presented 
a problem for the Syrian nation, and mounting demand for access to travel papers and work 
outside of Syria was proof that France had failed to build a viable political system in the 
Mashriq. Ibrahim Yunis, for example, drew a direct causational link between French colonialism 
in Syria and Lebanon and the continuing problem of emigration. By failing to provide needed 
educational and economic infrastructure in Syria, average Syrians found their country stunted 
and wanting of opportunity: “Where are the national schools… that will establish [in Syria] a 
leadership for the nation’s sons? Where are the public works, planning in economics and the arts 
that would lighten the hearts of the poor and undercut the [necessity for] emigration?”557 Beyond 
blaming French maladministration for the emigration problem (a problem that the Mandate’s 
consular system was, after all, straining to contain), Yunis’s line of questioning pointed out that 
the Mandate’s stated goals—to build a viable political system in Syria in preparation for 
independence—had yet to be seriously addressed. 
Observing the political deadlock between the moderate nationalist movement at home 
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and the French Mandatory authorities, Jurj Sawaya, Jurj ʿAssaf, Amin Arslan, and others in the 
Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya criticized both and held fast to a hope for a second Revolt 
against the Mandate. In 1928, the Syrian National Bloc drafted an appeal to the League of 
Nations which accused France of failing to comply to the terms of the Mandate, specifically, to 
the requirement to build representative political infrastructure in Syria. Among other things, the 
National Bloc’s delegation demanded complete independence for Syria and its reunification with 
Lebanon. Unprepared to censure France and award the Syrian National Bloc its demands, the 
League of Nations declined to intervene in Syria. For Syrian National Bloc leaders, the League’s 
refusal underlined that any Syrian independence at all would come through piece-meal, bilateral 
negotiation with the French. But for the radical Arab nationalists of Argentina’s Hizb al-Istiqlal 
li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya, the League of Nations had proven itself not an international organization 
of high-minded ideals but a cover for European colonialism and “serving the ignoble ambitions 
of France and England.”558 In an editorial in al-Islah, Jurj Sawaya wrote: 
“It is apparently not enough that they [the League] has declared a Mandate over Syria, a 
country and nation which has now demonstrated its love for liberty and independence to 
the point of Revolution; not enough that the defenseless Damascus has been bombarded 
in a cowardly manner, or that our men were hoisted to the gallows for committing the 
‘terroristic crime’ of loving their native country… This Mandate has exploited its 
converts and apostles [Syrians cooperative with the Mandate], cowing them into weak 
submission. The rest are treated as in the times of crudest barbarity, as though they were 
black slaves in African colonies! With this evidence in place, for all of the world to see, 
we declare that the League of Nations, itself an invention of war, is in practice a 
camouflage in service to European imperial interests.”559 
 
Sawaya’s criticism of the League of Nations did not stop there, or with Syrian issues; from 1928 
forward his reporting about the organization highlighted his assertion that the League was invested in 
producing and maintaining “anachronistic” forms of governance in parts of the world beyond Europe. 
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Sawaya resented the League’s support for monarchies in particular, and wrote at length about the 
preservation of the Egyptian monarchy under Fuʾad as well as the imposition of (or the “regression to” in 
Sawaya’s words) a monarchy in Albania under Ahmet Muhtar Bey Zogú in 1928.560 Of Egypt, Sawaya 
described Fuʾad as a British puppet, installed to impose foreign rule on the Arab people, “the 
impediments facing Egyptians are much like those in Syria, differing very little. In the Egyptian case, 
they are under the absolute domination King Fuʾad, whose irritating regime is just like that of Msr. Ponsot 
in Syria.”561 Sawaya’s pan-Arab sensibilities explain his solidarity with the Egyptians, but his connection 
to Albania was a different matter. After World War I, Ahmet Muhtar Bey Zogú emerged as Albania’s 
leader in 1924 after a period of intense political instability and competition with the allies of Hasan 
Prishtina, leader of the Albanian National Movement. Sawaya saw Prishtina’s platform for Albanian 
independence as a clear cognate for Syria: Pristina’s movement was rooted in demands for constitutional 
self-determination, administrative autonomy, linguistic nationalism, and an uncompromising position on 
the legitimacy of military force (e.g. the maintenance of a strong Albanian army). And like in Syria, 
Prishtina’s hardline stance against foreign intervention made him suspicious of the League of Nations.562 
Empowered by support from the French and the League of Nations empowered Pristina’s rival, Ahmet 
Zogú, who then pushed the Albanian Nationalist Movement underground. According to Sawaya, Zogú 
owed his presidency and his subsequent coronation as Albania’s monarch to the League of Nations.  
But the Albanian crown came at a cost: one of King Zogú’s first official acts was his signing of 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact a the first in a series of multilateral treaties 
which, while establishing new international legal norms for conflict resolution, sovereignty, and 
diplomatic protocol, sought to delegitimize recourse to armed conflict as a means of national resistance. 
Sawaya saw the document as undermining the rights of colonized nations to repel their occupiers through 
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armed insurrection, and he bristled against news that France sought to impose the treaty on its allies. 
Albania’s signing of the document appeared an imperialist quid pro quo: international legitimacy at the 
cost of foregoing national sovereignty. “We Syrians express our sympathies to the Albanian people,” 
wrote Sawaya, “for they will endure this anachronistic reign at such cost.”563  
 Sawaya’s denunciation of the League of Nations as a veil for a new European colonialism, his 
critique of the Syrian National Bloc and of moderate nationalism in general, his resentment for the 
imposition of monarchies on Arab and Muslim peoples by foreign powers, and his prescription of pan-
Arab unity and armed insurrection as the necessary means for Syrian (and Arab) liberation all 
demonstrate an increasingly global anticolonial worldview. For Sawaya and his compatriots in the Hizb 
al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya, theirs became a struggle between the many-headed hydra of European 
colonialism on behalf of “the subalterns [subalternizados] and weak peoples of the world [los débiles del 
mundo].”564 By the end of the 1920s, Sawaya and his partisans freely drew connections between 
manifestations of this globalized imperialism in ways that earlier nationalist thinkers had not: in late 
1928, for instance, Sawaya concluded this of the world under the League of Nations’ purview:  
“[Albanian monarch] Zogú, [Egyptian king] Fuʾad, the Kellogg[-Briand] Pact, and 
France’s resistance to the evacuation of Romania: all are one single system of 
colonialism [un sistema de colonización] of entire nations under the Mandates. All of 
this, in sum, leaves a shocking and unpleasant index, opening up huge questions about 
our immediate future.”565 
Sawaya’s disdain for the creation of monarchies in the Middle East mirrored that of his party’s partner 
then exiled in Cairo, the former Syrian revolutionary ʿAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar. Sawaya and 
Shahbandar carried on a lively personal correspondence between 1927 and 1929, much of which Sawaya 
dutifully reproduced in al-Islah (in both Spanish and Arabic). In one letter, Shahbandar told Sawaya “the 
foundation of modern colonialism lies in the creation of kings in our lands; with the monarchy comes the 
foreigner’s boot.” Despite the “democratic feelings that prevail in Syria and Lebanon… the kings have 
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been in service to the foreigner, with very few exceptions – Emir Faysal being one of them.”566 Both 
Shahbandar and Sawaya presented Faysal’s short-lived monarchy in Syria as the exception to the 
monarchical rule, because (they argued) his was not a kingdom imposed by a foreign power.567 In al-
Islah, anyway, both men remained silent on Faysal’s monarchy in Iraq, imposed by the British after 1921.   
Mandated Migration: The Patronato Sirio-Libanése and the Business of Papers  
 
 The 1926 invalidation of the Ottoman passports and travel documents held by most of 
Argentina’s Syrian and Lebanese immigrants started with a technicality written into international 
law; the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne were wholly intended to be a temporary measure to 
protect former Ottoman subjects as matters of national construction were sorted out post-World 
War I, after all. But through this technicality the French Mandate government, and particularly 
the Mandate’s Consulate in Buenos Aires, saw new opportunities to reel in their emigrant 
constituencies. The Consulate offered (and later began to require) new Syrian and Lebanese 
immigrants identity papers, travel permissions, and the option to apply for Syrian or Lebanese 
nationality. Upon arrival to Buenos Aires, Syrians and Lebanese were required to register with 
the Buenos Aires Consulate and collect these documents. Implicit in this exchange, however, was 
a documented legitimation of the French Mandate and its domicile not merely over Syria and 
Lebanon, but also over the diasporic communities. Those who entered Argentina after 1926 
increasingly opted for clandestine means, relying on smugglers, traffickers, and the informal 
network of simsars (migration agents) who flourished in the business of visas, identity papers, 
and off-the-books contracting with local employers. 568 As for those Syrians already in Argentina, 
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with decades old Ottoman documents? The overwhelming majority (greater that 99 percent, 
according to Amin Arslan) did nothing, neglecting to register with the Consulate and quietly 
allowing their documentation to lapse in August 1926.569  
Between 1926 and 1928, an individual immigrant’s lack of papers meant less than might 
be assumed: the majority of Syrians in the colony worked within the community’s own trades 
and industries, and those who worked in agriculture or other labors for Argentine employers did 
not need to resort to Argentinian naturalization.570 It was in matters of travel that the absence or 
presence of papers posed a real challenge after 1926. With rates of Syrian immigration into the 
country rebounding during the 1920s, joined by the rates of return migration and circular travel 
between Buenos Aires and the port at Beirut, the French Mandate saw the registration of Syrian 
travelers as a means of managing its subject populations for demographic, economic, as well as 
political purposes. 571 However, the new registration process required by the Mandatory 
government in 1926 had an important unintended consequence: it empowered migrant middle-
men who worked in the migration “industry” (shipping, credit, or employment agents), many of 
whom were moved less by loyalty to the French than by profit. Indeed, between 1926 and 1928, 
a dizzying array of simsars emerged in Buenos Aires, individuals who either assisted Syrians in 
travelling illegally or who filed the registrations paperwork required at the Consulate for a fee.  
More concerning for the French was the participation of the colony’s political parties in 
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providing just these services, some of which agitated directly against the Mandate: al-Jamʿiyya 
al-Suriyya, a society which espoused an increasingly anticolonial Syrian nationalism during the 
1920s, managed a fee-based service filing registrations at the French Consulate for incoming 
Syrian immigrants.572 Groups like it, some Francophile (for instance, al-Tahalluf al-Lubnani, a 
breakaway organization once allied with Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani that counted French 
dragoman Shukri Abi Saʿab as a member), others deeply critical of the Mandate, often invested 
these funds into political causes, including remittance to the Syrian revolutionaries in the 
Hawran.573 Clearly, if the French wanted to “usurp from rival claimants… the ‘monopoly over 
the legitimate means of movement’,” they would have to create not only a documentary regime; 
they would also need to find a client to oversee the registration process and undermine the 
immigration grey market.574 
In 1928, the French Consulate in Buenos Aires found this client in an organization called 
the Patronato Sirio-Libanése. Called al-Jamʿiyya al-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya li-Himayat al-
Muhajir in Arabic, the Patronato Sirio-Libanése on Avenida Corrientes was, in essence, a formal 
migration agency operating for a fee with the French Consulate’s blessing. Its founders were 
Musa ʿAzizi, Musa José Busader, and Juan Ibrahim. Musa ʿAzizi, a Syrian merchant and banker 
originally from Hama, had made his fortune reinvesting capital from his textile firm, La 
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Dominion Textiles,575 into the city’s Syrian-Lebanese Bank. 576 He served as the Patronato’s 
chairman and president.577 The Patronato Sirio-Libanése’s foundational charter laid out the 
society’s aims and interests: “taking care in a special manner to orient and guide [new Syrian and 
Lebanese immigrants in Argentina] in their first steps in this hospitable country” by providing 
loans, temporary housing, and access to employers.578 But one major distinction set the Patronato 
apart from other Syrian mutual aid societies then operating in Buenos Aires: ʿAzizi committed 
himself to using the organization to negotiate terms with the Argentinian government, the French 
Foreign Ministry, and the Mandate’s Consul in Argentina. ʿAzizi lobbied the French Foreign 
Ministry for exclusive access to the registration of Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to Argentina, 
and in June 1928 his Patronato was granted this request in the interest of undermining the 
informal network of simsars that had predominated to that point. ʿAzizi built upon this 
partnership with the French Consulate and within months, his organization opened a Beirut 
office. By late 1928, Musa ʿAzizi and his Patronato Sirio-Libanése effectively controlled the 
flow of migration between Lebanon and Argentina. 
For the city’s Arab nationalists and the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya, the 
institutionalization of the Patronato and its place in the registration of Syrian migrants looked 
like an illegitimate extension of French power into the diaspora. Jurj ʿAssaf, in particular, saw 
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the Patronato as the Mandate’s “chosen instrument” for the regulation of Syrians abroad. 579 He 
looked askance at ʿAzizi’s frequent public statements that his organization stood for the rights of 
Syrian and Lebanese immigrants and for the homeland’s economic development and national 
progress.580 In September 1928, ʿAssaf argued that contrary to ʿAzizi’s high-minded claims, his 
Patronato Sirio-Libanése made migration even more financially strenuous than the simsars his 
supplanted. Before the Patronato began managing the registration of new immigrants at the 
French Consulate, ʿAssaf pointed out in al-Islah, the going rate for the processing of papers had 
been around twenty-four “riyals,” with small deviations between competitors.581 But when the 
Patronato Sirio-Libanése took over the process as an institutional monopoly, that price ballooned 
up to seventy-four “riyals,” tripling the cost of entering the country legally. “This is how an 
organization ‘for the protection of immigrants’ becomes, in fact, an organization for blackmail in 
the name of protection,” protested ʿAssaf, “how does [the Patronato Sirio-Libanése] dare call 
itself a benevolent organization when it refuses to obtain travel permissions for a man who does 
not pay to become a member?”582 When Musa ʿAzizi offered a response to ʿAssaf, appealing that 
“our aims are to enrich the Syrian and Lebanese colony, not impoverish it”, ʿAssaf shot back 
with “what he [ʿAzizi] is doing is hoarding immigrant monies and enriching himself.”583 
 In defending his organization, Musa ʿAzizi availed himself of the themes of unity and 
national development, both ideas with capital for the colony’s Arab nationalists. He also invoked 
                                                          
579 Referring to a strategy of governmentality and international diplomacy championed by Woodrow Wilson during 
World War I, the “chosen instrument” model involves a government’s identification of a single private enterprise or 
client capable of enacting desired policies in a setting beyond that government’s formal control. Wilson coined the 
phrase in 1915, although Emily Rosenberg argues it is a reiteration of Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy.” Emily Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1982), 59-61. 
580 Jurj ʿAssaf “Jamʿiyyat al-Muhajira Tarhaq al-Shaʿb,” al-Islah 21 August 1928, 4. 
581 Likely francs, but the term “riyal” was used in the Syrian immigrant press generically to refer to Argentinian 
pesos, British pounds, or French francs. Jurj ʿAssaf, “Ma ʿala Zuhr al-Jaliyya,” al-Islah 4 September 1928, 5-6. 
582 ʿAssaf, “Ma ʿala Zuhr al-Jaliyya,” 5. 
583 Jurj ʿAssaf, “Ma ʿala Zuhr al-Jaliyya, 4” al-Islah 11 September 1928, 5. 
227 
 
the increasingly nativist tone in Argentinian politics as well as the threat of immigration 
restriction:  
“Our principal action and purpose is to employ our funds to obtain, from the 
authorities [Poderes Publico], the repeal of any legal obstacles that create 
difficulties for our immigrants. We have achieved some of our proposed aims, and 
we hope that [with these achievements] our immigrant ancestors will be satisfied 
and rested.”584 
 
The Patronato Sirio-Libanése’s sizable financial reserves (ʿAzizi reported they were in excess of 
100,000 Francs)585 were absolutely needed in the interest of fighting immigration restrictions in 
court and protecting individual Syrian or Lebanese immigrants from possible imprisonment or 
deportation. Unconvinced by ʿAzizi’s argument for contingency planning, al-Islah Jurj Sawaya 
argued that “the Patronato says nothing of what kind of immigrants [it seeks to help], nor which 
difficulties [it will fight],” arguing that the specter of immigration restriction remained entirely 
ephemeral in Argentina, more scare-tactic than legal eventuality.586  
Reporting on actual difficulties faced by Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to Argentina, 
Jurj ʿAssaf argued that unlike the United States, Argentina’s republican government had 
continued to endorse and even encouraged free immigration of Syrians.587 The U.S.’s move 
towards quotas and immigration restriction with the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act did not presage new 
obstacles for Syrians arriving in Argentina. Indeed, ʿAssaf argues that Argentinian presidents 
Hipolito Irgoyen and Marcelo Torguato de Alvear had been receptive to Syrian appeals in the 
country, and even counted the Syrians among their constituents (both al-Islah editor Jurj Sawaya 
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and Jurj ʿAssaf himself were Irgoyen supporters). During his investigation of ʿAzizi’s claims, 
ʿAssaf interviewed Yusuf Ghattas, an attorney who was in the process of filing claims against the 
Patronato Sirio-Libanése by immigrants who felt defrauded by the organization. Ghattas reported 
that “entry into Argentina has never before been simpler,” concluding that “the obligation of a 
benevolent society is to disburse money to needy people, not to take money from them.” Ghattas 
pointed to one of his clients, Nasib Antun Mikhaʾil, who reported that ʿAzizi had told him his 
seventy-four “riyal” payment would go towards processing his papers and finding him work in 
textiles. Mikhaʾil did not discover for some time that the textile factory he was employed by at 
was one of ʿAzizi’s own, and that in effect (Ghattas charged) he had entered into a precarious 
position where he depended on ʿAzizi for both his wages and his legal status.588 Yes, there were 
serious obstacles facing Syrian and Lebanese immigrants to Argentina, al-Islah concluded of the 
matter: 
“There is found on our backs a heavy burden... and the time has come to speak 
frankly about this heavy burden on our colony. [But] this burden does not emanate 
from the government of this [Argentinian] Republic, which has not excluded any 
Syrian from entry except for those... who are in some way degraded.”589 
 
According to al-Islah, the “burdens” facing new Syrian immigrants to Argentina-- migration 
restriction, institutional corruption, financial hardship— originated not with Argentinian attitudes 
about immigration but with the French Mandate, its Buenos Aires consulate, and its partners in 
the Patronato Sirio-Libanése. By assuming a semi-institutional role as the colony’s gatekeeper, 
the Patronato’s interests were not in protecting immigrants but in the preservation of a 
documentary regime that Jurj ʿAssaf and his partisans saw as intrinsically illegitimate. Even 
worse, ʿAssaf argued, was the ammunition that ʿAzizi’s organization might actually give to 
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Argentinian nativists. The new financial hardship behind the pursuit of papers might place some 
Syrian immigrants in poverty, bolstering nativist complaints that the Syrian colony was a net 
burden on Argentina’s economy. 590 Invoking the image an impoverished, unemployed, and 
exploited Syrian immigrant fresh off the boat, ʿAssaf implored Musa ʿAzizi with an unsubtle 
amount of vitriol: “if your outsized funds are needed anywhere at all, it is in the streets of this 
local colony. Build a library or community center instead.”591 
 At the same time, there were those within the French consular system who disliked Musa 
ʿAzizi’s Patronato Sirio-Libanése for a different set of reasons, particularly personal linkages 
between some of its board-members and the Syrian National Bloc in Damascus. Musa Busader’s 
involvement was a particular problem; Busader had been sympathetic to ʿAbd al-Rahman 
Shahbandar and the Syrian Palestinian Congress in the early 1920s. Although it was clear to Jurj 
ʿAssaf, al-Islah newspaper, and the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya that the Patronato 
Sirio-Libanése was profiting by France’s increasingly restrictive documentary regime, Sofia 
Martos makes a compelling case that the French authorities in Buenos Aires often mistrusted the 
organization’s loyalty and political affiliations. She points out that by 1930, the Buenos Aires 
Consulate wrote letters of complaint to the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, claiming that 
ʿAzizi’s organization was exploiting Syrian travelers by charging commissions on their sea 
passage tickets and extorting them upon arrival.592 At the same time, Musa ʿAzizi protested 
openly to the Argentinian press when the French Consulate interfered in his business in l930.  
                                                          
590 ʿAssaf, “Ma ʿala Zuhr al-Jaliyya,” 5. 
591 Jurj ʿAssaf, “ʿAzmat al-Jamʿiyya al-Suriyya al-Lubnaniyya li-Himayat al-Muhajira,” al-Islah 28 September 
1928, 5. 
592 Martos’ conclusion, that the enmity between the French Consulate and the Patronato had been constant since the 
Patronato’s establishment in 1928, is reasonable given the reportage available from French Consular documents. The 
reports on this relationship in the Syrian press of Buenos Aires, however, reveal an initial partnership that eventually 
went south. "Le Consul De France a Buenos Aires a Monsieur Le Haut Commissaire De La Republique En Syrie Et 
Au Liban," in V. 616 (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Archives Diplomatique: July 28 1930), 138-43, as cited by 
Martos, The Balancing Act, 259. 
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So what happened? How did the Patronato Sirio-Libanése go from a trusted French client 
in the mahjar in mid-1928 to an organization of questionable French loyalty in 1930? The 
answer to this questions lies in French dragoman Shukri Abi Saʿab’s translations of the local 
Syrian press for French officials; in summer 1929, he began to report on the community’s 
growing outrage at Musa ʿAzizi’s Patronato, translating articles by Jurj ʿAssaf and others.593 
Perhaps in these translations, Abi Saʿab was arguing that if the French Consulate sought 
emigrant hearts and minds, the Patronato Sirio-Libanése had expended its usefulness as a French 
client. But his reports on the grumblings of his nemeses in the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar appear 
to have succeeding in causing the French Consul to watch the Patronato very closely after 1929, 
with a concern for any francophobe statements made by its leaders. The relationship between the 
French Consul of Buenos Aires and the Patronato Sirio-Libanése, then, was less a partnership 
than a joint venture, born of a temporary confluence of interests more than actual political 
loyalty. As a result, it turned out to be as ephemeral as the France’s alliance with the Syrian 
nationalists had been during World War I [see Chapter 2]. 
Meanwhile, Syrian and Lebanese travelers often found their ability to travel for tourism, 
work, or more permanent resettlement found such matters much more difficult, and spaces for 
effective protest more circumscribed. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the reactions of 
would-be travelers who were denied visas by the Mandate’s Buenos Aires Consulate. In 
November 1928, one Lebanese traveler spurned by the state attempted to appeal to a higher 
authority. Butrus Kairuz, the son of Domingo Kairuz, a textile mogul in Buenos Aires, applied 
for a round-trip visa to visit family in Lebanon for a period of months before returning to 
                                                          
593 "Letter from French Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in V. 411 (Ministère des 
Affaires Étrangères, Archives Diplomatique, June 26 1929), v. 411, p. 212-14; “Traduction: Du "Journal Syrio-
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Argentina. His request was denied, leaving Kairuz stranded abroad. Relying on a pattern of 
petitioning already decades old (and one which the French at one point endorsed, see previous 
chapter), Kairuz wrote a letter of appeal to Maronite Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik in Bkerke. He 
protested his disagreeable treatment by the French Consulate in Buenos Aires, which he 
attributed to his family’s political role in Lebanon’s “war of Creation” [al-harb al-kawniyya, 
World War I]. The Kairuz family had been allied with Hizb al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, a secular 
political party that opposed French tutelage in the Levant during the War [see Chapter 2]. To 
demonstrate that his grievance was not merely his own, Kairuz appended the signatures of 
several dozen Maronite leaders in Buenos Aires, as well as the official stamp of the Jamʿiyyat al-
Ittihad al-Maruni, an organization established by Huwayyik’s Church for representative 
purposes just a few years earlier [see Chapter 3]. Kairuz explained that he had exhausted his 
opportunities for appeal to the French Consulate in Buenos Aires, which had complete power 
over visas for the community, and “having been unable to secure our own rights and liberties, we 
appeal to you, your Excellency, to prevail on the French Consulates to restore our rights to 
us.”594 Kairuz argued that the Mandate government’s continuing discretion over matters of 
nationality, passports, and visas, was a problem to be combatted. He recommended bringing the 
matter to Yusuf Istafan, a member of Lebanon’s parliament, in the name of Lebanon’s emigrants 
summarily locked out of the country. 
  Butrus Kairuz’s political background and perspectives varied immensely from those the 
Arab nationalists discussed elsewhere in this chapter: whatever the wartime predilections of his 
father, by the 1920s his was a pro-Mandate, Francophile aristocratic family with ties to the clergy 
and the local Maronite mission. Kairuz’s protest against the Consulate’s handling of the emigrant 
                                                          
594 Butrus Kairuz and al-Ittihad al-Maruni to Patriarch Ilyas Butrus Huwayyik, 26 November 1928 letter, Archives 
of the Maronite Patriarchate, Bkerke, Lebanon, Huwayyik Collection, Folder 89, Latin America, number 368. 
232 
 
visas issue and the Mandate’s continuing control over matters that, he argued, should be 
Lebanese affairs reveals the extent to which Syrians and Lebanese living in Argentina saw the 
Mandate state as a hindrance to aspirations of self-determination. For Kairuz, being refused his 
right to return to his family home was an imposition of exile, thrust upon him by a foreign 
occupying power; his appeal to the Maronite Patriarch to rectify the problem was a strategy in 
creating leverage. 
 In the end, the increasing number of obstacles, regulations, and restrictions made Syrian 
and Lebanese migration to Argentina progressively more difficult, and did so by design. To travel 
from Beirut to Buenos Aires required that a traveler seek permission from the Mandatory 
government both before disembarkation and (after 1926) upon arrival. Once in Buenos Aires, the 
French Consulate required a registration process that involved a formal change in nationality, a 
requirement resented by Syrians and Lebanese who opposed the Mandate. This paperwork, 
furthermore, became expensive to obtain, and this was especially so after 1928 because the 
Consulate depended on the Patronato Sirio-Libanése. And once in Argentina, the Consul could 
deny Syrian and Lebanese immigrants a visa to return home, and the lack of formal oversight 
over this process created even greater resentment. Argentina’s continuing leniency on Syrian 
immigration during a decade when other American nations were increasingly curtailing new 
immigration ensured that Syrians still made the trip, but the matter was now more onerous, 
expensive, and potentially exploitative than before, making migration one of the central topics of 
discussion among Arab nationalists in Argentina. 
Conclusions 
 By 1929, Argentina’s Arab nationalist movement had changed significantly in terms of 
goals and prospects. Between World War I and 1929, Arab nationalist intellectuals like Amin 
Arslan, Jurj Sawaya, and Felipe Homad had gone from looking upon the international forum 
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(especially the League of Nations) as a space for the realization of Syria’s right to self-
determination, to looking at it with deep mistrust as just another manifestation of Western 
colonialism. France went from honorable collaborator in the Syrian-Arab independence project 
during World War I, to Syria’s brutal colonial occupier, and as a result, Arab nationalist thinkers 
in Argentina increasingly looked to American models for an anticolonial liberation narrative. 
With the rise, in Syria, of the moderate nationalist Syrian National Bloc, a new disjuncture 
between Arab nationalist at home and those abroad surfaced. In Buenos Aires, the Hizb al-
Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya condemned the movement’s “honorable cooperation” with French 
authorities, and continually pushed for a Revolution that looked increasingly unlikely. And as the 
Mandatory government progressively cinched up its regulations pertaining to Syrian and 
Lebanese travelers and migrants living abroad, the Arab nationalists of Argentina found 
themselves less able to evade the expanding political reach of the Mandate, its consular network, 
and its clients within the Syrian-Lebanese colony.  
 That said, at least as many continuities as changes can be observed among Argentina’s 
Arab nationalists between 1914 and 1929, and these continuities ultimately prove more 
significant in explaining movement from its leaders’ perspectives. The movement’s principle aim 
was for an independent Syrian federated state under constitutional rule, and this objective had 
remained constant since World War I. These Arab nationalists saw themselves as the ideological 
descendants of the Young Turk movement which had executed the Revolution of 1908. Some of 
them had themselves been “Young Turks”: Amin Arslan, Ottoman Consul of Argentina, reported 
in his memoirs that he came to South America to reintroduce Syrians in al-mahjar to the new 
constitutional era.595 During World War I, the Arab nationalist movement under Emir Faysal 
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seemed the clearest descendent of this spirit of Ottoman constitutionalism, and the Great Syrian 
Revolt of 1925-7 after that. The goal remained the same for Arab nationalists: political unity, 
complete independence, and constitutional government. 
 As the primary point of contact between the state and its emigrant populations, the 
Consulate remained, from 1914 to 1929, an important site for political contest, and it had been so 
since the end of the Ottoman period. During the Mandate, French consular officials kept tabs on 
Arab nationalist leaders and intellectuals, using their authority to issue (or deny) travel 
permissions and nationality documents as a means of political control. In the meantime, 
bureaucratic issues like the processing of visas became an increasingly complex and expensive 
affair, creating practical problems for Syrian travelers and generating new complaints about the 
Mandatory state. Despite the commonplace notion that it was American receiving states that 
attempted to place new restrictions on immigration during the 1920s, among the Arab 
nationalists in Buenos Aires it seemed clear that it was French, not Argentine, authorities that 
sought to limit Syrian mobility, dividing Syrian from its diaspora with an opaque documentary 
regime. The radicals of the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya’s proclamations of Arab unity 
should be read with this facet in mind. Not only did Jurj Sawaya, Jurj ʿAssaf, and Amin Arslan 
declare their intention to represent “Arabs from every locale and every people, from Syria or 
Lebanon, or Palestine…from East Jordan and any other Arab lands that are presently under the 
foreign yoke”596 on the basis of an ethnic solidarity based on being soldiers of the language of 
ḍād.”597 Such expressions of broad unity serve to upend the divisive logic of an internationally 
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inspired imperialism that, through the mask of state-building placed new barriers between 







CHAPTER 5: SOUND MINDS IN SOUND BODIES: TRANSNATIONAL PHILANTHROPY 
AND PATRIOTIC MASCULINITY IN AL-NADI AL-HOMSI AND SYRIAN BRAZIL 
 
On 2 May 1920, al-Nadi al-Homsi (Homs Club) opened its doors on Rua 25 de Março at 
the heart of São Paulo's Syrian neighborhood. Surrounded by textile merchants, ethnic grocers, 
and itinerant peddlers returning from the Brazilian interior, al-Nadi al-Homsi was a fraternity 
(fityan) for young men of a certain level of education, piety, and patriotism. The club provided a 
space for civilized leisure and refuge from the Syrian neighborhood's bustling commerce, and its 
members cultivated a careful respectability centered on the preservation of Syrian literary 
traditions, charitable work, and the training of the body through sport. At al-Nadi al-Homsi’s 
opening celebration, Syrian intellectual and founder Jurj Atlas pronounced, “this Nadi is not a 
brotherhood but for the society (mujtamāʿ) which exists within it.” He motioned to a series of 
portraits of prominent nationalist 
personalities from the city of 
Homs adorning the clubhouse's 
walls: ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad, 
ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, 
Orthodox Bishop Athanasius 
ʿAtallah, and Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Hourani.598 Atlas continued, 
“fraternity is what happens 
when its brothers return to this 
                                                          
598 al-Nadi al-Homsi, al-Nadi al-Homsi:Haflat al-Tadshin wa-l-Yubil al-Fuddi: Musadarat bi-Fadhlaka Tarikhiyya 
(São Paulo: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr al-ʿArabiyya, 1946), 15. 
Figure 8: al-Nadi al-Homsi's Sitting Room, 1920. Portraits Include: Bishop 
Athanasius ʿAtallah (center); Top from Left: Ibrahim Hourani, ʿAbd al-
Hamid al-Zahrawi, Yusuf Shahin. Bottom from Right: ʿAbd al-Massih 
Haddad (1), Hanna Khabbaz (2), Rafiq Rizq Sallum (4), ʿIsa Asʿad (5). 
Source: al-Nadi al-Homsi, al-Nadi al-Homsi, 15. 
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space that make it thus... you are all sons of Madīnat al-Ḥarāra,599 and the eyes of its shaykhs 
look to you. Illuminate the winter of their lives with your youthful vigor, shining like rays of 
sun.”600 
 Within the halls of al-Nadi al-Homsi, young Syrian men worked out new definitions of 
patriotic masculinity during the 1920s and 1930s. Although the group was established by a group 
of prominent immigrants from the Homs, young men up to twenty-eight years old from Syria, 
Lebanon, or Palestine were welcome to join if they accepted the club's mission: the disciplining 
of body and mind, participation in a secular patriotic ethos stressing anti-colonial unity, and a 
devotion to philanthropy as the primary work of the nation.601 Distinguishing itself from other 
village and town-based Syrian socities, al-Nadi al-Homsi promoted that the origin of its name 
was in the oft-repeated saying that “the Homsi is strong in tradition,” a notion that then prevailed 
among Syrians both at home and in the mahjar. 602 The fraternity saw its role as giving young 
men an Eastern cultural education, raising them into men with a strong national tradition.  
 Founded just weeks before the Battle of Maysalun extinguished Emir Faysal's Arab 
nationalist government in 1920, al-Nadi al-Homsi sat within a transnational constellation of 
clubs spanning the entire Syrian mahjar. Drawing on existing networks of philanthropy and 
                                                          
599 Madīnat al-Ḥarāra translates here loosely as “City of the Sun,” and references Homs' ancient past. The city was 
once a settlement devoted to al-Gabal, the sun deity. In the Roman Period, Apollo became the city's patron. 
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abroad. Jurj Atlas, “Shabibat Homs fi-l-Mahjar,” al-Karma October 1914, 266. 
600 Atlas, “al-Nadi al-Homsi,” al-Kalimat al-Khalida: wa-hiya Majmuʿa baʿd ma Nashr min-Khutub al-Marhum Jurj 
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601 Among Syrian immigrants to Brazil, Homs was one of the most significant cities of origin. This can be partially 
explained by the growing weaving industry under industrialists Nami and Basilios Jafet, who contracted significant 
numbers of weavers from Homs beginning in 1908. Antunius Jafet, Naʿimi Jafet: Hayatuhu, Amaluhu, wa-Atharuhu 
(São Paulo: Antunius Jafet s.p., 1934), 12. The preponderance of Homsis in Sao Paulo is also reflected in the 
number of mutual aid societies and organizations bearing the city’s name by the 1920s: in addition to al-Nadi al-
Homsi, there was Homs al-Fatat and al-Jamʿiyyat al-Shabiba al-Homsiyya (which also had chapters in Argentina 
and Chile). Zahle was probably the second largest point of origin for Syrians living in São Paulo.  
602 al-Nadi al-Homsi, al-Nadi al-Homsi, 14-16. 
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patronage, the fraternity initiated a program of cultural reform aimed squarely at remaking a 
patriotic Syrian manhood. The project that had its intellectual origins in Ottoman Syria's last 
constitutional period (1908-1913) and evolved with the changing realities of World War I, the 
rise (and fall) of Hashimite Arab nationalism, and the subsequent emergence of a bourgeois, anti-
colonial Syrian patriotism. Through charitable work, moral training, intellectual self-
improvement, and physical challenge, al-Nadi al-Homsi charged young men with taking the 
mantle of an enlightened Syrian manhood, rendered simultaneously in paternalist and patriotic 
terms. Using materials culled from al-Nadi al-Homsi's foundational library (established in 1923), 
from the personal libraries of the club's founders, and from Syria's diasporic press, this chapter 
outlines the fraternity’s history during the 1920s and early 1930s.603 It argues that the fraternity's 
cultural mission, making Syrian men, was transnational in scope and that the political culture of 
the mahjar must be considered a part of Syria's interwar social history. 
Homs Reaches Behind the Sea: Orthodox Bishop Athanasius ʿAtallah and Transnational 
Philanthropy 
Owing to a flourishing weaving industry, the city of Homs enjoyed an unprecedented 
period of growth in the early twentieth century. The various facets of Homs' textile industry– the 
investment of capital, production and shipping of bulk cloth, piecework and sale of ready-wear 
garments– linked the city to Syria's diaspora, reinforcing chain migration patterns, particularly 
among the Greek Orthodox and Syrian Protestants who comprised one-third of the Homs' 
population.604 Sizable communities of Homsi emigrants selling textiles appeared across the 
                                                          
603 al-Nadi al-Homsi 's first library opened on Rua 25 de Março in 1923. When the clubhouse moved in the 1940s, 
much of the original Arabic collection was donated to Harvard University among the personal papers of Syrian 
intellectuals. Two common practices common allowed me to track these materials. First, the stamps and inscriptions 
of Maktabat al-Nadi al-Homsi and persons who borrowed, bought, and donated the materials establish a visible 
chain of transfer. Second, because the Syrian emigrant press function on a mail-order subscription system, the 
mobility of texts can be traced through postage markers and the locations of subscribers. 
604 ʿIsa Asʿad, Tarikh Homs, vol. 2 (Homs: Mutraniyyat Homs al-Urthudoxiyya, 1983), 36, 416-7. 
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Americas, but São Paulo (itself experiencing a boom in cloth production under Syrian-Lebanese 
cotton mogul Nami Jafet) served as Homs' port of entry into the mahjar.605 
 As a human network of weavers and cloth traders linked Homs to São Paulo, a remittance 
economy emerged, allowing for private investment into Syrian philanthropic societies, schools, 
and orphanages. The Orthodox Church in Homs took the lead in developing philanthropic 
infrastructure abroad, particularly under Bishop Athanasius ʿAtallah and his colleague, the priest 
ʿIsa Asʿad. Born in Shwayfat and educated in Suq al-Gharb (in present day Lebanon), 
Athanasius ʿAtallah arrived in Homs in 1886 after a succession of clerical posts in Istanbul, 
Latakia, and Mar Ilyas.606 A man of the nahda, Bishop ʿAtallah firmly believed in the power of 
education (both religious and secular) to guarantee social and political progress. In Syria, he 
worked with the Ottoman wakil al-madaris to diversify the types of education available to 
Syrians, founding adult night schools and workers' education programs in Beirut, Tripoli, 
Damascus, and Mount Lebanon, dozens of secondary schools and charities in the 1890s, as well 
as a hospital in Homs, opened in 1912.607  
Bishop ʿAtallah built “national schools” at the tertiary level as well. The most well-
known of these was the Kulliyat Homs al-Wataniyya, established in Homs in 1901. Opened on 
the site of a former missionary school, ʿAtallah rebuilt the college’s curriculum employing the 
pedagogical ideas of Butrus al-Bustani, a nineteenth century reformer who blended the rigorous 
content of the missionary education with the believe that “education should inculcate in the 
                                                          
605 Clark Knowlton reports that of the 91 Syrian and Lebanese industrialists operating in Brazil, 73 were engaged in 
the textile industry,  “The Social and Spatial Mobility of the Syrian and Lebanese Community in São Paulo, Brazil,” 
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minds [of its students]... the patriotic principle.”608 Butrus Abu Manneh argues that al-Bustani’s 
mid-nineteenth century approach to a “national” curriculum had been a direct response to the 
influx of foreign missionaries in Syria; the multiplication of religious schools by foreign 
missionaries produced the province’s most educated generation among the Syrian Christians, but 
it had also fostered divisions between Christian denominations. National schools like Kulliyyat 
Homs al-Wataniyya sought a cross-confessional student body and a secular curriculum with 
shared patriotic content, to create unities and counter confessional divisions.609 The school’s 
head (and Bishop ʿAtallah’s parter) was Hanna Khabbaz, from a prominent Protestant family in 
Homs. The Kulliyat Homs al-Wataniyya’s first cohorts were primarily from Orthodox of 
Protestant backgrounds.610 Many of them, furthermore, would become significant personalities in 
the mahjar. ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad taught there before moving to New York and founding the 
political daily al-Saʾih.611 Syrian writer Nazir Zaytun received a scholarship there, and after 
graduating in 1912, he moved to Brazil where he became one of the colony's most important 
intellectuals.612 The nationalist poet Husni Gharrab had entered Khabbaz's school in 1909; he 
would transfer out to the American School in Tripoli, graduating in 1914 before leaving Syria 
just weeks before WWI.613 Both Zaytun and Gharrab became founding members of the al-Nadi 
al-Homsi, further cementing the linkage between Homs, São Paulo, and the educational 
institutions they shared. 
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The Bishop was an incredible builder of social institutions, much-needed in that late 
nineteenth century moment. Homs’ population was simply exploding, increasing nearly five fold 
in between 1810 and 1889 (to 45,000).614 The weaving industries in cotton and silk encouraged 
skilled workers to move there from Hama, Damascus, as well as from the rural hinterland. Along 
with these arrived foreign missionaries: the American Protestants in 1856, French Jesuits in 
1882, Russians soon thereafter.615 One-third of Homs’ population was Christian, and the 
majority of that number Greek Orthodox;616 the combined influx of new immigrants and 
competition with foreign missions informed the Greek Orthodox Church’s enthusiastic building 
of schools, charities, orphanages, and other social infrastructure. The ambitious Bishop, 
furthermore, did not limit such projects to the city of Homs but extended them into Orthodox 
communities abroad: reaching out to partners in the mahjar, ʿAtallah endowed the Jamʿiyyat al-
Shabiba al-Homsiyya, a philanthropic organization with branches in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 
between 1908 and 1909. By 1914, this organization boasted over twenty branches spanning 
across South America.617  
In 1908, Bishop ʿAtallah supported the Young Turk revolutionaries, and he swiftly 
refocused his efforts on building a network of constitutionalist patriotic clubs across Syria and its 
diaspora. In Homs, he endowed the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabiṭa al-Adabiyya, a youth group led by ʿIsa 
Asʿad with the mission to create an empowered male citizenry among the city's middle class. 
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Asʿad described the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya as an organization rising to meet the need 
for a comprehensive cultural movement [haraka shamila thiqafiyya] towards the “spreading the 
spirit of the nation [al-ruh al-qawmiyya] among the various sons of this single Syrian nation [al-
watan al-wahid].”618 The organization was overwhelmingly Orthodox, and its president, Asʿad, a 
priest, but the society nonetheless insisted that its mission was nonsectarian and patriotic, about 
“homeland, national community, and nationality [al-watan, al-umma, wa-l-jins].”619 The clubs 
which ʿAtallah and Asʿad helped establish in South America were modelled similarly to the 
Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya of Homs. Neither priest ever visited Brazil, but as their network 
of Homsi clubs expanded, ʿAtallah's project of making Syrian men found expression within a 
transnational space between Homs and its emigrants abroad. 
If the Bishop played an important role in constructing Syrian social infrastructure in the 
mahjar, Syrian social activists living abroad also influenced how these societies performed their 
work. In 1909, for instance, ʿ Atallah’s patriotic club in Homs received a very special delivery from 
Sao Paulo: a printing press, donated by Syrian wholesaler Bishara Mahradawi. The press was of 
the metal plate type, its plates aged after a couple decades of use; Mahradawi said he had purchased 
the press from a defunct Syrian paper in Brazil, but that it had originally come from Cairo.620 
Mahradawi’s printing press went to good use in Homs: the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya 
founded its own political weekly, called Homs, the first of its kind in the city.621 Homs reported on 
political and social events in Syria and around the world, but focused especially on the patriotic 
clubs that linked Homs to its mahjar. During the twenties, it regularly reported on events at the 
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Kulliyyat Homs al-Wataniyya, the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya, and al-Nadi al-Homsi. The 
serial even had a Sao Paulo correspondent, Daud Qostantine al-Khuri, who lived in Homs but who 
corresponded with al-Nadi al-Homsi regularly and reported on Syrian societies, charities, and 
sports clubs in South America.622 
 
Figure 9: Image of Homs Press, unknown date. Source: “Matbaʿat Homs,” Homs, 13 June 1924, 8. 
 
 With the beginning of World War I, ʿAtallah's patriotic clubs served important social and 
political functions. Each branch provided charitable assistance, education, and social services to 
Syrian emigrants, while also remitting donations to Homs. Simultaneously, they provided 
political support for the Syrian constitutionalist cause, first under the Ottoman banner (1908-
1913), then under the Emir Faysal (1916-1920).623 The War was a catastrophe for Homs, but an 
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enervating moment for Syrian activism in the mahjar. In 1915, Ottoman general Cemal Pasha 
occupied Syria and forced Homs' civilian government under kaymakam Amin al-Tamimi into 
exile. Bishop ʿAtallah and ʿIsa Asʿad, watched helplessly as their schools and hospitals were 
requisitioned by Ottoman troops, and the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabiṭa al-Adabiyya banned and pushed 
underground.624 As the mortal realities of military government, famine, and disease set in, 
ʿAtallah and Asʿad joined a clandestine branch of Emir Faysal's Arab Revolt, laying the 
groundwork for a general uprising in Homs upon the arrival of Hashimite Arab forces.625 They 
encouraged Homsis around the world to do the same, and sought money, food aid, and military 
recruits from abroad. 
 Cemal Pasha's mass hanging of Syrian journalists and reformers on 6 May 1916 marked a 
major turning point in the war, fundamentally altering Syrian opinion on the Ottoman 
government both in bilad al-sham and its diaspora. ʿAtallah's societies abroad sprang to action, 
funneling young emigrant men into the French infantry. Hafiz Khizam, a peddler living in São 
Paulo, was the first to join up; one of the Bishop's clandestine organizations, Homs al-Fatat, paid 
his passage across the Atlantic.626 The following year Syrians from across South America joined 
the Légion d’Orient, a French-led irregular unit comprised of Syrian and Armenian emigrants 
seeking to liberate their homeland from Ottoman rule.627  The short-lived alliance between the 
Syria's nationalist movement and the French Foreign Ministry would shake apart after 1918, but 
                                                          
624 Asʿad, Tarikh Homs, 425-6. 
625 Both men joined al-Fata al-ʿArabi in 1916. This party was Homs' local wing of Faysal's organization, Hizb al-
Istiqlal al-ʿArabi; Philip S. Khoury, “Factionalism Among Syrian Nationalists during the French Mandate,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 4 (1981), 442. 
626 Hafiz Khizam al-Homsi, “Risalat al-Mutatawiʿ al-Suri al-Homsi fi-l-Jaysh al-Fransawi,” al-Saʾih 10 April 1916, 
1; Khizam, “Fi-Sahat al-Qital,” al-Saʾih 20 July 1916, 1. 
627 Gildas Brégain, Syriens et Libanais d'Amerique du Sud, 1918-1945 (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2008), 141-4; Maria 
Narbona, The Development of Nationalist Identities in French Syria and Lebanon: a Transnational Dialogue with 
Arab Immigrants to Argentina and Brazil, 1915-1929 (Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 2007), 44-5. 
245 
 
during the war, the Syrians of Brazil provided a critical source of material support for the Allied 
Powers as they engaged Ottoman soldiers in the Levant.628 
 With the liberation of Homs on 2 October 1918, Emir Faysal appointed ʿIsa Asʿad the 
official representative of the city's Orthodox Christians. With government support, Bishop 
ʿAtallah reopened the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabiṭa al-Adabiyya as a mouthpiece for Homsi youth living 
at home and abroad.629 Empowered by this turn of events, a new political culture grew up 
between Homs and its mahjar through the fraternities they shared. As Faysal spent 1919 
shuttling between Damascus and Paris suing for Syria's complete independence (al-istiqlāl al-
tām), Syrian intellectuals abroad set about defining their national community and its 
development. They equated the work of nation-building to the moral, intellectual, and physical 
development of Syrian men, their masculinity, and their placement at the head of a paternalist 
social order.630 This vision wedded Syrian masculinity to desires for territorial liberation, cultural 
renewal, and parliamentary democracy. In June 1919, Faysal’s party in Damascus, the Jamʿiyya 
al-Istiqlal al-Suriyya al-Markaziyya drafted an appeal to “Syrian men of the world,” arguing that 
Syrians both at home and abroad ought cooperate in building a completely independent Syria 
“without tutelage” [bila wisaya]. The appeal, printed on flyers which appears in Syrian cities and 
in the press abroad, deployed the rhetoric of family and national duty in a call for unity against 
an imminant French occupation: “the will not be a nation of madhhabs or sects,” Faysal 
concluded in the broadside, “for is you are one of a faction of Syrians who is afraid of his 
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brothers,631 let me say to you that it will be in our nation as it is in the family. You must not look 
at yourself as distinct from your country [kawnak], Arab Syria.”632 
 al-Nadi al-Homsi's establishment in May 1920 came at the apogee of Emir Faysal's effort 
for a Syrian state under a Hashimite constitutional monarchy, and the club's patriotic outlook was 
intensely informed by visions of the Syrian nation as a family, with the attendant role for men as 
paternal providers. It was in many ways a response to challenges to Syria's capacity to rule itself 
then being made in the international community. At the same time, Faysal’s rhetoric which 
combined familial nationalism with a plea for territorial sovereignty and international legitimacy 
was itself international. Images of male patriots, discussions about manhood, national duty, and 
the preservation of the nation circulated in the Arabic-language press, which had become a global 
force, and was a network heavily populated by Syrian emigrants. Much of the Arabic press's focus 
on young men, physical culture, and nationalism in 1919 derived from newspapers in Egypt, 
especially in al-Ahram, al-Muqtataf, and al-Hilal.633 At that moment, Egypt roiled in popular 
revolution against the British imperial administration after the forced exile of Sa'ad Zaghlul, 
founder of Hizb al-Wafd. Before the War, the Egyptian anti-colonial movement was largely an 
elite affair. But like Syria, Egypt had suffered during the War, which brought discontent with the 
imperial government to the popular classes and the countryside. President Wilson's Fourteen 
Points received Egyptian support, and immediately after the November 1918 armistice, Zaghlul's 
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Wafd made moves towards Egyptian self-determination and requested the removal of the British 
occupation.634 After his exile in 1919, a series of mass demonstrations and widespread civil 
disobedience encouraged the British administration to do business with Hizb al-Wafd.635 Whether 
in Cairo, in Syria, or across the mahjar, Syrians took notice of the 1919 Egyptian Revolution and 
described it as the model for successful engagement with the Powers. 
 Just six weeks after al-Nadi al-Homsi's opened its doors for the first time, however, the 
French utterly defeated Faysal's troops at the Battle of Maysalun in July 1920.636 But rather than 
extinguishing the diaspora's nationalist aspirations, the Independence movement's suppression at 
home only stoked patriotic flames abroad. al-Nadi al-Homsi became an experiment in generating 
a patriotic male class that demonstrated intellectual, physical, and political sovereignty, with the 
utopian goal of returning to Syria to reignite the cause of Syrian unity and nationalism. 
 The image of the able-bodied male patriot as the ideal combatant of Western imperialism 
circulated the Syrian press at home, in Egypt, and in the American mahjar from 1919 through the 
1930s.637 Linked to larger ongoing discussions about social eugenics in the newspaper press, al-
Nadi al-Homsi's project had two broad goals. The fraternity focused first on Syrian children, 
particularly orphans, as potent symbols for the nation, its peril, and its future. al-Nadi al-Homsi 
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and its members built orphanages in both São Paulo and Homs, devoting volunteers and services 
to raising children who had lost their parents during World War I and the 1920 war of French 
occupation. Provisioning for orphans became a nationalist duty for Syrian men specifically. Not 
only did it restore hope for Syria's future by saving a generation of children poorly served by 
colonialism, mentoring Syrian orphans also provided the Nadi's young men with moral training 
and preparation for their future roles as fathers of the nation.  
 The Nadi was similarly investing in making Syrian men through a rigorous program of 
moral, intellectual, and physical self-improvement. The fraternity stressed a holistic balance 
between an active intellectual life, moral health, and corporeal discipline through sports. Each of 
these faculties would produce the modern Syrian male, which the fraternity believed presaged 
Syria's political independence. To this end, al-Nadi al-Homsi built a library for the colony, held 
lectures, poetry readings, and theatrical performances which all nurtured Syrian ethnic identity 
and offered an anti-colonial reading of events back home. At the same time, the club supported 
physical education and maintained a masculine physical culture which drew analogies between 
strong bodies and national self-determination. 
 In order to found a patriotic fraternity in a Syrian colony he had never seen, Bishop 
Athanasius ʿAtallah required local contacts. He found them in two Homsi emigrants of very 
different backgrounds: Bishara Mahradawi and Jurj Atlas. The same Orthodox wholesaler who 
had sent home the printing press in 1909, Bishara Mahradawi had moved to São Paulo at the turn 
of the century, where he struck success as an importer. In his store on Rua 25 de Março, he sold 
silk and cotton textiles, sewing notions, and ready-wear clothing; on the side, he extended credit 
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to new Syrian immigrants.638 Jurj Atlas, by contrasted, ended up in Brazil quite by accident. The 
son of Mikhaʾil Samʿan Atlas, a Protestant convert who had assisted Ahmad al-Shidyaq in 
translating the Bible into Arabic in the 1850s, Jurj Atlas had received an American missionary 
education which took him from Homs to Suq al-Gharb, Tanta, and finally to Oxford, where he 
attended university.639 Atlas worked briefly in London before returning to Homs to marry and 
strike out a path as a journalist. In 1914, he married Salwa Salameh Atlas; the couple was in 
Brazil on honeymoon when World War I began. Unable to return home, they permanently 
resettled in São Paulo and integrated themselves into the colony's social elite. They established 
al-Karma, a literary magazine which included translations of European philosophers, discussions 
of Syrian politics, church news, and topics in pedagogy, science, and medicine. The magazine 
later served as al-Nadi al-Homsi 's official organ.640  
 In his spare time, Jurj organized politically with Homs al-Fatat.641 al-Nadi al-Homsi 's 
clearest predecessor, Homs al-Fatat was a political fraternity for young men in São Paulo which 
advocated revolutionary action against the Ottoman state.642 Atlas combined his interests in 
youth education with his knack for political activism as Homs al-Fatat's mentor. When in 1916 
Atlas learned that an acquaintance of his from home, the Ottoman parliamentarian ʿAbd al-
Hamid al-Zahrawi, had been among those martyred by Cemal Pasha, Jurj responded by founding 
a political magazine called al-Zahrawi which carried the tagline “independence or death.”643 He 
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called for Syrians to “break the Turkish yoke” by joining the Légion d’Orient and rising in 
revolt, and together with Najib Trad, Jurj Atlas helped funnel young Syrian recruits to Argentina 
to join the forces of the Entente.644  Atlas supported the Hashimite Arab Revolt of 1916, and 
after the War's end, the Arab nationalist government which emerged under Emir Faysal.645 This 
activist resume made Atlas Bishop ʿAtallah's ideal partner for his postwar project: to establish a 
Syrian fraternity in Brazil, built on the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya's model which would 
promote an Arab nationalist perspective among Syrian youths. From Homs, Bishop ʿAtallah  
sent a sizable donation to Brazil, which was matched by Bishara Mahradawi and fundraising 
from the Homsi community os São Paulo. Jurj Atlas leased a clubhouse on Rua 25 de Marzo and 
was charged with developing a mission and overseeing recruitment.646 al-Nadi al-Homsi 
openedits doors in May 1920, just as King Faysal’s independent Syria looked its most hopeful. 
 At al-Nadi al-Homsi's inaugural meeting, Jurj Atlas sat in the clubhouse's foyer and 
outlined the fraternity's agenda. Its executive board was populated with Orthodox and Protestant 
Homsi immigrants: Tawfiq Bunduqi, Shakib Jarrab, Daud Shakkur, Husni Gharrab, and Nazir 
Zaytun, among others.647 Most of these young men had been members of Homs al-Fatat; others 
had been meeting at a cafe next to Mahradawi's store locally famous for poetry readings and 
raucous political debate.648 A full membership roster for this early period does not exist, but the 
names of 78 young men were recorded as present at the May 1920 meeting that established the 
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club; by the 1930s, fraternity boasted an estimated 730 regular members and attedants.649 At this 
meeting, Atlas described the fraternity as a deeply historical social experiment, dating back to the 
roots of freemasonry in the English tradition. He credited the European Enlightenment and the 
19th century Lebanese nahda to networks of educated gentlemen spanning across oceans. These 
men congregated in cafes, meeting halls, and taverns, and there they gave Western civilization its 
leading edge: secular education, constitutionalism, and the polite masculinity of an empowered 
citizenry. al-Nadi al-Homsi was to recreate this power by combining the best of Syria's cultural, 
social, and political traditions into a new complete package to be remitted to the homeland, 
ending its imperial despair.650  
 al-Nadi al-Homsi’s clubhouse provided a social setting not only for the fraternity itself, 
but for the Syrian community in Brazil. The fraternity encouraged stewardship over the colony's 
social rhythms as a matter of paternalist duty, and it hosted social occasions (especially those 
associated with life milestones) with a great deal of ceremony. The club encouraged interaction 
between Syrians of varied religious backgrounds, sponsoring plays, concerts, poetry readings, 
and social mixers designed to foment discussions about secularism, patriotism, and literature.  al-
Nadi al-Homsi believed that sanctioned social mixing between young Christian, Muslim, and 
Druze youths was a critical part of its mandate; the fraternity similarly believed that Syrians in 
the mahjar had a greater opportunity to transgress older social boundaries than their brothers at 
home. Coed events were also common; al-Nadi al-Homsi hosted chaperoned receptions for 
young singles. In overseeing courtship, the club’s founders hoped to end the practice of Syrian 
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men returning to Homs for a bride, a practice that many in the mahjar saw as outmoded and 
problematic.651 
 The Nadi's most frequent gatherings in its early years were less joyous, however; the 
clubhouse was often used as an improvised funeral home. Syrian immigration to Brazil began in 
the 1880s; as the mahjar's second generation came of age, their parents had aged significantly.652 
Providing this generation's final services carried symbolic weight marking the rise of the new 
generation. Through these ceremonies, al-Nadi al-Homsi shaped the colony's collective memory 
while officiating over its communal affairs. In eulogies offered by Nadi members, the memory of 
the deceased was often celebrated as patriotic example of a life well-lived. In 1922, for example, 
Syrian writer Farah Antun passed away in Egypt after a heart attack. Antun had never visited 
Brazil, although his writings were much enjoyed by the Brazilian Arabic press, particularly 
Naʿum Labaki's al-Munāẓir.653 Antun's own experience in the American mahjar was a stint in 
New York City between 1899 and 1909 as the editor of the literary magazine al-Jamiʿa. After 
the serial folded in 1906, Antun left America, ultimately settling in Alexandria where he 
contributed to Cairo's al-Ahram and became an important public intellectual.654 Antun's first love 
was theater, and he wrote plays like Sultan Saladin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, where he 
engaged reformist themes and championed an Eastern cultural identity conversant with (but not 
subservient to) Western-style modernity.655  
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 The brothers at al-Nadi al-Homsi saw their group as putting Antun's philosophies into 
practice, and on 28 October 1922, they put together a day of speeches and poetry recitation in 
Farah Antun's memory.656 Khalil Saʿadih , founder of the pan-Syrian Hizb al-Watani al-Suri and 
Farah Antun's former colleague at Beirut’s Syrian Protestant College, gave the eulogy.657 Saʿadih  
described Antun as the Eastern Man par excellence, who in ceaseless intellectual pursuit 
(quwwat al-tafkīr) struggled against darkness, tyranny, and religious extremism. He was a part of 
an “intellectual revolution,” (thawra fikriyya) that would bring Syria “into the light, and from the 
light to the Sun” (ilā al-nūr wa-min al-nūr ilā al-ḥarāra).658 Saʿadih  painted a Manichean image 
of the Syrian world divided between the forces of light and darkness; his congregants in al-Nadi 
al-Homsi represented a force for enlightenment and the “union of all Eastern peoples” who stood 
opposite the dark forces of ignorance and oppression under the “Western yoke” (nīr al-gharb).659 
 Saʿadih  placed Farah Antun's memory among those other “martyrs of the pen” (shuhadāʾ 
al-āqlam) from nineteenth century nahda: Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Shibli Shumayyil, and Jirji Zaydan, 
as well as those “martyrs of the nation” (shuhadāʾ al-watan) executed during World War I.660 He 
pressed al-Nadi al-Homsi to follow the examples of great men “those who burn themselves up to 
light the way for the nation,” equating the fraternity's quest for knowledge with the nationalist 
political pursuit.661 He closed the eulogy with a challenge, directed at the four hundred men and 
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youths present that day: “if there remains any strength in the conquerors of Syria, let it be for this 
holy obligation. Who in the São Paulo colony will shout out like roaring thunder? Who will 
make the needed sacrifice to fulfill his patriotic prophecy, for something much greater than 
himself, for the cause of his fellow citizen (muwāṭinihi)?”662 Saʿadih 's “holy obligation” referred 
to the Syrian colony's responsibility to develop their community, society, and nation; to his mind, 
the most beneficial way to do this was though the mahjar's fraternities, which he linked to 
enlightenment ideas and secular political progress.663 Saʿadih  invoked both the masculinity and 
piety of his audience: Farah Antun was the Eastern Man, and his manliness was as important as 
his Eastern identity. 
 Holding funerals at al-Nadi al-Homsi was important for several reasons. First, such 
services gathered São Paulo's Syrian community in a new public space to celebrate and distill 
meaning from the lives of its cultural icons. Saʿadih 's eulogy demonstrates that patriotism, 
liberation, and the nahda's revivalist spirit provided recognizable signposts rooted in unity, 
secularism, and an authentic Syrian modernity. Similarly, at these events speakers sketched out 
the masculine ideal centered on cosmopolitan worldliness, a reverence for Syrian literary culture, 
and a project to enlighten the Syrian people, characteristics that al-Nadi al-Homsi tied to political 
liberation. Finally, such events cemented the club's place at the center of the colony's social life. 
By leading the community in grief, the Nadi also accepted the mantle of social leadership. 
  Through the provision of meaningful social services, al-Nadi al-Homsi rooted itself 
firmly within a transnational community of Syrians. The fraternity's members saw themselves as 
agents of modernizing social change within a patriotic milieu. At the same time, the Nadi also 
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viewed young men as objects for social reform, and the club's fellowship was built on a rigorous 
schedule of philanthropy, intellectual cultivation, and corporeal discipline through sport. The 
image of Syrian men as self-possessed, sovereign, and strong patriarchs depended on their 
training early in life; the Nadi saw this training as the most important part of its work in Brazil. 
Charity and Children: al-Nadi al-Homsi's Orphanages and Ihsan as Patriotic Duty 
Philanthropy comprised al-Nadi al-Homsi’s first pillar. As stewards to the community, 
members donated resources and time to maintaining the clubhouse, volunteering at Nadi events, 
and providing gifts to the poor. This work was in many ways a continuation of larger Middle 
Eastern social processes. In Managing Egypt's Poor, for example, Mine Ener argued that the 
Egyptian state's nineteenth century retreat from poor provisioning produced a “philanthropy 
gap,” which prompted Arab elites to create private charities and mutual aid societies. By the 
1920s, these charities served the Egyptian nationalist movement with space for “managing” 
poverty, often while competing with the colonial administration over who was best suited to care 
for Egypt's poor.664 A “politics of benevolence” appeared, creating hierarchies of worthiness and 
bringing new focus to ameliorating the suffering of the nation's most vulnerable members.665 
Ener illustrates this most clearly when discussing the 1919 Revolution, which she argues brought 
new emphasis to the plight of impoverished children as the symbols of an emerging Egyptian 
nation.666 
 With its private endowment, connection to an emerging Syrian bourgeoisie, and its 
preoccupation with youth development, the al-Nadi al-Homsi resembled Ener's philanthropic 
societies in Cairo. Furthermore, this club operated on the principles of mutual aid, collective 
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decision-making, and good works done in the name of ihsan (benevolence).667 It appealed to a 
transnational Syrian public with the languages of honor and patriotic duty to encourage young 
men to participate, placing such obligations within a “discourse of responsibility and shame” cast 
increasingly in secular terms. And in the early 1920s, the Nadi placed a special emphasis on care-
giving for the colony's most worthy poor: young Syrian orphans who populated the darker 
corners of the Syrian diaspora. al-Nadi al-Homsi helped found two large orphanages; the first, 
called Dar al-ʾAytam al-Suriyya, opened in São Paulo in 1923. The second, al-Maytam al-
ʾUrthudhoksi, opened in Homs the following year. Although each orphanage operated within 
local sets of context that were in many ways distinct, they shared a common mission that 
transformed Syrian children (and especially boys) into objects of national reform, casting them 
as the future liberators of French-occupied Syria. 
 In São Paulo, the Dar al-ʾAytam al-Suriyya's creation resolved some practical issues 
regarding the provision of social welfare in the Syrian community. Most of the Syrians living of 
São Paulo lacked Brazilian citizenship and had limited access to Brazilian public educational, 
medical, or welfare services.668 Typically, Syrian immigrants tightly clustered in neighborhoods 
like that on Rua 25 de Março, where they founded their own schools, hospitals, banks, and 
philanthropic institutions.669 Such a situation offered opportunities to the mahjar’s rising elite to 
build up the community's social infrastructure and ultimately promoted ongoing networks of 
philanthropy between the mahjar and its homeland. Indeed, philanthropic assistance flowed in all 
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directions across this transnational space: Khalil Saʿadih  and Salwa Salameh Atlas opened 
Syrian primary schools in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile while simultaneously raising funds for a 
new hospital in Homs, for example.670 When the Brazilian government refused to admit a 
destitute Syrian child into São Paulo's municipal orphanage, the Syrians community relied 
instead on its own philanthropic networks, collecting donations for a private orphanage from 
Syrians living in Argentina, 
Chile, the United States, as 
well as Beirut, Hasbaya, 
Zahle, and Homs.671  
 The largest source of 
funding for the São Paulo 
orphanage came not from 
the mahjar but from the 
homeland: Orthodox 
Bishop Athanasius ʿAtallah provided the Dar al-ʾAytam al-Suriyya's original endowment, 
entrusting it to local businessman Bishara Mahradawi, who served as the orphanage's resident 
director.672 Be that as it may, the orphanage’s budget was extremely limited, and the institution 
depended on around-the-clock volunteer labor. To this end, al-Nadi al-Homsi dedicated 
manpower to the initiative. Relying on a Syrian discourse of self-assistance, communal 
                                                          
670 Saʿadih  opened al-Madrassa al-Suriyya in Buenos Aires in 1915, “Hafla Khariji al-Madrassa al-Suriyya,” al-
Majalla 13, no. 13 (December 1915), 377; Salwa Atlas opened a similar school in São Paulo in 1914, Jurj Atlas, 
“ Haflat Tadshin al-Karma,” al-Karma July 1914, 90-1;  Salwa Salameh Atlas, “al-Mustashfa fi-Homs,” al-Karma 
January 1927, 20. 
671 Nazir Zaytun, Fi-Dhurwat al-Wataniyya wa-l-Insaniyya: al-Maytam al-Suri fi-San Bawlu fi-Mahrajanihi al-
Dhahabi (Damascus: Matabiʿ ibn Zaydun, 1958), 6. 
672 ʿAtallah, Yawmiyyat Mutran Homs, 145. 
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responsibility, and good works as a patriotic virtue (references to honor which “made the 
colony's heart leap from its chest” according to member Nazir Zaytun), al-Nadi al-Homsi called 
on local Syrians to donate their time in the name of the homeland, honor, and ihsan. A corps of 
Syrian volunteers built the boarding house on some farmland that Mahradawi had purchased. 
Nazir Zaytun, present at the construction site, recalled, “the people were amazed at their self-
realization; was all of this great work from their own hands?”673 Five children moved in, and 
they were provided with safe lodging, good food, and a secular education. Jurj Atlas' wife, 
Salwa, provided lessons, and al-Nadi al-Homsi provided grounds-keeping, cooking, tutoring, and 
physical education.  
 The Brazilian Dar al-ʾAytam proved a success, and in 1926 Mahradawi enlarged the 
structure to incorporate full-size classrooms and a recreational yard for its growing population.674 
A day school operated in conjunction with the boarding house, and residents attended classes in 
Arabic and Portuguese languages, writing, recitation, mathematics, and the scienceswith Syrian 
children from the neighborhood, all free of charge. Students also took classes in Arabic poetry 
(qasaʾid), music, and nationalist history and sciences (al-qawmiyyat). Beyond the classroom, 
resident children had daily chores and were expected to help out with cooking, cleaning, and 
tending to the local Orthodox Church during its services.675 When these duties were completed, 
visitors from al-Nadi al-Homsi provided extracurriculars: a sports program, guided poetry 
readings, and a theater club. The children reenacted the classics as well as patriotic plays directed 
by playwright and al-Nadi al-Homsi member Daud Qostantine al-Khuri. The children 
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occasionally presented al-Khuri's originals, the most popular of which featured the wily Karagöz, 
a character borrowed from Syrian shadow puppetry.676 
 Although al-Nadi al-Homsi provided the Dar al-ʾAytam's volunteer workforce, in many 
ways the orphanage remained a transnational project with ties running across the mahjar. Bishara 
Mahradawi made regular visits to Homs, Beirut, Hasbaya, and Zahle seeking donations for the 
orphanage, and as the 1920s wore on he solicited from not only Orthodox and Protestant donors 
but also from Maronites, another community with numerous emigrants in Brazil.677 Similarly, the 
Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya of Homs sent annual payments to Brazil for the building's 
upkeep.678 Meanwhile, al-Nadi al-Homsi drew up plans for their second orphanage to be built in 
Homs, al-Maytam al-ʾUrthudhoksi. They submitted building blueprints, curricular information, 
and a small collection of books printed in São Paulo toʿIsa Asʿad in Homs.  Asʿad coordinated 
with the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-
Adabiyya of Homs to build the 
second orphanage, Dar al-Aytam 
al-Suri's twin, in Homs' Hamidiyya 
district. It opened its doors on 25 
March 1924, a date selected in 
commemoration to the donors 
living on Rua 25 de Março.679 
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 Homs’ al-Maytam al-ʾUrthudhoksi took in fifteen boys in 1924, expanding to twenty-five 
the following year.680 Most of these boys lost their families during the instability of World War I 
and the short-lived Faysal Period, a “string of disasters” that al-Nadi al-Homsi member Daud 
Qostantine al-Khuri said “left their sad effects, one of which is the orphans remaining in the land, 
whose number is not small and who have no home.”681 Orphaned by war, famine, and foreign 
occupation, these orphans were living symbols of Syria's political situation. As both a priest and 
a nationalist, ʿIsa Asʿad sought to not only save the children from a life of idleness, crime, and 
privation; by raising them into competent men and patriots, he reckoned the Maytam could 
liberate Syrian society as a whole. In Homs newspaper, Asʿad explained that a people “cannot be 
free when (they are) afflicted by illness, ignorance, orphaned, or until they are liberated from 
their sins. The way to beneficence is difficult, as is that of society's betterment.”682 As vulnerable 
symbols of a nation under threat, Asʿad argued that children were most worthy of charity, “a 
child has a heart that beats and a brain that thinks, but neither grows without sustenance. Neither 
develops without nurturing.”683 Asʿad framed the Maytam's work in a pious and patriotic light, 
and he emphasized the ways that assisting Homs' lost children served elite Syrians with a way to 
atone for both personal sins and a lost vision of the nation. Volunteering at the Maytam, or 
donating resources in its name, would help Syria heal. As for the boys, they were to learn 
patriotic values, receive vocational training, and gain access to the fellowship of the Jamʿiyyat 
al-Rabita al-Adabiyya. For Asʿad, Homs' orphans had already made greater sacrifices than most 
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for the Syrian national movement; with training and beneficence, he promised “they will also, 
God willing, be this nation's future.”684 
 Meanwhile, in Brazil the al-Nadi al-Homsi labored to sustain both orphanages through 
fund-raising, volunteering, and material donations. Its members in Brazil maintained a lively 
public correspondence with the Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya in Homs on the aims and merits 
of Syrian philanthropy; this discussion was published in Homs newspaper for consumption by a 
transnational reading public. Playwright, Homs columnist, and Jamʿiyyat al-Rabita al-Adabiyya 
member Daud Qostantine al-Khuri wrote to al-Nadi al-Homsi so frequently that he was dubbed 
an honorary member in 1924 and elected al-Nadi al-Homsi 's president in 1925, a year before he 
actually emigrated to Brazil.685 After his relocation, al-Khuri continued to submit monthly letters 
to Homs newspaper, eliciting discussions about piety, patriotism, and philanthropy between 
Syrians living around the mahjar. Beyond the practical demands of philanthropic activism, 
nurturing intellectual links across the transnational Syrian world remained important for 
symbolic reasons: ʿIsa Asʿad not only compared the experience of diaspora to the hardships of 
being orphaned, he also blamed French imperial rule for deliberately “partitioning brother from 
brother, and cutting fathers from sons,” especially in the context of partitioning Lebanon from 
Syria. To Asʿad, the Mandate system was designed to create more Syrian orphans, both 
metaphorically and practically.686 Therefore, as orphans became a symbol for the Syrian national 
community, caring for orphans served that community with a concrete means of repudiating the 
Mandate while building an image of Syrian masculinity rooted in piety and strength. 
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 Whether in Homs or abroad, orphaned children became objects of Syrian social reform 
discourse during the 1920s. In Brazil’s Syrian press, writers often drew analogies between the 
beleaguered homeland and the plight of young orphans. In the Atlas' magazine, al-Karma, young 
writers told the nation's story through an orphan's pain and 
redemption. In January 1927, for example, Salwa Atlas published 
four full-page images of crying boys, asking her young readers to 
submit captions narrating each boy's story.687 Young men from 
al-Nadi al-Homsi and around the Syrian colony responded, and 
the captions were printed the following March.  
 The respondents described some of the basic hardships of 
life in the mahjar, for example, “this boy cries because his mother 
took fancy buttons from her kasheh and gave them to his 
sister.”688 Others explained, “he cries because his parents have 
returned from the homeland, and he's forgotten his Arabic,” or “because he cannot understand his 
grandparents.” Statements about linguistic displacement dramatize the commonplace sense of 
isolation and generational change that drove a wedge between first-generation Syrian immigrants 
and their Brazilian-born youngsters. But in 1927, the most numerous responses were political 
explanations linking orphaned children to French-occupied Syria: “he cries because his father is 
absent, has gone to assist the devastated in the homeland (al-mankūbīn fi-l-waṭan),”689 or 
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“because his parents have forsaken him,” and most clearly, “because he sees São Paulo's orphans 
in the [Dar al-Aytam] al-Suri, and he fears he might (also) become one.”690 
 While the Dar al-ʾAytam al-Suri in Brazil was coed and admitted Christian children from 
the Orthodox, Protestant, and Maronite communities, its branch in Homs took in Greek Orthodox 
boys only. In the Brazilian mahjar, the breaking of social barriers between sects and the sexes 
infused with the colony's politics of modernity. al-Nadi al-Homsi itself publicly emphasized the 
multi-confessional nature of its membership, although in reality its membership remained 
predominantly Greek Orthodox and Syrian Protestant.691 In Homs, however, boundaries between 
the sexes remained fast. Regardless of their actual makeup, however, both orphanages cultivated 
a public image that remained unambiguously male. In the Syrian press writers made only brief 
references to the Dar al-ʾAytam's female residents. Photos, stories, and descriptions of the 
orphanages focused wholly on boys, stressing their vulnerability but also their reform through 
education. Their degree of visibility and intensive grooming for national service confirmed 
expectations that theirs would be a lifetime of public and patriotic work. 
“Sound Minds in Sound Bodies:” Intellectual Refinement and Corporeal Discipline 
In both Homs and São Paulo, orphaned boys became symbols of Syria's troubled present 
and imperiled future. But the provision of an authentically Syrian political education could 
transform them into capable, self-determined citizens. Orphanages constituted only one aspect of 
al-Nadi al-Homsi's project, however; the fraternity also helped to found secondary schools, 
colleges, and vocational training centers across Syria.692 Borrowing from a nineteenth century 
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vision of education as the force for a non-sectarian Syrian modernity (a vision which owed much 
to the nahda and the pedagogical ideas of Butrus al-Bustani),693 al-Nadi al-Homsi brought 
secular “national” education beyond the classroom, into public lecture halls, social parlors, and 
popular festivals in São Paulo. Founder Jurj Atlas believed popular education and intellectual 
pursuit (al-jihād al-ʿaqlī) would forge young Syrian men into the “enlightened class” (al-ṭabaqa 
al-mutanawwira) needed to restructure Syrian society and continue the struggle for 
independence.694  
Pedagogy remained one of al-Nadi al-Homsi’s foremost interests during the 1920s. This 
faith in national education as a modernizing force derives from the background of the club’s 
founders. Jurj Atlas had been educated in American Protestant schools, but several more 
members attended the Kulliyyat Homs al-Wataniyya, a “national school” established in Homs by 
Protestant convert Hanna Khabbaz in 1908.695 Before the War, Khabbaz had opened his school 
to Syrian students of all classes, sects, and backgrounds, and his curricula emphasized secular 
patriotism, instruction in Arabic, and Syrian political unity.696 He was exiled for his efforts in 
1914, but in 1922 he returned to Syria, reopened the school and toured the mahjar lecturing on 
the importance of compulsory Syrian national education to combat foreign political domination. 
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 When Hanna Khabbaz arrived in São Paulo in 1922, he toured al-Nadi al-Homsi and was 
greeted there by his former students, Nadi members Nazir Zaytun and Husni Gharrab. That 
evening he delivered a lecture on anti-colonial pedagogy; over 1,000 Syrians coming from across 
South America attended. Khabbaz cast the objective of learning in terms of national sovereignty. 
Khabbaz's concept of education stressed cultivation of all human faculties together, placing equal 
emphasis on reason, logic, literary capacities, and physical education among young Syrian men. 
According to Khabbaz, what distinguished this approach from older, traditional Syrian pedagogy 
was its emphasis on unity and balance. He explained that the brain was divided into several 
sections, which mirrored Syria's division into spheres of colonial influence (mināṭiq al-nufūdh). 
Because traditional education sought to develop aptitude in the religious sciences at the expense 
of technical skills or a broader Syrian patriotism, Syrian minds had become as fragmented as the 
Syrian homeland. There was no mystery in it for Khabbaz: the nation's schools played right into 
imperialism, turning out students intellectually incapable of self-determination along a national 
model.697 The French exploited this handicap capably, partitioning bilad al-sham, manipulating 
Syria's religious diversity to foster social divisions, and importing French educational models to 
deplete Syrian minds of their sense of history and national destiny. A new pedagogy was needed, 
authentic and indigenous but simultaneously patriotic and technocratic. For Khabbaz, a 
successful struggle against imperialism depended wholly on the ability of colonized men to 
educate themselves.698 
 Khabbaz offered a two-point solution to the problem. First, he argued that Syrians must 
assert educational sovereignty at home, founding national schools with modern curricula and 
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Arabic-language instruction. Courses must teach practical vocational skills, civics, and patriotic 
values to craft the Syrian people into a community with like goals and aspirations. Similarly, for 
Khabbaz the best way to create a patriotic culture in the schoolyard was through the preservation 
of Syria's authentic “eternal knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-khālid): those great Syrian contributions to 
world civilization, among them mathematics, the medical sciences, and Arabic poetry (qasīḍāt 
and zajal).699 Honoring Syrian history and culture went hand in hand with asserting curricular 
sovereignty, and through Arabic language instruction, national schools would work for public 
good (al-maṣlaḥa al-umumiyya) until Independence was possible.700 
 Khabbaz's audience at al-Nadi al-Homsi applauded this approach to education, funding a 
scholarship program at the Kulliyyat Homs al-Wataniyya for impoverished students.701 This 
began a tradition of diasporic subsidies for Syria's national schools; in 1929, for example, al-
Nadi al-Homsi opened its own college in Homs, dedicating it to Syrian National Bloc leader 
Hashim al-ʾAtassi.702 But back in São Paulo, schoolhouses remained only one of many sites for a 
patriotic education. When the clubhouse was not used for festivals, funerals, or lectures, it served 
as a library for young men with literary or political ambitions. Outlined in its founding charter, 
the Nadi allocated an annual endowment for the collection of historical, literary, and scientific 
texts in Arabic, Portuguese, French, and English for a community library within its walls.703 The 
club brokered deals with the colony's Arabic language presses, specifically the Atlas' al-Karma, 
Rashid ʿAtieh's political daily Fatat Lubnan,704 and later, the printing house Dar al-Tibaʿa wa-l-
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Nashr al-ʿArabiyya owned by al-Nadi al-Homsi members Jubran and Jurj Bunduqi.705 Each 
submitted copies of their materials to the Nadi's collection, and in 1923, the director of the 
library project, Mikhaʾil Maluhi, reported to Homs newspaper that Maktabat al-Nadi al-Homsi 
had become “the single largest such collection in Brazil” growing at a pace of 1,000 texts 
annually.706 Shakib Jarrab, then Nadi president, described the library as an integral part of the 
club's “national duty,” which would abet the enlightenment of Syrians abroad and assist them in 
“the pursuit of all that is fitting of the name 'Homsi.'”707 
 The Maktabat al-Nadi al-Homsi became a place of refuge for an emerging intellectual 
movement in Brazil, with political philosophy and poetry being the favored media. Member 
Nazir Zaytun translated the works of Maxim Gorky, focusing particularly on Gorky's theological 
ideas which he republished in a volume called Where is God?708 Meanwhile his colleagues Daud 
and Rashid Shakkur wrote a nationalist history of bilad al-sham for use in the local Syrian 
colony, called East and West. The volume pinpointed Syria's origins between the Phoenician the 
biblical eras, and emphasized Syrian contributions to Western history, religion, and society. By 
reteaching “the enlightened Arab youth” the greatness of their past, the Shakkur brothers hoped 
to create the type of national solidarities needed for Syrians to “break the yoke of imperialism, 
and extract themselves from bondage” through a recognition of their political culture.709  
 Although philosophy was the Nadi's primary concern, the group became even more 
famous for its poetry. Husni Gharrab, Ilyas Farhat, Shafiq ʿAoun, Anis Jaoquim al-Rasi, and 
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Musa Kuraiem attended the Club regularly, where they recited zajal, the Syrian lyrical style then 
in vogue.710 The Nadi also invited Brazil's most famous poets--Fawzi and Michel Maʿluf, and 
Rashid al-Khuri (famously known as al-Shāʾir al-Qarāwī) to share their work with the group. By 
the late 1920s, al-Nadi al-Homsi's patriotic poetry was widely celebrated across South America, 
as well as in Syria and Lebanon. In 1932, the group formed a formal literary society called al-
ʿUsba al-Andalusiyya (the Andalucian League) and established a literary monthly, al-ʿUsba, to 
showcase the group's work.711 
 al-Nadi al-Homsi offered intellectual amenities that made it unique in the Syrian mahjar. 
The mind’s refinement, however, was paired with the body’s discipline. The fraternity 
emphasized physical fitness as the final pillar of a complete Syrian manhood, and physical 
strength was openly equated with moral fortitude and political sovereignty. “It is commonly said 
that 'a sound mind (rests) in a sound body' (al-ʿaql al-salīm fi-l-jism al-salīm) because the 
security of the whole ensures that of all parts,” Jurj Atlas wrote in 1914, “the mind is merely one 
part of that whole totality.”712 In an article explaining the moral benefits of sports, Atlas argued 
that in addition to preventing bodily decay (al-inḥiṭāṭ al-jasadī), physical education underwrote a 
manly sense of honor to complement an active mind. Physical education, which Atlas 
alternatively called al-riyāḍa al-jasadiyya and al-riyāḍa al-badaniyya, was as crucial to the 
project of making new Syrian men as fluency in Arabic, philanthropic values, and a patriotic 
worldview.713 Atlas emphasized team sports like soccer and basketball because both games 
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required cooperation. He linked the ability to compete as part of a team directly to a boy's 
transition into manhood; mere boys play, but when they meet in competition, they rise above 
themselves and struggle collectively. Atlas contrasted such images of honorable homosocial 
interaction against the disreputable aimlessness of the Brazilian nightclub, a space where he 
argued too many Syrian youths wasted their time. Atlas made a strong connection between 
sporting culture and political liberation: successful nations present a class of men, an “an 
enlightened class amidst ignorance” cooperating as a team on the world stage, whereas colonized 
peoples seek only their own small ends at the expense of the whole.714 
 By the 1920s, São Paulo's Syrian colony already had a small collection of sports clubs, 
the most popular of which was the Nadi al-Riyadi al-Suri, originally endowed by cotton mogul 
and industrialist Nami Jafet in 1917.715 al-Nadi al-Homsi formed an affiliation the Nadi al-Riyadi 
al-Suri, and urged its members to join either its soccer or basketball program. Men who joined 
would meet other Syrians and Brazilians of Portuguese, Italian, and German descent on the 
courts.716 A common masculine culture of sportsmanship, fair play, and a valuation of the male 
body as a national symbol emerged in this context. In the words of Nadi al-Riyadi president Faris 
Dabaghi, sports ensured that Syrian bodies, like Syrian minds, would become “strong like steel” 
(qawī ka-l-ḥadīd).717 
 More than any other space in the Syrian colony, sports clubs allowed for social mixing 
between Syrian men and other immigrant groups living in São Paulo. In an interview with Betty 
Loeb Greiber, Lily Saʾigh Hashim reported that during her youth in the late 1920s, the Nadi al-
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Riyadi al-Suri's biggest rivalry was with the local German Club. This rivalry was fueled in part 
by the fact that the German Club encouraged Syrian players to join their side, as Lily's brother 
Richard did in 1924.718 While soccer had long been a popular pastime both in Brazil and among 
Syrians and Lebanese, the inclusion of basketball raises more questions. An American sport, it is 
known that American missionary schools in the Mashriq introduced basketball in their sports 
programs; Lily Hashim recalled that her father Fadlallah preferred basketball to soccer, having 
played for the Syrian Protestant College before coming to Brazil.719 In 1930, basketball had 
caught on in São Paulo; of the Nadi al-Riyadi al-Suri's five hundred members, one-third 
participated in the basketball program.720 
 Although the Nadi al-Riyadi al-Suri built up the nation's physique, the group publicly 
denied its role in Syrian and Lebanese politics, claiming instead (as al-Nadi al-Homsi did) to 
have a cross-sectarian membership from all sides of the political spectrum. However, in reality 
the Nadi al-Riyadi al-Suri was broadly associated with pan-Syrian territorial nationalism, and 
particularly the pan-Syrian Hizb al-Watani al-Suri then under Khalil Saʿadih . The club's 
political affiliations sometimes brought controversy, for example in 1925 when many of its 
number supported the Great Syrian Revolt against the French, provoking conflict with local 
Lebanese Christians then supportive of the Mandate. That said, Hizb al-Watani al-Suri's support 
for the sports club lay in Saʿadih 's belief that sports mimicked politics and fostered patriotic 
solidarity. In May 1926, Khalil's son, Antun, offered a speech at the club's annual reception. He 
remarked that the building of sound bodies and free minds must precede the Syrian people’s 
liberation, and he praised the Syrian men of São Paulo for developing their “physical and 
                                                          
718 Betty Loeb Greiber, Lina Saigh Maluf, and Vera Cattini Mattar, “Lily Saigh Hachem e Emelie Saigh Calfet,” in 
Memórias da imigraçao: libaneses e sírios em são paulo (São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 1998), 50-1. 
719 Grieber, Maluf, and Mattar, “Lily Saigh Hachem,” Memórias da imigraçao, 39, 50. 
720 Atlas and Dabaghi, “al-Riyada,” al-Karma July 1931, 53. 
271 
 
intellectual strengths together” (al-qawa al-mādiyya wa-l-qawa al-ʿaqliyya maʿan).721 Four years 
later, Hizb al-Watani al-Suri president Faris Dabaghi argued that “in playing sports one finds the 
importance of national life (hayat al-umma). What the Nadi al-Riyadi achieves in advancing the 
Syrian name, it similarly seeks to build strength among the players as a unit, influencing our 
society. (Our team) is like all of the masses, eager for victories,” both on the field and off.722 
 São Paulo's Syrian community did not limit their interest to team sports alone. Body 
building, weight lifting, and the appreciation of the male physique also became a fad closely 
related to feelings of anti-colonial nationalism. In the late 1920s, Syrian bodybuilder ʿAbd al-
Rahman al-Jizawi, or al-baṭal (the champion) as he was locally called, toured South America in 
power-lifting competitions, leaving his home in Santiago, Chile, where he had lived since 1924 
(See Image 4). When al-Jizawi arrived in Buenos Aires, the city's Arab nationalist newspaper al-
Islah ran a feature on him, positing him as the model of masculine strength and soundness of 
mind. The article gave his biography, emphasizing that he was highly educated, with advanced 
degrees from both Lebanon and Germany. al-Jizawi was fluent in Spanish, French, and German 
in addition to Arabic, and before becoming a body-builder he had struck success as a merchant in 
Chile. All of this at only twenty-five years old, concluded al-Islah reporter Nasim Khayrallah. 
For Khayrallah, al-Jizawi's youth, paired with his well-formed balance between intellect and 
physique, made him an ideal role model for Syrian youth in the mahjar. As al-baṭal trounced 
dozens of competitors in tournaments in Santiago, Buenos Aires, and São Paulo, Khayrallah 
noted the lifter’s serene air and dignified self-possession which he argued presaged true personal 
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sovereignty. Khayrallah drew clear associations between al-Jizawi's physical strength, his mind's 
clarity, and the physique of the nation.723  
 Two years later, al-Jizawi visited São Paulo, where he arrived at al-Nadi al-Homsi for an 
interview with Jurj Atlas' son, Julio. Julio Atlas has followed his father's footsteps: a lifetime 
member of al-Nadi al-Homsi, he had assumed chief editorship of al-Karma in 1930. Sitting 
down with al-baṭal in 1931, Julio clearly saw al-Jizawi as the exemplary Syrian patriot, saying, 
“tomorrow is our generation's age of strength, for we do not bind our political pillars save by 
strength, and we cannot win our political goals but with strength. And this strength, these 
strongmen, (they) show us and the world the ideal way of life.”724 He detailed al-Jizawi’s 
characteristics: his broad shoulders, and deep brown complexion. At 5'9”, the lifter's average 
stature concealed his strength: al-Jizawi boasted that he could carry 1,000 kilograms on his head. 
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But what also interested Julio Atlas was al-Jizawi's intelligent eyes and “electric wit.”725 In the 
Syrian cult of the body, admiration for the physical form was nearly always accompanied by a 
discussion of intellectual prowess. 
 Al-Jizawi told Julio Atlas that he had fancied bodybuilding since his boyhood in Syria, 
concluding that weightlifting “took him home” in a metaphorical sense. This piqued Julio's 
political sensibilities, prompting him to ask whether reconnection with Syria was al-Jizawi's 
political goal. Julio's assumption missed its mark, however, and al-Jizawi insisted that sports 
brought him back to his childhood, and not to a mythic national past or any political agenda. 
Undeterred, Atlas pressed al-Jizawi on his politics further, a decision that was clearly 
unappreciated; Julio admitted that at that point, “the words between us ran out” and the pair fell 
into charged, awkward silence.726 This interview dramatizes the expectations Julio Atlas placed 
upon al-baṭal, demonstrating that the politicization of male bodies often began with the audience 
rather than with participants themselves. So closely was Syrian sporting culture infused with the 
politics of nationalism that, regardless of his own motivations, al-Jizawi had to confront such 
assumptions regularly. 
Although misplaced in this instance, Julio Atlas' expectation that sports mimic politics 
was a common one. al-Nadi al-Homsi members frequently invoked sports in political ways, 
especially in the context of a young man's realization (or reclamation) of his social rank within 
the nation. Indeed, just weeks after Julio's interview with al-Jizawi, the famous poet Rashid al-
Khuri spoke on the topic at the clubhouse, proclaiming that the importance of sports laid 
primarily in teaching young men to accept social rank. “Trader and writer, poor and rich, strong 
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and weak alike... have their obligatory work” on the field and in the nation. While the 
enlightened man knows each role is of equal worth, al-Khuri argued that a man's strength is in 
finding (and knowing) his place within that organic political order. Dividing the Syrian 
community into “bodies tired from practice and toil” and “minds exhausted by hope,” al-Khuri 
concluded that Syria's “true athletes” were those who joined efforts, striving and struggling 
together off field, in the realm of patriotic politics.727 
Conclusions 
As a fraternal organization, São Paulo’s al-Nadi al-Homsi stressed philanthropy, 
education, and physical discipline as the highest callings of the young male patriot. Each 
characteristic built on the others, forging an organic whole that would transform Syrian political 
society, creating an empowered generation of Syrian men ready for the challenges of a modern, 
civics-minded citizenship. These men provided social services, invested in philanthropic 
infrastructure, and strove for intellectual and physical self-improvement. Each of these endeavors 
was tied to al-Nadi al-Homsi 's belief that national sovereignty and self-determination started 
with the construction of an authentic national culture, albeit one with significant transnational 
dimensions. 
 The density of the institutional networks laid out above, and the continuous circulation of 
people, money, printed materials, and ideas between Homs and São Paulo underscored the extent 
to which Syrians in the interwar period lived transnational lives, whether migrants or not. Bishop 
Athanasius ʿAtallah and ʿIsa Asʿad founded al-Nadi al-Homsi from afar, collaborating with 
Syrian emigrant “colonists” in a long-distance nationalist project. ʿAtallah's Homs newspaper 
was printed in Syria on a press from Brazil; half of Homs' readership resided in Brazil, and the 
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paper's chief editor (Daud Qostantine al-Khuri) was elected al-Nadi al-Homsi 's president 
months before his arrival in São Paulo. Hanna Khabbaz's national school in Homs, the Kulliyat 
Homs al-Wataniyya depended on funding raised in al-Nadi al-Homsi 's clubhouse. Homs' 
Orthodox orphanage was built on blueprints drawn by Syrian hands in São Paulo.  
 In sum, al-Nadi al-Homsi 's philanthropic works tied Syria to São Paulo, the Mashriq to 
the Mahjar. The club promoted a transnational patriotic masculinity to be shared by Syrians 
living in both places, leading to a degree of transnationalization of Homs itself. Piecing together 
the fragments of al-Nadi al-Homsi 's early records, event ephemera, and the publications of its 
founders, this chapter has attempted to show how a tightly-bound network of emigrant activists 
strove to make Syrian men. In doing so, these activists influenced patterns of philanthropy, 
education, and male sociability not only in the mahjar, but also in the homeland. These mahjari 
influences can be successfully written back into Syrian social history if historians think about the 
diaspora the same way Bishop Athanasius ʿAtallah did: as a source of moral, fiscal, and political 
support, as a culturally fecund human network capable of contributing to Syrian advancement, 





CHAPTER 6: LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM: 
SYRIAN WORKING WOMEN OF NEW YORK BETWEEN TWO MOVEMENTS 
 
 On a Thursday evening in March 1918, some two dozen women arrived at the home of 
Mrs. Saʿada ʿAbd al-Nur in South Boston. Two generations of Syrian women gathered around 
small tables crowded with Syrian sweets and hot tea: older women who had emigrated from 
Syria in the 1890s and early 1900s, and their American born daughters growing up in New York 
City, Lowell, or Boston. Many had been accompanied to ʿAbd al-Nur’s home by male relatives, 
but they were promptly excused to a waiting area, and the meeting of the Syrian Ladies Aid 
Society of Boston came to order. The organization, founded by congregants of the local St. 
George’s Greek Orthodox Church, operated as a local satellite for a larger women’s philanthropic 
movement centered on the Syrian colony in New York. Its objectives were to provide shelter, 
relief, education, and fellowship to needy Syrian women and girls in the mahjar; the group 
additionally raised monies to remit to female-run charities in Syria. Between the 1890s and 1914, 
women’s groups like the Syrian Ladies Aid Society operated side-by-side with political 
fraternities, maintaining similar patterns of transnational philanthropy but otherwise entirely 
independent from men’s groups. Growing out of the principles of mutual aid, early Syrian 
women’s groups raised informal cash donations moved through female channels, collected from 
the sale of baked goods, homemade clothing, or their wages in the textile mills.The $17.65 
collected on that March day was destined for Syrian American women and girls who needed 
evaporated milk, subsidies for heating oil or rent, or warm clothing for the dragging New 
England winter.  
 But with the rise of the nationalist movements in the mahjar after 1916, a confrontation 
was coming; for the Syrian Ladies Aid chapter in Boston, it was this March 1918 evening, for in 
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the hallway stood one Yusuf Touma, a delegate from a political committee in New York, the 
Lajnat Tahrir Suriya wa-Lubnan [Syrian-Lebanese League of Liberation] led by Ayyub Tabet 
(see Chapter 2).728 Representing the devastated Syrians in the homeland as well as the Syrian 
nationalist movement, Touma had come for the contents of the Ladies Aid’s treasury. Touma was 
not the first male visitor to the women’s club, but his appeal – that Syrians in the homeland 
needed immediate cash relief, and that the duties of patriotism trumped the goals of a local 
women's charity – introduced a new hierarchy of worthiness that troubled the women present at 
the meeting greatly.729 Touma argued that his committee, the Lajnat Tahrir in New York, was 
best equipped to safely funnel cash to the homeland, and he sought money from the women’s 
group not in the name of their sex but that of the nation at large. The club’s secretary, a young 
textile worker named Hannah Sabbagh, recorded the proceedings in the society’s records but was 
unimpressed with Touma’s nationalist exhortations. In a tense moment, she asked why her group, 
devoted to assisting impoverished and deprived women in the mahjar, should invest in what 
sounded to her like a political project, “this is not a political party (like yours); it is a 
philanthropic organization with pious aims.” Many other young women in the room nodded in 
assent. Touma shot back, with an air of provocative urgency, “and what is your society's purpose 
if not that of Syria?”730 
Invoking a woman's patriotic duty to the homeland, Touma’s rhetoric struck the Society's 
older members, many of who grew up in Ottoman Syria and had already lost relatives to the War. 
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He invoked a Syrian woman’s responsibility to guard and uplift society, protect its children, and 
labor towards national renewal and liberation. His call to Syrian women to “mother” the nation 
blended old ideas with new. The notion that women had the power (and responsibility) to 
civilize, enlighten, and revitalize Syrian society emerged in the late nineteenth century.731 Part of 
an early Syrian women’s movement that pushed for the advancements in education and personal 
status rights, a woman’s primary work remained in the home, in civilizing her husband and 
educating her children in the interest of social progress.732 Touma’s 1918 appeal to women as the 
moral sex resonated with the tenor of previous three decades of women’s social activism. What 
was new, however, was his appeal to Syrian women as mothers of the nation, and as bearing a 
special responsibility to work towards the political emancipation of the Syrian people. And 
approaching the Syrian Ladies Aid Society in particular, Touma addressed not only the middle 
class society ladies who led the organization but also immigrant working women who made up 
much of the group’s membership. Well-known in the immigrant communities in New York and 
Boston, the Syrian Ladies Aid pooled together the earnings of young women textile workers with 
the proceeds of more “polite” sources like ribbon drives, bake sales, and Church bazaars. This 
funding provided basic philanthropic services and assistance for the community’s impoverished 
Syrian women, particularly workers with small children, absent husbands, and few options.733 By 
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seeking relief money from the Ladies’ Aid, then, Yusuf Touma was appealing to Syrian 
immigrant women as mothers, as patriots, and critically, as workers. 
Touma left the group to discuss his proposal, awaiting their response from the hallway. At 
that moment, a sharp generational divide appeared between members of the Syrian Ladies Aid 
Society. Older emigrant women, conversant in the idioms of elite nineteenth century Syrian 
feminism, supported a partnership with the Lajnat Tahrir’s relief branch (the Lajnat Mankubin, 
the Relief Committee for the Devastated). In their roles as wives and mothers to society and to 
the nation, these women saw partnership with the nationalist movement as a means towards 
women’s advancement. The society’s younger members, however, mistrusted the paternalistic 
rhetoric of the nationalist committees like the Lajnat Tahrir. Hannah Sabbagh saw Yusuf 
Touma’s proposal as a means by which her organization’s objectives—to assist needy women 
and children and support women’s education—would be subsumed by the nationalist cause. In 
the years following World War I, Sabbagh’s Syrian American generation sought political 
alternatives to nationalism, finding them in the American and international women’s movements. 
In that Boston sitting room in 1918, the gender politics of Syrian long-distance nationalism were 
laid bare.734 
By an unprecedented close margin vote, the Syrian Ladies Aid Society of Boston resolved 
to join the Lajna Tahrir in homeland relief. They granted Yusuf Touma a significant portion of 
their Treasury and changed their name to Jamʿiyyat Iʿanat Mankubi Suriyya wa-Lubnan li-l-
Sayyidat [the Women’s Society for Assistace of Syrian and Lebanese Devastated] to reflect their 
new affiliation. Having concluded his business, Touma continued along his circuit, stopping in 
                                                          
734 Lebanese Syrian Ladies' Aid Society (Boston, Mass.) Records, 1917-2005; Meeting Minutes, 8 January 1918. 
MC 574, folder 1. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. 
280 
 
Lowell, Lawrence, and Fall River, Massachusetts before returning to New York City. In the 
coming months, the Ladies Aid labored to raise cash, warm clothing, evaporated milk, and other 
relief items for those affected by the war in Syria.735 Amira al-Hilu described later these wartime 
efforts in the language of familial sacrifice: as “honored mothers and wives to their men,” the 
war and its horrors demanded that women put aside demands for equal access to education, 
work, and social advancement for the interest of “saving Syria from martyrdom.”736 At the same 
time, the entry of the Syrian Ladies Aid into long-distance nationalist activism also drew them 
into the midst of intense rivalries and competing nationalist agendas between the committees of 
New York. No sooner had Touma left Boston, for instance, than a representative of a competing 
committee, the Muntada Suri Amriki [the Syrian American Club, see Chapter 1] arrived, 
condemning the Lajnat Tahrir as a corrupt émigré social club and claiming that “no more than 
twenty five percent (of the Ladies Aid’s donations) goes to assist Syrians and Lebanese; the rest 
will build the committee's statues in dedication to martyrs.”737 
 Women’s transnational social activism was not a new phenomenon during World War I. 
In Syria, elites and middle-class women had organized private philanthropic societies within 
their own circles since the mid-1890s, and similar organizations appeared in the American 
mahjar by the turn of the twentieth century. Before World War I, women’s philanthropic groups 
emerged independently of the men’s political clubs; organized entirely through women’s social 
networks, they raised relief for the impoverished, pushed for advancements in women’s 
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education (particularly in adult education), and developed a lively women’s press featuring 
articles written largerly by women, for women. Society life and the women’s press provided the 
two lodestars in the emergence of an elite Syrian feminism. These spaces mirrored the men’s 
institutions described elsewhere in this dissertation, with one significant distinction: they labored 
in service to a community defined by gender rather than nation, seeking the advancement of 
women’s rights, legal status, and access to education and employment.738 The Syrian women’s 
press, furthermore, was just as transnational as its mainstream counterparts: Syrian women could 
pick up a copy of Fatat al-Sharq in Cairo, Fatat Lubnan in Beirut, or al-Marʾa al-Suriyya in 
New York City and read the same editorials by ‘Afifa Karam, Labiba Hashim, and Salima Abu 
Rashed on issues like women’s right to work, the desirability of marriage, and the importance of 
philanthropic social endeavors.739  
 What changed with World War I was that the various nationalist political committees 
operating in the mahjar deployed ideas about political femininity to encourage women’s groups 
to participate in their movement. They called women to service as patriotic “national mothers,” 
invoking the image of the family as a metaphor for the nation.740 Even as they contributed to the 
cause by raising money or relief for the nationalist committees of the mahjar, many Syrian 
American women looked upon the paternalistic practices of these same committees with 
suspicion. This suspicion, moreover, carried over into debates about Syrian motherhood and the 
image of patriotic of “national” mothers shortly after World War I. This was particularly the case 
with the second generation: girls and young women born in America to Syrian immigrant parents 
or having moved there as children. Growing up in the United States during the birth of the 
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739 Kallas, Tarikh al-Sihafa al-Nisawiyya, 34-8; Khater, Inventing Home, 154-7. 
740 Baron, Egypt as a Woman, 7-8. 
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women’s movement, these young women increasingly looked towards early American feminism 
and international women’s organizations as models for a Syrian American femininity. The 
resultant image of modern Syrian “new women”—youthful, modern, conversant with feminist 
ideals, and demanding improved women’s access to employment, activist work, and political 
organization—emerged in the early 1920s through young women’s debates with (and dissent to) 
the paternalism within the nationalist movement.  
Although a series of studies on the mahjar have dealt with the “women question” before 
and during World War I,741 this chapter pursues the experiences, images, and debates surrounding 
young working women in the 1920s. Working women—and particularly women who worked in 
the textile and garment industries—became the primary focus of debates about women’s place in 
the twenties. During the War, female textile workers and their associations played a significant 
role in provisioning wartime relief, in supporting the mahjar’s transnational textile economy, in 
funding the operations of the nationalist committees in New York, and in liasing with the 
American humanitarian groups like Near East Relief. Each of these labors brought Syrian 
American women into new activist roles during the War, shaping the emergence of a new Syrian 
feminism in the years that followed. But what sorts of anxieties did Syrian “new women” 
feminists create among their nationalist co-activists, and how did they influence discussions 
about women’s work and workers? In the nexus between nationalism, women’s activism, and 
international feminism, how did Syrian intellectuals in New York City deal with women workers, 
and how did the mahjari feminist debates filter back to the homeland? 
                                                          
741 See Akram Khater, “A Woman’s Boundaries,” in Inventing Home, 146-78; Sarah Gualtieri, “Marriage and 
Respectability in the Era of Immigration Restriction,” in Between Arab and White, 135-54; Alixa Naff, Becoming 
American; Evelyn Shakir, Bint Arab; Maria Narbona, “The ‘Woman Question’ in the Aftermath of the Great Syrian 
Revolt,” al-Raʾida 116 (2007), 5-9. 
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Syrian Women’s Work and Social Activism in New York City and Beyond: a Brief History 
 The mass migrations of the nineteenth century were overwhelmingly male, but by the 
turn of the twentieth century, Syrian women also arrived at Ellis Island in significant numbers. 
Between 1900 and 1914, thirty-two percent of all new Syrian immigrants were female, a higher 
percentage than other national groups.742 While many Syrian women arriving in the U.S. came to 
join their husbands or male relatives, Sarah Gualtieri demonstrates that many more came to 
America to work, particularly as peddlers selling household goods door-to-door.743 The same 
proletarian economy that allowed for women working in silk-reeling factories in Syria also made 
labor emigration a viable option for young women; the early Syrian woman workers living in 
New York and New England came from families that had for some time participated in the 
transnational textile economy outlined in Chapter 1. Hannah Sabbagh, the defiant young 
Secretary for the Ladies Aid Society in this chapter’s first pages, came from one such family. She 
left Syria as a child in 1895, accompanying her mother from Ain al-Rummaneh in Mount 
Lebanon to Ellis Island to join her father, uncle, and brothers, most of whom had already been in 
the New York colony for four years (the family later moved to Massachusetts).744 Having worked 
as dyers and weavers back in Syria, her father and brothers opened a wholesale shop selling 
textiles; once she was old enough, Hannah worked in the textile factories in both New York and 
New England, weaving cloth and stitching, her wages off-setting the ups and downs of her 
                                                          
742 Sarah Gualtieri compares this figure with Italian women specifically. Italian women immigrated in significant 
numbers and engaged in some of the same types of labor as the Syrians, particularly in the garment industry. Her 
figure for Italian women, derived from Donna Gabaccia, is 21%, 11 percentage points below the Syrians; Sarah 
Gualtieri, “Gendering the Chain Migration Thesis: Women and Syrian Transatlantic Migration, 1878-1924,” 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, no. 1 (2004), 68; Donna Gabaccia, From the 
Other Side: Women, Gender, and Immigrant Life in America (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1994), 28. 
743 Gualtieri, “Gendering the Chain Migration Thesis: Women and Syrian Transatlantic Migration, 1878-1924,” 70. 
744 The Sabbaghs were not originally from Ain al-Rummaneh, but from Douma, in Mount Lebanon. In an interview 
with her daughter, Evelyn Shakir, Hannah Sabbagh explained that the family had move from Douma to Dhour al-
Shweir in 1860, and maintained a home there and in Ain al-Rummaneh therafter. Sabbagh Family Reunion Book, 2-
3; Evelyn Shakir Collection, Box 1, Folder 4, Arab American National Museum, Dearborn, MI. 
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brothers’ wholesaling business.745 By the time she defied Yusuf Touma in 1918, Hannah was 23 
and had worked as a factory girl for nearly ten years. 
 Where the lives of Syrian female 
peddlers have been explored in some depth by 
historians of the mahjar,746 documenting the 
lives of Syrian American female factory 
workers has been complicated by the paucity 
of material records.747 Records detailing the 
lives of Syrian textile workers are hard to 
come by, but they can be traced through their 
interactions and engagements with fellow 
women garment workers from other immigrant groups in Lower East Manhattan. Syrian women 
joined much larger groups of Italian, Jewish, and Eastern European women in the shirtwaist 
factories, where they participated in the immigrant labor movement, for example in 1909 
“Uprising of the Thirty Thousand,” a garment worker strike led by the Women’s Trade Union 
League in New York City.748 Syrian women also participating at the Bread and Roses Strike of 
1912 in Lawrence, Massachusetts, establishing a “relief kitchen” preparing meals of burghul and 
                                                          
745 Hannah Sabbagh interview with Evelyn Shakir, Sabbagh Family Reunion Book, 5-6; Evelyn Shakir Collection, 
Box 1, Folder 4, Arab American National Museum, Dearborn, MI. According to Shakir, Hannah and her brothers 
later opened a factory making aprons in East Boston; Evelyn Shakir, Bint Arab: Arab and Arab American Women in 
the United States (Praeger: Westport, CT: 1997), 43. 
746 Gualtieri, “Gendering the Chain Migration Thesis,” 71-4; Naff, “Pack Peddling,” in Becoming American, 128-
161; Shakir, Bint Arab, 38-41; Khater, Inventing Home, 82-3. 
747 Shakir argues provocatively that “in the Northeast, many Syrians, both male and female, worked in the textile 
industry, though their participation in the labor force has been largely ignored by historians of the Arab American 
experience,” presumably in favor of that of peddlers; Shakir, Bint Arab, 46-7. 
748 See Meredith Tax, The Rising of the Women: Feminist Solidarity and Class Conflict, 1880-1917 (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 221-4. 
Figure 14: The Sabbagh Family in 1919. Hannah at 
Center. Source: Sabbagh Family Reunion Book, Evelyn 
Shakir Collection, Arab American National Museum. 
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rice, lamb, and yogurt, for striking millworkers.749 Twenty-four nationalities were represented at 
the Lawrence strike in 1912; Syrian women represented 11 percent of all the female strikers.750   
In the Syrian colony on Washington Street in Manhattan, women’s labor played a 
significant, under-acknowledged role in the workings of transnational Syrian textile industry, 
especially in the production of hosiery, lace, undergarments, and the kimonos that made the New 
York colony famous.751 Young women who did not work alongside Italian, Jewish, and Irish 
immigrant workers in the garment factories of Manhattan often found themselves nonetheless 
working in piece-work, stitching, or tailoring for smaller clothiers within the Syrian 
community.752 Laces, cotton broadcloth, and kimono nightgowns made of a blended silk were the 
                                                          
749 Shakir, Bint Arab, 48. The sole Syrian fatality at the 1912 Bread and Roses Strike, furthermore, was a young man 
named John Ramey who had gathered with some of his compatriots for a “singing march,” an action that the police 
had explicitly forbidden. Ramey was reportedly practicing a melody on his cornet, and, misunderstanding an 
officer’s orders that he stand down, he was run through with a bayonet, trumpet in hand. 
750 Ardis Cameron, Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1830-1912 
(Carbondale: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 161-2. 
751 Adele Younis, The Coming of the Arabic-Speaking People to the United States (New York: Center for Migration 
Studies, 1995), 168. 
752 Sallum Mukarzil, Tarikh al-Tijara al-Suriyya al-Amrikiyya (New York: al-Matbaʿa al-Suriyya al-Amrikiyya fi-
Figure 15: Syrian textile workers doing piecework in Mahal Michel ʿArida, New York City, 
1921. Source: Mukarzil, Tarikh al-Tijara al-Suriyya al-Amrikiyya, 47. 
286 
 
most typical Syrian businesses, and it was widely thought within the Syrian community that 
women were better suited for such delicate types of work.753 Established in 1905, Mahal Michel 
‘Arida was one of the first producers of the Syrian kimono, constructed almost entirely through 
female piece-work and labor. Mahal Michel ‘Arida followed a fairly typical pattern that 
illustrates the importance of women’s work to the Syrian colony of New York. Having arrived in 
the 1890s, the ‘Arida family had multiplied its number in the first years of the twentieth century 
as brothers, cousins, and wives came to join the 
household situated on Washington Street. Michel 
‘Arida, the family’s patriarch, made a living through 
wholesale trade centered on goods coming through the 
port with Syrian immigrants. Although his business was 
a lucrative one, run entirely through the family home, 
wholesale trading was a risky business, dependent on 
large capital investments which did not always yield 
immediate returns.754 As Michel travelled between ports 
and buyers across New York and New England, the 
women of the household began producing simple 
lacework at home, selling such items to local Syrian 
stores for a small profit. What began as a household 
craft swiftly snowballed into an important local 
industry; in 1905, Michel ʿArida sold his wholesaling 
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754 Naff, Becoming American, 71. 
Figure 16: Shahin & Sons Advert for Syrian 
Kimonos. Source: Majallat al-Tijariyya al-
Suriyya al-Amrikiyya, August 1919. 
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business, leased a store front on Carlyle Street (adjacent Washington Street), and hired young 
women from around the colony to produce lace, undergarments, and kimono-style 
nightgowns.755 By 1919, the ʿArida store transformed into a full-blown factory, employing over 
150 Syrian women to produce silk-blend kimono nightgowns for a mass market.756 
In the Syrian communities of New York and New England, female labor presented both 
secondary and primary industries. Making between $5.00 and $6.00 cash earnings a week, 
Syrian women textile workers made more than any other women’s trade available on Washington 
Street: office cleaning, the most common labor for other immigrant women in the district, was 
not only remuneratively inferior (at $4.50 a week); it was also seen as dirty and degrading work 
unbefitting to the Syrian woman. 757 Similarly, Syrian immigrant women who worked in textiles 
not only fit within patterns of honorable labor established in the Mashriq during the previous 
century;758 their steady, regular wages also helped offset household expenses, allowing their 
husbands or other male relatives to work in riskier, more potentially profitable endeavors like 
wholesaling or capital investment. Their wages made them important players in the workings of 
the transnational Syrian cloth economy.  
The normalization of women’s work in the Syrian immigrant family economy, 
furthermore, blurred class lines. In both New York and Boston, distinctive Syrian middle and 
working classes emerged between 1900 and 1920, but at their edges remained families that 
blended between both. Hannah Sabbagh’s family was a good example of this phenomenon: from 
                                                          
755 Mukarzil, Tarikh al-Tijara al-Suriyya al-Amrikiyya, 45. 
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757 Conducting interviews with women workers from many immigrant groups in the vicinity of Washington Street, 
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a family of a middling peasant background, her wages facilitated the businesses of her brothers 
and cousins, and because of them, the “Sabbagh Bros. Company” lifted the family into a 
comfortable, middle-class affluence.759 Hannah’s marriage to journalist (Fatat Boston) and 
political activist Wadiʿ Shakir in the 1920s ended her days as a factory girl.   
The ʿArida concern incorporated a business strategy copied by many Syrian clothiers in 
greater New York. In the attic, young women unrolled bolts of cloth purchased through Syrian 
channels at the port, cutting and transforming them into simple kimonos. The kimonos produced 
were then divided into three groups. The first were placed in the Mahal ʿArida showroom 
downstairs, a dark wood-paneled space where Michel ʿArida ’s sons, Raphael and Kamil, 
displayed them for visiting wholesalers. The second group was destined for American boutiques 
in the greater New York area; silk-blend kimonos became a fad enjoyed by American elites by 
the 1920s, enriching not only the ʿArida family but the Syrian colony as a whole. The last third 
of the kimonos produced went to the port; Mahal ʿArida shipped kimonos to Syria and Lebanon, 
as well as to Syrian communities in South America.760  
But while the ʿAridas branded their use of female labor as indicative of their kimonos’ 
delicate quality, the business maintained a very strict separation of the sexes.761 Female 
employees produced the goods, but they did not trade in them, mix with buyers, or take part in 
the shipping or sale of the kimonos abroad. The gendered division of labor was typical among 
the Syrian textile firms in the United States, the pattern likely borrowed from Syrian precedent: 
the silk reeling factories of nineteenth century Mount Lebanon operated on a similar logic, 
                                                          
759 The records of the Sabbagh Bros. Company can be found in the Evelyn Shakir Collection, Box 1, Folders 1-3, 
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purportedly to protect the delicate (but malleable) honor of young, unmarried factory workers.762 
On the other hand, however, the reliance on female textile workers was not a pattern typical of 
the entire Syrian mahjar. In South America, where textiles were produced in immense factories 
employing thousands of laborers, weaving, piecework, and finishing were all men’s work, as was 
the case in Nami Jafet’s Ypiranga factory in Brazil (see Chapter 1). Why Syrian women in the 
United States were more likely to engage in garment work than their compatriots in Brazil in 
Argentina is yet unclear: the garment industries in both South American countries employed 
large numbers of immigrant women in their factories, just as they had in the United States. 
Whatever the reason, Syrian immigrant women worked both within Syrian immigrant firms as 
well as in larger American garment factories with a multinational workforce. As the Syrian 
kimono industry took off and ever greater numbers of Syrian companies producing lingerie and 
lace accessories took off, however, Syrian women increasingly sought work in factories run by 
their immigrant compatriots. 
Mahal ʿArida may have been one of the first Syrian businesses to incorporate female 
labor, but the business model was so thoroughly replicated by other Syrian firms in New York 
and New England that it became commonplace. In 1921, Syrian American journalist Sallum 
Mukarzil enumerated a half dozen Syrian kimono factories near Washington Street alone, all of 
which depended entirely on female labor for production.763 One factory that defied the logic of 
an all-female labor force was Mahal ‘Abdallah Barsa. To create a better profit margin, the Barsa 
brothers integrated on-site weaving with the cutting and construction of kimonos. Nonetheless, 
the gendered division of labor remained: Barsa’s weavers were all men, all of his stitchers were 
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women, and the two groups of workers worked on separate floors of his expansive factory on 
Washington Street.764 
 By 1914, then, the New York Syrian colony had developed a class of proletarian Syrian 
female workers: garment workers in the mills, stitchers and lace-makers in the colony’s own 
kimono industry, and female peddlers who operated home-to-home selling small goods to a 
female clientele. Young, unmarried women dominated the ranks in each of these types of labor, 
and by 1914, social issues adjacent to women’s work – poverty, access to social services, and the 
issue of women’s work in relation to “traditional” feminine goals like marriage and child-rearing 
– joined the daily chatter of the well-to-do in the Syrian colony. As unmarried women, what sort 
of protections should be afforded to Syrian garment workers? Who would protect them against 
poverty and privation? How would the colony encourage women’s social advancement? And 
most significantly, what was the goal of women’s work? Was wage work a life phase to be 
discontinued with marriage or a means to social mobility and advancement? If women were to 
continue to work after their marriages (as was typically the case in the United States, because 
women’s cash earnings so easily subsidized their husbands’ entrepreneurship), how would the 
community provide for the children of working mothers? The earliest Syrian women’s 
philanthropic association in New York City, the Syrian Women’s Union established in 1896, was 
organized by immigrant elite women as a polite salon for the discussion of the colony’s social ills 
and women’s issues; according to Evelyn Shakir, its founders sewed clothing for the immigrant 
poor.765 In the decade to follow, however, working women and women from the immigrant 
middle class became the liveliest of philanthropic organizers, and their “ladies societies” would 
incorporate the principles of mutual aid and social reform to create a practical safety net for 
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women workers, women in financial straits, or women in crisis.  
The Syrian Ladies Aid Societies, as these groups were collectively called, were 
established between New York City, Brooklyn, and Boston in 1907, 1908, and 1917 
respectively.766 These groups, while secular and welcoming a multiconfessional membership, got 
their start among middle class and working women who met in the Orthodox Church; their 
founders were Orthodox, their first meetings at the Church (although unlike al-Nadi al-Homsi 
and other men’s organizations, the clergy did not seem to have had a direct hand in establishing 
this society). Very soon after their establishment, the Syrian Ladies Societies began holding their 
meetings beyond the space of the Church in a concerted effort, argues Evelyn Shakir, to maintain 
a secular (albeit privately pious) orientation and welcome new members from other confessional 
groups.767 Such organizations aimed themselves at relieving the burdens of young working 
women in the mahjar by providing food aid, subsidies for coal, heating oil, milk, clothing, and 
bedding.768 The Boston chapter also had its own clubhouse and boarding house, which kept 
impoverished immigrant women off of the streets and also provided a space for new Syrian 
immigrants to lodge as they sought employment.769 Volunteers from the community (and when 
Society funds could afford it, a paid staff member) sometimes provided childcare. Women who 
                                                          
766 The group’s name in Arabic was Jamʿiyyat al-Isʿaf al-ʿUmumiyya li-l-Sayyidat.  
767 Membership was predominantly Orthodox, Maronite, and Melkite, however. Member records from the Boston 
chapter do not demonstrate that the Society had Muslim or Druze members. Shakir, “Good Works, Good Times: the 
Syrian Ladies Aid Society of Boston, 1917-1932,” in Eric Hooglund, ed. Crossing the Waters: Arabic-Speaking 
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Secretary Hanna Sabbagh, heating fuel was the most significant cost facing working immigrant women; the second 
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required material assistance applied for it, their cases considered by a panel of fellow Syrian 
working women elected by the membership. Additionally, these groups aspired to raise the lot of 
immigrant woman workers by offering night classes in English language, typically taught by 
American social workers who framed interaction with Syrian working women as a part of the 
“Americanization” process.770 Like Brazil’s al-Nadi al-Homsi and other political fraternities in 
the mahjar, Syrian American women’s clubs emphasized community service and self-
improvement as a means of remaking Syrian womanhood. Syrian emigrant women, particularly 
young ones, were transformed into objects for social reform through education and employment.  
Unlike the men’s fraternities, the 
Syrian Ladies Aid Society of New York 
depended wholly upon private donations 
from its membership and from Syrian 
immigrant leaders to provide its services. At 
$1 a year, its membership dues brought a 
modest income, supplemented by cash 
donations from women’s wages, rummage 
sales, supper gatherings, and ribbon drives.771 
The Ladies Aid, in other words, received subsidies almost entirely through female social 
networks, rather than the institutional endowments that men’s organizations relied upon (recall 
the Maronite Church’s endowment of New York’s al-Ittihad al-Maruni in Chapter 3, or Orthodox 
                                                          
770 Settlement houses operating in both New York City and Boston also presented spaces where Syrian immigrant 
women mixed with American social workers from the 1890s through the 1920s. The Rivington House in lower 
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Figure 17: The Syrian Ladies Aid Society of New York's 




Bishop Athanasius ‘Atallah’s endowment of al-Nadi al-Homsi in São Paulo in Chapter 4).772 
Similarly, the types of relief the Syrian Ladies Aid Society engaged in revealed a particular 
concern for working women with children. The group emphasized the maintenance of the Syrian 
working households, indemnifying against the threat of familial disintegration. In an economic 
environment where many Syrian American women resorted to wage labor, groups like the Ladies 
Aid ensured the smoother functioning of the transnational Syrian economic system. 
 The Syrian Ladies Aid Society prided itself on being about women working for women, 
there were also important class implications to the group’s philanthropic agenda. By identifying 
working women, mothers, and impoverished women for Society relief, the organization 
confirmed a philanthropic “hierarchy of worthiness” that saw the preservation of the nuclear 
household as its most important goal, and they focused on the role of women in maintaining that 
nuclear household.773 The Society regularly subsidized young mothers and wives whose 
husbands were absent from the household, unemployed, or deployed during World War I. Such 
women were seen as most worthy for the Society’s assistance, and the Society framed its 
assistance to needy women and children within the obligations of self-provisioning, 
philanthropy, and benevolence [iḥṣan].774 Payments were envisioned as temporary until the men 
                                                          
772 During its first years, the Boston chapter of the Syrian Ladies Aid Society recorded annual donations between 
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returned to resume their place at the head of the household. The Syrian Ladies Aid Society and 
organizations like it provided important services for women but prioritized certain goals. The 
organization saw the unification and maintenance of the nuclear family and household as its most 
important aim. For the Syrian Ladies Aid Society, a secular-yet-pious club whose members came 
from the emigrant middle class (although perhaps half of the ladies also worked or had done so 
in their youth),775 women’s progress and advancement began at home. Very rarely did the Society 
give relief to men, and when it did so, it was in the interest of maintaining the household. When 
one member’s husband was detained at Ellis Island because he lacked proper documentation, for 
instance, the organization sponsored his passage in the interest of reuniting him with his wife.776 
They also provided her with housing assistance until he got on his feet. The group’s regular relief 
payments demonstrate a concern for mitigating the social ills that accompanied young women’s 
entry into factory work, family disintegration being first among them. Ultimately, the image of 
the nuclear household that the Syrian Ladies Aid sought to protect was itself a bourgeois 
construction, a vision idealized by the emerging transnational Syrian middle class. 
Enter the Nationalists: Women’s Groups and Patriotic Womanhood through World War I 
 Until World War I, women’s groups like the Syrian Ladies Aid Society operated more or 
less independently of the men’s political fraternities. But with the development of the diasporic 
nationalist movements during the War, the same political committees that agitated in favor of 
Syrianist, Lebanist, or Arab nationalist movements in the Mashriq also intervened in women’s 
social activism, calling for female activists’ cooperation with their respective projects. One of the 
                                                          
775 Relying on participant interviews and an enumeration of the Boston chapter’s twenty five founders, Evelyn 
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central ironies in this turn of events is that the women involved did not appear to have overt 
nationalist inclinations (and others, like Sabbagh, appeared to distrust the nationalist 
organizations), cash remittances and material relief raised primarily by women workers were 
some of the most sizable contributions that organizations like Lajnat Tahrir took in during the 
War. Women also participated in fundraising with international organizations, often relying on 
their contacts within the American women’s movement to volunteer with the Red Cross and Near 
East Relief.777 Both international organizations, in turn, channeled the efforts of women’s groups 
towards assisting women and children survivors of the War, particularly Armenian women who, 
Keith Watenpaugh argues, Near East Relief presented as “victims(s) of the rapacious, terrible 
Turk and requiring rescue by the West.”778 The close connections of American women’s groups 
that Syrian immigrant women were close to with the international humanitarian relief 
organizations gave the Syrian Ladies Aid Society unmatched access to homeland assistance; 
women proved, if anything, to be more capable fundraisers than their male counterparts.  
Founded in 1915 by American missionaries James Barton, Charles Crane, and Cleveland 
Dodge, Near East Relief was an American organization that strove to join the interests of local 
Armenian and Syrian American philanthropic groups, to collect aid and disburse earmarked 
payments in the Levant as part of the U.S. government's good will mission and in the name of 
Christian charity.779 Between 1915 and 1918, Near East Relief reported $11 million in payments 
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to religious establishments, charitable groups, and schools across greater Syria; in 1919, this sum 
climbed to $19.5 million.780 Like the Syrian Ladies Aid Society, Near East Relief's charter 
operated on the principle of self-help: “the core of its philanthropy is to work with the people and 
not for the people.” By working through partnerships with groups like the Syrian Ladies Aid, 
Near East Relief “forestalled later misunderstandings” about the intentions of the United States 
government in Syria and its political future.781 This approach also encouraged women's activism 
by presenting a ready set of projects and goals.782 During the War, the Syrian Ladies Aid Society 
raised donations for Near East Relief and the American Red Cross.783 
 Syrian emigrant women also drew on their experiences and connections to the Syrian 
textile industry to participate in the relief drives organized by the Syrian and Lebanese political 
committees of New York. When working with the nationalists, however, there was much more 
concern about what sorts of political work a woman should do. In the Syrian neighborhoods of 
New York and Boston, the politics of the press, petitions, and other sorts of public engagements 
were seen as male endeavors. Rarely did women write for the community’s major political 
periodicals, although there were notable exceptions, like ʿAfifa Karam. But by engaging in 
philanthropic and humanitarian measures, particularly in those spaces already coded “female,” 
women contributed to the relief efforts led by the nationalist committees in New York, 
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principally through Lajnat Tahrir and the Muntada Suri Amriki. The factory floors of Syrian 
textile firms transformed into an activist space functioning in concert with the nationalist 
movement. In these factories, skilled women workers produced relief items like blankets, warm 
coats, and undergarments for shipment to Syria, engaging their employers in the New York 
colony in the meantime.  
A philanthropic “putting out system” developed among women who worked in textiles. 
Factory owners donated bolts of raw cloth, which Syrian women would finish into clothing, 
bedding, and other essentials, either in the factories after hours or in their homes. Some of these 
items would be given to the Red Cross, Near East Relief, and the Lajnat Tahrir for shipment to 
Syria. Others would be placed in Syrian shops, sold at market value, and the proceeds would be 
donated to funds for Syrian relief. The system not only joined Syrian employers, merchants, and 
women workers into a common activist pattern; it also joined activists working in New York with 
their compatriots in the mills of Fall River, Lawrence, and Boston. The Syrian Ladies Aid 
Society, for instance, arranged such a contract with a New York wholesaler and Lajnat Tahrir 
boardmember, Adolph Nahhas.784 Nahhas sent cotton broadcloth to the Society’s branches in 
Brooklyn and Boston, where women textile workers would piece them into garments to be sold; 
the profits were returned to the political committee in New York at regular intervals.785 
 The Syrian Ladies Aid Societies also campaigned for and supported Syrian American 
enlistment into the Allied armed forces, including both the U.S. Army and the French-led Légion 
d’Orient. But in this effort, women’s groups played a complementary role demonstrative of a 
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gendered division of activist labor. The Syrian Ladies Aid Society raised money for volunteers in 
the Légion d’Orient, but earmarked the money not for recruitment or for shipping boys to the 
front. Instead, the Ladies’ Aid money was put into a trust with the Syrian Educational Society, 
where it would await the return of Legion volunteers and pay for their college education. 786 The 
Syrian Educational Society was a New York organization founded by Syrian Protestant College 
graduates Fuad Shatara and Philip Hitti. Approaching Syrian independence and nationalism 
through educational development (rather than armed conflict), the group’s purpose was “to 
promulgate among the Syrian people the vital necessity of giving higher education to the young,” 
and to enact a “plan... whereby the Syrian people through this Society will aid in the 
reconstruction period in the old home land” after the War's end.787 Both Shatara and Hitti had 
succeeded in the U.S. university system and argued that a new patriotic pedagogy modeled on 
the American system would prepare Syria for rule by an “educated political class” that they 
hoped to train in the mahjar. In a speech delivered to donors in 1919, Philip Hitti cited both the 
“special connection America has with the revival of Syrian intellectual scene” and the 
enthusiasm of “young Syrian-American leaders and teachers” in New York City as proof that his 
goals to educate Syrian émigrés in preparation for their return to Syria was the best means by 
which to advance the move to independence.788   The threat was otherwise, Hitti warned, that 
lacking a technocratic leadership, Syria would devolve into a “Bolsheviki situation as in Russia- 
the masses trying to rule and making a mess of it.”789   
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In partnership with Dr. Hitti’s group, the Syrian Ladies Aid Society maintained a 
$1400.00 scholarship endowment that would start Syrian American veterans off in higher 
education. Returning Syrian American soldiers participated in a small school, called the Syrian 
College, also established by Philip Hitti, where they would receive core instruction in both 
Arabic and English as well as intensive training in American educational culture. The goal was to 
produce Syrian American transfer students bound for mainstream American universities, where 
they would complete their degrees.790 In enrolling the former Légion d’Orient troops, Brooklyn's 
Syrian College rewarded their service but also encouraged interaction between returning soldiers 
and the Syrian American community at large. The Légion d’Orient scholarships also had the 
effect of drawing young Syrian men from across the entire mahjar to New York City's colony 
(many of the irregulars had not originated in New York), all for the goal of encouraging a new 
Syrian political class, ultimately with the goal of returning to Syria.791 
 Modest as it was, the Syrian Ladies Aid Society scholarships were ultimately an interest-
free loan to be paid back after graduation.792 The reimbursement requirement fit the Society's 
mutual-aid principles and philanthropic agenda; these funds promoted the social good, but 
became sustainable as the endowment grew through a combination of reimbursements and new 
donations.793 But the Ladies Aid was interested particularly in improving Syrian girls' chances at 
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higher education, so in addition to working with the Educational Society to acculturate Syrian 
irregulars, the group introduced a few initiatives directed at young women: scholarships, free 
classes in English, and social events that promoted cooperative female social action. By 1921, 
for example, the two organizations had placed fifteen students at nine institutions in the New 
England area; of these, one scholarship went to a young woman studying at Boston University.794 
 By participating in the relief effort, raising money and goods to assist Syrians at home, 
Syrian women activists assisted the nationalist movement through a gendered division of activist 
labor. But despite how central working women’s contributions were to wartime relief, the 
discomfort some Syrian American political activists felt with women’s wage labor crashed into 
the mounting feminist demands of emigrant working women. The result was a set of images and 
debates about young Syrian women as mothers, as workers, and as radicals in the early 1920s. 
Work, Marriage, and Motherhood: Feminist Debates and Nationalist Anxieties in the 1920s  
 During World War I, Syrian feminists, philanthropists, and social activists entered into 
new kinds of political relationships with the political committees of New York. Although 
women’s wartime activism followed a strict gendered division of labor, their contribution was 
sizeable and in many ways dependent on the labor of female textile workers. But after the War, 
the same nationalist discourse that allowed women to participate through philanthropic social 
activism as patriotic mothers also produced intense anxieties about women’s wage work and 
other “incursions” into male political spaces. At the same time, a younger generation of Syrian 
American feminists came of age in New York. Well-versed in the American women’s movement 
and increasingly interested in international feminism, these “new woman” feminists alarmed 
male nationalists thorough their critiques on patriarchy and “traditional” Syrian culture. Within 
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nationalist circles, concerns that Syrian American young women had radicalized fueled 
discussions about the relationship between women’s roles as workers, wives, and mothers. In the 
meantime, debates about marriage and the changing Syrian American household revealed the 
yawning disjuncture between interwar Syrian feminism and nationalism. 
 As we have seen, the ideals of self-improvement, the pursuit of enlightenment, collective 
striving, and gender complementarity provided the bases for early Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalist thought in the 1920s mahjar. Although Syrian and Lebanese women had engaged in 
factory work, textile production, and other forms of wage labor since the 1870s, a woman’s place 
was generally thought to be the home, her primary role that of wife and mother. Even with the 
development of a “patriotic motherhood” during the War, the political roles of Syrian and 
Lebanese women remained confined to the home, particularly in the upbringing of children. 
Despite working women’s participation in nationalist activism in New York’s Syrian colony, it 
was generally assumed that women’s work proved exceptional, socially acceptable in time of 
crisis, but as a temporary means to an end. After 1920, Syrian feminists who advocated for 
female employment outside the home contended with public perceptions that working women 
would be incapable of living up to their feminine duties to “civilize” their husbands or educate 
their children. Public debates that began in the late nineteenth century surrounding the 
intersection between women's work and female honor continued in the mahjar through the 
1920s, and Syrian women living in the diaspora continued to pursue employment, sorting out 
questions about honor in the meantime.795 
 In the 1920s, Syrian and Lebanese feminists in New York wrote fervently in the women’s 
press on the issue of women’s work and family honor, seeking to find a niche between a 
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woman’s two roles: as worker, and as maternal figure in the home. One of the most common 
ways feminists achieved equilibrium was to present wage work as a natural extension of a 
woman’s duties at home. If patriotic mothers were to labor in the home to raise good citizens and 
assist their husbands, then was not wage work also done in service to the household? A young 
Syrian American feminist from lower Manhattan named Victoria Tannus clearly though so. She 
argued in the newspaper al-Akhlaq in 1924 that “most of us view with favor a woman who works 
to help her husband if circumstances necessitate it,” because such labors were a natural extension 
of the demands of marriage: “To my sisters, do not shy away from these types of work...your 
daily sacrifice for the success of your husbands.”796 In a similar vein, editor Amira al-Hilu 
explained, “after her marriage, the life of a Syrian woman is not her own but belongs to her 
family. This is because the truest love requires sacrifice. In the real world, her sacrifice is for her 
beloved husband and children.”797 By encoding women’s work within the language of feminine 
sacrifice (rather than in emancipation or liberation from patriarchy), these authors framed their 
arguments in favor of working women within the expectations that family, home, and household 
remained a woman’s first priority. They fit their feminist objectives within the dominant 
maternalist rhetoric of the time; the factory, in turn, became an extension of the household. 
 At the same time, these feminists argued that the benefits of women’s work outside the 
home were more than economic. By working in American factories, among American women, 
Amira al-Hilu argued that Syrian emigrant women would be privy to some of the cultural and 
intellectual gains of American society, among them, individual rights and social equality. Hilu 
argued that by discarding norms “from the Mountain” like women’s seclusion, Syrian immigrant 
women could acculturate “into the modern modes” of mainstream American life. Working 
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mothers, she added, would bring American ideas to their children, “provid(ing) them with a 
meaningful intellectual revolution.”798 In al-Hilu’s estimation, a woman’s maternalist role as a 
cultural alchemist and teacher is maintained. Wage work proved a new means to that same end.  
ʿAfifa Karam argued more pointedly that Syrian women workers in America had a 
responsibility to engage with the American women’s movement and its ideas. Responding to a 
letter from al-Huda editor Na’um Mukarzil which argued for Lebanese women to strive in the 
home towards raising properly patriotic children invested in the homeland and its politics, Karam 
responded that a woman’s national work extended far beyond the household, and the entire 
nation (not merely her children) were to be her pupils. “(The Syrian American woman) is not a 
daughter from a single village. She must come to grips with two civilizations—East and West—
that seem permanently at odds within her… she sees in herself the traditions, character, and 
mannerisms of both ways of life.” If Mediterranean and Atlantic cultures were two distinct seas, 
Karam argued, “why should she (the emigrant woman) not drink of both? Young women who are 
growing up today cannot be forced to conform to a way of life from the past.”799 If even “that 
man of great nationalism… the honorable Mr. Mukarzil describes the need for patriotic men to 
honor the culture they are living in abroad,” Syrian American factory women were well-placed to 
“make the most of their combined cultural wealth” as simultaneously Syrian and American. By 
blending some of the cultural, social, and political ideas of the American people, Karam 
concluded that women workers labored in the interests of the entire nation: 
“We (as Syrians) are a small people, our homeland threatened as much by 
deficiency and ignorance as by (political) domination. Our predicament obliges us 
to blend and mix our customs”800 
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By framing her feminist appeals for women workers within the obligations of immigrants 
to blend within American society, Karam pushed into a notion commonly employed by long-
distance Syrian and Lebanese nationalism: that America was the model for anti-colonial political 
success, and that Syrian and Lebanese political culture would do well to emulate or integrate 
aspects of American society as observed by the emigrants. Jam’iyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya 
member Habib Katibah, for instance, regularly described the need for a mutual program of 
edification and cultural uplift between East and West; as a writer and manager of a reading room 
on Washington Street, he saw this exchange happening through the production and sharing of 
good books, “it is obligatory for us to translate the most important books from language to 
language, and into the vernacular, in order to achieve intellectual progress.”801 Similarly, Yaʿqub 
Rufaʾil attributed American gender attitudes to America’s “undisputed civilization, and its 
influence over the enlightened world.” In a piece on Mother’s Day, Rufaʾil explained,  
“The beautiful and endearing feelings of men for the women in their lives, these 
women who lighten the otherwise heavy burdens of daily life…(these women) 
participate in our affairs and bring their labors to support us. The greatest man is 
he who labors for his women just as she labors for him.”802 
 
As political projects, Syrian American feminism and long-distance nationalism shared important 
intellectual features: the obligation to civilize, progress, and uplift the national whole through 
novel forms of education and labor, and the translation of American norms and knowledge 
learned in the mahjar. Karam and other emigrant feminists used these two shared goals as the 
best means to converse with the nationalists; they made appeals in favor of women’s wage labor 
in the context of a grander project for familial and national enlightenment. 
 If a woman’s work in the factory contributed to the cultural advancement of her nation 
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and her children, so too would it contribute to the civilization and domestication of Syrian 
American husbands. Victoria Tannus and other immigrant feminists railed against popular 
perceptions that working women made poor wives by presenting a countervailing image: the 
aging and illness-ridden bachelor who scorned to marry a factory girl. In 1923, Tannus published 
the tale of a fictional 41-year old bachelor named Wadiʿ. In “Do you Despise the Working 
Woman?”, Wadiʿ approached a female matchmaker, who walked him up and down Washington 
Street introducing him to dozens of the Syrian colony’s most eligible ladies. Each woman was 
highly educated, polyglot, impeccably dressed, morally incorruptible, and more beautiful than 
the last; they comprised the feminine ideal of the Syrian American imagination. Growing 
increasingly impatient, Wadiʿ begs his matchmaker to find him a “most virtuous” wife, a subtext 
lost on the matchmaker until, 
“he then told me he did not want to marry a woman who had worked for her 
means, whether she labored in the very best market, or toiled in the lowest trades. 
He would not seriously consider a working woman as an option for himself, even 
if her morals and manners were undisputed.”803  
 
Tannus argued that far from protecting Wadiʿ from sinfulness, his “scorn for women who work” 
did naught but reduce him to an elderly bachelorhood, rendering him incapable of fulfilling his 
own honorable role as husband and head of household. Attitudes like Wadiʿ’s also damaged 
Syrian American society as a whole, Tannus continued, because they mitigated working women’s 
abilities to find a suitor, impeding their civilizing work as women.804 Both trends, she continued, 
were socially disruptive and needed revising in the interest of the community’s advancement. 
After laying out the sad story of Wadiʿ, Victoria Tannus described the trades of illustrious 
American women: Helena Taft, for instance, worked as a teacher, while Woodrow Wilson’s 
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daughter, Margaret, was a famous singer. As prominent examples from presidential families (one 
of which, Wilson, was seen as a hero among Syrian and Arab nationalists in New York), Tannus 
pointed out that an American woman’s decision to work did nothing to mar her honor: “no young 
American men scorns her for seeking her economic independence. Nor do they subtract it from 
her moral or marital worth.” Drawing on mainstream American examples implied that Syrian 
American men must live up to their rhetoric of civilization, and Tannus concluded they could 
begin by joining Syrian women in abandoning “ignorant traditions that no longer suit them.” 
Until then, the threat of spinsterhood loomed large for Syrian American women who, while 
educated and very eligible, would be overlooked because their lives in the diaspora necessitated 
their employment in trades beyond the household “to earn a life for her family.”805 
Feminists like Victorian Tannus, Amira al-Hilu, and ‘Afifa Karam each argued for wage 
work as a natural extension of a woman’s matrimonial and maternal roles, a strategy that placed 
women’s work squarely within the nationalist ideals of patriotic motherhood. But at the same 
time, prominent Syrian nationalists in New York persisted in citing women’s work as the cause 
for the colony’s social ills, particularly for rising rates of divorce, the idleness of male youth, and 
the petty street crime that sprang from it. A founding member of the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-
Lubnaniyya, newspaper editor Yaʿqub Rufaʾil employed these ideas in a letter on the ongoing 
problem of male violence in the mahjar.806 In the 1920s, the New York Syrian colony saw a 
surge of street violence among young men: fist-fights, sometimes involving dozens of 
participants, broke out on Washington Street, particularly in the men’s cafes known as haunts for 
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local bachelors and politically conscious alike. Practical reasons for the mounting tension 
included competition between settled immigrants and new arrivals for limited employment 
opportunities, endemic grinding poverty, isolation from family support networks, and continuing 
political controversies over homeland politics.807 The frustrations of young Syrian immigrant 
men were many and reports of fighting common, grabbing the attention of the Washtington 
Street district authorities and reform-minded Syrian journalists alike.808 Mounting concerns 
about rising crime in the Washington Street district led the New York State Crime Commission to 
launch an investigation into its causes in 1927. Among issues like crowding and chronic male 
under-employment, the Commission’s report cited the abundance of immigrant men’s 
recreational spaces like cafés, reading rooms, and printing houses and immigrant working 
women’s absence from the household as they toiled in the factories as root causes for violent 
crime on Washington Street. Male idleness, homosocial crowding, economic distress, and 
rivalries within (and also between) immigrant groups created opportunities for petty 
disagreements to explode into gang violence, mobbing, and fighting between groups.809 
For some, the problem stoked fears about general cultural decline, but for Rufaʾil, the 
diagnosis was clear: the disintegration of the Syrian American family, brought on by climbing 
divorce rates and the contradictory demands of Syrian working women.810 “The muhajirin,” he 
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began, “have overall been successful, become wealthy, and are less prone to danger than their 
compatriots in the homeland,” began Rufaʾil in 1923; however, the mahjar's material success 
produced contradictory changes for men and women. While the promise of wealth drew ever 
larger numbers of young single men into the diaspora, Rufaʾil believed that Syrian American 
women’s wage work and material comfort let them to delay their first marriages while making 
them more likely to divorce. To Rufaʾil, the institution of marriage “has a civilizing effect on the 
Syrian man,” and the rising numbers of unattached men was a clear cause for social unrest and 
even violence. 811 He described crime and divorce as linked “social illnesses” [al-amraḍ al-
ijtimaʿiyya] that were “part of a larger social assault on the family” which threatened the 
respectability of the Syrian immigrant community.812 By choosing to work rather than marry, a 
working woman shirked her responsibility to maintain her community’s social order. Both 
Tannus and Rufaʾil described women’s matrimonial roles as civilizing, particularly in 
domesticating the men of the colony. But where Rufaʾil blamed women’s work for men’s uncivil 
acts, Tannus laid the blame squarely at the feet of an antiquated disdain for women’s work. 
Whomever was to blame, discussions about women’s work were often accompanied with the 
image of unwed Syrian men, often brutish, violent, and in need of a woman’s civilizing touch. 
This image was employed in arguments against women’s work as well as in its favor.  
 The culturally degraded emigrant man was a recurring stock character in al-Akhlaq and in 
discussions about Syrian American marriage and motherhood generally. Images of wayward 
bachelors also combined with generalized anxieties about ghurba, a cultural alienation brought 
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on by confrontations with an alien American culture. Syrian American women writers, whether 
feminist or not, described the mitigation of ghurba to be a woman’s special preserve: as wives, 
they gave their husbands a household to strive for, as mothers they bore responsibility for 
passing on both folk culture and a good moral character to their children. In a 1924 article on the 
children’s education, Adme Hazuri recounts a common Syrian American parable about a 
wayward emigrant bachelor.813 The young man, a peddler who left his mother’s home in the 
Lebanese mountains, had “wandered without aim from town to town” for a full year, becoming 
not wealthy and successful, but a listless, debauched vagrant. Ghurba was his only companion, 
and his distance from significant female figures (presumably his mother, sisters, potential wives) 
had degraded him into a state of near barbarism. One day, he walked by a home where a small 
Syrian girl was hanging laundry on a line in the yard. She sang to herself a folk song her mother 
had taught her, unaware of the vagrant who stood at her gate. Recognizing the song, the same 
one his mother cooed to him as a child, the man broke into unrestrained weeping “for all the 
pains and sorrows he had caused for those around him.” 814 The girl's song ended and she 
returned to her house, but the man was forever changed. According to the story, he returned to 
Lebanon, repented sincerely, and recommitted to the life of a proper, civilized man. Hazuri 
concluded that “our children are like gems in our hands. We are obliged to refine them in every 
way possible. We must shape the ranks of our children until they radiate with light.” 815  
Hazuri confirmed that responsible motherhood was the primary work of Syrian American 
women, arguing that a child’s education should incorporate the passing on of folk traditions as a 
                                                          
813 Adme Hazuri was a well-known social worker in New York’s Syrian colony. In introducing her piece in al-
Akhlaq, editor Yaʿqub Rufaʾil described her as an expert of family issues. Hazuri also gave lectures on children’s 
education and household hygiene to Syrian women’s groups, see Adme 'Atieh Hazuri, “Kayfa Nurabbi Awladna,” al-
Akhlaq January 1924, 52. 
814 Hazuri, “Kayfa Nurabbi Awladna,” 52. 
815 Hazuri, “Kayfa Nurabbi Awladna,” 53. 
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means of combatting personal and societal alienation. But in her entire article, the singing girl’s 
mother remained conspicuously absent. Hazuri did not clarify whether she was in the kitchen or 
at the factory, nor did she weigh in on the larger issue of women’s work or its influence on the 
family (indeed, she cautiously avoided it al-Akhlaq, a journal where the topic was broached 
regularly). But she did assert that a woman’s capacity to uplift, civilize, and domesticate Syrian 
society (and men in particular) radiated beyond her immediate presence, an argument that Syrian 
American feminists would use to makes claims on public spaces previously reserved for men 
only. Through discussions about a woman’s capacity to civilize came a new feminist objective: to 
advance women’s access to certain types of public spaces in order to advance society at large. 
“New Woman” Feminism in the Mahjar: Where Do Women Belong? 
 Beyond the factory floor, in the 1920s Syrian American feminists sought to increase 
women’s access to the public spaces, debates, and political stylings that had up to that point 
“remained a man’s game.”816 In the early 1920s, these feminists demanded more equitable 
editorial representation in the Syrian and Lebanese press and equal access to public spaces like 
theaters, cafes, and clubs. Feminist claims upon these spaces invoked the same theory of a 
woman’s special power to civilize, uplift, and educate any of the men she encountered along the 
way. Their appeals stretched across transnational space, the debates linking Syrian women in 
New York to Beirut, Cairo, and elsewhere in the mahjar. They called the feminist ideal they 
constructed the “new woman,” and although her power to civilize her surroundings through 
proximity was quite old, the deployment of this idea in service to allowing women into 
traditional men’s spaces was a new twist, in the Syrian context as well as beyond it.817 The “new 
                                                          
816 Shakir, Bint Arab, 54. 
817 Some of the aesthetics of the “new women” culture among Syrian American feminists had global roots, 
particularly the tendency for these feminists to select and borrow from an eclectic set of feminist figures and 
personalities. The women’s press in Syrian New York (essentially ʿAfifa Karam’s newspaper, al-ʿAlam al-Jadid) 
presented and promoted images of the “modern woman” from American and European media, and incorporated 
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woman” idea was a potent mixture of ideas about Syrian femininity and the demands of the 
international women’s movement, also gaining steam in the 1920s. As a result, the idea tipped off 
the anxieties of Syrian and Lebanese nationalists who saw in the “new women” not only a threat 
to their movement but also the tinge of radicalism. 
 In the 1920s, Syrian and Lebanese feminists between New York City, Beirut, and 
Damascus wrote about a “new Syrian woman.” Educated, assertive, and ready to take on new 
public roles as worker, activist, and political agent, Syrian “new women” engaged American and 
international visions of gender equality, merging them with the early Arab feminist ideas of 
Qasim Amin and his contemporaries. Although the “new woman” as public figure was a creation 
of the 1920s, however, the terminology of new woman [al-marʾa al-jadida] was borrowed from 
Qasim Amin’s 1900 book, The New Woman, on women’s education and advancement in Islamic 
societies.818 Credited as one of Egypt’s earliest Arab feminist writers, Amin’s was an elite and 
paternalistic feminism, aiming at women’s uplift through education in preparation for their roles 
as wives and mothers. Fighting patriarchy was not at issue so much as combating “traditional” 
practices that undermined women's fulfillment of her social destiny. The New Woman was 
                                                          
stories about both American feminist figures, presidential first ladies, and international organization humanitarian 
activists (the Red Cross and Near East Relief were recurrent favorites). Of the “modern girl,” Tani Barlow, Madeline 
Dong, Uta Poiger, et al argue that the topos of cosmopolitan modernity with youthful feminity was a prominent 
global flavor between 1910-1940; along with the first strides of the international women’s movement came an 
aesthetic culture (and a consumer market) for products which produced a “modern” feminity which bore its own 
racial hierarchical value system and had a close (if complicated) relationship with nationalism. One major departure 
between the Syrian Amerian “new woman” and the “modern girl” analyzed by Barlow et al. is the continuing focus 
of Syrian feminists of chastity/purity and the redefinition of work (even factory work) as pure; the “modern girl,” by 
contrast, was fixated on feminine leisure with a taste of carefully marketed sensuality. While the form and aesthetic 
of both were similar, the content was at points quite distinct. See Alys Eve Weinbaum, Lynn M. Thomas, Priti 
Ramamurthy, Uta G. Poiger, Madeleine Yue Dong, Tani E. Barlow, The Modern Girl Around the World: 
Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 10-3. 
818 See Muhammad Mustafa, Qasim Amin: al-Aʾmal al-Kamila (Cairo: Dar al-Sharq, 1989). Qasim Amin did not 
coin the term “new woman,” significantly. His “new woman” referred to the type of enlightened woman that 
Western societies produced, a result of advancements in girl’s education and a heighetened degree of female status in 
personal status matters. Amin was simultaneously an Egyptian writer responding to debates regarding women taking 
place within Egypt and also an Egyptian writing in response to his knowledge about “new women” politics in 
Europe. For the latter, see Carolyn Christensen Nelson, ed. A New Woman Reader: Fiction, Articles, Drama of the 
1890s (Broadview Press, 2007).  
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Amin’s second book, both a prescriptive text on maintaining a successful marriage (still seen as 
the primary goal of womanhood) but also pushing for advancements in women’s matrimonial 
rights, in particular, protections from arbitrary unilateral divorce. 819 The goal of the “new 
woman,” according to Amin, was the attentive rearing and education of children. The home and 
hearth became a site of progressive social and cultural reform.  
In turn-of-the-century Egypt, in Beirut, and across the mahjar, Amin’s new womanhood 
resonated most clearly with urban, educated, and elite- to middle-class women because it 
provided solutions to problems confronted by this class, namely, how to strike a new balance 
between older patterns of family honor within an emerging capitalist world economy that 
demanded women's participation.820 At the same time, new womanhood soon spun into what 
feminist theorist Karen Offen calls “relational feminism,” a middle-class variant that focuses on 
the reproductive couple and their kin as the locus for social change.821 Through progressive, step-
by-step advances in women's status within the context of the productive family unit, Syrian 
women could achieve a viable “equality in difference” as wives and mothers to the nation.822 But 
by the 1920s, the concept of new womanhood was changing, and Syrian feminists calling to 
question the maintenance of boundaries between women’s activism and mainstream (male) 
intellectual society as well as women’s exclusions from public sites of cultural and political 
debate. If Amin saw the home as the place where the enlightened new woman “uplifted” society 
through raising, educating, and nurturing her children children, the “new women” of the 1920s 
ventured into the public, invoking her mandate to “civilize” society through her participation in 
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the workplace, press-room, or playhouse beyond her household. As this section argues, the new 
woman’s place changed after World War I, but at the same time, her special mandate – to 
enlighten, civilize, uplift – in many ways did not.  
In New York City, Syrian women worked in textile and garment factories, in ethnic 
grocers, as weavers and peddlers, typically in employment systems that placed them entirely 
within female circles or in cloistered spaces managed by Syrian American “Brothers” companies 
(Sabbagh Brothers, Faour brothers, al-Khuri Brothers, and the ʿArida Brothers companies all 
maintained offices in New York). Women’s work was a fact of life. However, the liberal and 
professional trades, especially those seen as “public” or political remained, for the most part, 
closed to women. This was especially the case with print journalism, seen by Syrians and 
Lebanese in the diaspora as the major site of political debate and contest. Women who sought 
entry into the community’s mainstream print culture risked being accused of usurping men’s 
space; as Victoria Tannus described in 1924, “if you were to read a newspaper today, you would 
not find a single word from a woman. If you went to the printing house, you would not find a 
woman in its administration, and you will not find a woman's opinions or views expressed.”823 
Notable exceptions confirmed the rule: ‘Afifa Karam, who wrote regularly for al-Huda, al-
Akhlaq, and other Syrian papers in New York, was herself deeply critical of women’s general 
exclusion from the mahjar’s largest newspapers.824  
At the same time, women who engaged in philanthropic committee-based activism also 
found themselves black-lettered if their activities were seen as usurping men’s spaces, the press 
first among them. In 1919, for instance, the Syrian Ladies Aid Society submitted an appeal and a 
petition to the Syrian papers of New York City during the debates of the Paris Peace Conference. 
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Writing from Boston, a frustrated Hanna Sabbagh reported that none of the New York papers 
would print a public petition from a Ladies club. In the face of a media blackout, Sabbagh 
resolved to print her society’s broadsides at her own expense, limiting both the scope and the 
distribution of her Society's message.825 The Ladies Aid simultaneously decided against 
distributing a sizeable windfall of donations collected in early 1919 through the nationalist 
committee, preferring to remit cash payments directly to the Patriarchs of the Maronite, Greek 
Orthodox, and Melkite Churches instead.826 What they did not send to the Churches, they 
remitted to women’s organizations operating in Cairo and Beirut, reasserting the principle that 
women’s philanthropy should serve women and remain automous from the goals of the 
nationalist committees (who were for most of 1919 concerned primarily with gaining influence 
at the Paris Peace Conference).827  
Before World War I, most women who wanted to get into print worked within the 
women’s periodicals, which emerged side-by-side with the mainstream political dailies, their 
editors operating a transnational press network that connected women’s clubs in Beirut to Cairo, 
New York, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires. The most well-known women’s syndicate before the 
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War was the one shared by Hind Nawfal’s al-Fatat, established in Alexandria in 1892, Labiba 
Hashim’s Fatat al-Sharq established in Cairo in 1906, al-Fatat al-Lubnan in Beirut, and ʿAfifa 
Karam’s New York City al-ʿAlam al-Jadid, founded in 1912.828 These titles targeted both elite 
and middle class Syrian women, and eschewed overtly political discussions in favor of 
discussions about enlightenment, education, civilization, marriage and motherhood.829 The 
women’s press was, in Tannus’s words, “the kitchen where new ideas bake and the fruits of 
debate can ripen and mature… (it) indicates the elevation of the people just as it inspires it. It is a 
school within which the common people learn without the discriminations of class, occupation, 
or sex.”830 These papers were, in other words, addressed to the “new women” cut from Qasim 
Amin’s nineteenth century cloth. With the entry of women (and more specifically, working 
women activists) into the politics of World War I, however, the concerns of the women’s 
magazines shifted. If women were to participate in building the nation, what consigned that work 
to the private space of the home? If the newspaper was the nation’s loquacious mouthpiece, 
surely it became women’s responsibility to ensure its language was correct? 
After the War, the gender segregation of the Syrian American newspaper industry was a 
major bone of contention between “new woman” Syrian feminists and the male editors of the 
mahjar. Feminist writers began demanding that the political presses in New York City include 
women’s voices, framing women’s inclusion as an extension of their mandate to uplift society as 
a whole. al-Akhlaq, founded by Yaʿqub Rufa’il (a member of the Jam’iyyat al-Nahda al-
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Lubnaniyya and a contemporary of Na’um Mukarzil) in 1921, was the first major serial to 
thoroughly integrate female columnists and editors and address itself to both men and women in 
the mahjar.831 As such, it quickly became one of the first titles where Syrian American feminists 
debated the merits of women’s work, social activism, and advancements in the public sphere. 
“The press,” Victoria Tannus wrote in 1924, “is the robust niche where nations are 
established. It is where the world becomes civilized… the journalist is a leader of public opinion 
[al-ra’i al-‘am]. But in the minds of his readers he is also a teacher, cultured and well-
mannered.”832 In an article detailing the history of the Syrian women’s press, Tannus argued that 
the inclusion of women’s voices in the mainstream political papers of New York served to 
strengthen the unity and cohesiveness of the nation as a unit. “A truly sophisticates press not only 
relays political news and daily events,” she claimed, but also “diagnoses and treats social ills,” 
shaping ideas and elevate entire societies. The labors of cultural elevation, education, and 
cultivation, she continued, had been for centuries considered women’s work, performed inside 
the family home within a woman’s network of family and kin relationships. The creation of the 
newspaper press, a modern phenomenon, had wrongfully excluded women from social discourse 
they had long been a part of since the pristine “golden age” [ʿusur al-salaf] of Eastern 
civilizations. Tannus joined her historical argument with the developmentalist rhetoric seen in 
her nationalist contemporaries: “only poor countries exclude some individuals from 
participating.”833 She also invokes the logic, seen elsewhere, that working women labor in the 
interest of their entire family, “(although) newspapers are like other kinds of employment, most 
of us view with favor a woman who helps her husband if circumstances necessitate it. The 
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female journalist is no different… How can you prohibit a woman from the press if its call to 
arms is obligatory?”834 Finally, she compared the Syrian American press with its mainstream 
American counterpart, which had made strides in incorporating larger numbers of female 
columnists, printers, and editors. As for the Syrian press in New York? “one woman among a 
thousand editors is not sufficient… a sophisticated press does not divide its participants” but 
considers the merit of their ideas.835 
 Gender parity, the press as women’s work, and the “uplifting” power of womanhood each 
found their way into Tannus’s article. Additionally, though, Tannus argued that “the women's 
Arabic press (in America) has had more success in dialogue with its American counterpart” than 
the mainstream Arabic dailies, and that Syrian women as a whole had done a better job of 
connecting with American organizations laboring to improve immigrant conditions in New York 
City. Whereas men’s papers eschewed local politics in favor of reporting on the homeland 
(“remaining wholly ignorant of events in the American press”), the women’s journals had 
dutifully explored contemporary American social issues, studying American culture as a means 
towards cultural revitalization. Women journalists therefore brought not only their perspectives, 
but also connections and expertise. By capitalizing on these contributions, the Syrian American 
press stood only to gain. Tannus’s concludes by granting advice to aspiring feminist writers: “So, 
the advice I offer to my sisters, young educated women, is do not shy away from your writing or 
from work in the public press. And to young female journalists, consider this the work of 
hearts… your daily sacrifice for the success of your husbands.”836 
 As the most important site for transnational public discourse, the press presented the most 
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important intellectual space that Syrian American feminists sought entry into. But contests over 
other sorts of public spaces also occurred, particularly over places linked to artistic or political 
expression like theatres, cafes, and concert forums. Mirroring discussions about the press, 
debates over women’s access to such spaces occurred across transnational space and depended 
on women’s capacity to uplift society through her presence. In 1923, for instance, the municipal 
government of Beirut drafted a series of laws prohibiting women from entering public “spaces of 
corruption,” defined as the cinema, gambling parlors, music halls, and gentlemen’s clubs. Citing 
public as well as moral health, the ordinance turned on the logic that women’s primary social 
obligations were the advancement and progress of Lebanese morality and character; by 
outlawing women’s presence in immoral public spaces, the law left them free to do their 
civilizing work. Writing to the Beirut women’s magazine al-Marʾa al-Jadida from New York, 
‘Afifa Karam pointed out the irony of a state that surveilled its women in order to civilize its 
men: “Why is it the government’s duty to know about and nanny its own people? (Is it) to rule 
the restless nation, pushing to advance it beyond its stumbling blocks?”837 Karam insisted that 
Lebanese women had the right to privacy, and continued that by banning women from the 
cinema, the city government was actually hindering women’s education and acculturation. For all 
its self-representation as a “civilized government,” (al-hukuma al-mutamaddina), Karam wryly 
concluded, the Beirut municipality was exercising a pretty backwards approach. She asked why 
the educated men of Beirut could not find their own way out of these “places of villainy, 
corruption, and dirty habits” without their wives standing outside the threshold.838 
 As might be expected, Karam’s indictment of the Beirut municipality on behalf of the 
“new women” of the mahjar caused a stirring of debate among nationalists as well as between 
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feminists of all varieties. On one hand, the law policed and restricted women’s movements; on 
the other, it did so with the advancement of the nation in mind. Even notable nationalists 
normally sympathetic to the feminist movement responded to Karam with ire. Writing from 
Cairo, for example, al-Ahram contributor and prominent Syrian intellectual Salim Sarkis 
responded to Karam’s ideas by attacking the feminism of “new women” as a threat to the social 
order: 
“Here is the primary difference between the ‘new woman’ and myself: you are 
seeking to be permitted from (adhering to) certain restrictions, and I want to 
maintain those restrictions.” … “Why are you a slave, I a master, and family life a 
curse upon humanity (and none of this is doubted)? … Our social system requires 
the presence of a (household) head as well as a subordinate; you know this is so in 
both the family and the nation.”839 
Sarkis showed sympathy for the allure of the new international feminism, but he argued that it 
was never men who oppressed women; rather, the functioning of the political order depended on 
women’s subordination. Indeed, Sarkis argued that women’s subordination was condoned by 
biology, “it is impossible to change the natural order, and its requisites are that you are to be 
wives and mothers. You are companions to your husbands, and servants of your children, 
whether you like it or not.”840  
 Sarkis accused the Karam and the “new woman” feminists of hazarding cultural mimicry 
and implored “do not abandon all that is old and cling to all that is new.” He asked Muslim 
women to maintain their veils; from Christian women, he warned against “becoming 
westernized” [tatafarnaji] under the cultural weight of the French Mandate.841 Drawing on the 
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stereotype of the unmarried feminist radical, Sarkis requested that women activists who “have 
‘liberated’ themselves from marital slavery” seek not to divide the nation with feminist causes. 
Instead, female activists should “become a man’s companion in the national family [dawlat al-
‘a’ila]” laboring in service to its advancement. At the same time, Sarkis concluded:  
“Do not ask to participate in shouldering all of a man’s official responsibilities. 
Do not try to be the queen bee [malikat al-nahl] who has no valuable work, 
husband, or roost to rule over. For even that queen bee is actually a provisional 
servant to others.”842 
In Sarkis’s estimation, women’s activism was welcome, and women’s advancement a desirable 
goal. But his vision of national progress depended on women assuming a complementary, 
subordinate status, and he read Karam’s attack on patriarchy as an attempt to win women’s 
liberation at the expense of the national whole. “I do not want you to be constrained by slavery,” 
Sarkis relayed to Karam, “I want you to be free, but will your attainments reach the nation as 
well as your sex? Will all individuals win their freedom at once?”843 
 Nationalist anxieties about the “new women” feminists dividing the ranks often spilled 
into patriarchal anxieties about what feminist politics would do to the Syrian American 
household. Some in the New York colony saw Syrian American feminism as a troubling mixture 
of modernist fetishism and radical politics, pushing into men’s spaces while chaos crept into the 
home. These tensions became most pronounced around feminists continuing insistence that 
social uplift was their goal: caricatures of “new women” feminists reveal mounting concerns 
about young working women simultaneously as mothers and radicals. A 1923 cartoon from al-
Akhlaq dramatized the pitfalls of the “modern” Syrian family in ironic contrast. Presented 
alongside an article questioning the virtues of “advancing” Syrian motherhood along the lines of 
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Western style institutions like romantic love, the nuclear family, and the rigorous training of 
small children in the moral culture of the nahda, the cartoon portrayed a husband reclining after 
a long day of work. His infant son plays on the living room floor as his wife tends to the kitchen 
nearby. The husband is interrupted from reading his newspaper when his infant son 
simultaneously breaks a vase and pulls the family cat's tail. Calling his wife into the room, he 
quips, “It appears, Hannah, that you were frequently reading Bolshevik books before you placed 
this child here, who is disturbing our comfort.”844 The cartoon pokes fun at the mother's 
influence over her children; her inculcation of, in this case, radical ideas in her son backfires 
when the child decides to declare a revolution against peaceful tranquility and the family pet. 
 The cartoon reveals male apprehensions about 
women's dual roles as raisers of children and 
modernizers of Syrian national culture. By 
promoting a nationalist vision of Syrian womanhood 
as contributing to the reproduction and inculcation of 
a respectable patriotic culture, women had been 
empowered with delivering the message to the next 
generation. The private space of the home was re-
envisioned as a political space, the act of 
motherhood itself transformed into a patriotic 
endeavor. But as Syrian American women made 
advances into the public sphere while 
simultaneously retaining firm female control over the home, the purported radical leanings of the 
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Figure 18: February 1923 Cartoon from al-
Akhlaq. Anxieties about women's supposed 
flirtations with radical politics (especially 
“Bolshevism"” as seen here) merged into concerns 
about Syrian motherhood. 
 
Figure 19: 1923 Cartoon from al-Ilkhlaq, 
linking anxieties about Syrian mothers 




modern woman has created chaos, not progress. The received wisdom that “sons take after their 
fathers” (written above the panel) is put to mockery, as this son had clearly personifies his 
mother's “chaotic” political proclivities. 
 Although the civilzing qualities of the “new woman” played a significant part in debates 
between Syrian American feminists and provided a powerful critique against the paternalism of 
the nationalist movement and its ideologies, there were also those who questioned women’s 
mandate to “uplift” Syrian society. Particularly among younger Syrian American feminists born 
in the United States, the model of the civilizing, patriotic mother proved less compelling and 
risked trapping the feminist movement into constant self-justification. The same generation gap 
which divided old from young during the relief efforts of the War manifested itself in debates 
over women’s roles in upholding social morals, leading to new diagnoses for Syria’s social ills.  
 A 1923 public debate between young Syrian feminist Victoria Tannus and her older 
contemporary Amira Jamal al-Hilu is instructive. In an al-Akhlaq article called “A Child Cries,” 
al-Hilu described a dramatized interaction with a Syrian street urchin on Washington Street 
(shariʿ washintun, al-hayy al-suri). Al-Hilu approaches the young boy, around 3 years old, wipes 
a tear from his face and asks why he is crying. “I am hungry,” the child says, “the door (to my 
house) is locked, and my mother is at the textile factory (al-fabirka) working.” al-Hilu indicted 
young Syrian mothers for shirking their primary obligations to their children: to provide shelter, 
safety, good food, and a proper moral education.845 Hilu argued that while women’s work was 
not forbidden, her most honorable labor remained at home, raising her children in a progressive 
manner. A lonely child crying on the street was a sign of a failed womanhood; if given the choice 
between wage-work and motherhood, Hilu emphatically concluded that stay-at-home mothers 
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committed “the highest sacrifice and self-love,” and ultimately did more for society than their 
wage-earning contemporaries.846 
 Skeptical of a feminist model that shunted all social progress to the shoulder of working 
mothers, young Victoria Tannus wrote back in outrage that Hilu had neglected to tell “both 
halves” of the story. Tannus “do(es) not deny the sanctity of motherhood,” but says that she too 
encountered the crying child moments after Hilu passed by. Her discussion with the toddler went 
more like this:  
 “Where is your mother?”  
“At the fabirka.”  
“Well then, where is your father?” 
(“between sobs, the child exclaims”) “Why, he's at the café!” 847  
 
Tannus then asked her female readers, “does it do us justice to take a social guilt upon ourselves 
as individuals?” By absolving Syrian men of their responsibility to maintain an active family life, 
Syrian women not only mislaid the blame for the disintegration of Syrian American families, but 
they also wound up becoming sole family caretakers. “Sure,” Tannus continued, “there are 
(working mothers) who do not provide the necessary love and nurturance, but for every one of 
those, there are a thousand Syrian women who work as both mother and father!”848 
 Tannus inverted Hilu’s expectation that women be of higher moral character and provide 
a moral compass for the nuclear family household by asserting a new hypothesis for familial 
disorder: perhaps men, not women, had shirked their household duties! Tannus’s Syrian mother 
labored at the textile factory, “seated over hot machines with none but God for company” before 
rushing home to prepare supper. Meanwhile, her husband spent the day carousing with his male 
company at the café, playing backgammon, smoking narghile, and reciting zajal. When he found 
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his way home to sit down to his meal, he complained roundly that his coffee was sour, he had 
lost his game, and “things in the homeland are not as they ought to be.”849 The crying child, 
Tannus concluded, lamented Syrian men’s refusal to rise to the challenges of modern American 
life just as much as they missed their absent mother. Tannus mocked the men’s café, depicted by 
political fraternities as the primary site for patriotic politics and nationalist activism, as a silly 
place of nostalgia, worshipful idleness, and loose values. She attacked not only women’s 
exclusion from these places; she openly questioned their social value and political relevance. 
Conclusion: The Mahjar and the International Women’s Movement 
 This chapter has framed the development of a “new woman” Syrian American feminism 
in greater New York City amid the tensions, anxieties, and debates between two activist 
movements. Syrian working women, young mothers, and emerging feminist intellectuals found 
themselves pulled between the maternalist politics of long-distance nationalisms (whether Syrian 
or Lebanese) and an increasingly internationalized women’s movement. In the 1920s, the face of 
the “new woman” changed in important ways: although she remained undeniable preoccupied 
with the “modern” way of life, her modernity was progressively appended to her identity as a 
worker and active public figure acting in the social good. In turn, feminist demands for more 
participation in the workplace, improved access to the press and other sites of public display and 
discourse, and a revised role in the household challenged the paternalism of the nationalist 
movement in the mahjar. Women like Victoria Tannus challenged nationalist patriarchy, mocked 
the places seen as sacrosanct to patriotic masculinity, and called to question whether men were 
living up to the challenges of true Syrian American modernity. It is of little wonder that such 
ideas were often called radical by their opponents, that the “new women” were seen as divisive 
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upstarts, tainted by the internationalist politics of the garment factory floor. 
 But was she a radical? Despite that some nationalists equated women’s activism to a 
radical agenda, it does not appear as though the Syrian American “new woman” feminism 
discussed here was actually so. These feminists were, however, intrigued by and sometimes 
connected with the international women’s movement taking off in the 1920s. In the 1920s, ‘Afifa 
Karam popularized the International Congress of Women as an example of how women could 
organize across national lines to better the circumstances of all. In al-Mar’a al-Jadida, for 
instance, she wrote the ICW’s history, describing its first convention at the Hague in 1915 “as 
women collectively speaking to the men of politics” to end World War I.850 Although in reality 
the ICW was at the outset an organization “divided by nationality and often fiercely loyal to 
different organizations,” its members, predominantly elite women from the Allied nations, 
devised an internationalist notion of “universal sisterhood,” a collective activist identity rooted in 
women’s difference from men.851 By the 1920s, furthermore, non-European elite voices helped to 
define this notion of sisterhood: Egyptian feminist Huda Sha’rawi proclaimed at an ICW meeting 
in 1923, for instance, that “if men’s ambition has created war, the sentiment of equity, innate in 
women, will further the construction of peace.”852 Karam argued that contrary the appeals of 
nationalists that women cooperate with the paternalist vision of the national “family,” the key to 
national progress lay instead in women’s ability to override men’s “natural” proclivities towards 
conflict, violence, and War. For Karam, organizing with the ICW was a means of preserving a 
peace through women’s work. Announcing her support for the ICW and related organizations she 
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appealed to her readers to “take advantage of the window of opportunity and search with us for 
the way to a new peace. Don’t forget those examples (of our work) from the days of the War. 
Work, and struggle, before the troops arrive.”853 
 Karam’s notion of universal sisterhood joined Syrian American feminists to American 
and European collaborators as well as to “sisters left behind” (ibnat baladi al-mutakhallifa) in 
Syria and Lebanon.854 Shortly after declaring her support of ICW, Karam addressed Syrian 
women in particular, asking “Is there more between you and your sister abroad than vast 
expanses of water?”… “(they are) grateful for freedom and democracy, and they endeavor for the 
same for you.” In one of her most controversial addresses, Karam invoked the port at Beirut, that 
site of maritime connectivity that brought Lebanon manufactured goods, cash remittances from 
abroad, and according to Karam, the progressive political benefits of modern democracy. She 
challenges women in the homeland to labor for women’s social advancement, defined by her as 
more equitable access to public spaces, politics, and employment. “I extend a hand across the 
oceans,” Karam concluded, “but this hand does not carry an eloquent pen all by itself. Nor does 
it work for its own benefit.” Karam’s challenge bore fruit by way of women’s activism (a Beirut 
women’s organization affiliated with al-Mar’a al-Jadida, called Jama’at al-Sayyidat, reported a 
boost in membership and donations in the weeks that followed),855 but it also generated a stream 
of criticism. Many Lebanese women, even ardent feminists critical of the paternalist social order 
of the early French Mandate, took issue with Karam’s characterization of the homeland as living 
in ignorant slavishness to centuries old traditions.856  
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 Although Syrian American connections to the ICW appear to have been intellectual rather 
than practical, the international women’s movement influenced Syrian American feminists in 
meaningful ways, including how they interacted with the homeland. But despite pop images of 
the “radical” new women and nationalist anxieties about divisions from within, Syrian American 
feminist did not target the nationalist movement itself as the problem. Women like al-Hilu, 
Karam, Tannus, and others saw Syrian women’s participation in the international women’s 
movement in two registers, simultaneously as Syrians and as women. Ultimately, their goal was 
national progress and social development, defined in ways marginally distinct from those of the 
émigré nationalists of New York. The biggest distinction was in attitudes towards women’s work, 
long a fact of life in both the homeland in the mahjar. Writing on national identity and women’s 
work in 1920, ‘Afifa Karam argued that if Phoenician blood flowed through the veins of male 
merchants, shippers, and traders, did it not also color the blood of Syrian women? 
“The Syrian woman is perhaps the best suited as a trader, perhaps as much so as 
her Phoenician grandfather that came to these American lands (and ruled them) 
before Columbus’ arrival… did she not also emigrate from her land? Did she 
board the steamship, feeling the sense of purpose that sent men abroad?”857 
 
Phoenician heritage, centuries old and “shared by both sexes,” joined together with the 
experience of emigration to explain women’s entrepreneurial spirit. Recognizing women’s 
abilities and the importance of her work was critical for national progress. The invisibility of 
women workers was not merely a feminist issue; it was a nationalist one, “to those men who say 
‘what woman (are you speaking of)?’ I say ‘that one, working next to her man in his market, or 
that one whose wages helped him open it.” And the net result of women’s work, in Karam’s 
estimation? 
“Most of us will recall that common saying uttered by our civilized men (rijalina 
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al-mutaqaddimin) that ‘the (Syrian) women in America behave better than the 
men,’ (because) the women work for the benefit of our brothers and sisters... and 
at the same time, she does not return as herself; the times and their virtues have 
impressed themselves upon her.”858 
 
By warding off poverty (which in other articles Karam equated as a “national illness,” a social ill 
that produced ignorance) as well as being privy to the “civilizing benefits” of the shop-room 
floors of America, emigrant woman workers were both pioneers and patriots. For all of her 
international connections – to the labor movement, the women’s movements, or to international 
humanitarian organizations – hers was a labor in service to her nation. Removing “the yoke of 
several centuries worth of oppression” from her shoulders was not a reversal of the goals of the 
nationalist movement; it was, in the eyes of the new women, a means for “restoring our 
civilization” by righting historical wrongs.859 By maintaining a feminist foundation that framed 
the Syrian “new woman” within a civilizational struggle (rather than a struggle for rights against 
the patriarchal dictates of the nationalist movement), both Syrian American feminists and their 
partners in the homeland distinguished themselves from the so-called “radical” elements of the 
international women’s movement.860 “When we speak of the ‘new woman’ (al-marʾa al-jadida) 
or ‘enlightened woman’ (al-marʾa al-nahida),” concluded the educator and feminist Julia 
Dimashqiyya in Beirut, “we do not mean the manly woman who shouts loud from Europe or 
America, where she demands for rights taken from her; such women are not enlightened (al-
nahida); rather, they embody folly.”861 Whatever the misgivings of some nationalists about the 
mahjar’s “new women,” her goals remained very much in line with the nationalist project of the 
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1920s: “the woman, just like the man, is responsible for developing her intellect, enlightening 
her mind and heart together.” What distinguished her struggle was that in addition to civilizing 
and developing the nation, these feminists also undertook to “free both (mind and heart) from the 
yoke of man that weighed heavy on her predecessors' necks.”862 
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CONCLUSION: ONE MAHJAR, MANY NATIONS: ISSUES IN DEFINING POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY IN CONTESTED TRANSNATIONAL SPACE 
 
 This dissertation has defined al-mahjar (literally “the place of emigration”) as a 
transnational discursive and activist space where Ottoman Syrian emigrants in the Americas 
conducted commerce, organized philanthropic and political committees, and debated nationalist 
ideas with one another through a shared set of institutions linking their communities in New 
York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires. Historians also widely translate mahjar as “diaspora,” a 
choice which reflects the word’s modern usage and invokes a sense of shared history and ethnic 
culture shared by Syrian and Lebanese emigrants living abroad as well as their enduring 
connectivities with the homeland. But “mahjar” and “diaspora” are not exactly coeval terms, nor 
do they translate cleanly. As historians and social theorists debate the connotations of the word 
diaspora, working them into a working definition which connotes the disruptions of dispersal, a 
shared collective memory of home, and the expectation (or mythology) of return, Syrian and 
Lebanese experiences in the Americas look less like a truly “diasporic” ones.  
Instead, this dissertation presents the interwar mahjar as a contested transnational space, 
a place where activists competed with one another over the political future of their communities, 
recently (and contentiously) defined in national terms. It argues that World War I granted 
politicized Syrians and Lebanese living in the Americas unprecedented access to the politics of 
their homeland. Although touting political visions very much at odds with one another, these 
emigrant activists consequently appear not as exiles but as “Syrians abroad” who continued to 
travel to, conduct business with, and organize politically in relation to home. After the war and 
through the 1920s, furthermore, mahjari Syrians and Lebanese positioned themselves as 
transnational citizens abroad, generating a transnational pattern of participatory, substantive 
citizenship which demanded recognition and services from the French mandatory state. Whether 
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in confirmation of this status (in the case of Lebanon) or in opposition to it (in Syria), the idea 
that emigrants were a part of the national community and its citizen body was confirmed by the 
French Mandatory state, albeit incompletely so. The mahjar, furthermore, was a place of sojourn, 
not a site of permanent displacement; upwards of half of the Syrians and Lebanese who 
emigrated to the Americans eventually return to the Mashriq, either permanently or before once 
again alighting to points abroad.863 “The homeland” was not a distant point rooted in historical 
memory (or even in the past); these emigrants maintained personal and political lives that 
spanned dynamically between Mashriq and mahjar.   
With those points in mind, Syrian communities in the Americas are perhaps more 
fruitfully thought of as frontiers, borderlands, or transnational suburbs than as part of a yawning 
diaspora. I argue that thinking about the Syrian communities of the Americas as a transnational 
political geography opens a means to more closely integrate the mahjar’s history with that of the 
Mashriq, perhaps even transnationalizing eastern Mediterranean history in the modern period. 
But such a transnational goal must be justified by the presence of empirical evidence—in this 
case, the existence of networks of individuals traversing the space between Syria, Lebanon, and 
the Americas (both North and South). Tracing these networks, mapping these connections has 
been the principle theoretical aim of this work. But the existence of the networks aside, how and 
when were they most politically significant in relation to the homeland? Why did emigrants, 
their politics, and their ideas ‘matter’ during World War I and the decade which followed? What 
mechanisms assisted the diaspora’s press, political parties, and the emigrant leadership into 
international relevance? And perhaps most critically, did this moment pass? Certain historical 
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contingencies—war, geopolitical considerations, and the emigrants’ ability to fit themselves 
within the aims of the powers of the Entente—created a transnational situation that, while 
perhaps more common than “methodologically nationalist” historiography allows, was 
nonetheless quite extraordinary.  
The diaspora’s political significance was to a large degree a product of the disintegration 
of Syrian political society and institutions during World War I. As Cemal Pasha dismantled the 
press, banned reform groups, and prosecuted Syrian decentralists and Arabist thinkers, the 
diaspora became the premier site for voices of the Arabophone opposition. In some cases, the 
linkage between Cemal Pasha’s repression and emigration was clear: those Syrian journalists not 
hanged by his government in May 1916 fled mostly to Egypt, but also to the Americas, where 
they continued their political activities, often in collaboration with the Great Powers.864 The 
CUP’s clampdown on the Syrian press at home contributed to the proliferation of political 
newspapers abroad, which during World War I saw a boom in both the number of titles available 
and the numbers of subscribers. Cemal Pasha’s governorate was concerned enough about Syrian 
newspaper printed abroad that he screened them closely at Ottoman ports. When their content 
turned decidedly against his rule in 1916, he banned their importation outright.865 
The political committees which emerged abroad during the War were not only 
organizationally fecund, putting down roots across the mahjar; they also presented space for 
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political action and participation in ways that were increasingly suppressed in Damascus and 
Beirut. While varied in their ideological orientations and nationalist outlooks, the committees 
abroad also provided space for negotiation with the Entente Powers during the War. As this 
research shows, the relationship between emigrant politics and the Entente was one of the most 
significant ways that the diaspora “came home” to the Mashriq through politics, even to the 
expense of Syrians and Lebanese still living in the homeland. Long-distance nationalist politics 
came home in 1919 and 1920, particularly in Lebanon, where long-distance Lebanese 
nationalists brought the French Mandate “home” with them. But if the long-distance nationalists’ 
complex series of entanglements with the Entente (especially but not exclusively with the 
French) helped usher in the Syrian and Lebanese Mandates, emigrant politics also influenced the 
early development of the Mandate states, particularly with regards to the Lebanese census of 
1921 and the politics of obtaining (or opposing) Syrian and Lebanese nationality laws. The 
Mandate’s expansion of state power through educational, philanthropic, and administrative 
policies designed to bring the state into direct interaction with its citizen body (what Elizabeth 
Thompson calls the “colonial civic order”) is clearly seen in the ways that the Mandate’s 
consular officers abroad interacted with Syrian and Lebanese emigrants.866 In turn, these 
emigrants framed themselves as transnational citizens of the homeland, regardless of their actual 
legal status or whether they supported or opposed French rule. 
Syrian (or Lebanese) in Times of Crisis: the Mahjar’s Shifting Political Relevance 
If the mahjar sat at the vanguard of the Mashriq’s nationalist politics during the World 
War, and if emigrants were among those counted by the League of Nations in 1919 or by the 
French in 1921, these voices became progressively more muted during the late 1920s. By the 
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beginning of the 1930s, emigrant nationalists continued to reach out to their homeland 
compatriots but with a much more tempered degree of success. Why? First, by the late 1920s, the 
historical juncture that brought the mahjar to prominence was passing. World War I in the 
Mashriq saw the destruction of the Ottoman governorate of Syria and the imposition of an 
imperial French administration in its footprint. During the 1920s, the Mandate states in Syria and 
Lebanon sought to condition the state-society relationship in ways that minimized local 
opposition, to varying degrees of success. In Lebanon, the French High Commissioner 
established the Representative Council in 1922, a parliamentary structure that was later codified 
in the Lebanese 1926 Constitution. Although its legislative powers were attenuated by the strong 
executive power of the Presidency (and the Lebanese President’s own powers were attenuated by 
French authorities, who retained the right to dissolve the government and suspend the 
Constitution), the emergence of representative institutions in Lebanon prompted Lebanese 
participation within the Mandatory system as opposed to rebellion against it. In Syria, the 
outbreak of the Great Syrian Revolt in 1925 prompted the French towards military solutions; 
counterinsurgency, not representative government, consumed the Mandate’s attention until 1927. 
But quickly after the revolt’s suppression, France found new (albeit ambivalent) partners through 
the creation of quasi-representative structures centered on Damascus. The Constitutive 
Assembly, then the Syrian National Bloc, stressed cooperation with the Mandate in the name of 
constitutional and national development by 1928. Reform, not revolt, was the preferred means of 
dealing with the Mandates at home. 
 Grand shifts in the mahjar’s political significance vis a vis the homeland suggest that the 
diaspora mattered most in times of crisis, war, and rebellion. The mahjar’s Lebanese nationalists 
took the vanguard in working with the French Foreign Ministry during and immediately after 
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World War I, and helped map the greater Lebanese state. When in 1920 it was revealed that 
many of the new “Lebanese” residents of the Grand Liban opposed the project, the mahjar 
became a critical demographic source for the Mandate’s first census. But although the French 
took measures to incorporate Lebanese emigrants into the Lebanese body politic through the 
extension of consulate, nationality, and optional citizenship, there was never a subsequent project 
to ensure their participation in the confessional, constitutional system they helped construct. 
Once the Lebanese Republic emerged, and dissenting voices more or less contained, the Mandate 
did not reach out to the mahjar as consistently as it had during the 1917-1925 period.  
The Syrian case illustrates this point even more strikingly; Arab nationalists in the 
mahjar participated vigorously in the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918 as well as the Great Syrian 
Revolt of 1925-1927. During the world war, Arab nationalists in the Americas raised funding, 
circulated petitioned, and attempted to broker the United States’ support for Emir Faysal’s Syrian 
project, and in 1925, nationalist parties centered in Argentina organized demonstrations and 
sought to bring international attention to the imperialistic nature of France’s Syrian Mandate. 
When these efforts failed, the Hizb al-Istiqlal of Buenos Aires funneled money to the Syrian 
revolutionaries at home. When the tone of Syrian nationalist politics “at home” tempered under 
the Syrian National Bloc in 1928, the Arab nationalists in the mahjar became highly critical; for 
them, armed insurgency and mass revolution were the most valid pathways to independence. But 
by the end of the decade (and especially once the National Bloc got its Syrian Constitution in 
1930) the firebrand voices of the diaspora found themselves increasingly speaking to one 
another, not the homeland. All in all, there was a close correlation between crisis and revolt in 
the homeland and the political significance of emigrant activists. While this correlation is not 
determinative of connectivities beyond the interwar period, it certainly holds true during the two 
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decades between the fall of the Ottoman government and the emergence of constitutional 
systems under French imperial management. 
Although the war presented long-distance nationalists with an unprecedented opportunity 
to affect political change in their homeland, there emerged alongside these movements a 
pervasive culture of criticism of nationalists, both by Ottoman loyalists and by everyday 
emigrants who doubted the viability of the national model within the multi-religious, multiethnic 
framework of Ottoman Syria. This “politics of doubt” gained steam through the 1920s, 
particularly among the younger generation coming of age in a transnational, multilingual setting 
and who increasingly did not desire a return to French Mandate Syria and Lebanon. Traces of 
emigrant disgust with the long-distance nationalist culture of the mahjar appear in this research: 
in Amin al-Rihani’s wartime insistence that he was “Syrian Lebanese”, in ʿAbd al-Rahman al-
Jizawi’s sharp silence to Julio Atlas’ questions about Syrian patriotism, and in Victoria Tannus’s 
mocking of the men’s cafes. Each individual saw nationalism as a limiting ideology, a divisive 
idea poorly suited to the ideals of unity and development it claimed were its ends. Such images 
of doubt, criticism, and skepticism found themselves into the mahjar’s public sphere during the 
twenties, often sitting uncomfortably in the pages of the nationalists’ political press. Although 
this research has focused on emigrant nationalism as a transnational project, mode of activism, 
and political culture, the interwar period was also a time of mounting critique of nationalism as a 
means of accomplishing progress and independence. The nationalists were prolific printers and 
disseminators of periodicals, propaganda, and petitions which aimed to demonstrate the “public” 
will of the people. But even as they claimed to be representative of the national whole, they did 
not produce a transnational political consensus and indeed, represented the earnest ideological 
views of a comparative small network of intellectuals and middle class educated émigrés. In 
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many ways, their outsized political significance was conditioned as much by their appearance at 
an apt geopolitical moment that offered new opportunities to speak for the homeland as by their 
active construction of a diasporic public sphere.  
“Many diasporas:” Emic versus Etic Readings of Mahjari Identity 
 Another complicating factor for the historian working with national identity and political 
community in the mahjar is the tension between emic perspectives on who belonged to the 
Syrian and Lebanese national communities and etic observations of how transnational activist 
networks functioned. Most of this dissertation’s central findings—that the mahjar’s transnational 
social institutions created space for emigrant political activism while also conditioning what 
types of activism (and which movements) prevailed—benefit from the etic perspective that 
frames this research. This bird’s-eye view allows us to draw comparisons, observe connections, 
and make build the argument that activists working across the Americas helped construct long-
distance “Syrian” and “Lebanese” national identities, and that by extension, the mahjar was a 
part of these emerging national communities. However, these findings are in tension with the 
emic perspectives of individual activists working within these transnational networks. Though 
they were engaged in the same expansive, transnational set of social structures, participating in 
the same activist habitus, and undertaking similar (even connected) philanthropic, social, and 
political projects, none of the activists in this dissertation saw the mahjar as a single (or even a 
plural) “imagined community.” Rather, theirs were a complex amalgam of many identities: each 
of the emigrants was cast within webs of confessional loyalties, village- or town-based social 
networks, and networks of kinship, commerce, and alumni. These identities, as well as a shared 
identity as emigrants, preceded nationalist identities which came later. The emigrants had not left 
home as Syrians or Lebanese; they belonged to their village, to their family, to their confessional 
group. Some educated elite emigrants identified as “Ottomans,” with connotations in sync with 
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the liberal ideas of Ottoman patriotism. During World War I, each layer of identity crashed into 
the new nationalist signifiers: Syrian, Arab, and Lebanese. In this single mahjar, there were 
simultaneously many “imagined” national communities, each with its own vision of the 
homeland and its future. 
 Confessional politics and village-based solidarities both influenced the development of 
long-distance nationalisms in the mahjar. Both appear in places in this dissertation, but neither 
receives complete analytical attention. Village-based social networks helped determine where the 
emigrants settled, what kinds of employment they pursued, what sorts of philanthropy they 
engaged in, and sometimes, whether they returned to the Middle East.867 Societies bearing the 
names of towns and cities with significant numbers of successful emigrants (Homs, Zahle, 
Tripoli, Shwayr, among others) appeared in both North and South America, and emigrants 
looking to hire Syrian workers relied on these organizations to contract labor from home. An 
individual’s experience of emigration, resettlement in the Americas, employment, and 
associational life was thus often encoded within a transnational network defined by connection to 
a particular town. Continuing patterns of circular migration along these town-based networks 
helped produce smaller communities of Homsis, Shwayris, and other such groups within the 
Syrian and Lebanese neighborhoods in the New World, creating diasporas within the diaspora. 
Confessional politics also influenced the shape of the mahjari communities, and bore 
more directly upon the politics of nationalism there. Between 1908 and through the 1920s, both 
the Greek Orthodox Church of Homs and the Maronite Church reach out into the mahjar, 
founding societies among communities of their believers in the Americas and encouraging a 
transnational political stewardship towards the homeland through philanthropy (in the case of al-
                                                          
867 Lesser, Negotiating National Identity, 55. 
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Nadi al-Homsi) or through participatory transnational citizenship (which emigrants argued was 
their right after the census of 1921). During the War, both Orthodox and Maronite clergy in the 
Mashriq got involved in competing nationalist projects: in Homs, Athanasius ʿAtallah and ʿIsa 
Asʿad were early supporters of Hashimite Arab nationalism, whereas Maronite Patriarch Ilyas 
Huwayyik came to represent a Franco-Lebanese project for greater Lebanon under French 
Mandate. Although the mahjar was incredibly diverse in terms of sect, comprising Maronites, 
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Druze, Sunni, Shiʿas and Jews, political divisions between 
Orthodox and Maronite believers (then the two largest groups in these communities) presented 
one of the sharpest sources of tension during and after the War. This is not to say that the 
mahjar’s nationalist politics was “sectarian,” nor that the allegiances of its activists were 
determined by their faith: Sallum Mukarzil (a Maronite) was critical of both the Maronite Church 
and Lebanese nationalism, and Nami Jafet (Orthodox) embraced the French Mandate in 
Lebanon. That said, many of the political parties in this thesis, while secular in orientation, 
remained confessionally homogeneous through the early 1920s. Political organizations with a 
truly cross-confessional membership—al-Nadi al-Homsi in Brazil, the (short lived) Hizb Suriya 
al-Jadida in the United States, and the Hizb al-Istiqlal li-l-Aqtar al-ʿArabiyya in Argentina—
were the exception, not the rule.868   
What a Transnational Lens Accomplishes, and Its Limitations 
 This dissertation had pursued a transnational unit of analysis to escape some of the 
complications that arise from a diasporic theoretical framework, chief among them the 
expectation that Syrian and Lebanese emigrants operated in a world apart from the Mashriq. 
                                                          
868 Even within these organizations, co-membership of Muslims and Christians was yet rarer. The Hizb al-Istiqlal li-
l-Aqtar al-Arabiyya in Buenos Aires is the only party in this dissertation with a demonstrably mixed membership 
with both Christians and Muslims. Its members were predominantly Greek Orthodox, Sunni, and Druze (but 
importantly, even this party claimed no notable Maronite members). 
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Emigrant activism, philanthropy, and political culture in the Americas between World War I and 
the French Mandatory period confirms that emigrants did only continue to see themselves as part 
of an ancestral nation (or nations); rather, they also took political action in relationship to the 
homeland, establishing patterns of collaboration and protest in relation to the nation-states 
emerging there. Emigrant activists took political action, not as emigrants, but as nationalists and 
as representatives of the nation from which they were descended. Theirs was a “long-distance” 
form of nationalism, rather than a diasporic one. The specific patterns of activism, substantive 
citizenship, and claims-making that make up “long-distance nationalism must,” in the words of 
Nina Glick Schiller, “be distinguished from other forms of collective longing,” including other 
diasporic articulations.869 
 Analyzing the development of long-distance nationalist politics and culture within a 
transnational frame allows this dissertation to pursue the ways that emigrants participated in the 
politics of their homeland, in collaboration with groups of co-activists at home and on equal 
footing. Similarly, individuals and groups operating “at home” in Lebanon and Syria participated 
in the political debates, philanthropic initiatives, and associational life of the mahjar, and the 
degree to which activists, organizations, and even the emerging Mandatory states in the Mashriq 
engaged with the mahjar constitutes a dimension commonly left out of diasporic readings of the 
Syrian communities in the Americas. From New York City, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires, 
emigrants participated vigorously in the politics of nationalism, employing the transnational 
Syrian press, philanthropic organizations, ethnic clubs, and political societies. For emigrant 
nationalists, the mahjar was a place of contest, a place to be represented as part of the national 
community, a source for material relief, funding, a site for political activism. It was a place with 
                                                          
869 Schiller and Fouron, Georges Woke Up Laughing, 22-3. 
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a free press, but also a place where propaganda was printed, where troops were levied, and where 
alliances with foreign powers were brokered. But the mahjar was all of these things for 
nationalists living “at home” in the Mashriq, too. The historians’ distinctions between mahjar 
and Mashriq impose a territorial principle on a set of transnational political movements that 
actively defied such distinctions and labored against them. 
The central irony of this story is that this same transnational body of nationalist activists 
played a role in the construction of the national boundaries laid down in the Mashriq 
immediately following the War. Emigrants from competing nationalist camps variously 
promoted the French Mandate, protested it, or promoted revolutionary action against it. The 
Mandatory states in Syria in Lebanon, in the meantime, entered into a pattern of selectively 
embracing and administering the emigrants of the Americas, working through their consular 
networks as well as through the Maronite Church and certain emigrant elites. Whether supportive 
of the Mandate or in opposition to it, Syrian and Lebanese emigrant leaders abroad encoded their 
political appeals within a discourse of transnational citizenship, its rights and responsibilities. 
The idea that emigrants should work for the good of the nation, refining themselves into the ideal 
citizen body through social reform, self-improvement, education, and selective borrowings from 
the American societies they were a part of was the hallmark of Syrian and Lebanese long-
distance nationalism through the 1920s. These social reform discourses filtered through a 
gendered language aimed squarely at Syrian and Lebanese young men and women in the 
Americas and offering complementary, but unequal, roles in the business of making the nation. 
For young men, this discourse promoted rigorous self-improvement, transnational philanthropy, 
and a patriotic masculinity that linked sound bodies and minds to a strong Syrian nation. For 
emigrant women, and especially young women working in textiles, nationalist debates that 
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insisted a woman’s proper and patriotic place was in the private space of the home (as wives and 
mother) was an unwelcome shift, coming so swiftly after their contributions to the movement 
during the War. To “new women” Syrian feminists, the activist politics of periodical press, 
political committee, and petitioning began to look like an emigrant boy’s club; their parallel 
activism demonstrates that while nationalism was the dominant “long-distance” political trend of 
the interwar mahjar, it was by no means the only one out there. 
 By relying primarily on “moveable texts:” emigrant serials, club ephemera, petitions, rare 
books, and personal correspondence, this dissertation has mapped out political networks linking 
Syrian and Lebanese activists in North and South America while also yielding insight into how 
these activists engaged foreign powers, particularly the French. My decision to use these 
fragmentary materials, rather than solely on official documents from state archives, was born of a 
desire to discern those patterns of transnational political activism and mahjari social culture 
beyond the confines of the French Mandate and its purview. But rather than escaping the 
Mandate, what resulted was a surprising picture of emigrant activists working with, dealing with, 
or protesting against the French Mandate as it extended its authority beyond Syria and Lebanon 
and sought to administer the communities of the mahjar. There are many avenues for further 
inquiry into the mahjar’s interwar politics, but paramount among them is the fraught relationship 
between emigrant nationalists (many of whom had at one point worked for the French) and the 
Mandate they campaigned for, collided with, and combatted against. Additional research in 
French diplomatic archives could tease out how this relationship evolved in the 1920s and 1930s.  
Major Findings and Summation 
 With the caveats of long-distance nationalists’ claims to represent the mahjari public 
versus their actual community impact, the continuation of local village-based or confessional 
styles of politics (and the uneasy relationship these politics had with the nationalist movements), 
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and the persistent politics of doubt expressed by skeptics both in the mahjar as well as in Syria 
and Lebanon, this dissertation’s argument that Syrian and Lebanese long-distance nationalisms 
influenced Syrian and Lebanese politics and society during and after World War I comes along 
with several significant corollaries. This research demonstrates that Ottoman Syrians and 
Lebanese abroad used the transnational Arabophone press to reach the Syrian reading public, and 
that during the War periodicals produced abroad became the most significant site for a middle-
class familial style of nationalism. The tenor of these publications moved from “pro-reform” 
within an Ottoman constitutional context to stridently nationalist by mid-1916; this is precisely 
the same moment that Cemal Pasha’s tightening censorship policies and subjection of journalists 
and reformers in Ottoman Syria made mahjari papers the principal outlet for opposition. It is 
shown, furthermore, that as the War progressed, the leadership of the mahjar’s nationalist parties 
increasingly opted for partnership with the Allied Powers, and used the press to publicize the 
Allied war effort. By 1919, the French Foreign Ministry proved most adept at managing its 
mahjari partners, and Lebanese emigrant leaders (many of them journalists or newspaper editors) 
played significant roles in the construction of the Grand Liban under French Mandate.  
 The alliance between Lebanese emigrant activists and the French Foreign Ministry bore 
implications for how emigrants were incorporated into the Lebanese national body, as 
transnational citizens. This dissertation argues that the three-way partnership between the French 
Mandate, the Maronite Patriarchate under Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik, and Lebanese Maronite 
nationalists operating abroad influenced the Mandate’s decision to include Lebanese emigrants 
in Lebanon’s first census, conducted in 1921. By relying on Maronite clergymen to enumerate 
their number in the Americas, the French Mandate not only guaranteed a confessional ratio seen 
as favorable for the French at home; the census also empowered the Church with custodianship 
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over an emerging Lebanese transnational citizenship, while stoking new expectations among 
Lebanese Maronite registrants living in the Americas. Put simply, the census was conducted as a 
means of domesticating the Maronite diaspora, but it also opened new questions about emigrants 
rights in relation to the Lebanese state (especially with regards to suffrage, legal documentation, 
and the right to travel, all of which the Mandate subsequently struggled to clarify through the 
1920s.) 
 Meanwhile, activists who continued to oppose the Mandate from abroad engaged in 
specific kinds of long-distance nationalist activism centered on the institutions France built in 
order to assert authority over emigrants, most notably the Mandate’s consular office which 
emerged in cities with large numbers of emigrant Syrians and Lebanese during the 1920s. By 
focusing on the development and increasing radicalization of the Arab nationalist movement in 
Argentina, this dissertation argues that activists like Amin Arslan, Jurj Sawaya, and Jurj ʿAssaf 
saw the Consulate as an important site for opposition to the Mandate system. Debates over the 
nationality status and travel documentation of Syrian emigrants took a new significance in a 
mahjar where accepting new documents meant implicitly accepting the French Mandatory 
regime. Arslan and his co-activists described the mahjar as a place where Syrians were freer to 
protest against the government in Syria and advocate revolutionary action against military 
occupation, ideas which had been more commonplace during World War I but which fell out of 
favor in the homeland after the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-7. By the late 1920s, the militant 
Arab nationalism of Arslan and company was increasingly at odds with the collaborationist 
moderate Syrian nationalism of the National Bloc in Damascus. The Mandate had struggled to 
domesticate parts of the diaspora, but in Arslan’s view, the French had effectively domesticated 
Syria’s nationalist movement by 1930. 
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 Finally, this dissertation’s final section illustrates some of the ways that long-distance 
nationalist ideas influenced political and social culture in the mahjar, highlighting how the 
paternalistic flavor of Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms during this period influenced patterns of 
philanthropy, sociability, and social reform within the Syrian communities of the Americas. The 
1920 establishment of al-Nadi al-Homsi in Brazil by emigrant partisans of Emir Faysal’s Arab 
nationalist Syrian state demonstrates how new patterns of patriotic masculinity, themselves of 
late Ottoman origin, stretched into the diaspora and colored the activities of a new generation of 
Syrian men and boys living abroad. al-Nadi al-Homsi outlived the Hashimite movement that 
helped produce it, but through the 1920s members of this fraternity found significant ways to 
reconnect with the homeland through child welfare initiatives, caring for orphans, and 
participating in a rigorous program of self-improvement through popular education and sport. In 
the process, “making Syrian men” transformed into a mahjari preoccupation, cast in terms of 
national development, self-determination, and an anticipated liberation of the homeland. 
Although al-Nadi al-Homsi was one of the most visible long-distance nationalist fraternities in 
the mahjar, it was certainly not unique: Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya similarly transitioned 
from a revolutionary political committee to a patriotic fraternity during the 1920s, and from 
Brooklyn this organization commissioned similar measures for the protection of Lebanese 
children and the preservation of a Francophile Lebanese nationalist culture in the Americas.870 
 Fraternities, masonic lodges, sports clubs, and reading rooms constituted major spaces 
where young emigrant men plugged into a long-distance nationalist culture that whether 
Lebanese, Syrian, or Arab, friendly or hostile to the French Mandate, shared a certain middle 
                                                          
870 For a detailed discussion of the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya’s major accomplishments in the 1920s, see 
Sallum Mukarzil’s chronicle of the society; al-Kitab al-Lubnani: li-tidhkar yubil al-Nahḍa al-Lubnaniyya al-Faḍi, 
1911-1936 (New York: Matbaʿat al-Huda, 1936). 
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class, paternalistic flavor that placed social reform, national development, and the total 
mobilization of the nation towards these goals at the forefront. The familial rhetoric of these 
institutions and their codification as men’s spaces, however, left Syrian emigrant women outside 
some of the more “public” roles of nation-making and consigned them to the role of the patriotic 
mother, a civilizing agent whose principle work was performed in the home. Syrian American 
women engaged in significant social activism during World War I, work that brought them into 
new, often tense relationships with male co-activists in the nationalist committees of New York.  
The experience of wartime relief generated two ironies that would later spill over. First, 
despite the patriarchal rhetoric of Syrian and Lebanese long-distance nationalists and the 
paternalistic practices of the mahjar’s textile industry, the wages and labor of emigrant working 
women constituted one of the most significant sources of the funding raised by the nationalist 
committees in New York during the war. Women activists sought to press these advantages, 
exerting themselves more publically and demanding more equal access to the mainstream Syrian 
press, only to find that the nationalist newspaper editors were hestitant to allow women into this 
forum. Debates about women’s “place” in relation to public political discourse continued into the 
1920s, where Syrian American feminists folded them into broader demands for a reassessment of 
women’s political and social roles. In New York City, Syrian “new women” feminists promoted 
a vision of a modern female citizen who worked outside the home, was well-read and 
opinionated on the political debates of the day, and whose husband contributed to the household 
as her equal. Influenced by the American women’s movement as well as by the reformist ideas 
of the men’s societies, these emigrant feminists criticized the social culture of the long-distance 
nationalists as idle, regressive, and unhelpful. The second irony was that within these critiques, 
the “new women” feminists in the mahjar continued to depend on ideas about Syrian 
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womanhood as a maternal, civilizing agent, ideas borrowed from nationalist visions of the 
homeland and its relationship to the diaspora. 
In the end, activist networks, the continuous circulation of people, printed materials, 
philanthropic assistance, and political ideas between mahjar and Mashriq meant that wherever 
they were, interwar Syrians and Lebanese lived transnational lives impacted by politics as 
practiced not only in Beirut or Damascus, but in New York, São  Paulo, or Buenos Aires. The 
collaborations of activists living across the Americas, and the competitions between them, played 
a significant role in the construction of the French Mandate and in concomitant nationalist 
movements agitating against it. Understanding the mahjar as part of Syria’s social geography 





I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Formal Archives and Manuscript Collections 
Arab American National Museum, Dearborn, Michigan 
 Evelyn Shakir Collection, Boxes 1-2 
 Michael Suleiman Collection, Boxes 135-148  
Centre des Archives Nationales [Muʾassisat al-Mahfuzat al-Wataniyya], Beirut, Lebanon 
Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 
James Ansara Collection 
Philip K. Hitti Collection 
Francis Maria Collection 
Lebanese Emigration Research Center, Notre Dame University, Zouk Mikayel, Lebanon 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and its Termination, 1914-
1929, Record Group 059 
Investigative Reports of the Bureau of Investigation 1908-1922, Old German Files, 1909-
1921, M1085 
 Fourteenth Census of the United States of America, 1920 
 Fifteenth Census of the United States of America, 1930 
 United States Commissioner General of Immigration Report of 1920 
Patriarchate of the Maronite Church, Archives and Library, Bkerke, Lebanon 
 Patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik, Letters and Correspondence, folders 96-99 (Archbishop  
Shukrallah Khuri, North America, South America) 
349 
 
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University 
 Lebanese Syrian Ladies' Aid Society (Boston, Mass.) Records, 1917-2005 
 Denison House. Records, 1890–1984 
 
B. Published Archival Selections 
Hokayem, Antoine, Daad Bou Malhab ʿAtallah, and Jean Charaf. Documents diplomatiques  
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